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Abstract
E CONOMIC agents are not fully rational machines, but humans with limited ca-pacities, feelings, and subjective perceptions and beliefs. Such less rationalaspects of behavior can become extremely important, especially in financial mar-
kets. This dissertation aims at quantifying different behavioral aspects of financial decision
making.
The first behavioral aspect addressed relates to the implementation of practical trading
rules. These rules are mostly simplifying and provide only imperfectly accurate infor-
mation. Nevertheless, this information may induce sufficient asymmetry among market
participants in order to affect prices. This holds in a market where imperfectly informed
users of practical trading rules meet perfectly informed traders and uninformed liquidity
traders. Both the accuracy of practical trading rules and the number of their users can
change the trade conditions, primarily the gap between the two prices set for buying and
selling the same asset. Particular trading rules of wide practical use appear to be success-
ful in terms of monetary profits.
Affective states, in particular emotions, represent the second behavioral aspect analyzed.
They impact on traders’ beliefs and actions and thus are transmitted into prices. We de-
sign a particular agent category, the emotional traders, who exclusively follow their affect
and intuition in both thinking and acting. They face rational traders, who form beliefs in
a traditional way and maximize the expected utility of wealth, as well as randomly act-
ing noise traders. The presence of emotional traders clearly influences market prices. An
appropriate rational strategy requires the adaption to the consequent market conditions.
Emotional trade does not necessarily impede market stability and efficiency. Certain emo-
tional profiles are apt to survive, and can even outperform, in terms of profits, rational
strategies.
Third, we study subjective perceptions of financial risks. These perceptions change the at-
titude of non-professional investors towards financial investments and the potential losses
they generate, as well as their decisions on wealth allocation. Subjective perceptions de-
pend on different behavioral parameters. The past performance of risky investments and
the revision frequency of risky portfolios impact investors’ perceptions and decisions. Sub-
stantial differences result depending on whether or not consumption is regarded as a utility
generator, besides financial wealth.
Zusammenfassung
W IRTSCHAFTSAGENTEN sind keine vollsta¨ndig rationalen Maschinen, sondernMenschen mit begrenzter Leistungsfa¨higkeit, Gefu¨hlen sowie subjektivenWahrnehmungen und Meinungen. Solche weniger rationalen Verhaltens-
aspekte ko¨nnen u¨beraus wichtig werden, vor allem in Finanzma¨rkten. Diese Dissertation
nimmt sich vor, verschiedene behavioristische Aspekte von Finanzmarktentscheidungen
zu quantifizieren.
Der zuerst beru¨cksichtigte behavioristische Aspekt bezieht sich auf den Einsatz von prak-
tischen Handelsregeln. Diese Regeln sind meistens vereinfachend und liefern nur un-
vollsta¨ndig genaue Informationen. Nichtsdestotrotz ko¨nnen diese Informationen eine aus-
reichende Asymmetrie unter den Marktteilnehmern erzeugen, um die Preise zu beein-
flussen. Dies gilt fu¨r einen Markt, in dem unvollsta¨ndig informierte Anwender praktischer
Entscheidungsregeln auf vollsta¨ndig informierte Ha¨ndler und zufa¨llig handelnde, unin-
formierte Agenten treffen. Die Handelsbedingungen, insbesondere die Differenz zwischen
den zwei Preisen, die fu¨r das Kaufen und Verkaufen desselben Wertpapiers festgesetzt wer-
den, ko¨nnen sich sowohl durch die Genauigkeit praktischer Handelsregeln, als auch durch
die Anzahl ihrer Anwender vera¨ndern. Spezielle Handelsregeln von weitreichendem prak-
tischem Gebrauch scheinen finanziell erfolgreich zu sein.
Affektive Zusta¨nde, insbesondere Emotionen, stellen den zweiten analysierten behavioris-
tische Aspekt dar. Sie wirken sich auf die Meinungen und Aktionen von Finanzagenten aus
und werden dadurch auf Preise u¨bertragen. Wir gestalten eine spezielle Agentenkategorie,
die emotionalen Ha¨ndler, welche im Denken und Handeln ausschließlich ihrem Affekt und
ihrer Intuition folgen. Sie stehen rationalen Ha¨ndlern gegenu¨ber, welche sich ihre Meinung
auf traditionelle Weise bilden und ihren erwarteten Vermo¨gensnutzen maximieren, sowie
auch zufa¨llig handelnden Noise Traders. Die Anwesenheit von emotionalen Ha¨ndlern hat
definitiv einen Einfluss auf die Marktpreise. Eine geeignete rationale Strategie erfordert
die Anpassung an die daraus resultierenden Marktbedingungen. Emotionaler Handel be-
hindert die Marktstabilita¨t und -effizienz nicht unbedingt. Bestimmte emotionale Typen
erweisen sich als u¨berlebensfa¨hig und ko¨nnen sogar rationale Strategien in finanzieller
Sicht u¨bertreffen.
Drittens untersuchen wir die subjektiven Wahrnehmungen von Finanzrisiken. Diese Wahr-
nehmungen vera¨ndern die Einstellung nicht-professioneller Investoren gegenu¨ber Finan-
zanlagen und den damit verbundenen Verlusten sowie auch ihre Entscheidungen u¨ber ihre
Vermo¨gensverteilung. Subjektive Wahrnehmungen sind von verschiedenen behavioristis-
chen Parametern abha¨ngig. Die vergangene Wertentwicklung der risiko-betroffenen Anla-
gen sowie die U¨berpru¨fungsha¨ufigkeit ihrer finanziellen Wertentwicklung wirken sich auf
die Wahrnehmung und die Entscheidungen der Investoren aus. Wesentliche Unterschiede
ergeben sich je nachdem, ob Konsum neben finanziellem Vermo¨gen als Nutzengenerator
betrachtet wird.
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Introductive word
In spite of the theoreticians’ belief that everything can be pictured by neat, easily tractable
models, the real world proves, on each occasion, to be substantially more complex and
hence less predictable than their equations. Being part of this reality (even the most
evolved one) human beings are highly intricate constructs. Until now, we – theoreticians
inclusively – have not been able to fully understand how human minds function, either to
explain and predict the outcome of our minds, i.e. human decisions.
However, one thing can be easily told by simple observation: Human decisions fail
exasperatingly often to follow the spotless logic of rationality, as imagined and put on
paper by economists. This occurs especially in complex environments, for instance in
very dynamic, uncertain, or informationally dense ones. Financial markets are obviously
a good example of such environments. It is no wonder that the evolution of financial
markets remains a puzzle even to highly trained experts, since the tools by which we
attempt to describe and predict decisions of financial agents simplify their behavior to
such an extent that they may fail to account for essential aspects.
The most frequent fallacy of (classic) economic models is to assume that all economic
agents – and especially traders and investors – are rational machines, able to process the
tremendous quantity of information available nowadays to everyone at almost no cost, to
compute and weigh out all possible risks, and to make decisions in the blink of an eye.
What such assumptions rule out is exactly the “humanity” of human decisions; in other
words, our own inability to form one-to-one mental mirrors of the real world, which carry
within the entire information surrounding us, and to further process all this information
at maximal speed. At the same time, the assumption of rationality also omits the human
gift to cope with such “humanity-due deficiencies”, for instance by retaining only some,
but relevant elements of information or by finding less exact, but faster and sufficiently
good solutions to complex problems; Omitted is also the fact that some aspects of the
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human personality such as affective reactions might be helpful in making use of this gift
and making “right” decisions. In more technical terms, economic models mostly neglect
what we can call behavioral aspects of human decision making. Taken into account, such
aspects could improve our theoretical representation and hence the understanding of real
environments, in particular of financial markets.
In this context, the present work attempts to capture better the way in which financial
decisions appear to be often made in practice: neither fully nor always rationally. The
adopted perspective is an economic one, aimed at capturing in measurable (and thus pre-
dictable) structures, different behavioral aspects, such as heuristics, emotions, subjective
perceptions, etc. It is interesting to note that other sciences, such as psychology and
neurobiology, have recognized for a long time already not only the existence, but also the
potentially positive effect of behavioral aspects. However, economists have only lately
become aware of these results and considered integrating them in their work.
The following chapters enlarge and combine existent settings of financial and behav-
ioral economics in order to account for important, and possibly additional, behavioral
elements. Moreover, they also propose new measures and even develop frameworks that
are – at least in part – new, for quantifying such elements. Our contribution is first
theoretical. Due to the lack of appropriate data sets, which is a frequent problem in the
research of individual behaviors, we are not able to perform direct empirical estimations
of behavioral variables. Yet, we underpin and extend our theoretical settings by means
of numerical simulations that account for various constellations of behavioral parameters
that can be considered to be plausible in practice.
Each chapter of this dissertation places the accent on a certain facet of financial
decision making and adopts a particular perspective. For this reason, we chose to organize
every chapter as a work on its own. At the beginning of each chapter, we introduce the
specific problem, the studied constructs, and the applied tools, in the form of reviews of
the main theoretical and empirical results obtained so far in the respective field of research.
Our own contribution is subsequently detailed. It mostly consists of a theoretical part
followed by an applicative one which is aimed at exemplifying and testing the theoretical
findings.
The first chapter analyzes the role of imperfect information in financial markets and, as
a particularization, of simple trading rules of wide practical use. Such rules are examples of
heuristics. We are interested in observing how they affect prices and what are the chances
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for their users to make profits and survive in the market. We propose an extension of
classic, information-based settings of market microstructure, where all traders remain fully
rational, but the accuracy of their information is better nuanced. Specifically, we introduce
a new category of traders who dispose of imperfect information and face perfectly informed
and uninformed agents. Practical decision rules stand for a potential source of imperfect
information. The emphasis is on the impact of imperfectly informed traders on the price
formation and evolution, which results from the information asymmetry generated by
their presence in the market. This information asymmetry becomes manifest through the
bid-ask spread set by the market maker between the buy and the sell price of the same
asset. The spread is always positive and becomes larger when the imperfectly informed
trade intensifies, either due to an increased accuracy or due to a wider use of imperfect
information.
An interesting fact suggested by the applicative part of this first setting is that simple
trading rules are not necessarily arbitraged out by full information. This holds, among
others, under the assumption that all traders behave rationally, in the sense that they form
beliefs following the Bayes rule. One could then ask what happens if some traders not
only apply simplifying rules, but also think in a less rational manner. The second chapter
goes a step further in the behavioral field, in the attempt to investigate on the substrate of
human (and possibly not fully rational) behavior and the mechanisms of its transmission
into actions. In particular, we concentrate on the influence of emotions on financial
decision making. We advance a theoretical model of thinking processes that accounts for
the difference between reason and emotion, and further develop on belief formation, and
on how these beliefs shape actions and flow into market prices. Again, we work with three
trader categories, which are this time designed to comply with the assumptions of rational,
emotional, and random behavior. Accounting for different possible manifestations of
emotions, we observe that certain emotionally driven agents have the chance to survive in
financial markets, and even to outperform their rational peers. Markets are not necessarily
destabilized by the presence of emotional traders. This is fostered by the fact that the
best rational strategy appears to be the adaption to the market conditions generated by
emotional traders.
The third and final chapter changes the focus from pure trading aspects to invest-
ment decisions. Now we consider non-professional investors, in particular their attitudes
towards financial risks and the resulting decisions on wealth allocation. The main be-
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havioral aspect analyzed here consists of subjective perceptions and loss attitudes. We
combine established models stemming from different fields, such as financial models of
capital allocation and behavioral models of perception, and introduce new variables that
describe loss attitudes. Our non-professional investors are first assumed to be exclusively
concerned with financial investments and hence to aim at splitting their wealth between
risky and risk-free assets. In a second step, they derive utility from both consumption and
financial wealth and allocate wealth between consumption and financial assets in total.
The past performance of risky assets and the evaluation frequency of risky performance
appear to play a determinant role in wealth allocation. With investment-based utility, we
are able to make a recommendation for an “optimal” frequency at which risky portfolios
should be revised in order to maximize risky holdings. When consumption is accounted
for, loss attitudes and wealth allocation depend on the theoretical framework used, specif-
ically if investors maximize expected or non-expected utility. Our loss attitude measure
appears to be appropriate for describing real behaviors.
CHAPTER1
Imperfect Information,
Practical Trading Rules, and Asset Prices
“The more perfect a thing is, the more susceptible to good and bad treatment it is.”
Dante Alighieri.
T HIS chapter studies the effect of imperfect information, such as that derivedfrom practical trading rules, on market prices. This effect mainly originates inthe information asymmetry generated by imperfect information. We commence by
reviewing the most important theoretical and empirical results of market microstructure
settings that deal with the bid-ask spread. The spread represents the gap between the
two distinct prices at which an asset can be simultaneously bought or sold. One main
determinant of the spread is, besides inventory and order-processing costs, the informa-
tion asymmetry among market participants. Numerous settings develop on information
asymmetries and the adverse selection problem they induce.
Our contribution consists of modeling a sequential trading environment where the infor-
mation asymmetry is better nuanced than in previous models. In particular, we add to the
commonly considered categories of (perfectly) informed and uninformed traders, a third
one: imperfectly informed traders. Imperfect information can stem from practical trading
rules, such as technical or fundamental analysis, and we explicitly model its accuracy. The
impact of imperfect information on prices is twofold: first qualitative, resulting from the
precision of this information, and second quantitative, given by the proportion of partially
informed trades to the totality of trades. We theoretically show that the more intense this
impact is, either in the qualitative or in the quantitative sense, the more pronounced is the
information asymmetry and thus the higher is the spread set by the market maker. These
conclusions are graphically exemplified for different market configurations. Moreover, we
study the price evolution when simple trading strategies of chartist and fundamentalist
origins are applied for deriving imperfect information. Some of these strategies can, under
certain market conditions, entail not only positive, but also highest profits in the market.
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1.1 Theoretical overview
We commence this chapter by a theoretical overview of the literature on market mi-
crostructure, aimed at introducing our own setting from Section 1.2 and facilitating its
understanding. The emphasis is on the bid-ask spread and its determinants, among which
we pay special attention to information asymmetries.
1.1.1 Market microstructure
Market microstructure studies the process of price formation in financial markets. Par-
ticular attention is given to how investor beliefs flow into prices1, to the contribution of
specific trading mechanisms2 to the price formation, and to the price evolution in time3.
Explaining how exchanging assets takes place and affects prices, market microstructure
gives thus an insight within the “black box” of financial markets. It therefore enriches the
traditional economic approaches that concentrate on the existence of a market equilibrium
without paying attention to how this equilibrium is reached.
Madhavan (2000) distinguishes among four main streams of research in market mi-
crostructure: price formation and discovery, market structure and design4, disclosure of
information5, and applications to other areas of finance6. In this section, we are par-
ticularly concerned with the first area, the price formation and discovery, and the role
of information asymmetries. According to the same author, two dimensions of the price
formation process have been considered in the literature so far: a static one (i.e. the
trading costs) and a dynamic one (how information is impounded into prices).
A first intuition for the existence of trading costs is advanced in Demsetz (1968).
Accordingly, they can occur in consequence of the time dimension of the trading process,
1The price formation is often – and especially in earlier works – modeled in the spirit of the classic
economic theory: Market participants form rational beliefs (expectations); These beliefs shape demands
and supplies; The aggregation of traders’ demands and supplies entails equilibrium prices, where numerous
papers consider that this process is conducted by a Walrasian auctioneer. Thus, markets clear at the
equilibrium price.
2According to O’Hara (1995), trading mechanisms include: the market players (e.g. customers, bro-
kers, dealers, market makers, etc.; see Harris (2003) for a practice-oriented description of their function),
the trading location (physical or virtual), and the trading rules (that differ substantially among ex-
changes).
3And thus to how prices reflect information.
4The focus is here on liquidity and market quality, more specifically on: market type (such as con-
tinuous or single-auction, auction or order-driven, floor or automatic), order types (market, limit, stop
orders, etc.), protocols (tick size, trading halts, circuit breakers, etc.), etc.
5In other words transparency (specifically, pre- and post-trade, anonymity, voluntary disclosure, etc.).
6Such as corporate finance, asset pricing, international finance, etc.
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as traders who are willing to transact as soon as possible are also disposed to pay a price
for this trade immediacy.7
Two manifestations of trading costs are the bid-ask spread and the market impact
of the trade, in particular how the market liquidity is affected.8 The dynamic aspect of
information incorporation into prices is related to the question of market efficiency.
We revise the most important theoretical and empirical results concerning the spread,
as our model in Section 1.2 elaborates further on this issue. Conclusions related to the liq-
uidity problem and to the information incorporation into prices are underlined throughout
the exposition.
On real markets, there are often not one but two different prices for buying and selling
the same asset: the ask and the bid, respectively. The positive gap between them is
denoted as spread. The spread formation has received various theoretical support so far.
Three main determinants of the spread have been isolated: the order processing costs, the
inventory costs, and the adverse information costs. We subsequently review some results
with respect to the two latter categories. The role of the order processing costs is detailed
in Roll (1984).9 Our interest lies in the adverse information costs, that constitute a basic
argument of our model in Section 1.2. All presented issues are to be understood in the
context of markets with market makers as price-fixing instances.10
Inventory models
Inventory models represent one of the first microstructural attempts to explain the bid-
ask spread. This is considered to be determined by inventory risks, i.e. by uncertainties
that occur due to random fluctuations of the asset inventories accumulated by market
makers in consequence of the accepted trades. As such fluctuations are not permanent11,
7Note that Demsetz (1968) views market makers as passive providers of immediacy.
8According to Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), the market liquidity has two dimensions: the spread
and the depth, where the latter is defined as the number of shares available at each quoted price.
9Roll (1984) is also the first to suggest a measure of the effective bid-ask spread, under the assumptions
of efficient markets and stationary return distributions. This measure equals twice the squared root of the
serial covariance of price changes taken with negative sign. Using this measure, the average percentage
bid-ask spread across all stocks listed at NYSE and AMEX between 1963-1982 is estimated at 0.298%
(1.74%) from daily (weekly) returns.
10In general, market makers are those who accommodate trading needs of other market participants.
They are responsible for the price discovery and stabilization, as well as for ensuring the fairness, liquidity,
and continuity of the market. See Madhavan (2000). Under the denomination of market makers we include
the NYSE specialists, the NASDAQ and LSE dealers, the Tokyo saitori, etc., where a sharper distinction
among these different categories is to be found in Harris (2003).
11Specifically, there is an inventory mean reversion: Market makers tend to set quotes in order to
bring inventories to their preferred positions. See Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2002) for a concentrated
explanation.
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inventory risks can manifest only in the short-run. In the long-run, prices should revert
to their “true” value12, so that markets become efficient. Consequently, prices exhibit
negative serial correlation.13 Note that in this context, the role of the market makers is
to balance supply and demand across time, by means of the inventory.14
The first paper that comments on the behavior of market makers (specialists) at the
NYSE suggesting the existence of preferred inventory positions is due to Smidt (1971).
Departing from his ideas, a first group of inventory models analyzes the nature of the
order flow. An important assumption of these models is the risk neutrality of the
market maker. They advance different interpretations of the spread: In Garman (1976),
the spread represents the defence mechanism of the market maker against failure (i.e.
running out of cash).15 In the extension by Amihud and Mendelson (1980), the spread
becomes a consequence of the market power of the market maker and serves for reaching
a preferred inventory position.16
A second group of inventory models concentrates on the optimization problem
of the market maker, which is this time considered to be risk averse.17 The spread
forms as a consequence of this risk aversion. Specifically, in the setting of Stoll (1978)
the spread reflects the costs of the exposure to different types of risk (such as holding
costs, order costs, and information costs).18 The multiperiod extension by Ho and Stoll
(1981) considers additional transactions uncertainty and shows that the spread can be
12That corresponds to the balanced order flows.
13Note that order processing costs also yield, ceteris paribus, to negative serial correlation in returns,
as demonstrated in Roll (1984).
14As underlined in Madhavan (2000). In the terms of Demsetz (1968), the market maker provides for
immediacy of execution. However, market makers in inventory models are more than passive suppliers
of immediacy, but active participants in price setting.
15Specifically, the market maker is obliged to ensure trading continuity when market buy and sell orders
arrive stochastically. She does this by carrying stock inventories. Each inventory-independent strategy
leads to failure, so that the market maker is obliged to relate prices to inventories in order to avoid failure.
16Specifically, the preferred inventory is the level at which the market maker’s profits per unit of time
are maximal. It is independent of the true asset value, the ask and bid prices decrease monotonically
in the inventory, and the spread is always positive. The optimal pricing policy is consistent with the
efficient market hypothesis in the sense that no (uninformed) trader can make profits by speculating in
the market.
17Specifically, the market maker attempts to maximize the risk-return profile of the portfolio that she
is forced to hold as a liquidity provider. This yields minimal inventory costs. The main function of prices
is to adjust the inventory to the desired position, i.e. the one that maximizes her expected wealth utility.
18In particular, holding costs depend on transaction value, return variance, dealer wealth and risk-
aversion, etc. Under the mere consideration of holding costs, the inventory itself does not affect the
size, but only the placement of the spread. Similar conclusions hold in Ho and Stoll (1981), where
the spread remains independent of the inventory level, but varies with the market maker’s time horizon.
Furthermore, in Stoll (1978) order costs are fixed transaction costs that decrease with the transaction size.
Information costs emerge in consequence of the adverse selection from dealing with superiorly informed
traders.
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formally split into a risk neutral component and a risk premium.19 The same twofold
spread decomposition holds in the discrete-time setting of O’Hara and Oldfield (1986)
that allows for both market and limit orders20, as well as for multiple uncertainty.21
A last group of inventory models considers multiple market makers, the main role
of which is to provide liquidity. For instance in the setting of Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and
Whitcomb (1981) the spread represents a consequence of the fact that it is suboptimal to
trade continuously.22 Moreover, Ho and Stoll (1983) show that inter-dealer competition
reduces the spread.23
As resumed by Coughenour and Shastri (1999), inventory models reach the conclusion
that the spread widens in the presence of higher prices or of elevated risk, but shrinks for
higher trading volumes or for an increased number of market makers.
Empirical evidence supports only in part the above theoretical results on the inven-
tory importance. For instance, Smidt (1971) finds that daily closing inventory positions
in NYSE stocks have both a contemporaneous and a subsequent price impact. Ho and
Macris (1984) confirm the theoretical findings in Ho and Stoll (1981) for two types of
AMEX options on two stocks during August-September 1981: The percentage spread of
these options depends significantly on the risk aversion of the market maker, and her in-
ventory affects the transaction prices (as well as the timing and direction of transactions).
Several further papers corroborate with the idea that market makers hold preferred
inventory positions and tend to fix prices in such a way as to encourage those transactions
that correct their inventory imbalances. In particular, investigating 16 NYSE-listed stocks
in the period February-December 1987, Madhavan and Smidt (1993) find that inventory
fluctuations lead to opposite changes in the quoted prices. Also, inventories revert to long-
19The risk-neutral spread maximizes expected profits. The risk premium consists of first- and second-
order components, both of which depend on risk aversion, transaction value, and return variance.
20While market orders are to be executed at the prevailing market price, limit orders specify a limit
price (specifically, a minimum sell and a maximum buy price) and a quantity. See Harris (2003).
21Note that this twofold decomposition concerns the market orders. In particular, the spread contains a
component for known limit orders, a risk-free adjustment for expected market orders and a risk premium
for market orders and inventory uncertainty. Moreover, as a consequence of this multiple uncertainty,
the inventory position impacts now on both the placement and the magnitude of the spread.
22In particular, transaction costs entail jumps in the execution probability of limit orders in the neigh-
borhood of the market bid and ask prices. These jumps underlie the so-called “gravitational effect” that
make traders jump their own limit price schedules and prefer the execution via sure market orders. This
generates positive spreads, where the spread size depends on the movements between market and limit
orders that rely on the profits from immediacy. Jumps are more probable for thinner (i.e. less actively
traded) securities and thus equilibrium spreads are wider for such securities.
23For the case with two dealers and two stocks, asks and bids are proven to be only second-best prices,
while spreads are positive in equilibrium. In general, spreads are always positive but depend on the
number of dealers.
6 Imperfect Information, Trading Rules, Asset Prices
term targets (which can shift with the stock risk-profile), but this process is very slow.24
An explanation for these weak inventory effects is found in a later paper by Madhavan
and Sofianos (1998) based on 1993 NYSE data: NYSE specialists appear to control their
inventories rather by timing the trade direction and size than through the quoted prices.25
Other markets are also investigated: Lyons (1995) reveals the existence of strong
inventory effects in the spot DM/$-foreign-exchange market during 1992, August 3-7.26
Considering the futures-trading activity in the first half of 1992, Manaster and Mann
(1996) further acknowledge an aggressive inventory management at CME.27 In spite of
the negative correlation between inventory and trade direction, FX-market makers appear
to quote relatively high ask (low bid) prices when their position is long (short), such that
inventory correlates positively with reservation prices.
Information-based models
Information-based models constitute another category of market microstructure settings,
that draw explicitly upon the information asymmetries among market participants and
the emerging adverse selection.28 The adverse selection problem faced by the market
maker can be resumed as follows29: The market maker recognizes that trading with
superiorly informed traders results in losses.30 She consequently sets not one but two
different prices for buying and selling the same asset, which are the ask and the bid,
respectively. These prices – and in particular the spread that forms between them –
are fixed in order to recover potential losses from transactions with uninformed traders.
Therefore, one important result is that positive spreads may arise in the absence of any
24Specifically, it takes over 49 days for an inventory imbalance to be reduced by a half, but after
controlling for shifts in desired inventories this time reduces to 7.3 days.
25In particular, specialists trade against moving prices, i.e. participate more actively as sellers (buyers)
when holding long (short) inventory positions. In addition, they trade more for smaller trade sizes and
when spreads are wider.
26This result is surprising since FX-dealers intensively use additional inventory-control instruments,
such as direct and indirect trade through brokers or laying off inventory at other dealers’ prices. Relative
to the equity or futures specialists, these instruments should allow for a better inventory control.
27Specifically, market makers appear to be very active profit seekers and inventory adjustment is much
faster than in equity markets.
28Note that symmetric information markets, in the absence of frictions, are efficient. See Madhavan
(2000).
29In the original interpretation of Akerlof (1970), the adverse selection points to the following problem:
When buyers cannot precisely infer the quality of the products in a market, the average quality of the
entire supply deteriorates. Accordingly, market makers cannot accurately evaluate the information degree
of their counter-parties, they account for the possibility that some trades will be informed. This worsens
the transaction terms in general (for all traders).
30The general intuition of information-based models is that trading on information can entail substantial
gains.
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transaction or inventory costs and even in competitive markets, only in consequence of
adverse information costs. Note that by contrast to the transient impact of the inventory,
the adverse selection puts a permanent mark on prices. Markets are efficient in the
limit,but the price-convergence speed depends on various factors. Moreover, there is no
serial covariance on prices induced by adverse selection.31
A first series of information-based models, which we refer to as competitive-behavior
models, assume that market participants act competitively. Within this category, Copeland
and Galai (1983) are the first to show that, in a single-period setting, information (asym-
metry) alone is sufficient in order to generate positive spreads, even with competitive risk
neutral market makers.32 Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987)
go a step further analyzing multiple rounds of trade where the market maker learns the
information of the informed traders from the order flow and prices eventually converge
to the true asset value. The seminal paper of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) represents the
cornerstone of a wider class of models that assume competitive behavior and sequential
trade execution. It also constitutes the theoretical support of our model in Section 1.2
and its main assumptions and results are presented in the sequel.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) design a market with three types of players: informed
traders (who trade on their superior information), uninformed traders (who trade for
information-exogenous reasons, such as liquidity needs), and the market maker. All these
players are assumed to be risk neutral and competitive. At each trading time, traders
can buy or sell one unit of an asset at prices already set by the market maker. The
true value of the traded asset represents a random variable known only by the informed
traders. Traders are probabilistically chosen to trade from the population of traders,
trade takes place sequentially, and the market maker is always confronted with the same
population. Prices are competitively set, so that the expected profit of the market maker
from any trade is nil (the zero-profit condition). In particular, they equal the market
maker’s expectation conditional on the asset value given the type of trade that occurs. –
These prices are said to be “regret-free”, i.e. fair given the occurring trade. – As (the
types of) trades carry valuable information, the market maker revises her beliefs (in other
words she learns) at each trade and adjusts prices accordingly. The belief revision follows
31See Glosten and Harris (1988) among others. Note that the same conclusion holds in pure order-
processing cost models, according to Stoll (1989).
32Moreover, they show that the spread depends positively on prices, on the return variance, and on
the number of informed traders, and negatively on volume, depth, continuity, and competition intensity.
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the Bayes rule.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that the asymmetric information alone entails a
positive spread.33 This spread depends on the number of informed traders, the uninformed
supply and demand elasticities, and the nature of the underlying information. Prices form
Martingales thus being semi-strong form efficient, i.e. they reflect all public information.
In addition, adverse information costs induce no serial correlation in prices.34 Finally,
when the adverse selection is extremely elevated, spreads grow so large that markets shut
down.
The role of trade size is extensively analyzed in Easley and O’Hara (1987). This setting
is similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in that informed and uninformed traders arrive
to trade sequentially, in random order, and that all market participants are competitive
and risk neutral. However, two new aspects are introduced: First, variable quantities –
specifically, either small or large – of the risky asset can be traded. This induces adverse
selection since large orders are a sign of informed trading.35 Second, it is possible that no
information events occur in one period (information-event uncertainty). Thus, the market
maker has to infer from the trades not only the direction but also the existence of new
information. It is shown that two equilibria may hold in this setting: a separating one,
where informed (uninformed) trade only large (small) quantities and there is a positive
spread only at large quantities; and a pooling one, where informed and uninformed trade
either small or large quantities and there is a spread at all quantities.36 Prices are shown
to depend on the trade sequence and to converge to the true asset value with a speed that
is sensitive to different factors, such as the market size, depth, volume, variance, etc.37
A further category of models develops the findings in Easley and O’Hara (1987) that
the price sequence and/or the volume can provide additional information with respect to
33As the transaction and inventory costs are set to zero, the arising spread – that is proven to always
be positive – is due only to adverse information costs.
34By contrast to the negative dependency generated by inventory costs, the risk aversion or the market
power of the market maker addressed by inventory models.
35Being profit-maximizers, informed traders will prefer to trade more.
36The separating (pooling) equilibrium predominates in markets with sufficient width (in narrow mar-
kets) or with few (many) informed traders. The small-trade spread is yet lower than the large-trade
one. Therefore, prices depend on the trade size and the spread is not an accurate indicator of the market
goodness. A pooling equilibrium appears to hold for the stock followed in the empirical analysis of Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997b), where volume carries no further information than that in the trades.
37In particular, prices are Martingales with respect to public information, but not Markov and hence
not only the aggregate volume, but also the entire trade sequence becomes informative. The importance
of depth is reinforced by the results in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996). By contrast, in the
setting of Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997b) trade size provides no additional information with respect
to the transactions themselves, while in Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997a) the information content of
different trade sizes varies across stocks.
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single prices. They are known under the name of noisy rational-expectations models
and are mainly concerned with how information is impounded into prices.
The main insights of these models refers to the fact that the price adjustment can be
correlated with time (in particular with the presence or absence of trade) and volume.
For instance, in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) the absence of trades becomes a signal
for bad news and makes both bid and ask prices fall and traders postpone their trading
to later date.38 By contrast, in Easley and O’Hara (1992) the trade absence points to
a lower probability of information-based trading. Thus, the occurrence of transactions
reveals the existence of new information, while the trade type gives an account of the
direction of information. The spread narrows for longer time intervals between trades
and grows with the overall volume of past transactions39 and hence the volume affects
not only the prices but also their speed of adjustment to new information.40 As prices
are Martingales but not Markov, their sequence is informative. The same result that the
price sequence can be more informative than single prices holds when there are multiple
sources of uncertainty, as demonstrated in Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and
McNichols (1989) among others.41 Due to information asymmetries, prices not only clear
the market, but also aggregate information.42
In the same context, Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) investigate the
impact of liquidity on the spread size. They theoretically show and empirically verify for
a sample of 90 NYSE stocks during October-December 1990 that spreads increase with
the probability of informed trades, which is lower for the high volume stocks.43 Based on
38Specifically, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) analyze the impact of short-sale constraints on prices.
In their setting, risk-neutral informed and uninformed traders face three situations: costless constrains,
proceeds restrictions, and short-prohibitions. The total prohibition of short sales renders the spread wider
and makes prices incorporate new information more slowly. More relaxed short-sale constraints attain
the opposite effect with respect to the price adjustment, but exhibit ambiguous impact on the spread.
Specifically, constraints applied merely to uninformed trades improve informational efficiency, especially
with respect to bad news.
39Specifically, the time between trades carries relevant information, as the probability assigned to the
occurrence of informational events increases in the trading frequency. In addition, the volume is related
to the no-trade outcomes and hence to the probability of informational events. The unexpected volume
affects both price levels and volatility.
40This prediction is supported empirically by Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993), who report a strong
positive (negative) relation between volume and spreads (depths) at NYSE.
41In particular, both papers analyze two-period economies where investors receive noisy private signals
at the first trade and public ones at the second one. They both demonstrate the existence of linear
(noisy rational expectations) equilibria where, although single prices are not revealing, their combination
is. The difference is that Brown and Jennings (1989) consider random exogenous supply, while Grundy
and McNichols (1989) model the supply uncertainty. Moreover, Brown and Jennings (1989) conclude,
on the basis of numerical analysis of 1978 CBOT data, that technical analysis can be valuable even in a
rational-investor economy, but such a market is inefficient in Fama’s sense.
42Thus, uninformed traders can learn from simply observing the price sequence.
43They design a discrete-and-continuous time, sequential trade setting, with a risk-neutral and compet-
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six stocks from the same NYSE sample, Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997a) find that the
information content of large and small trades can be distinct and that uninformed trades
are history dependent. Reversals in order flows and the absence of trades are found to be
most informative.
The role of the trading volume under asymmetric and noisy information is also ana-
lyzed in the noisy rational-expectations settings. Wang (1994) shows that the transaction
volume decreases for a more pronounced information asymmetry among market partici-
pants44, being positively correlated with absolute excess returns and also with the arrival
of public information. Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994) argue that the volume statistic
provides valuable information that cannot be deduced from prices, facilitating learning
and hence the adjustment of prices to information.45 In addition, Lee, Mucklow, and
Ready (1993) underline the importance of market depths – in combination with spreads
– in characterizing market liquidity.
Before closing this subsection, let us recall several empirical findings that support
the idea that the adverse selection represents a significant determinant of the spread.
Considering a sample of 20 NYSE stocks during December 1981-January 1983, Glosten
and Harris (1988) suggest a twofold spread decomposition: A permanent component (due
to adverse selection) is estimated at around 80% of the spread, and a transitory one (due
to inventory costs, specialist market power, clearing costs) amounts to the remaining
20%.46 Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) conclude based on 1988 intraday data that
spreads in the same market widen for large transactions and in anticipation of earning
itive market maker, informed and uninformed traders. A new method for assessing the effect of informed
trading from the market maker’s beliefs is suggested in this context. In particular, the probabilities of the
occurrence and the direction of information events, as well as the arrival rates of informed and uninformed
traders are estimated by maximizing the likelihood of observing a certain order sequence.
44As less-informed traders face higher chances of losing in front of the better informed.
45Specifically, two groups of myopic traders disposing of different information – i.e. with identical
mean and a common error term, but differently distributed idiosyncratic errors – trade one risky and
one riskless asset. By contrast to Brown and Jennings (1989) and Grundy and McNichols (1989), the
aggregate supply is now fixed and the source of noise is the information precision. The equilibrium price
is shown to be non-revealing and one group looks for more information concerning the signal quality
in the volume. For a fixed precision, the volume is a V-shaped function of the equilibrium price. The
steepness and dispersion of this curve depend on the precision and dispersion of information. Thus, the
volume offers supplementary information with respect to prices, as it represents a basis for disentangling
between the quality and the direction of information. Moreover, while prices eventually converge to the
full-information value, but volume does not shrink to zero, in other words the trade does not cease as
beliefs converge. The paper explains the emergence of trading patterns and also underlines the utility of
technical analysis as a tool for learning uncertainty.
46These components interact, but while the former depends on the trade size, the latter does not.
Explicitly accounting for price discreetness renders the permanent (transitory) component to be 35%
(65%).
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announcements, as the adverse selection is more pronounced in both cases.47 Huang and
Stoll (1994) also confirm the significant impact of large trades on bid and ask prices.48
More generally, French and Roll (1986) underpin the importance of information trading in
the formation of prices, by observing that the volatility of stock returns is mainly caused
by the information impounded into prices when exchanges open.49 Finally, Manaster and
Mann (1996) verify the effect of the informational content of order flows on prices.50
Strategic-trader models
Within the same category of information-based settings, strategic-trader models assume
that some traders are able to determine not only the optimal size, but also the optimal
time of their trades. In other words, they act strategically, i.e. account for the impact
of their trades on prices. These models put emphasis not on the spread, but on the
incorporation of information into prices, which, as mentioned at the beginning of this
section, is a dynamic aspect of price formation.
In early models, strategic behavior is considered to be an exclusive attribute of in-
formed traders. The cornerstone setting of this category is due to Kyle (1985) and its
most important assumptions and results are revised in the sequel.
By contrast with the sequential trading in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985)
assumes a batched order execution. The market participants are a single informed trader,
uninformed liquidity (or noise) traders and a market maker. All of them are again risk
neutral and revise beliefs according to the Bayes rule. However, unlike in Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), traders can exchange unbounded quantities of an asset51 during a finite
number of trade rounds. In so doing, they simultaneously submit market orders which are
batched together, so that the market maker can merely observe the total order flow. A
single market-clearing price is set at each trading time, namely after orders are placed.52
47At the same time, depths fall. They note that only the combination of spreads and depths is relevant
for inferring changes in market liquidity, and not on merely one of these two variables. Market makers
appear to manage information-asymmetry risks actively, by means of spreads and depths.
48See also the comments below related to the spread decomposition.
49Specifically, the large difference of over 70% in volatility between trading and non-trading hours
observed for all NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks from January 1963 through December 1982 appears to
be driven in proportion of 88-96% by differences in the flow of (private) information.
50Note that, however, they cannot exclude the inventory influence. Specifically, changes in prices in
response to order flows depend on inventory levels. See also the comments above with respect to empirical
findings related to inventory models.
51The asset has a normally-distributed true value.
52Again, following the zero-profit condition, this price equals the expected asset value, conditional on
the total order flow.
12 Imperfect Information, Trading Rules, Asset Prices
The informed trader acts strategically in that she accounts for the effect of the own trades
on the equilibrium price. Her goal is to maximize future trading profits, up to the end of
the entire trading interval. Uninformed traders transaction random (normally distributed)
asset amounts.
Kyle (1985) analyzes two settings: a single-auction and a multiple-trading one.53 He
shows that in both of them there is a unique linear equilibrium, where the optimal asset
quantity traded by the informed is linear in the true asset value and depends on the
variance of the uninformed trader flow. The larger this variance is, the better can the
informed trader hide her identity from the market maker and the higher are her profits.54
Equilibrium prices are linear in the aggregated volume of the current trades and their
adjustment depends on the amount of noise to informative trading. As the informed
trader always trades proportionally to the uninformed order size, the price behavior is
independent of volume. Information is gradually incorporated into prices, which even-
tually converge to their full-information values. In the single-period setting, half of the
information of the active informed trader is revealed in the price at each trade. With
multiple periods, prices have constant volatility and are efficient (i.e. Martingales).55
In spite of the apparent disagreement in the designs of Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
and Kyle (1985), both models draw upon the idea that adverse selection – that the
market maker has to face in trading with better informed traders – generates costs. In
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) these costs become manifest in the form of the bid-ask
spread, while in Kyle (1985) they influence the market liquidity. Back and Baruch (2004)
show that both settings are consistent: Under the assumptions of small trade sizes and
frequent uninformed trades in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and of small time intervals
and low variance of the uninformed trades in Kyle (1985), the two markets reach the same
equilibrium.56
There are numerous extensions of the Kyle (1985) model. First, Back (1992) allows
for more general distributions of the true asset value and shows that it is optimal for
53The analysis in the multiple-trading setting is undertaken in continuous time.
54In other words, profits of the informed traders result from the variation of order sizes.
55Note however that prices are only semi-strong, but not strong form efficient, due to noise trading
that renders impossible the full inference of informed signals from prices.
56In particular, Back and Baruch (2004) consider a version of the model in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), where the occurrence of uninformed trades is probabilistic, but the single informed trader can
chose trading times. The spread amounts in this version to a quantity that is approximatively twice
the order size multiplied by the inverse-liquidity parameter in Kyle (1985). Moreover, the equilibrium
in the considered modification of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assumes mixed strategies and thus allows
for randomization. This implies the possibility of trading contrary to the received information, which is
denoted as bluffing.
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the informed trader to set the same order flow distribution as the uninformed flow (i.e.
Brownian motion).57 Prices incorporate all information at the end of the trading, almost
surely and change proportionally to cumulative order sizes.
Further extensions incorporate multiple informed traders. For instance, the endoge-
nous number of informed traders affects their strategy in the two-period setting of Kyle
(1984). Prices become more informative both for an increased amount of noise trading
and when there is more private information.58
These conclusions may change dramatically when the assumption of risk-neutral in-
formed traders is dropped. Subrahmanyam (1991) points out a dual effect of the risk
aversion in a one-period setting: Risk-averse informed investors trade less than their risk
neutral peers, but their risk tolerance is also affected by the total number of trades.
Therefore the market liquidity can even decrease when more informed traders enter the
market.59
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) analyze further how quick prices incorporate (long-
lived) information when multiple risk-averse informed traders compete with each other.60
Their conclusions differ radically from those in Kyle (1985) (where a single informed
trader was active in the market): There exists as well a unique linear equilibrium (which
moreover resembles the one in Kyle (1985), but where all parameters depend on the num-
ber of informed traders), but, since informed traders trade more aggressively in early
periods, prices become efficient much faster.61 Furthermore, Blume and Easley (1990)
show that there is no standard rational-expectations (i.e. Walrasian) equilibrium when
each informed trader disposes of her own information, independently of the number of
traders. Kyle (1989) considers more complex order strategies of both strategically acting
informed and uninformed traders and demonstrates the existence of an imperfectly com-
petitive rational-expectation equilibrium, where prices reveal less information than in the
57Note that Back (1992) extends the time-continuous version of Kyle (1985), which implies that mar-
kets are infinitely tight. The solution in Kyle (1985) is replicated when true asset values are normally
distributed. For log-normal distributions, the equilibrium prices amount to a geometric Brownian motion.
58Individual profits depend on how total profits split among informed traders. They consequently
reduce at higher amounts of noise trading. In addition, the size of the individual trades varies with the
total number of traders. The informed activity shrinks for an enhanced amount of private information.
59Specifically, liquidity is nomonotonic in the number of informed traders, their risk aversion, and the
precision of their information, and, with endogenous information, also in the variance of liquidity trades.
Prices become less efficient for an intensified liquidity trading.
60And the informed traders are assumed to act identically.
61In fact, with an infinite number of auctions – or equivalently with an infinitesimal interval between
auctions – information is almost immediately incorporated into prices. The same occurs when the number
of informed traders grows to infinity (perfect competition). Such a market is perfect in the sense that it
is infinitely deep, tight, and resilient.
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competitive equilibrium.62
A series of further theoretical settings allows both informed and uninformed traders
to behave strategically. This model relaxation often entails multiple and/or non-linear
equilibria.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) develop the basis setting in this category of strategic-
trader models. It considers two categories of uninformed traders, both of which trade for
exogenous liquidity reasons and cannot split the traded amount. The difference between
them draws upon the choice of transaction time: While nondiscretionary traders must
transact at fixed times, discretionary traders can freely opt for a trading moment. The
other actors of this strategic play are the informed traders and a competitive market
maker. All market participants are risk neutral.63 Discretionary liquidity traders appear
to concentrate their trades in equilibrium.64 When they can allocate trades across time,
this concentration is higher at times closer to the realization of their demands. In this
situation, multiple equilibria become possible. During periods of discretionary concentra-
tion, informed trading is also more intense65 and, with endogenous information, prices are
more informative. Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) show that NYSE-trading
concentrates at the beginning of the day.
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) extend the model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) for
long-lived information. There is a single informed trader active in the market and the
discretionary uninformed traders can delay their transactions for at most one day. While
private information arrives every day, public information is known only at the end of
the trading days. Thus, there is a substantial informational advantage of the informed
trader at the openings, in particular on Mondays, and it is more pronounced the longer
the markets were closed.66 Foster and Viswanathan (1990) show that multiple equilibria
62Specifically, the designed market prices, unique for buys and sells, are set by a Walrasian auctioneer.
The traders are: noise traders, motivated by exogenous reasons; and informed and uninformed traders
which can submit more complicated demand schedules, are risk averse, and maximize the expectations of
negative exponential utilities. The symmetric linear equilibrium exists under certain conditions, such as
the existence of sufficient informed traders with homogenous information and risk averse, and normally-
distributed random variables. Equilibrium prices never reveal more than one-half of the private precision
of informed speculators.
63In particular, different settings are analyzed. First, when discretionary traders are forced to trade
only once, the number of informed traders is fixed and their information homogenous. Second, when
traders can become informed at certain costs. Third, when information is heterogenous and, finally,
when discretionary traders are allowed to split trades across periods.
64Where the optimal trading time corresponds to the minimum cost period offered by the market
maker.
65Which improves trading terms for liquidity traders and enhances the volume and returns patterns
induced by discretionary traders.
66In the absence of public information, the optimal behavior of the single informed trader is to delay
1.1– Theoretical overview 15
are possible but, in each of them, there is a clear Monday-pattern: On Mondays, trading
volume is low and trading costs and return variance differ with respect to other days of
the week. This result offers a new perspective compared to the sequential trade models
and the strategic investor models where prices are Martingales and markets efficient.
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) extend the model in Kyle (1984) suggesting an
endogenous motivation for uninformed trading: risk hedging.67 A linear equilibrium ex-
ists only if the risk-averse (uninformed) hedgers are not dominated by the risk-neutral
informed traders. Market liquidity and price efficiency are nonmonotonic in the number
of hedgers.68
Finally, Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) extend their earlier setting considering the im-
plications of bid and ask commissions.69 The exchanged quantities at a certain trading
time are set to one unit of stock and the commissions are made public at the beginning
of the trade interval. One possible equilibrium is characterized through the concentration
of the trades of discretionary buyers and sellers, each in one period. This concentration
reduces commissions but consequently attracts more informed traders. The two concen-
tration periods for discretionary buys and sells are necessarily distinct with endogenous
information. In this case, prices deviate from their expected values at the two moments
of concentration and equal these values at all other times.
Note that, in essence, both inventory and information-based models consider the effect
of the order flow on prices. As observed by Madhavan (2000), they both predict that prices
move in the direction of the order flow70, but for different reasons: according to the former,
trades as much as possible. This renders the price variance constant across the days of the week. By
contrast, with an informative daily public signal the informed trader transacts more intensely at the
beginning of the week and hence the price variance declines through the week. A second setting assumes
that some liquidity traders (called discretionary) are allowed to delay transactions for a maximum of one
day. With no public information, the strategy of the informed trader aims at keeping constant the trading
costs of the discretionary traders. Hence, postponing transactions by these traders is not optimal. Under
valuable public information, the equilibrium trading pattern depends on the number of discretionary
liquidity traders. As the public information is more accurate, discretionary traders pool their trades on
two days of the week, but do not trade on Mondays, while for less accurate public signals discretionary
trades concentrate on Fridays.
67Specifically, uninformed trade for the reason of sharing endowment risk. They act strategically,
attempting to maximize expected utility.
68Specifically, liquidity can decrease in the number of hedgers, when their risk aversion is high. More-
over, for the number of informed traders approaching an upper bound markets become illiquid and the
linear equilibrium disappears. In addition, the individual welfare of uninformed traders decreases with
the number of their informed peers, while the informed profits may also shrink when more hedgers are
active in the market.
69The ask commission is defined as the difference between the ask price and the expected asset value,
while the bid commission stands for the difference between the expected value and the bid price.
70Specifically, that market makers rise (reduce) prices in consequence of buyer-initiated (seller-initiated)
trades.
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the order flow determines changes in the inventory of market makers; By contrast, in the
information-based models the order flow carries valuable information and entails belief
revisions.
Spread components
In reality, all three main effects that have been theoretically insolated (inventory costs,
adverse information costs, and order-processing costs) become simultaneously manifest.
Several theoretical and empirical works attempt to disentangle and assess the magnitude
of the the corresponding spread components.
Thus, Hasbrouck (1988) develops a VAR-method for comparing the importance of in-
ventory and information effects. These effects are both found to be significant for NYSE-
listed stocks during March-April 1985, where the latter dominates the former one.71 These
results are qualitatively replicated by other authors for different data and using differ-
ent techniques. For instance, Madhavan and Smidt (1991) develop a Bayesian model
for intraday pricing that incorporates fixed transaction costs, inventory costs, and asym-
metric information costs. They also provide a measure of information asymmetry, which
is the weight placed by the market maker on prior beliefs.72 Tests of the model for
NYSE-specialist market data from February to December 1987, specifically for 16 stocks
traded by a single specialist firm, confirm the major role of the information asymmetry
as perceived by the market maker and the existence of only weak inventory effects. Also,
both new information and trading volume move prices.73 This model is extended by Lyons
(1995) and applied on the spot foreign exchange DM/$-market, where both inventory and
adverse-information effects appear to be significant and strong.74 Moreover, Madhavan
and Smidt (1993) use the same data set as in their earlier paper for estimating a time-series
model with random level shifts that captures both inventory and adverse-information ef-
fects on prices. Their results point to weak inventory effects and positive correlations of
quote revisions and unexpected order flows.75 Using the VAR-method, Hasbrouck and
71Moreover, negative autocorrelation related to inventory effects is significant only for low-volume but
not for high-volume stocks.
72Which is very small for high asymmetries, as the market maker overweights the importance of the
current order flow. Accordingly, the change in price is due to the innovation in the order flow and not to
its aggregated value.
73Specifically, spreads are higher during the October 1987 market crash, trades in more active stocks
have smaller price impact compared to less active stocks, large blocks have more impact than small ones,
and buyer-initiated move prices more than seller-initiated trades.
74In particular, for each net open position of $10 million, the inventory effect is of three-quarters of a
pip and the information effect of one pip.
75The model considers a market maker which acts both as active investor and dealer and an informed
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Sofianos (1993) find evidence for both inventory and asymmetric-information effects for a
NYSE-stock sample from November 1990 to January 1991, where the considered firms and
the data set length vary across analyzes. In addition, inventory adjustments are found to
be slow (from days to weeks) which reinforces the above presented empirical conclusions
related to the inventory models.
The two-equation model in Huang and Stoll (1994) proves the ability of microstruc-
ture variables to predict the very short-run price behavior. In particular, the simultaneous
existence of all three spread effects – adverse selection, inventory, and order processing
effects – is confirmed for price and quotes data (in five-minutes interval) for 20 stocks of
the Major Market Index and S&P futures from 1988.76 Huang and Stoll (1997) formally
identify and empirically estimate two spread components by means of the serial covariance
of price series for 19 stocks in the Major Market Index in 1992. According to their two-way
decomposition of the spread – in order processing and pooled inventory and information
costs – order processing costs play the main role in the spread determination at NYSE
(with a weight of almost 89%). According to a three-way spread decomposition, the order-
processing cost component remains the highest (with 62.7%), followed by the inventory
component (28.7%), while information asymmetry costs are much lower (9.6%) and also
significantly smaller for large trades. Nevertheless, empirical investigations performed on
different data sets and for other markets, such as Stoll (1989) for over 750 NASDAQ firms
between October-December 1994, reach qualitatively contrary conclusions: The informa-
tion component is now estimated at 43% of the spread, while the inventory component
reaches only 10%, the rest of 47% being due to order processing costs.
Moreover, Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) perform estimations of the spread compo-
nents based on 1988 transaction data of 150 NYSE firms and approximate the overall
adverse information component to 35% and the order processing component to 33%.
Both components depend on the trade size. Moreover, spreads follow a U-shaped pattern
during the day, where the adverse information component decrease, while order process-
ing costs are inversely U-shaped.77 Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) develop
investor, both of which behave strategically. For more comments related to the inventory effect, see the
beginning of this section, under inventory models. As far as the information effects are concerned, large
trades appear to convey little information.
76For instance, expected quote (transaction) returns are positively (negatively) correlated with the
deviation between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, which is consistent with both adverse
selection and order processing theories. Moreover, the negative serial dependence in quote returns, the
reaction of transaction prices to volume – for instance the price reaction to large trades – underpin the
inventory theories.
77Estimation takes place in a one-period setting and spread is decomposed into two elements. The
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a structural model of intraday price formation. Estimations performed on the basis of
NYSE 1990 transaction data for 274 firms assess the information component at approxi-
matively 43% on average and the transaction costs to be the remaining 57%. They also
observe that, while information asymmetry diminishes over the day, transaction costs (in
the main due to inventory holdings) grow. This provides an explanation for the U-shaped
patterns in spreads and volatility and the decrease of ask-price variance. In addition, the
fraction of the spread due to asymmetric information is found to fall from 51% to 36%
during the day.78
George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) design a new procedure for estimating the
spread components from both transaction prices and bid and ask quotes.79 Estimation
results using daily and weekly data from AMEX/NYSE (during January 1963-December
1985) and NASDAQ (January 1983-December 1985) suggest that the adverse selection
part of the spread is only 8-13% (daily-weekly data), the inventory costs are negligible and
hence order processing costs play the leading role (with 87-92% of the spread). Finally,
Prucyk (2005) develops on the estimation of the three spread components derived by
Huang and Stoll (1997). For a sample of 30 NYSE stocks with options at CBOT during
1993-1994, they show that it is the inventory component – and not the adverse selection
one – that increases for very liquid stocks when volatility changes are high in absolute
value.80
adverse information (order-processing) component depends positively (negatively) on trade size and in-
creases (decreases) from 18.9% to 62.6% (46% to 20.1%). The order persistence amounts to around 66%
and decreases with trade size. For trades at NASDAQ or in regional markets, the adverse selection costs
are not significantly different from zero. Order processing costs are higher than at NYSE but do not vary
with trade size.
78The used estimation method is GMM. The estimated autocorrelation of the order flow is positive.
The estimated spread lies between 14-15 cents and is high at the beginning (end) of the day due to high
information asymmetries (inventory costs), while the effective spread – that accounts also for possible
order execution within the quotes – increases monotonically during the day. Furthermore, the intraday
volatility is decomposed into components due to public information shocks and trading frictions which
are further attributed to price discreetness, asymmetric information and transaction costs and their
interaction. The asymmetric-information impact on volatility is low, but transactions costs play a much
more important role in this context.
79They argue that previous estimators, based on the assumption that inventory costs are the only source
of return autocorrelation, are biased due to the time variation of returns. The new spread measure relies
on the serial covariance of the difference between transaction returns and returns based on bid prices and
is robust with respect to the data frequency. Estimations rely on the idea that the spread is independent
of the trade size, so that the obtained values are valid for small transactions (or equivalently can be
interpreted as lower-bounds for large trades).
80Specifically, they consider return volatility to be an insufficient risk measure. Changes in volatility
are as well important, as they point to arrival of new information and its direction. Thus, quoted
spreads widen (depths shrink) for higher volatility, but also when volatility increases and decreases. This
reaction cannot be significantly attributed to the concerns of market makers with adverse selection, but
to inventory adjustments, since market makers appear to be forced to be more active in periods of higher
volatility changes which rises inventory holding costs.
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There are also some studies concerned with inferring the magnitude of the spread
components in order-driven markets. Thus, Brockman and Chung (1999) estimate the
(median) adverse-information and order-processing components on the Hong Kong SE at
around 33% and 45%, respectively.81 In the Taiwanese futures markets TAIFEX (elec-
tronic screen-based call trading), Huang (2004) finds a much lower information compo-
nent than at SGX-DT (continuous floor trading), where he uses intraday data between
January-September 2001.82
81The adverse information component is inversely related to the transaction volume in dollars and to
the firm size, while order processing costs appear to be insensitive to both volume and firm size. A third
spread component accounting for order persistence amounts to 60,7%, increases in volume and in firm
size and points to the tendency of buys (sells) to follow buys (sells).
82Specifically, the asymmetric information component is approximatively 26.5% (51.1%) at TAIFEX
(SGX-DT). The corresponding order processing component amounts to 73.5% (48.9%). Moreover, both
components exhibit U-shaped patterns, depend significantly on volatility and information, but not on the
number of trades. These results hold for both exchanges.
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1.2 Imperfect information, practical trading rules,
and asset prices
1.2.1 Introduction
For the last thirty years the academic community has been engaged in a considerable
debate about the efficiency of financial markets, but has not yet reached a satisfactory
conclusion. In the meantime, the trader community has kept investing according to
different practical trading rules, such as fundamental indicators (e.g. book-to-market
values, price-earnings or price-cash-flows ratios) and technical patterns (derived from the
systematical observation of prices and trading volumes). Despite the growing interest
with regard to the application of such empirical methods, their efficiency as a support in
decision making as well as their consequences still remain controversial and unsatisfactory
when investigated from a theoretical viewpoint.
In our view, the essence of practical trading rules can be expressed in terms of infor-
mation: The purpose of these rules is to provide information, but the accuracy of this
information can fluctuate in dependency of different factors (such as the method itself,
the way in which it is applied, the extent of their dissemination, the environment, etc.).
Our goal is to quantify the impact of imperfect information, specifically of that obtained
by means of practical decision rules, on market prices.
Our model extends the sequential-trading setting of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) by
introducing a supplementary category of informed traders. These traders merely dispose
of inaccurate information regarding the true value of the risky asset and hence we refer
to them as imperfectly informed traders. They coexist with two categories commonly
considered by previous market microstructure settings: the perfectly informed traders and
the uninformed liquidity traders. As already mentioned, we can think of the information
of our imperfectly informed traders as stemming from systematic observations of market
data, performed by means of methods of wide practical use, such as fundamental or
technical analysis.
In line with Easley and O’Hara (1987), we further assume that information (both
perfect and imperfect) reaches the market stochastically, so that both the trading itself
and its direction carry informational value. The informed traders follow their signals and
hence their actions are entirely dictated by the information they receive or derive. Prices
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are set by a market maker who, as all traders, is competitive, risk neutral, and forms
Bayesian beliefs. At each trade, two distinct prices are fixed for buying and selling the
same risky asset and the gap between them represents the spread.
We show how the accuracy of imperfect information (the qualitative effect) and the
dimension of the imperfectly informed group (the quantitative effect) reflect on prices
and point out some differences relative to the respective impact of perfect information.
Although information is now present in the market in different degrees of accuracy, the
spread is always positive and prices remain semi-strong form efficient in the short run
and strong form efficient in the long run, where efficiency is defined in line with Fama
(1970). In particular, prices at each trade represent market maker’s expectations of the
true risky value, given the public information, and in the long term and considered as a
whole they follow a Martingale. However, the single transaction prices are not Markovian
when imperfect information relies on past market evolutions, as it is often the case when
imperfectly informed traders apply trading rules commonly used in practice. In other
words, the sequence of each of the double prices set simultaneously for buying and selling
the risky asset becomes informative.
Numerical simulations support these results and also serve to extend them in some
particular cases. Specifically, we analyze the evolution of prices and trader profits when
imperfect information is derived from three simple trading rules. These strategies can
be considered as examples of heuristics, which represent a broad category of simplified
decision rules commonly employed in making decisions and are detailed in Section 2.1.2.
They also belong to categories of trading methods of wide use in practice: technical
analysis (also known as chart analysis) and fundamental analysis. In particular, two of
our practical trading rules are of chartist type and hence derive recommendations from
past price movements. The third one is of fundamentalist type and compares the intrinsic
value of the risky asset (i.e. the true value) with its market value (i.e. its price). When
imperfectly informed traders use the chartist strategies, prices converge to the true asset
values. This not always the case for the fundamentalist rule. Moreover, one of the chartist
rules (based on the observation of successive trades of the same type) yields not only
positive, but also highest group-profits in the market. Thus, users of certain practical and
simple trade rules appear to be fit for survival, even when faced with perfect information.
The remainder of the section is organized as follows: We first introduce the theoretical
setting in Section 1.2.2, starting with the main variables and assumptions, continuing with
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the belief updating process of the market maker, and finally deriving the expressions of
the buy and sell prices. Section 1.2.3 details the results. We first examine the general price
evolution in the short and the long run. Second, we concentrate on the impact of each
imperfect and perfect information on market conditions. Up to this point, our analysis
is theoretical and mainly considers ceteris paribus variations of the spread in dependency
of different model variables. Section 1.2.3 makes use of numerical simulations in order to
exemplify the theoretical results and investigates three simple trading rules. The focus is
extended in order to encompass not only the price evolution, but also the trader profits.
The final Section 1.2.4 summarizes the main findings. Mathematical proofs, graphs, and
further results are included in Appendix A.1.
1.2.2 Theoretical model
Variables and assumptions
Our setting takes on the main assumptions in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley
and O’Hara (1987). In particular, it provides for two main categories of market partici-
pants: traders who periodically subscribe buy and sell orders; and a market maker whose
principal task consists in setting prices and maintaining a fair, orderly, liquid and efficient
market.83 All market participants are considered to be risk neutral84 and myopically com-
petitive.85 Also, they use the Bayes rule in order to form expectations of the economy
type.
The trade takes place at each time t = 1, . . . , T . The trade object consists in one
risky asset with the (true) value V . This value represents an indicator of the economy
83As discussed in Section 1.1.1, there is no clear and unitary assignment of these attributes to a certain
market participant in financial market terminology. At the NYSE or AMEX, the so-called specialists
fully undertake these tasks, while the market makers act sooner as brokers/dealers. On the floor of
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange the so called Amtlicher Kursmakler is responsible for price setting and
maintaining of proper market conditions. In our view, the name “market maker” best reflects the principal
task of such an agent, namely “to make the market” (i.e. to bring together the traders’ demand and
supply). As she accommodates but does not initiate trades, the market maker can be considered to be
passive. This conforms with reality, as, according to Harris (2003), market makers are unable to control
the timing of their trades.
84Their utility functions exhibit a linear evolution subject to their wealth.
85The term “myopia” is used here in the sense of short-term behavior (and not in the sense defined in
Section 3.1.3). Thus, the agents do not account for the effects of their actions on subsequent prices. Their
trading horizon is restricted to one period. Hence, their periodical trading decisions are independent, as
underlined in O’Hara (1995). The survey by Taylor and Allen (1992) makes the case for an appropriate
application of practical trading rules in a market with myopic traders. The use of technical analysis is
ascertained to be greater for short-, than for long-term decisions. Brown and Jennings (1989) demon-
strate furthermore, that the technical analysis exhibits a certain value in a linear two-period rational
expectations equilibrium of a market with myopic traders.
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type, which is considered to be fixed during the whole trade. It is formally modelled as
a binary random variable with two possible values: high and low, V ∈ {V H , V L}, where
V H ≥ V L. The value V becomes public information only at the end time T .86 Some
traders – specifically the informed87 – stochastically receive information about V during
the trade.
The trade unfolds as follows: At each time t, the market maker fixes the current buy
and sell prices and a trader is randomly chosen to trade.88 She can refuse or accept
trading. In the latter case, she submits either a buy or a sell order for one unit of risky
asset.89
The public information set at t consists of the past prices and the current quotes for
buying or selling the risky asset (i.e. the so called bid and ask) and can be written as
ht ≡ {X1, . . . , Xt−1, XBt , XSt }, where h0 ≡ ∅.90 For reasons of notational simplicity, we
henceforth omit the notation ht for all conditional probabilities and expectations at time
t, and replace it with the subscript t.
We denote the probability of a high risky value, assessed on the basis of the public
information at time t by:91
pt = Pt(V = V
H) = 1− Pt(V = V L), (1.1)
and refer to it as public beliefs.
As stressed in the introduction, a particular assumption of our model is the existence
86Thus, all market participants become equally informed at T . In principle, we can assume that the
whole trading period consists of many uninterrupted episodes of the form t = 1, . . . , T that correspond
in practice to the trading days, months or years and are naturally separated by intervening periods. At
the beginning (t = 0) and at the end (t = T ) of such an interval, the agents dispose of homogenous
information.
87See the definition of informed traders below.
88In other words, the trade is sequential and anonymous. The market maker is assumed to know the
probabilistic structure of the arrival process, which, according to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), allows her
to make correct inferences from the observed data.
89Our traders can submit only market orders that are immediately executed. The restrictions upon
the order size and the trading frequency should help avoid a premature trade cessation. Otherwise, the
perfectly informed traders could already trade at t = 1 as much as possible, thereby making the price
fully informative from the beginning and eliminating every trade incentive.
90Prices are formally defined below.
91Thus, pt reflects the public opinion. For instance, at t = 0, all traders are aware of the prior
probability p0 = P0(V = V H) = 1− P0(V = V L) derived from the results of the previous trade intervals
of length T . For instance, when the risky value disclosed at the end of the previous interval was high
(low), p0 increases (decreases). During the coming trade interval traders gather further decision-relevant
information, namely on the basis of the collective experience or also with the help of new periodical
information.
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of three trader groups : the perfectly informed (a), the imperfectly informed (b),92 and the
liquidity traders (c). These groups are all non-overlapping and homogenous,93 but differ
in the degree and the accuracy of the received information as well as in the employed
trade strategies. The market maker ascribes constant probabilities to the fact that a
trader belongs to a certain group. Specifically, these probabilities are identical to the





94 In addition, we assume that there are always some liquidity traders
active in the market nc > 0.
95
Concerning the degree and accuracy of information at their disposal, traders separate
in two distinct categories: informed and uninformed.96 First, liquidity traders are driven
by trade exogenous reasons, such as the need of liquidity, and do not obtain any particular
information on the risky value. Consequently, their information set exclusively consists
of public information hct ≡ ht and they can be considered to be uninformed.
Second, both perfectly and imperfectly informed agents may receive – or derive –
information about the risky asset value and we refer to them as informed traders. This
information can be zero (no information), positive or negative (corresponding to the
high and the low value of the risky asset, respectively), that is sgt ∈ {0,−1, 1}, where
g ∈ {a,b}. Furthermore, the probabilities of information arrival for the two informed
types are denoted by:
αt = Pt(sat 6= 0)
βt = Pt(sbt 6= 0).
(1.2)
Thus, the information set of the informed at time t yields hgt ≡ {ht, sgt}, for g ∈ {a,b}.
However, the perfectly informed traders (group a) receive completely accurate infor-
mation which allows them to recognize exactly the economic situation and to choose the
92Our interest is in the case when the imperfectly informed traders apply simple trading rules, of
wide-spread use in practice, such as methods of fundamental or technical analysis.
93Here we refer to informational homogeneity: all members of a group dispose of the same information
at the same time and interpret it in the same way.
94Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997b) estimate the fraction of informed traders in the US-market at
about 17%. The ZEW survey of Rebitzky (2004) assesses a fraction of technical analysts in the German
Foreign Exchange Market of approximatively 30%, while the share of fundamentalists participating in
trading is roughly 60%.
95As underlined in see Easley and O’Hara (1987), as long as the number of liquidity traders remains
strictly positive, the market maker can compensate the losses from doing business with informed agents
by the gains from transactions with the uninformed ones. Otherwise, the excessive and repeated losses
resulting from buying or selling exclusively from or to the informed traders could cause a definitive trade
cessation.
96Received information is here considered to be private signals and/or signals derived as a result of
systematical analysis of the market data.
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appropriate trade alternative:
Pt(sat = 1|sat 6= 0, V = V H) = 1− Pt(sat = −1|sat 6= 0, V = V H) = 1
Pt(sat = 1|sat 6= 0, V = V L) = 1− Pt(sat = −1|sat 6= 0, V = V H) = 0.
(1.3)
In contrast, the imperfectly informed (group b) acquire only inaccurate signals:
Pt(sbt = 1|sbt 6= 0, V = V H) = 1− Pt(sbt = −1|sbt 6= 0, V = V H) = qHt
Pt(sbt = 1|sbt 6= 0, V = V L) = 1− Pt(sbt = −1|sbt 6= 0, V = V H) = qLt
s.t. qHt ≥ qLt .
(1.4)
The condition qHt ≥ qLt stands for the fact that the market maker believes that the
imperfectly informed traders receive no misleading information, i.e. no positive (negative)
information in bad (good) economic states. This amounts to the belief that these traders
can be considered to be informed – or to have a sufficiently good sense of the market
evolution – even though the precision of their signals may not be perfect.97
In particular, perfect information can be insider information. Imperfect information
could be derived from (public) market data by means of specific methods, such as technical
or fundamental analysis. The different trading rules pooled together by these two method
categories are widely used by individual traders in practice and have been shown to achieve
positive performance.98 As public information is freely available to all traders, the users
of practical trading rules should be able to perform their analysis and hence derive new
information at each time t. Thus, the probability of imperfect information βt should be
high, specifically close to 1. On the other hand, the probability of perfect information αt
may be closer to 0, as the occurrence of private information cannot represent a common
event. Moreover, practical trading rules can be considered as examples of simplifying
rules, which are termed in psychology as heuristics.99 Note that, since in the present
setting all traders use the Bayes rule in order to form beliefs, we can consider that such
heuristics are rationally employed.100 At the end of Section 1.2.3, we will observe the
97Of course, only in this case considering imperfectly informed traders as a separated category of
informed traders makes economic sense.
98Most models that account for technical or fundamental analysis assume two groups of traders: in-
formed (often called sophisticated or rational traders) and uninformed (mostly designated as liquidity or
noise traders). The fundamentalists are mostly integrated into the first group, while the technical ana-
lysts are viewed as being uninformed, such as in De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990). We
consider that neither technical nor fundamental rule can deliver perfect information, so that they both
amount to particular cases of imperfectly informed strategies. More details in this respect are deferred
to the final applicative part of Section 1.2.3.
99For more details on heuristics, see the subsequent Section 2.1.
100Please refer to Chapter 2 for an example of non-rational employment of heuristics.
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market evolution for some simple trading rules of both fundamentalist or technical type.
Thei trading strategies are formulated as follows: Informed traders can either buy or
sell one unit of risky asset, or simply do nothing at each time t, i.e. xgt ∈ {B,S, ∅}, for
g ∈ {a,b}. There are no budget constraints that can restrict trader decisions. Moreover,
we consider that both informed groups fully trust their signals, irrespective of the true
risky value. Hence they buy, sell, or do nothing when they receive positive, negative, and
no information, respectively:101
Pt(xgt = B|sgt = 1, V = V H) = 1− Pt(xgt = S|sgt = 1, V = V H)
= Pt(xgt = B|sgt = 1, V = V L) = 1− Pt(xgt = S|sgt = 1, V = V L) =: 1
Pt(xgt = S|sgt = −1, V = V H) = 1− Pt(xgt = B|sgt = −1, V = V H)
= Pt(xgt = S|sgt = −1, V = V L) = 1− Pt(xgt = B|sgt = −1, V = V L) =: 1
Pt(xgt = ∅|sgt = 0, V = V H) = Pt(xgt = ∅|sgt = 0, V = V L) =: 1.
(1.5)
In other words, the market maker considers that all (perfectly and imperfectly) informed
traders trust their information, as they cannot directly observe the actual risky value
during the trade.
As liquidity traders do not dispose of more than the public information, they are
assumed to trade at random by either buying or selling one unit of risky asset, irrespective
of the economic situation, with identical probabilities:102
Pt(xct = B|V = V H) = Pt(xct = S|V = V H)
= Pt(xct = B|V = V L) = Pt(xgt = S|V = V L) = 0.5.
(1.6)
The market maker accommodates the buy and sell orders issued by the traders and
executes them at the currently quoted buy and sell prices, that are also referred to as
ask XBt and bid X
S
t , respectively.
103 These prices are competitively set,104 such that the
101The conditions from Equations (1.5) result in:
Pt(xgt = B|sgt = 1) = 1− Pt(xgt = S|sgt = 1) = 1
Pt(xgt = S|sgt = −1) = 1− Pt(xgt = B|sgt = −1) = 1
Pt(xgt = ∅|sgt = 0) = 1.
102Obviously, Equation (1.6) results in identical probabilities of buying and selling, independently of
the risky value Pt(xct = B) = Pt(xct = S) = 0.5.
103We assume, that all transactions take place at exactly the quoted prices. In reality, dealers can
preferentially treat some traders by offering them price reductions. See Harris (2003).
104The monopolistic power of the single market maker is constrained by the duty to set fair and efficient
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market maker gains no profit from any of the buys and sells undertaken.105 They are
calculated on the basis of market maker’s assessments regarding the type of economy.
The market maker is subsequently committed to fulfill all the received traders’ orders at
these prices. The ask price normally exceeds the bid price by the amount of the bid-ask
spread St. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the spread should cover the order processing
costs, the inventory costs, and the costs of adverse selection that arise during trading
and represents the only source of earnings for the market maker. We expect a constant
fraction of the spread to be responsible for the first two cost-generating factors. We also
require that all transactions are processed by the market maker, i.e. there is no direct
transaction among traders.106
Probability assessments of the market maker
According to the above assumptions, at each time t the trading is initiated by the market
maker who fixes the current prices for buying and selling the asset. Then, the randomly
chosen trader i observes these prices and acts, in that she either issues a market order for
buying or for selling one unit risky asset or does nothing. The market maker commits
herself to accepting and executing the submitted orders. She is aware of the fact that
some traders may be better informed, in which case the order execution results in a loss
for the market maker. Consequently, the ask and the bid are set so that contingent losses
suffered in facing the informed are covered by gains from trade with uninformed, and the
total expected trade result is nil. In other words, the two distinct prices for buy and sell
protect the market maker against costs originating in informational disadvantages or, in
other words, against the adverse selection generated by asymmetric market information.
This section presents the assessments of the market maker regarding the true risky
value. The final prices are based on these assessments and hence result from the market
maker’s view over the economy type, the trading process, and the traders’ strategies.
In particular, the market maker attempts to ascertain the probabilities that the chosen
trader is informed and prefers to buy, sell, or do nothing. Recalling that she applies the
prices. This analysis can therefore be viewed as a marginal case of the general situation with many
competing market makers. Some real markets (e.g. NYSE) do indeed function with only one market
maker per traded asset. According to Demsetz (1968) and Harris (2003), even in such markets there are
factors accounting for competition, such as competing markets with lower bid-ask spreads, limit orders,
other specialists, floor traders, etc.
105The competitive price setting represents an application of the zero expected profit-condition. Ac-
cordingly, the prices equal the expectations of the market maker regarding the value of the risky asset,
conditional upon the available information.
106Thus, our market functions as a quote-driven system, as defined in Demarchi and Foucault (1998).
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Bayes rule in order to update probabilities, her assessments with respect to the informed
traders g ∈ {a,b} yield:
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V H) = Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V H , sgt = 0)Pt(sgt = 0|V = V H)
+ Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V H , sgt = 1)Pt(sgt = 1|V = V H)
+ Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V H , sgt = −1)Pt(sgt = −1|V = V H)
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ g, V = V H) =
∑
sgt∈{−1;0;1}
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ g, V = V H , sgt)Pt(sgt|V = V H)
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V L) =
∑
sgt∈{−1;0;1}
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ g, V = V L, sgt)Pt(sgt|V = V L)
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ g, V = V L) =
∑
sgt∈{−1;0;1}
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ g, V = V L, sgt)Pt(sgt|V = V L).
According to our model assumptions, this results for the perfectly informed traders
in:
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ a, V = V H) = αt
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ a, V = V H) = 0
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ a, V = V L) = 0
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ a, V = V L) = αt,
(1.7)
and for the imperfectly informed in:
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ b, V = V H) = βtqHt
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ b, V = V H) = βt(1− qHt )
Pt(xit = B|i ∈ b, V = V L) = βtqLt
Pt(xit = S|i ∈ b, V = V L) = βt(1− qLt ),
(1.8)
while liquidity traders buy and sell with equal probability as assumed in Equations (1.6).
Price formation
As mentioned above, the market maker fixes the periodical ask and bid prices compet-
itively, so that no profits result from accommodating the received buy and sell orders.
The prices should thus equate the expected values of the risky asset, conditional on the
market maker’s information set.
The ask XBt (bid X
S
t ) represents the price at which traders can buy (sell) the risky
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asset and is derived as:
XBt = Et[V |xit = B] = V HPt(V = V H |xit = B) + V LPt(V = V L|xit = B)
= V L + (V H − V L)Pt(V = V H |xit = B)
XSt = Et[V |xit = S] = V HPt(V = V H |xit = S) + V LPt(V = V L|xit = S)
= V L + (V H − V L)Pt(V = V H |xit = S).
(1.9)
The probability of a high asset value when the arriving trader i buys (sells) can be
computed by means of the Bayes formula and yields:
Pt(V = V
H |xit = B) = Pt(xit = B|V = V
H)Pt(V = V
H)
Pt(xit = B|V = V H)Pt(V = V H) + Pt(xit = B|V = V L)Pt(V = V L)
Pt(V = V
H |xit = S) = Pt(xit = S|V = V
H)Pt(V = V
H)
Pt(xit = S|V = V H)Pt(V = V H) + Pt(xit = S|V = V L)Pt(V = V L) ,
(1.10)
where the following holds according to our model assumptions:
Pt(xit = B|V = V H) =
∑
g∈{a,b,c}





(1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βtqHt − 1)nb
)
Pt(xit = S|V = V H) =
∑
g∈{a,b,c}





(1− na + (2βt(1− qHt )− 1)nb
)
Pt(xit = B|V = V L) =
∑
g∈{a,b,c}





(1− na + (2βtqLt − 1)nb
)
Pt(xit = S|V = V L) =
∑
g∈{a,b,c}
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Thus, the ask and the bid result in:107
XBt
(1)
= V L + (V H − V L)pt 1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βtq
H
t − 1)nb
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
(2)
= V H + (V L − V H)(1− pt) 1− na + (2βtq
L
t − 1)nb




= V L + (V H − V L)pt 1− na + (2βt(1− q
H
t )− 1)nb
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
(2)
= V H +
(V L − V H)(1− pt)
(
1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βt(1− qLt )− 1)nb
)
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
.
(1.12b)
Consequently, the price formation process is characterized by a double price setting
in every trade period. The difference between the two simultaneously set ask and bid
prices is denoted as the bid-ask spread St = X
B
t − XSt . According to Equations (1.12),
the spread is always positive and can be expressed as follows:
St = 4(V
H − V L)pt(1− pt)(1− na − nb + αtna + βtnb)(αtna + βt(q
H














In this section, we first present some general price and spread properties. Second, we
discuss how the ask, the bid, and the spread vary subject to group specific features of
the two categories of informed traders, such as the informational probabilities and the
proportion to the totality of traders, other things being equal. Unless otherwise specified,
all proofs are included in Appendix A.1.1.
For reasons of analytical simplicity, we focus on ceteris paribus price variations, i.e. in
dependency of each variable of interest (one at a time), such as the time, the proportions of
different trader groups, the information probabilities, etc. Joint effects of these variables
are addressed graphically. We focus on the following parameter combination: a good
107For each the ask and the bid, the formulations (1) and (2) are equivalent, and we make use of them
in the proofs of the propositions in Section 1.2.3.
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economy V = V H , proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%,
108 public
beliefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20 and accuracies of imperfect
information in good and bad economies of βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33, respectively. Note
that at each step of our analysis, all variables other than the argument of the considered
ceteris paribus function are fixed.109 Concerning the price evolution in time, we also
present results for V = V L, random αt ∼ U [0, 1], and random βtqHt , βtqLt ∼ U [0, 1].
General results
The general results presented here replicate the findings of previous market microstructure
models that assume the existence of only two trader categories, informed and uninformed,
such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). We show that, even
with better nuanced informational asymmetries – in particular with our third category of
imperfectly informed traders – the price formation process continues to be governed by
the same rules.
Let us first consider prices in a general sense, that is with respect to all possible
transactions that may occur at time t. These prices, which we henceforth refer to as
“general prices” or “prices as a whole” and denote by Xt, represent formally expectations
of the true risky value given the current public information and yield:
Xt = Et[V ]
= Et[V |xit = B] · 1{xit=B} + Et[V |xit = S] · 1{xit=S} + Et[V |xit = ∅] ·
(
1− 1{xit=B} − 1{xit=S}
)
,
where 1 stands for the indicator function.
Our first general result stresses that prices as a whole are efficient in the sense that
public information offers no profit opportunities with respect to them:
Proposition 1. The sequence of general transaction prices Xt forms a Martingale relative
to the public information ht.
In consequence, first differences of general prices are serially uncorrelated.
108This comes in line with Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997b), who find a proportion of informed trades
of around 17%. Moreover, for nb = 75%, the number of remaining uninformed trades yields nc = 5%,
which can be considered as a reasonable minimal proportion of exogenously motivated trades.
109For instance, dependencies on a certain variable other than time (for instance on αt) represent
evolutions of the time-t prices as function of that variable when the remaining variables are “frozen” at
time t (e.g. XBt (αt) and X
S
t (αt)). Thus, we have chosen to keep the time-subscripts t, since we do not
work with values that are constant over all t = 1, . . . , T , but at a fixed time t.
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However, detailing the analysis for the double price setting process at each time t
offers new insights: The two distinct but simultaneous prices set for trading the risky
asset, namely the ask XBt and the bid X
S
t , may depend on history. Specifically, this
occurs when the imperfect information is derived from the observation of past prices. In
this case, the sequence of each ask and bid prices becomes informative and thus offers
additional information with respect to the single transaction prices.
Proposition 2. When imperfect information is history dependent, the transaction prices
XBt and X
S
t are not Markovian.
Several further conclusions address general, previously shown properties of prices at
time t. First, under the assumptions of our model, information asymmetries result in a
positive gap between the buy and sell prices:
Proposition 3. At time t, the spread St is positive and the ask and bid prices X
B
t and
XSt are bounded by the high and the low value of the risky asset V
L ≤ XSt ≤ XBt ≤ V H .
Recall that our model assumes constant costs of order processing and inventory. Con-
sequently, the sole source of this positive spread resides in the adverse selection costs that
the market maker has to pay when she trades with better informed agents. Augmenting
the ask and lowering the bid thus turns into a defence mechanism, that allows the mar-
ket maker to recover contingent losses from trades with the informed at the expense of
the uninformed traders. Naturally, this price setting procedure affects all agents in the
market.
These ideas are summarized by the following corollary:
Corrolary 3.1. The positive bid-ask spread St at a given trade time t represents the
market maker’s reaction to the adverse selection problem generated by the informational
asymmetries present in the market.
The spread expansion in consequence of the increasing adverse selection is consistent
with the evidence provided by other authors and summarized in Section 1.1.1. The result
expressed in the above Corollary thus speaks for the validity of our model.
Moreover, we can show that the market maker indeed expects to lose money to per-
fectly informed traders, as well as to imperfectly informed who dispose of highly accurate
information, but makes profits from the trades with uninformed traders. The expected
group specific profits Et[Ggt|xgt], for g ∈ {a,b, c}, can be calculated on the basis of the
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differences between the expected value of the risky asset and the price of the undertaken
action:
Et[Ggt|xgt = B] = Et[V |xgt = B]−XBt
= V HPt(V = V
H |xgt = B) + V LPt(V = V L|xgt = B)−XBt
Et[Ggt|xgt = S] = XSt − Et[V |xgt = B]
= XSt − V HPt(V = V H |xgt = S)− V LPt(V = V L|xgt = S),
(1.14)
and, thus, should be positive for the perfectly informed, negative for the liquidity traders,
and variable for the imperfectly informed.
Proposition 4. At time t, perfect information always generates positive expected profits
Et[Gat] ≥ 0, while liquidity traders are expected to lose money constantly Et[Gct] ≤ 0.
Imperfect information of high (low) accuracy is expected to result in gains (losses).
Remark 4.1 Specifically, the market maker expects highly accurate imperfect informa-
tion under a current buy or sell when (qHt −qLt )(1−na−nb) ≥ 2αtqLt na and (qHt −qLt )(1−
na − nb) ≥ 2αt(1− qHt )na, respectively.
Furthermore, it is interesting to analyze the price evolution subject to the prior prob-
ability pt ascribed by the market maker to a positive evolution of the economy at large
and known to all market participants at time t.
Proposition 5. Both ask and bid prices at time t increase with the prior probability of





concave (convex) and hence the spread St is concave. The spread is zero when the true
risky value is common knowledge pt ∈ {0; 1} and attains its maximum for a middle-range
prior probability of a high risky value pmaxt .
The exact formula of the spread-maximizing probability pmaxt is given in the proof of
this proposition in Appendix A.1.1. It depends on the probability of perfect information





t , in sum on the “quality” of the information that arrives in the market. In general,
the spread is higher at middle-range values of the probability scale, as these values stand
for higher uncertainty about the economy type.
The evolution of the ask and bid prices, as well as that of the spread, at the fixed
time t and in ceteris paribus dependency on the public beliefs pt at the same moment, is
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illustrated in Figure 1.1, in both good economies V = V H and bad economies V = V L,
and for the usual proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, perfect
information probability αt = 0.20, and imperfect information accuracies βtq
H
t = 0.67 and
βtq
L




Finally, we return to the market evolution in time and refer how public beliefs change
at each trade.
Proposition 6. In time, the prior probability of a good economy pt incorporates the infor-
mation gathered by the market maker from the undertaken trades and converges towards
1 (0) for a high (low) risky value V = V H (V = V L).
Remark 6.1 Formally, the ratio pt+1/(1−pt+1) of the probabilities of high and low risky
values at time t + 1 equals the product of the same ratio one period before pt/(1 − pt),




t+1|V H)/Pt(XBt+1, XSt+1|V L) that the
market maker quotes at t+ 1 certain prices subject to the public information at t and to
a certain (good vs. bad) economy.
Exact formulas are included in the proof of this proposition in Appendix A.1.1. Thus,
all market participants should be able to infer the real risky value after a sufficient number
of transactions. We simulate the course of pt and the corresponding ask and bid prices
for both fixed and random values of the probabilities of perfect and imperfect information




t+1|V H)/Pt(XBt+1, XSt+1|V L),
where all random variables are uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
The evolution of prices and prior beliefs in time, for proportions of informed traders
na = 20% and nb = 75%, and in good economies V = V
H (bad economies V = V L),
110We have considered an entire range of alternative parameter values and observed that the spread
maximizing probability pmaxt varies in the direction of the true risky value. Specifically, for high risky
value V = V H , keeping the accuracy in bad economies βtqLt constant and increasing the accuracy in
good economies βtqHt yields increasing p
max
t . In addition, for low risky value V = V
L, pmaxt drops
for fixed βtqHt and decreasing βtq
L




t = 0.33, βtq
H
t = 0.75 results in p
max
t = 0.5191, βtq
H
t = 0.90 yields p
max
t = 0.5917, and βtq
H
t = 1 gives
pmaxt = 0.7341. For V = V
L and βtqHt = 0.67, βtq
L
t = 0.25 yields p
max
t = 0.4809, βtq
L
t = 0.10 results
in pmaxt = 0.4083, and βtqLt = 0 gives pmaxt = 0.2659. This reaction can be explained if we recall that
pt = Pt(V |V = V H) is the probability of a good economic development and that βtqHt (βtqLt ) reflects the
information accuracy in good (bad) states. Thus, the more accurate the imperfect information becomes
– i.e. the higher βtqHt is, when V = V
H , or the lower βtqLt is, when V = V
L – the faster it should be
incorporated into prices. The public beliefs (which are also the market maker’s beliefs) pt should hence
point more and more to the true risky value, or, equivalently, lie closer to the right end of the probability
scale for V = V H and the low end for V = V L. We can also observe that pmaxt represents the point of
maximal reluctance of the market maker towards meeting better informed investors and hence towards
making losses in good economies. Then, βtqHt = 0.67, βtq
L
t = 0.33 describe for both V = V
H and
V = V L a situation in which the maximal loss-reluctance of the market maker pmaxt corresponds to the
highest uncertainty with respect to the true economy 0.50.
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(a) Good economy V = V H .





















(b) Bad economy V = V L.
Figure 1.1: The evolution of time-t prices subject to the public beliefs pt,
in different economies, for proportions of informed traders na = 20%
and nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, and
accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
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are depicted in Figure 1.2 (Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1.2) for fixed perfect information
probability αt = 0.20 and imperfect information accuracies βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33,





t . We observe that, in time, the information is incorporated in prices and the public
beliefs pt converge to their true value. This process is noisier for random probabilities of
(perfect and imperfect) information.































Figure 1.2: The evolution of prices and public beliefs in time, in a good
economy V = V H , for proportions of informed traders na = 20%
and nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, and
accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
The impact of imperfect information on prices
In the sequel, we focus on the impact of imperfect information on prices, according to the
view – in particular, to the beliefs – of the market maker. This impact is twofold: On
the one hand, a qualitative influence originates in the accuracy of imperfect information,
measured by the probabilities that such information consists of positive signals in good
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of prices and public beliefs in time, in a good econ-
omy V = V H , for proportions of informed traders na = 20% and
nb = 75%, random probability of perfect information αt, and random
probabilities of imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
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t , respectively. On the other hand, a quantitative effect is
generated by the proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb to the totality of traders.
Recall that we focus on ceteris paribus variations of prices in dependency of each
variable of interest, while joint effects are graphically depicted for our particular cases.
A general conclusion can be formulated as follows:
Proposition 7. The intensification, either in the qualitative or in the quantitative sense,
of the trade activity of imperfectly informed traders at time t, other things being equal,
entails the deterioration of trading terms for all market participants.
The “deterioration of trading terms” here stands for the simultaneous augmentation
of the ask and diminution of the bid, which results in a spread enlargement. The intuitive
motivation of the effect addressed in Proposition 7 is straightforward: The market maker,
although unaware of the identity of a potential trading counterparty, is acquainted with
the fact that doing business with better informed agents generates losses. Thus, she faces
adverse selection. Her defence mechanism consists in enhancing the spread, and she does
so to a greater extent when the probability of facing better informed traders is higher.
In order to demonstrate Proposition 7, we rephrase it by means of several more specific
statements focussing on variations in each of the qualitative and quantitative variables of
interest.
First, we concentrate on the qualitative impact of imperfect information on prices. In




t ) plays an important role when the economy is in a
good (bad) state, as in this case the accuracy of imperfect information depends positively
(negatively) on it.111 The effect of the ceteris paribus variation of the probabilities of
imperfect information that conforms with the true risky value on prices can be summarized
as follows:
Proposition 7.1. An increase of the accuracy of imperfect information in a good econ-
omy βtq
H




t ) at time t to grow (drop)
following a concave course. Subject to the decrease of the accuracy of imperfect informa-
tion in a bad economy βtq
L
t , prices exhibit similar trends but convex curvatures. In both
situations, the spread St increases.
We assumed that the market maker believes that informed traders follow their sig-
nals. Thus, the probability of imperfectly informed buys during a positive (negative)
111Recall that a decrease of βtqLt is equivalent to an increase of the probability of receiving negative
signals in a bad economy βt(1− qLt ).
1.2– Imperfect information, practical trading rules, and asset prices 39
economic development increases with the probability that imperfectly informed traders
receive positive (negative) signals, other things being equal. At the same time, the prob-
ability of imperfectly informed sells diminishes. Consequently, the market maker reckons
on a higher loss probability and widens the bid-ask spread preventively. Interestingly,
the spread increases at lower (higher) speed with the accuracy of imperfect information
in good (bad) economies, suggesting that the intensity of the market maker reaction to
better information depends on the type of economy.
Figure 1.4 depicts the evolution of prices and of the spread as a function of the accu-
racy of practical rules at time t, in a good economy V = V H (bad economy V = V L),
for proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, a probability of perfect
information αt = 0.20, the accuracy of imperfect information in the opposite economy
βtq
L
t = 0.33 (βtq
H
t = 0.67), and public beliefs pt = 0.50. Note that the spread takes nega-
tive – and hence implausible – values as long as the imperfect information is excessively
inaccurate qHt < q
L
t . This case is ruled out by our model, as required in Equation (1.4).
Also, the spread exhibits an inflexion point which lies for the considered parameter values
at βtq
H
t = 0.5329 for the curve in panel a and at βtq
L
t = 0.4671 for the curve in panel b.
The spread at t as function of βtq
H
t is concave on the left and convex on the right of the




For the same values of the remaining parameters, Figure A.3 in Appendix A.1.2 shows




t . We observe
that the spread grows dramatically for higher informational accuracy in both good and
bad economies, i.e. for high βtq
H
t and low βtq
L









t , a case
which is irrelevant for our analysis.
Second, we address the quantitative influence of imperfect information on prices, which
can be traced back to the fraction of traders disposing of such information nb. Based on
the price expressions in Equations (1.12), we can stress the following:
Proposition 7.2. When imperfect information is sufficiently accurate, the ask XBt (bid
XSt ) at time t depends positively (negatively) on the proportion of imperfectly informed
traders active in the market nb, other things being equal. The corresponding spread St
increases thus for higher values of this proportion. Moreover, in this case the price cur-
vatures vary with the probabilities of positive imperfect information at time t, irrespective
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(a) Time-t accuracy in good economy for βtqLt = 0.33.

















(b) Time-t accuracy in bad economy for βtqHt = 0.67.





t , in a good economy V = V
H , for pro-
portions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, public be-
liefs pt = 0.50, and a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20.
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of the economy type.
Remark 7.2.1 At time t, the imperfect information is sufficiently accurate with respect
to the ask XBt if the following holds: βt(q
H
t − qLt )(1 − na) + αt(1 − 2βtqLt )na ≥ 0. With
respect to the bid XSt , the sufficient accuracy condition yields βt(q
H
t −qLt )(1−na)+αt(1−
2βt(1− qHt ))na ≥ 0.
A sufficient condition regarding the information accuracy that makes the ask XBt increase
with nb, other things being equal, is that the probability of deriving positive signals
in a bad economy is low, that is Pt(sbt = 1|V = V L) = βtqLt ≤ 0.50. For the bid,
sufficiently accurate information is attained when negative signals in good economies are
sooner improbable, that is Pt(sbt = −1|V = V H) = βt(1 − qHt ) ≤ 0.50, a case when the
bid decreases with nb.
Remark 7.2.2 Specifically, with sufficiently accurate imperfect information, the askXBt
price evolves convexly when the derivation of positive imperfect information at time t is




t (1− pt) ≤
0.50. Otherwise the ask is concave. In contrast, the bid XSt is convex when it is less
probable that negative information is obtained compared to positive or no information
Pt(sbt = −1) = βt(1− qHt )pt + βt(1− qLt )(1− pt) ≤ 0.50. Otherwise the bid is concave.
Proposition 7.2 suggests that, after isolating the (first and second-order ceteris paribus)
influence of the number of imperfectly informed traders, the market evolution continues
to depend on the accuracy of imperfect information. In other words, the quantitative
impact cannot be fully disentangled from the qualitative one. The qualitative component,
given by the information accuracy perceived by the market maker, appears to play a
particularly important role both when the market maker concentrates on the number and
on the precision of the imperfectly informed trades. It is possible that the market maker
fears possible information asymmetries more than a higher number of trades that are
possibly unadvantageous but not in a high degree. However, the joint effect of numerous
and imperfectly, but yet sufficiently well informed, traders gives rise to intense adverse
selection.
Figure 1.5 presents the prices and the spread at time t, as functions of the proportion
of imperfectly informed traders nb, in a good economy V = V
H , public beliefs pt = 0.50,
either for a fixed proportion of either fully informed traders na = 20% or liquidity traders
nc = 5%, for a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, and imperfect information
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accuracies βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33. Indeed, for a fixed fraction of perfectly informed
traders, the conditions in Remarks 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 are fulfilled, the spread increases and
both the prices and the spread evolve linearly in dependency of nb. In contrast, fixing
nc = 5% and varying nb violates the conditions in Remark 7.2.1, while those in in Re-
marks 7.2.2 are still fulfilled and hence the spread decreases convexly. Intuitively, with
(more imperfectly informed traders and implicitly) less perfectly informed traders active
in the market, the market maker fears less extremely high losses caused by very accurate
information and thus reduces the barriers meant to cover such losses, in particular the
spread.

















(a) Fixed proportion of perfectly informed traders na = 20%.

















(b) Fixed proportion of liquidity traders nc = 5%.
Figure 1.5: The evolution of time-t prices subject to the proportion of im-
perfectly informed traders nb, in a good economy V = V
H , for pub-
lic beliefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20,
and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33..
An intuition for the joint influence of qualitative and quantitative factors is provided
in Figures A.4-A.7 in Appendix A.1.2, for the same particular cases. As expected, the de-
preciation of the trading conditions is more acute for jointly higher accuracy of imperfect
information and more market participants who have access to this information, i.e. for





t , respectively) and higher nb, as long as the number of perfectly
informed traders is fixed. For fixed nc, the improvement in accuracy is somewhat coun-
terbalanced by the increase in the proportion of the imperfectly informed traders (that
implies a decrease of the number of perfectly informed). The obvious motivation is the
increased reluctance of the market maker towards losses from transactions with better
informed traders, that become more probable in the first situation and less probable in
the second one.
Remark 7.2.3 Prices evolve as described in Proposition 7.2 during an interval with
no perfectly informed trades, specifically either due to the fact that there are no fully
informed traders active in the market na = 0, or because no perfect information reaches
the market at the time of informed trades αt = 0.
The proof is evident from Equations (1.12). The two cases in Remark 7.2.3 represent
manifestations of the same situation: the absence of perfect information. Either this
information cannot be accessed at all during the trade (formally, there is no group of
traders who have access to private information) or at the trade time t (such that the
group a does not trade at t). Then the impact of the dimension of the single informed
trader group that is active, namely the group b, becomes apparent and can be fully
separated from the qualitative influence.
Finally, the joint impact of the prior probability of a high risky value pt and the




t ) on prices at time t is depicted in Figure A.8
(Figure A.9), again in a good economy V = V H , for proportions of informed traders na =
20% and nb = 75%, and fixed probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, public beliefs
pt = 0.50, and imperfect information accuracy βtq
L
t = 0.33 (βtq
H
t = 0.67). Of note is that
a more accurate imperfect information enhances the impact of public beliefs on prices,
i.e. the spread increases and changes curvature. As expected, in case of more pronounced
information asymmetries, the market maker becomes more wary in formulating periodical
prices and conforms more closely with the available information provided by the prior
probability of a good economy.
When imperfect information is derived by a larger number of traders (i.e. for higher
nb) and at the same time public beliefs reflect high uncertainty (i.e. for middle-range pt),
the spread grows (falls) for fixed na (nc). This conclusion is illustrated in Figure A.10
(Figure A.11) for similar values of the remaining parameters and should be understood in
the light of the same idea: As the market maker should fear informed traders more than
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uninformed but fully informed more than imperfectly informed, the spread increases with
the ratio of the proportions of fully and partially informed traders. This reaction is thus
consistent with the idea that adverse selection increases for both more informed traders
and more accurate information.
The impact of perfect information on prices
In this section we replicate the analysis of the qualitative and quantitative impacts with
respect to perfect information.
We commence again by formulating a general conclusion that is in the sequel analyzed
separately for qualitative and quantitative aspects:
Proposition 8. The intensification, either in the qualitative or in the quantitative sense,
of the trade activity of perfectly informed traders at time t, other things being equal, entails
the deterioration of trading terms for all market participants.
In spite of the similarity of Propositions 7 and 8, there are several differences regarding
the impacts of perfect and imperfect information on prices, on which we comment in the
sequel.
Similarly to the above section dedicated to the imperfectly informed traders, Propo-
sition 8 is demonstrated in two steps: At first, we investigate the role played in the price
evolution by the probability αt that perfectly informed traders receive information at time
t. We again denote this effect as qualitative and summarize it as follows:
Proposition 8.1. An increase of the probability of perfect information αt, other things
being equal, entails a corresponding convex increase (concave decrease) of the ask XBt (bid
XSt ) at time t, thus a concave enhancement of the corresponding spread St.
As often demonstrated in the literature, the market maker is confronted with more
serious adverse selection when it is more probable that perfectly accurate signals reach
the market. Her reaction consists of widening the spread. Note however that, while for
the imperfectly informed the qualitative effect on the spread curvature was ambiguous,112
the spread clearly increases faster for lower values of the full information probability αt.
It appears that perfectly informed traders are already perceived as a menace for low
probabilities that they receive and trade on their information.
112The spread curvature depends on the information accuracy in different economies. See the proof of
Proposition 7.1 in Appendix A.1.2.
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The time-t price course dictated by the probability αt that perfect information reaches
the insider group, other things being equal, is depicted in Figure 1.6, for our usual par-
ticular case with good economy V = V H , proportions of informed traders na = 20% and
nb = 75%, public beliefs pt = 0.50, and imperfect information accuracies βtq
H





















Figure 1.6: The evolution of time-t prices subject to the probability of per-
fect information αt, in a good economy V = V
H , for proportions of in-
formed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, public beliefs pt = 0.50,
and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
The following statement formalizes what we denote as the quantitative influence of
perfect information on prices:
Proposition 8.2. An increase of the proportion of fully informed traders na, other things
being equal, yields an enhancement (a reduction) of the ask XBt (bid X
S
t ) at time t, thus an
increase of the corresponding spread St. The curvature of prices depends on the probability
that informed traders receive information αt and on the prior probability of the economic
state pt.
Remark 8.2.1 Specifically, the ask XBt and the bid X
S
t are convex if αtpt ≤ 0.50 and
αt(1− pt) ≤ 0.50, respectively, and concave otherwise.
In particular, if αtpt ≥ 0.50 the ask is concave and the bid convex, so that the spread St
evolves concavely, while for αt(1− pt) ≥ 0.50 the opposite holds.
Obviously, when the market maker anticipates that more fully informed traders are
present in the market, the probability ascribed to making losses is higher. This renders
the ask (bid) higher (lower). Of course, the variation speed of the spread depends on
the probability that these traders receive information and hence proceed to trade. For
instance, when perfectly informed traders receive information with a low probability αt,
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the ask (bid) grows (drops) at an increasing (decreasing) speed, i.e. convexly (concavely),
subject to a higher proportion of fully informed traders na. In other words, in this
case informed traders are considered to be dangerous only if they are numerous, because
otherwise the probability that they trade is small.
Likewise with respect to imperfect information, the quantitative effect of perfect in-
formation cannot be entirely separated from the qualitative one. However, this interde-
pendency is now weaker, specifically only of second-order degree, thus affecting not the
trend, but only the variation speed of prices. Note that the second-order dependency now
also implies the prior beliefs pt.
The evolution of time-t prices subject to the proportion of perfectly informed traders
is presented in Figures 1.7, for fixed proportions of imperfectly informed traders nb =
75% and of liquidity traders nc = 5%, in good economies V = V
H , perfect information
probability αt = 0.20, public beliefs pt = 0.50, and imperfect information accuracies
βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33. We can observe that in both cases, the conditions in
Remark 8.2.1 are fulfilled, so that the ask is convex, the bid concave, and hence the
spread increases convexly. Together with the above results illustrated in Figure 1.5, we
can clearly observe that the proportion of perfectly informed traders is the one that
dictates the price evolution.
The joint effect of na and αt on prices is illustrated in Figures A.12 and A.13 in
Appendix A.1.2, for identical values of the remaining parameters. Other things being
equal, the spread changes from extremely convex (concave) and increasing (decreasing)
to linearly increasing in na, for higher probabilities αt that the perfect information reaches
the market, when the proportion of imperfectly informed traders (liquidity traders) is fixed
at nb = 75% (nc = 5%). Naturally, when αt is low, it takes a very numerous presence of
potential insiders in the market for the market maker to take protective measures against
possible losses.
Imperfect information from practical trading rules: some particular cases
As stressed above, imperfect information can be obtained applying common trading meth-
ods, such as the technical or fundamental analysis. The technical analysis attempts to
forecast future evolutions by examining past movements in price and trade volume. In
contrast, the fundamental analysis investigates the company, market, and global environ-
ments in order to determine possible causes for these movements.
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(a) Fixed proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 75%.


















(b) Fixed proportion of liquidity traders nc = 5%.
Figure 1.7: The evolution of time-t prices subject to the proportion of per-
fectly informed traders na, in a good economy V = V
H , for public be-
liefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, and
accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
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Technical and fundamental analysis The technical analysis considers the market
as the sole “instance” that values an asset. Technical analysts resort, among others, to
the visual examination of the charts of past price and volume series. Thus, the core
field of technical analysis methods is also known under the name of chart analysis or
chartism. The purpose of this optical inspection is to recognize repetitive patterns in
prices. Technical analysts believe that prices follow general movement directions – referred
to as trends – and that price history is recurrent. Thus, repetitive patterns in past prices
are reckoned to give valuable indications with respect to future market tendencies. In
particular, different patterns suggest different action courses to by taken by traders, and
manifold chart techniques have been developed in order to recognize them in due time for
making profits.113
In contrast, the fundamental analysis argues for the existence of so-called fundamental
values of financial assets. These values reflect the real, intrinsic value of the company that
issued the respective asset, and not how this is priced by traders. Fundamental values are
thus independent of transitory market phenomena. Their estimation necessitates complex
studies involving not only financial aspects, but also broader economic interconnections,
and even political, social, and ethical factors. As long as the fundamental value of an
asset is lower (higher) than its market price, the asset is considered to be undervalued
(overvalued) and the resultant recommendation of fundamentalists is to buy (sell).114
Both technical and fundamental analysis represent sets of rules that are, in the main,
handy and easy to understand by common traders. This motivates their wide use in
practice. In spite of the fact that initially, economists have refuted the chances of success
of all not (fully-)rational strategies, more recent theoretical and empirical research speaks
for the fact that technical and fundamental analysis can offer valuable information. For
instance, several models, such as De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), con-
113These patterns correspond optically to different shapes, such as spikes, wedges, triangles, etc., or
to the combination of these simple shapes into more complicated ones, denoted as hedge-and-shoulders,
double and triple tops and bottoms, etc. The numerous patterns considered by chartists to be relevant
can be grouped into several main categories: trend, reversal, or continuation patterns. As reflected by the
respective names, these patterns indicate the beginning, reversal, or continuation of price trends. Please
refer to Murphy (1999) and Edwards, Magee, and Bassetti (2001) for more details.
Strictly speaking, when our imperfectly informed traders apply technical analysis methods, the probabil-
ities βtqHt and βtq
L
t should be functions of both price and volume histories at time t. As our model does
not account for the influence of trading volume, βtqHt and βtqLt will be based merely on the public price
history ht.
114According to Murphy (1999), fundamental values are derived from the analysis of the global, market,
and firm-specific situation. When our imperfectly informed traders make use of fundamental analysis,
the probabilities βtqHt and βtq
L
t should depend both on the on the current public information ht and on
the fundamental value of the traded asset.
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sider fundamentalists as belonging to the category of informed traders. Informed traders
are traditionally proven to outperform uninformed ones. Several further approaches cor-
roborate with the relevance of technical information (as a combination of the past prices
and volumes) or of some technical methods (such as moving average) for obtaining pos-
itive excess returns in the stock and foreign exchange market. Specifically, Treynor and
Ferguson (1985), Brown and Jennings (1989), and Blume, Easley, and O’Hara (1994)
account from a theoretical point of view for the rationality of the technical analysis and
the effectiveness of using a price sequence instead of single prices. They also emphasize
the benefits of the combination of past prices and volumes for choosing optimal trading
strategies. Using real market data, Brock, Lakonishok, and Le Baron (1992), Allen and
Karjalainen (1999), Neely, Weller, and Dittmar (1997), and Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang
(2000) consider the success of different technical methods to be, in the main, positive.
We consider practical trading rules – in particular technical and fundamental anal-
ysis – as examples of heuristics, i.e. rules-of-thumb meant to facilitate and speed up
the decisional process.115 These rules provide information about future market evolu-
tions, but the accuracy of this information varies across methods and in dependence on
the specific market conditions. Thus, technical and fundamental analysts are potential
partially-informed traders in the sense of our model. It is then interesting to observe
how prices evolve in our setting when imperfect information is generated from certain
practical trading rules of chartist or fundamentalist type; And also which are the profit
chances offered by these rules to their users, recalling that they are rationally employed
and coexist with full information.
115Please refer to Section 2.1.2 for more details on heuristics.
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Simple trading strategies and further assumptions To this end, we concentrate on
three simple strategies of both chartist and fundamentalist origins. In order to introduce
them formally, we avail ourselves of the following variables:














- the subjective expectations of the true risky value (the fundamental value):
Ebt[V ] = V
HPt(V = V
H |sbt) + V LPt(V = V L|sbt) = V L + (V H − V L)Pt(V = V H |sbt)





V L + (V H − V L)pt βtq
H
t
βtqHt pt + βtq
L
t (1− pt)
, for sbt = 1
V L + (V H − V L)pt, for sbt = 0
V L + (V H − V L)pt βt(1− q
H
t )
βt(1− qHt )pt + βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)
, for sbt = −1.
(1.15c)
Then, our practical trading rules can be formulated as follows:
(TA-1) (momentum strategy): The imperfectly informed traders buy (sell) after observing
two successive buys (sells). Otherwise, they do nothing.
(TA-2) (moving-average strategy): The imperfectly informed traders buy (sell) if the current
midquote Xmidt crosses from below (from above) the five-days moving-average line
MA
(5)
t . In case of equality, no order is submitted.
(FA) (fundamentalist strategy): The imperfectly informed traders buy (sell) if their ex-
pectation with respect to the true risky value – or, equivalently, the fundamental
value – Ebt[V ] lies above (below) the current midquote X
mid
t . In case of equality,
no action is undertaken.
Note that, although stylized, the first two strategies belong to the broad category of
chartist methods. In technical terms, they stand for momentum and moving-average
techniques, respectively. In essence, momentum strategies make use of the existing trend.
Momentum traders buy (sell) in rising (falling) markets. This is precisely what our (TA-
1)-traders do, specifically in a simplified form where trends are assessed from the last
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two past trades. Moving-average methods are based on the comparison of current prices
with the market trend, where the latter is obtained from averaged past evolutions. Our
strategy (TA-2) proceeds similarly and considers averages over the last five days of trade.
Finally, the third strategy (FA) relies on the comparison of group specific expectations of
the true risky value to market prices and hence is of fundamentalist type.
In the sequel, we simulate the price evolution resulting from our model equations,
when imperfectly informed traders use one of the above simple trading strategies. In so
doing, we consider various parameter constellations and market configurations. In order
to keep the exposition as clear as possible, we will present only a part of the results,
which is also representative across all analyzed cases. Unless otherwise specified, the
subsequent comments rely on the following assumptions: The proportion of perfectly
informed traders is set at na = 20%. Imperfectly informed traders are active in the
market in high, middle, or low proportions, that is nb ∈ {25; 50; 75}%, respectively. The
rest of trades is automatically considered to be uninformed.116 Trade starts with neutral
beliefs p0 = 0.50 and unfolds over T = 100 periods. At each time t, an agent is chosen to
trade with replacement from the trader pit.117 The probability αt that perfectly informed
traders receive information is either random (in particular, uniformly distributed in [0, 1])
or fixed (i.e. αt = α over all trading times t = 1, . . . , T , where our subsequent comments
are based on α = 0.20).
Note that all three simple strategies assume that imperfectly informed traders always
derive information, that is βt = 1, ∀t = 1, . . . , T . Consequently, the accuracy of imperfect
information is given merely by the probability qHt (q
L
t ) in good (bad) economies. For




t as the accuracies of imperfect
information. Let us now detail the choice of these probabilities.




t to vary randomly around three distinct
accuracy thresholds in the set {0.25; 0.50; 0.75}. Specifically, βtqHt (βtqLt ) lies above (be-
low) the accuracy threshold with a quantity that is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. In so
doing, we attempt to study market evolutions subject to different information accuracies.
It is yet important to distinguish between the chartist and the fundamentalist strategies:
The chartist strategies rely on a constantly enlarging data set (since at each trade past
116We also run simulations for a fixed nc = 5%. The corresponding results will be, in part, addressed
below.
117The results obtained for the case when traders were chosen to trade without replacement are similar
to those presented below.
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t change at each time t. In
contrast, the fundamentalist strategy (FA) assumes that traders derive the information
about the economic situation (or, equivalently, the fundamental value) from analyzing





t of the (FA)-traders are fixed at the beginning of trade t = 0,
and remain constant over all t = 1, . . . , T . We emphasize this fact by dropping the time
subscripts t when the (FA)-strategy is applied and hence work with the notations βq
H
and βqL.
More explanations have to be given on how exactly the information accuracy is set for
each of our three simple strategies. The momentum strategy (TA-1) implies that, after
two successive buys, the imperfectly informed traders are also buying the risky asset,
which can be formally written as xbt = B. Since traders actions perfectly mirror their




t = 1. Similarly, after two successive sells, (TA-1)-






118 Otherwise, no action is undertaken, which equivalently
yields βt = 0.
119
The second chartist strategy (TA-2) is similarly designed and follows the moving-









t = 0) results when the price midquote crosses the
five-day MA-line from below (from above). Otherwise, xbt = ∅ and hence βt = 0.
For the fundamentalist strategy (FA), βqH and βqL are uniquely determined before
the beginning of trade, but in a similar manner: As explained above, they vary around
the same three accuracy thresholds in {0.25; 0.50; 0.75} by a random quantity that is
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. (FA)-traders compute the expected risky value according
to Equation (1.15c), the last expression of which has three branches. Their signal sbt
will reflect the most probable – in terms of the accuracies βqH and βqL– of these three
values.120
118In the strict sense, (TA-1) requires that the probability of buying after a series of two successive buys
is 1, that is Pt(xbt = B) = βtqHt pt + βtq
L
t (1 − pt) = 1. Analogously, after two successive sells we have
Pt(xbt = S) = βt(1− qHt )pt+ βt(1− qLt )(1− pt) = 1. For showing how this yields the conditions stressed
in the text, let us consider the following equation xp + y(1 − p) = 1, where all p, x, y ∈ [0, 1]. We can
easily derive y = (1−xp)/(1− p) ≤ 1 and hence x = 1. Then, y = 1 as well. Then, this result applies for
both cases, namely with x = βtqHt , y = βtq
L
t after two successive buys and x = βt(1− qHt ), y = βt(1− qLt )
after two successive sells. In other words, a buy (sell) becomes sure after a series of two consecutive buys
(sells), irrespective of the economy type.
119More exactly, βtqHt = βtq
L
t = 0 and βt(1− qHt ) = βt(1− qLt ) = 0, which implied βt = 0.
120For instance, if in a good economy V = V H the probability of a positive signal Pt(sbt = 1|V = V H) =
βtq
H
t pt + βtqLt (1− pt) is higher than each the probability of no signal Pt(sbt = 0|V = V H) = 1− βt and
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The public beliefs pt+1 at the beginning of time t + 1 are derived as posterior proba-
bilities at t, conditional on the new information set ht ≡ ht−1
⋃{xt, XBt , XSt } and based
on the Bayes rule. This yields:
pt+1 = P (V = V







1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βtqHt − 1)nb
)
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
, for xt = B
pt
(
1− na + (2βt(1− qHt )− 1)nb
)
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
, for xt = S
pt, for xt = ∅.
(1.16)
Results Under the above assumptions, we can now detail the estimation results. First,
we address the price convergence, then the qualitative and quantitative impacts of imper-
fect information, and finally the trader gains.
Prices converge towards the true risky value, as long as the information asymmetries
in the market are not too high and the trading lasts sufficiently long. Specifically, the
convergence manifests for both TA-strategies, even with relatively numerous imperfectly-
informed traders nb = 75%, and irrespective of the way in which full information reaches
the market (specifically for fixed α = 0.20 or random αt ∼ U [0, 1]). This can be observed
in panels a and b of Figures 1.8 and 1.9 for good economies V = V H . The moving-average
strategy (TA-2) appears to induce somewhat faster convergence, especially when the prob-
ability of perfect information αt is random. Qualitatively similar results were obtained
for bad economic states V = V L, across all considered combinations of parameters. An
example for the same na = 20%, nb = 75%, and random αt is illustrated in Figure 1.10.
Consequently, we henceforth focus on the case with V = V H .
Yet, when imperfectly informed fundamentalists (FA) are present in high proportions
in the market, prices do not converge within the interval of T = 100 trades, as shown by
Panels c of Figures 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10. In particular, spreads are strictly positive, which is
due to the following fact: Although the price corresponding to the “right” action, dictated
by the true economy type – i.e. the ask XBt (the bid X
S
t ) for V = V
H (V = V L) – comes
fast close to the true risky value V , the other price bounces below (above) this value in
the probability of low signals Pt(sbt = −1|V = V H) = βt(1 − qHt )pt + βt(1 − qLt )(1 − pt), then we take
sbt = 1. Thus, Ebt[V ] is derived according to the first branch of Equation (1.15c).
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good (bad) economies.121 Apparently, the (FA)-strategy does not allow the market maker
to infer (sufficiently fast) the true economic state from the trader actions.
Moreover, with (FA) as an imperfectly informed strategy, the price convergence is
ensured only for sufficiently high proportions of informed trades and/or for sufficiently
high information accuracy. Thus, we find that prices attain the true risky value within
the T = 100 trades merely for low proportions of fundamentalists nb ≤ 13% and in our
usual case with na = 20%, V = V
H , and random αt ∼ U [0, 1] and βtqHt and βtqLt of
middle accuracy 0.50. For nb = 15% (and the same na = 20%, V = V
H , and random




t , specifically around a threshold of at least
0.90, in order to ensure price convergence within 100 trades.122 If we fix the proportion of
liquidity traders at nc = 5%, then V = V





accuracy 0.50 entail convergence within T = 100 trades for nb ≤ 43% (and, equivalently,
for na ≥ 52%). With nc = 5% and nb = 50%, it takes around 2000 trades for that market
stability is attained.
121Where the variations are higher for random αt.
122The variations with the other parameters are also interesting. Following results were obtained for
nb = 13%: With a fixed α = 0.20, around T = 50 trades are necessary for that prices come sufficiently
close to the true value V = V H . In contrast, the trade should unfold over at least T = 140 moments
in order to ensure convergence for random αt ∼ U [0, 1] and in bad economy V = V L. Taking a high
accuracy threshold of 0.9 for βqH and βqL ensures price convergence already within T = 80 for V = V L
and random αt.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.8: Price evolution for all three imperfectly informed strategies, in
a good economy V = V H , for a fixed probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
56 Imperfect Information, Trading Rules, Asset Prices

















(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.9: Price evolution for all three imperfectly informed strategies, in
good economy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect information
αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.

















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.10: Price evolution for all three imperfectly informed strategies, in
a bad economy V = V L, for a random probability of perfect information
αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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Let us further analyze the twofold influence of the users of practical trading rules on
prices. Recall that the accuracy of their information generates the qualitative impact,
while the trade participation intensity underlies the quantitative influence. Note that the
two chartist strategies (TA-1) and (TA-2) yield similar results, from which we subsequently
illustrate only those obtained under (TA-1).
Figure 1.11 illustrates the qualitative effect of the (TA-1)-strategy on prices for our
usual case with good economies V = V H , random αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of
informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%. Our theoretical model in Section 1.2.3
predicts that spreads lower for more accurate imperfect information. Indeed, the spread
in Figure 1.11 appears to vary (slightly) less for higher accuracy thresholds. However,
there is no clear difference among the three panels of this figure. This is due to the fact





t turn into binary variables. They take the value 1 when a certain, strategy-specific
condition is met – for instance, after two successive actions of the same type for (TA-1),
or when prices cross the moving-average line for (TA-2) – and 0 otherwise.
In essence, the same problem occurs for the fundamentalist strategy (FA), where the
information probabilities βqH and βqL take either the value 1, when the deviation of
the subjective expectation from market prices has a certain sign, or 0 otherwise. The
qualitative effect of the fundamentalist strategy is somewhat easier to recognize in Figure
1.12, where the spread decreases and prices bounce less for higher accuracy thresholds of
imperfect information.
The quantitative effect of imperfect information on prices can also be investigated.
As Proposition 7.2 predicts, the spread is higher for larger proportions nb of users of
practical trading rules. This affirmation is supported for the momentum strategy (TA-
1), as apparent in Figure 1.13, and for the fundamentalist strategy (FA) in Figure 1.14.
However, note that these figures depict a situation that is similar but not identical to
the one studied in the theoretical section. There we have considered ceteris paribus
variations of prices with nb; In contrast, the present application assumes that other
variables also change, such as the public beliefs pt (see Equation 1.16). Figures 1.13
and 1.14 indicate that smaller nb yield a less pronounced price variation and render the
price convergence towards true asset values more probable. With (TA-1) the convergence
is not necessarily faster. This is plausible since less momentum traders nb coupled with
a constant proportion of perfectly informed traders na result in a larger participation
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of liquidity traders nc. This reduces the amount of information to be incorporated into
prices.
We also consider a market where the proportion of liquidity traders is fixed at nc = 5%
and hence the variation of nb entails changes in the perfectly informed trades na. The
pure qualitative and quantitative effects analyzed in the theoretical part are now con-
taminated by the variation of both na and pt. Thus, the qualitative effect becomes opti-
cally indistinguishable. As for the quantitative one, Figures A.15 and A.16 in Appendix
A.1.2 show that prices attain the true risky value for lower proportions of imperfectly in-
formed traders nb (in particular of momentum traders or fundamentalists, respectively).
The moving average strategy (TA-2) delivers again results similar to (TA-1). Obviously,
with less users of practical trading rules and, consequently, with more perfectly-informed
traders, information should be faster impounded into prices.
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(a) High accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.75).

















(b) Middle accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.50).

















(c) Low accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.25).
Figure 1.11: Price evolution for the momentum strategy (TA-1) of different accu-
racies, T = 100, in a good economy V = V H , for random probability of perfect
information αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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(a) High accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.75).

















(b) Middle accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.50).

















(c) Low accuracy of imperfect information (threshold 0.25).
Figure 1.12: Price evolution for the fundamentalist strategy (FA) of different ac-
curacies, T = 100, in good economy V = V H , for random probability of perfect
information αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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(a) High proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 75%.

















(b) Middle proportion of imper-
fectly informed traders nb = 50%.

















(c) Low proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 25%.
Figure 1.13: Price evolution for the momentum strategy (TA-1) for dif-
ferent proportions nb of imperfectly informed traders, in a good economy
V = V H , for a random probability of perfect information αt ∼ U [0, 1],
a proportion of perfectly informed traders na = 20%, and random prob-




t of middle accuracy 0.50.
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(a) High proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 75%.

















(b) Middle proportion of imper-
fectly informed traders nb = 50%.

















(c) Low proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 25%.
Figure 1.14: Price evolution for the fundamentalist strategy (FA) for dif-
ferent proportions nb of imperfectly informed traders, in a good econ-
omy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect information αt ∼
U [0, 1], a proportion of perfectly informed traders na = 20%, and prob-
abilities of imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
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Furthermore, we compute the cumulated monetary gains of each trader group.123 The
background intuition for doing this is that observing monetary results we can gain an
insight in the survival chances of the traders.124 We would expect that perfectly informed
traders not only always gain money from their trades, but also make the highest profits
in the market.
Indeed – as illustrated in Figure 1.15 (Figure 1.16) for na = 20% and nb = 75%,
a partial-information accuracy threshold of 0.50, and random αt (fixed α = 0.20) – the
cumulated individual profits of perfectly informed traders are always positive. Simulations
performed for further combinations of parameters show that the individual profits of a-
traders are also the highest in the market across all analyzed cases. However, this does not
necessarily hold with respect to group profits, with respect to which the group dimension
plays a decisive role. Thus, the users of practical decision rules can earn more money,
as a group, than their perfectly informed peers, as it is the case in panel a of Figure
1.17 for the (TA-1)-strategy. Note also that individual profits are on average higher with
random probability of perfect information αt. Interestingly, the momentum traders (TA-1)
always make positive profits, both individually and as a group. In particular, this occurs




t varying randomly around
the thresholds in {0.25; 0.50; 0.75}. Individual profits also remain positive, irrespective
of the trader participation nb. Moreover, for a sufficiently high proportion nb, (TA-
1) yields for its users as a group even higher monetary gains than those obtained from
perfect information. The corresponding individual gains remain comparable with those of
perfectly informed traders as long as the probability of perfect information αt is random.
This situation is exemplified for nb = 75% and in good economic states V = V
H in panels
a of Figures 1.15 and 1.16.
In contrast, the moving-average strategy (TA-2) always results in losses, irrespective





One possible illustration is given in panels b of Figures 1.15 and 1.17.
Panels c of the same figures show that fundamentalists (FA) who derive information in
good (bad) economies with an accuracy around a middle-range threshold of 0.50, can also
come best off in terms of their individual profits. This occurs for shorter or longer time
intervals, at the beginning of the trade. This finding is replicated for numerous other
combinations of parameters, such as for bad economies V = V L, different information
123Note that we refer here to the realized gains, and not to the expected gains analyzed in Proposition 4.
124For more details on survival, please refer to Section 2.1.2.
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accuracy thresholds, or different proportions of fundamentalists nb. Moreover, with low
proportions nb – in particular, comparable with those of perfectly informed traders na –
and a fixed α = 0.20, both individual and group profits of the fundamentalists are positive
and the highest in the market during the entire trade interval. This result is illustrated
in Figure A.17 in Appendix A.1.2 for nb = 25% and V = V
H and also holds qualitatively
in bad economies V = V L, for different accuracy thresholds, and even for different values
of the fixed perfect-information probability α.
More intuition for the success or failure of our simple trading strategies can be gained
by analyzing the number of buys and sells effectively executed by the respective imper-
fectly informed traders. Mostly, momentum traders (TA-1) act in a “correct” way, i.e.,
they buy the risky asset in good economies V = V H and sell it in bad ones V = V L.
The rate of “correct guesses” is maximal (i.e. 100% of the cases) for high proportions
nb = 75% and decreases when momentum traders become less numerous. Since, by the
essence of their strategy, (TA-1)-traders are following the trend of the market (i.e. mim-
icking previous trades), their trades reinforce the price movements. If these traders have
the chance to observe (a sufficient number of) previous informed trades, their actions
should speed up the price convergence towards the true risky value and thus increase the
market efficiency. Otherwise, they can only enhance the market noise.125
In contrast, the number of imperfectly informed buys and sells resulting from the
moving-average strategy (TA-2) is better balanced. Under the market conditions consid-
ered here, this strategy entails actions that are similar to the random liquidity trades.
This renders plausible our finding that it cannot generate positive profits.126
The fundamentalist strategy (FA) entails more frequent sells (buys) in good (bad)
economies. Thus, it pushes the market in the “wrong” direction, i.e. opposed to the
true risky value.127 For this reason, prices converge much more slowly or not at all when
125Out of T = 100 trades, for random αt and V = V H (V = V L), momentum-traders buy 72 times
and never sell (never buy, but sell 25 times). When α = 0.20 and V = V H (V = V L), the number of
buys yields 31 (0) and that of sells 0 (32). For low nb = 25%, a random αt and V = V H (V = V L), we
observe 7 (2) buys and 3 (6) sells. Finally, a fixed α = 0.20 and V = V H (V = V L) generate 9 (4) buys
and 7 (15) sells.
126For V = V H (V = V L), (TA-2) results in 19 (28) buys and 21 (26) sells out of 100 trades when αt
is random, and in 1 (8) buys and 1 (10) sells with fixed α = 0.20. When moving-average traders are less
numerous nb = 25%, the corresponding numbers of buys and sells for V = V H (V = V L) and random
αt are 3 (5) and 1 (2), and for fixed α = 0.20 respectively 3 (5) and 4 (3).
127The fundamentalist strategy amounts to 29 (44) buys and 49 (34) sells out of 100 trades for V = V H
(V = V L) and random αt, and to 28 (45) buys and 47 (30) sells for fixed α = 0.20. For low nb = 25%,
V = V H (V = V L) and random αt generate 4 (15) fundamentalists’ buys and 18 (7) sells, while a fixed
α = 0.20 yields 11 (18) buys and 16 (9) sells. Middle proportions nb = 50% entail qualitatively similar
results.
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imperfect information is derived by means of this strategy, as observed above, which
lowers the market efficiency. However, this does not imply that the fundamentalists are
constantly loosing money. As illustrated in panels c of Figures 1.14 and A.17, these traders
are able to generate sufficient noise in order to benefit from it and to outperform their
fully informed peers.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.
















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.





















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.15: The evolution of individual cumulated gains for all three imperfectly
informed strategies, in a good economy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect
information αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.


















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.


















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.16: The evolution of individual cumulated gains for all three imperfectly
informed strategies, in a good economy V = V H , for a fixed probability of perfect
information α = 0.20, and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.




















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure 1.17: The evolution of cumulated group gains for all three imperfectly in-
formed strategies, in a good economy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect
information αt ∼ U [0, 1], and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%.
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In sum, practical trading rules appear to offer the possibility of realizing positive
profits, both individually and as a group. Moreover, depending on the specific market
conditions, their users can even come best off in the market, during shorter or longer time
periods. Specifically, our users of simple momentum and fundamentalists strategies can
gain more than all other traders, but this is not the case for our moving-average traders.
Possible motivations are that users of practical rules simply mimic previously observed
“correct” actions and thus reinforce price convergence; Yet, they could also increase slug-
gishness by adopting “incorrect” actions and profit from the emerging noise.128
1.2.4 Summary and conclusions
Our paper extends the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in order to capture better
nuanced information asymmetries. In particular, we are interested in the impact of imper-
fect information on prices, when traders acting on both perfect and no information are also
active in the market. We rely on the same main assumptions as in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985): The trade takes place sequentially; At each time, a trader is stochastically chosen
from the totality of traders and can submit (only) market orders for buying or selling one
single unit of risky asset; The true value of the risky asset remains unknown to the market
until the end of the trade, but some traders may receive information about it already dur-
ing the trade interval; Submitted orders are executed by a competitive and risk-neutral
market maker; Prices are competitively set, so that the market maker expects zero total
profits; Inventory and order processing costs are considered to be constant. Moreover, as
in Easley and O’Hara (1987), information arrives randomly in the market.
Our contribution consists in refining the view over information asymmetries, by intro-
ducing a supplementary category of informed traders. Specifically, instead of the common,
but somewhat coarse, twofold categorization of traders in informed and uninformed, we
consider three trader groups: the usual informed traders (who dispose here of perfect
information about the true risky value); the usual uninformed traders (motivated by ex-
ogenous trade reasons, such as liquidity needs); and a new group of imperfectly informed
traders who derive some information, the accuracy of which is explicitly modeled. We
consider that our threefold trader-type setting resembles better real markets, where, be-
sides liquidity traders and insiders which have access to perfect information, there is also
128In an evolutionary environment, where traders can switch between groups, we expect that more
uninformed traders start using practical rules. This would render group b even more numerous and thus
reinforce the impact on prices.
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a relatively high proportion of users of practical trading methods, such as technical or
fundamental analysis. The users of practical rules derive information from the system-
atical analysis, that employs specific tools, of market-specific and/or market-exogenous
data. This information is imperfect – more exactly imperfectly accurate – in the sense
that it can be more or less valuable, depending on the deployed method and the skills of
the respective traders. However, this information is used in a rational manner, since all
traders forming expectations in line with the Bayes rule. We are interested in how this
imperfect information affects prices.
Our “threefold” setting replicates the main theoretical results of the settings with only
two categories of traders: In consequence of the information asymmetry, the market maker
is confronted with adverse selection. Therefore, she sets two different prices for buying
and selling the risky asset at each trading time, namely the ask and the bid, respectively.
We theoretically show that a positive gap, denoted as spread, forms between these prices
on the condition that the imperfect information is somewhat accurate. General prices
are Martingales, but, when imperfect information is derived from past market data, the
single prices are not Markovian. In other words, prices as a whole are efficient while the
ask and bid sequences can be informative relative to single transaction prices. We also
analyze how prices evolve with respect to public beliefs and determine the public belief
level at which the spread is maximized.
We subsequently detail the impact of imperfectly information on prices. In so doing,
we distinguish a twofold effect: qualitative, i.e. given by the accuracy of imperfect infor-
mation, and quantitative, i.e. due to the dimension of the group of imperfectly informed
traders. These two influences are studied separately, by considering first- and second-
order effects on prices of all variables that characterize the imperfectly informed trade.
Our main finding is that an intensification of the imperfectly informed trade, either in the
qualitative or in the quantitative sense, entails worse overall trading conditions, i.e. higher
spreads. The same conclusion holds with respect to the impact of perfect information on
prices, although several differences manifest with respect to second-order effects.
Finally, we analyze how prices evolve in time when three simple trading strategies
are employed, one at a time, for generating imperfect information. All these strategies
belong to groups of heuristical methods of wide practical use, such as the technical and
fundamental analysis. In particular, we account for the simplified forms of two chartist
strategies, namely of a momentum and a moving average one, and of one fundamentalist
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strategy. When imperfectly informed traders use the fundamentalist strategy, prices do
not always converge within the considered trading interval or, as the case may be, the
convergence necessitates longer intervals. When prices do converge, they constantly reach
the true risky value. Yet, for both chartist strategies, we observe price convergence across
all considered cases (with different proportions of chartists and different chartist infor-
mation accuracy). Moreover, the momentum strategy always ensures positive profits, the
moving-average one yields merely losses for its supporters, and the fundamentalist strat-
egy makes money only during shorter time intervals or under specific market conditions.
In sum, (some) practical trading rules appear to be able to provide, at least under certain
circumstances and when they are employed in a rational manner, the opportunity of mak-
ing profits; and, in line with Lo (2004), of surviving in the market.129 This supports the
claim of the same author that survival can be reached, among others, through heuristics.
129Lo (2004) argues that in financial markets the most fit for survival are the richest.
CHAPTER2
Emotions and Financial Decision Making
”All learning has an emotional base.”
Plato.
T HIS CHAPTER deals with the role of affect and emotions in financial decision mak-ing. We commence by a review of the main findings on emotions stemming fromother sciences such as psychology and neurobiology. Accordingly, emotions are
indissolubly related to all human decisions and unavoidable to asset trading. Emotions
can even improve human decisions, especially in situations of high uncertainty and time
pressure such as those specific to financial markets.
We contribute to the theoretical study of the emotions’ role in financial markets by devel-
oping a model in which three categories of traders face each other: rational, emotional,
and noise traders. Each of these categories is guided by different perceptions of informa-
tion and different action principles. We suggest a method for quantifying belief formation,
which conforms to the Bayesian logic for the rational traders and complies with affective in-
tuition for the emotional ones. Rational traders maximize expected wealth utility, demands
develop proportionally to subjective beliefs, and prices are linear in the total order flow. Un-
der these assumptions, the best rational strategy in equilibrium is to perfectly adapt to the
market conditions created by the other market participants. In spite of their apparently
simplistic demand strategy and distorted revision of beliefs, emotional traders not only de-
cisively influence prices, but can even make more money than their rational peers. Thus,
prices in (certain) financial markets may represent a thermometer of the market mood and
emotions, rather than informative signals as stated in traditional financial theory.1
1The main ideas of this chapter are based on joint work with Diego Salzman. The current version has
been developed with the help of Michel Baes.
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2.1 Theoretical overview
This section introduces the notion of emotion and addresses its effects on decision making.
As (traditional) Economics mostly abstracts from the existence of emotions, we commence
by resuming the view of neurobiologists and psychologists about what emotions mean at
a psychophysiological level. In the context of the traditional economic assumption regard-
ing the rationality of economic decisions, we subsequently discuss the relation between
emotions and cognition and why emotions are not only indispensable but can even be
beneficial to decision making.
2.1.1 Definition of emotions and related notions
Emotions are defined by Damasio (1996) (p. 139) as “the combination of a mental
evaluative process, simple or complex, with dispositional responses to that process, mostly
toward the body proper, resulting in an emotional body state, but also toward the brain
itself [...] resulting in additional mental changes.” In other words, emotions generate both
a behavior as a reaction to the inducing situation, and a change in internal state which
prepares the organism for that particular behavior.
In order to better understand this definition and how emotions emerge, we rely on a
classification suggested by the same author. This classification uses the closely related
notion of feelings that, according to Damasio (1996), designate the experience of the
changes induced by an emotion, in juxtaposition to the mental images that has initiated
them. Thus, feelings represent perceived emotions, in other words, emotions that became
conscious.2 Feelings imply the (subjective) perception of the stimulus itself, as well as of
the engendered body state and changes in mental processes. Therefore, feelings rely on
cognition,3 specifically the cognition of our body state and of how it modifies under the
influence of the stimulus.
Note however that most authors do not discriminate between emotions and feelings.4
Even Damasio (1996), underlines that both emotions and feelings rely on the same basic
processes.5 As this distinction is of no importance for our model in Section 2.2, after
2Damasio (1996) notes that we can speak about “feelings of emotions”.
3This already emphasizes the close interrelation of affect and cognition discussed in Section 2.1.2.
4For instance, Oatley and Jenkins (1996), talk about emotion as a feeling, namely of what is going
on inside the body. Also, Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000b) (p. 5) define emotions as “states that
comprise feelings [...]”.
5He stresses that these basic processes are two, namely the view of a body state jointly with the mental
images that triggered it and a certain evolution of the accompanying mental processes.
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giving a brief account on the classification of emotions and feelings in Damasio (1996),
we employ the terms of “emotions” and “feelings” interchangeably.
Damasio (1996) classifies emotions and feelings in three main categories.
• The primary (or innate) emotions are specific reactions to particular stimuli, that
rely on innate and inflexible mechanisms. The associated primary feelings are hap-
piness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust. At physiological level, these emotions are
automatically triggered when the limbic system – especially the amygdala – recog-
nizes the respective stimulus. Hence, stimuli entail responses before and/or without
necessarily becoming conscious. This type of emotions is shaped to ensure that the
organism survives. It is not specific to humans. Yet in humans, primary emotions
are mostly followed by the corresponding feelings, so that, becoming conscious, they
can be predicted and controlled.
• The secondary emotions can be felt as variations of primary feelings, such as eupho-
ria, melancholy, panic, shyness, remorse, embarrassment, or vindication. Secondary
emotions are acquired as, in the course of individual experience, the human mind
systematically associates primary emotions to a broader range of encountered stimuli
and situations. At physiological level, secondary emotions need not only the sup-
port of the limbic system but also the participation of prefrontal and somatosensory
cortices.
• Apart from the feelings that stem from emotions, there is another category of feelings
relying on background body states. Therefore, they are denoted as background
feelings and are mostly generated by body states that prevail between emotional
states. Thus, background feelings are of low intensity. The collection of background
feelings that persist over a longer period (such as hours or days) is denoted as mood.
This classification of emotions already points out further terminology nuances, this
time in terms of duration. According to Oatley and Jenkins (1996), emotions last for
short intervals of time, up to several hours. In contrast, moods stretch over more days
or weeks, while personal traits accompany us over years or the whole lifespan. Again,
we do not differentiate among these technical terms, as they all denote emotional states
of different length and intensity, but which may become manifest in similar ways in our
model. Finally, the affect is a more general term that includes emotions, moods, and
feelings. According to Damasio (1999), it refers to how we emotionally experience certain
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stimuli and situations and this every day of our lives, independently of the current mood.
We employ the term “affect” in the same general sense, and underline that it always
includes emotions.6
Clearly, emotions are not simple mental processes, but complex and varied collections
of responses that imply a whole range of mental and physical transformations. Oatley
and Jenkins (1996) distinguish among several – tightly linked – stages of emotions. They
correspond, in essence, to the above definition of emotions.
1. Accordingly, emotions start by the evaluation of the trigger event. This is the
appraisal phase that consists of recognizing the relevance of the event itself.7
2. In the subsequent phase of context evaluation, thoughts about the context serve to
the evaluation of the context of the trigger event, such as the meaning of the event
and how to cope with it.
3. Emotions can then be identified with the action readiness,8 the setting of priorities,
and the prompting of plans. Different types of action readiness describe distinct
emotions.
4. Finally, emotions get around to be experienced, namely as mental states that are
often accompanied by physiological changes, expressions, and/or actions. Although
these collateral manifestations may let us recognize the respective emotion, there is
mostly no one-to-one correspondence system.
Note that further definitions and classifications of emotions can be found in the litera-
ture. Although they focus on slightly different aspects, all of them include the same main
characteristics of emotions that emerge from the definitions and classifications presented
above, i.e. the tendency to act, the resulting bodily changes, and the valence. There are
yet several interesting views to note. Thus, Frijda (1986) implicitly connects emotions to
cognitive antecedents (i.e. beliefs) (see the subsequent Section 2.1.2 for a more detailed
6A last term occurring in the literature but unused in the present work is sentiment. In line with
Frijda and Mesquita (2000), sentiments are emotions that turned into long-term beliefs.
7Note that this recognition is not necessarily conscious. According to the same authors, appraisal pro-
files explicitly characterize different emotions and are shaped according to several appraisal features. Such
features are: the goal relevance, according to which the event is categorized as emotional or non-emotional
(and discarded as irrelevant in the latter case), the goal congruence that entails positive emotions (such as
happiness, love, pride) or negative emotions (such as anger, fear, sadness), and the type of ego involvement
in the event (such as neutral, enhancing, or damaging self-esteem).
8The readiness to act constitutes, according to Frijda (1986), the core of an emotion.
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discussion on the interdependency between affect and cognition).9 Oatley and Jenkins
(1996) divide emotions into basic categories, underlining the fact that they can be both
conscious and unconscious.10 Finally, Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) rely on the moment
when emotions are experienced in order to distinguish between expected and immediate
emotions.11
2.1.2 Emotions and decision making
Primarily, economists either negated any significant influence of emotions on decision mak-
ing or reckoned emotions as undesirable due to their exclusively negative consequences.12
According to the latter view, emotions would distort pure rational behavior, which was
assumed as the comportment norm of economic agents. Even research in psychology
and neurobiology has initially focussed on the cognitive aspects of decision making. For
instance, the original heuristics-and-biases program of Kahneman and Tversky – a cor-
nerstone of behavioral finance – accounts for the failures (i.e. fallacies) resulting from the
employment of simple decision rules, called heuristics,13 on the decision rationality.14 The
analyzed heuristics were mainly cognitive,15 yet emotions were considered to enlarge the
panoply of causes for such faulty behavior patterns.
9Specifically, Frijda (1986) and Elster (2003) define emotions by means of six features that serve to
distinguish them from other visceral factors, such as hunger, pain, etc. (For a more detailed analysis
on visceral factors and their effects on economic decisions, see Loewenstein (2000).) These features are:
cognitive antecedents, which account for the fact that emotions are triggered by beliefs, intentional objects,
pointing out that emotions have an object (this contradicts yet the claim that emotions are not necessarily
conscious; see the classification in Oatley and Jenkins (1996) below), physiological arousal, that refers to
the bodily changes induced by emotions, physiological expressions, that sometimes allow us to recognize
the respective emotion, the valence, that describes the location of emotions on the pleasure-pain scale,
and action tendencies, with the character of urges or impulses.
10Specifically, emotions are classified into nine basic functional families. All of them are based in the
limbic system, but each of them sets the brain into different modes of organization (see Section 2.1.2
for further details on this cognitive function of emotions). Thus, emotions can be free-floating, that is,
unintentional and unconscious. Happiness, sadness, anger and fear belong to this category. There are yet
emotions that always have an object, that is, they are felt towards a certain goal. For example attachment
love, caregiving love, sexual love, disgust, and contempt.
11Accordingly, experienced emotions represent expectations of the emotions that will be experienced
by choosing a certain decision alternative. They have been incorporated in recent economic models of
decision making. Immediate emotions are experienced at the time of decision making and can drive
behavior in directions opposed to the long-run evaluation of the decision problem.
12See Smith (1759) and Peters and Slovic (2000). As noted in Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000b) and
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003), the negative view of emotions is common to philosophy, literature, and
even law.
13For more details on heuristics see subsequent comments in this section.
14See Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002) for a summary of the main work in this respect.
15The three main heuristics considered in the original paper of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) are the
representativeness, the availability, and the adjustment and anchoring. Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
reformulate them as the attribute substitution and the affect heuristic.
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However, psychologists and neurobiologists are the first to recognize the fact that,
desirable or not, emotions always impact on human decisions. Thus, emotions are de-
scribed as “the very center of human mental life” (Oatley and Jenkins (1996), p. 122)
and regarded as our link to the outside world.
In this framework, emotions are proved to show both disruptive (i.e. negative) and
functional (i.e. positive) effects on decision making. According to Damasio (1996) and
Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000b), the negative effects occur for example when emotions
have no object and can be misattributed to false causes, entailing biases against objective
facts or interfering with working memory. Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) mention several
main reasons for such negative effects: First, emotions that have evolved to solve certain
decision problems may be incompatible with the current environment; Second, the emo-
tions experienced at the time of decision making (the immediate emotions) are extremely
sensitive to non-normative guiding factors of behavior and also distort evaluations of the
probability and value of choice alternatives. In the same spirit, Simon (1967) observes that
emotions may become disruptive when the triggering stimuli are intense and persistent,
and repeatedly interrupt and hence prevent an organized behavioral response.16
The more recent perspective over emotions has however changed. (See Elster (1999).)
Damasio (1996) suggests that emotions turn into suitable decision tools when the quality of
decisions is measured by the survival in a given environment. The main reason is that, as
underlined in Oatley and Jenkins (1996), emotions serve to focus on certain events and to
discard irrelevant decisions alternatives. Since deciding well means very often – especially
under time pressure, uncertainty, and limited resources – deciding fast and well enough,
emotions represent survival-oriented (i.e. adaptive) instruments developed in the course
of our biological evolution. As emphasized in Elster (2003), emotions improve decision
making in twofold respect: first by avoiding the delay of (vital) decisions. In other words,
emotions help us to make some decision; And second by improving the decision quality
that could be achieved exclusively by rational deliberation.
Numerous recent studies detail the motivation and implications of emotions as bene-
ficial decision making tools. We commence by supporting evidence from psychology and
neurobiology. This evidence serves the purpose of better understanding the psychophys-
iological mechanisms of emotions, and hence the origins and the manifestations of their
16He also notes that emotional behavior can be learned. This can both enhance and reduce the
“emotionality” of responses, the former when occuring emotions stop the process of fulfilling real-time
needs and the latter by adaptive improvement of the reaction programs.
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positive features. Also, it helps to better define the relation between emotions and ratio-
nality.
In this context, the somatic markers hypothesis of Damasio (1996) is one of the main
theories meant to explain how emotions occur, to which extent they imply the body and/or
the brain, and which is the valence of their impact on decision making. Somatic markers
are defined as instances of feelings connected – by learning and experience accumulated
during education and socialization – to secondary emotions. Their function is to “label”
decision alternatives as favorable or dangerous.17 A first general consequence of this la-
belling is underlined in Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002): Since they mark
the mental representations of reality (as positive or negative), somatic markers – hence
emotions – direct the decision making. Second, Damasio (1996) argues that the choice
alternatives marked as dangerous are automatically eliminated. Thus, somatic markers
provide for reducing the number of choice options and hence for fastening decisions. This
is a crucial feature in particular in dynamic environments and/or when decisions need to
be made under time pressure, as it is the case on financial markets. Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, and MacGregor (2002) stress as well that, in spite of the importance of the delib-
eration in certain decision making situations, affect and emotions provide a faster, easier,
and more efficient way to cope with the environmental complexity and uncertainty.18 The
somatic markers hypothesis explains in detail a fact apparent from the definition but with
important implications for decision making: Emotions can be rooted in both the body
and the brain. The usual inducers of emotions are representations of objects or situations
that can come either from the outside world and elicit bodily reactions or from inside of
the organism, being entirely triggered in the brain. Consequently, emotional reactions do
not necessarily respond to real stimuli, in which case they are even faster and may be
more difficult to control.19 We can thus conclude that emotions play an adaptive – hence
necessary and positive – role in decision making.
The beneficial aspects of emotions for decision making can be further motivated in
17In other words, somatic markers provide criteria for ranking the choice alternatives.
18They even speak about an “affective rationality”, as the optimal behavior may be achieved by means
of the affect.
19Damasio (1996) offers more details on the functioning of somatic markers. They are mainly experi-
enced as bodily responses to external stimuli and many feelings stem indeed from changes of the bodily
state. This mechanism is denoted as the body loop. However, our brains appear to have evolved in order
to minimize the reaction time and the energy consumption during the response to certain stimuli. Certain
neural devices, that help us to feel “as if” bodily changes would occur, have been developed. The trigger
signals are now entirely processed by the brain and do not necessitate the intervention of the body. This
corresponds to the so-called as-if loop. Of course, the core condition for such “bypass devices” to start
functioning is that the process implying actual bodily reactions had run at least once.
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view of the relation between rationality and emotions. It is not possible to draw a clear
separation line between these phenomena, either with respect to their development at
physiological level or to their impact on decision making. In effect, the mechanism of
behavior is based on the interaction of rational and emotional processes. Yet, as all
cognitive processes not only rely on emotions but are also framed by them, “emotions may
be an indispensable foundation for rationality” (Damasio (1996), p. 164). In particular,
since emotions are indissolubly related to the body (see the definition in Section 2.1.1),
they guide all posterior mental processes, hence all cognitive processes which are slower
and arise subsequently. Moreover, emotions themselves require the intermediation of
both the brain core (viewed as the center of affect) and the cortex (viewed as the center
of cognition).20 Furthermore, Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000b) consider that beliefs –
hence cognition – are not sufficient to initiate action, they need the support of emotional
impulses. Accordingly, “emotions can awaken, intrude into, and shape beliefs [...]” (p. 5).
This occurs in that emotions can either create new beliefs or change the strength of
existent ones (i.e. amplify or alter them, and/or increase their resistance to change).21
In essence, emotions appear to guide cognition.22 Damasio (1996) explains that somatic
markers boost the other two supporting mechanisms of reasoning, i.e. the attention and
the working memory, throughout the cognitive system.23 This idea is reinforced by Oatley
and Jenkins (1996), who argue that emotions have two main cognitive properties. The first
is the management of action and is intermediated by the so-called informational signals
carried by emotions. These signals carry information about events that caused the emotion
and commands to specific destinations. Thus, emotions change the readiness to act. The
second cognitive function of emotions is to set the cognitive system into distinct modes
of organization. This is achieved through specific signals that control brain organization
but have no informational content. The effects of this brain structuring are to modify
perception, to direct attention, to give preferential access to certain memories, and to
bias thinking. Thus, emotions guide the cognitive search for possible plans. Note that
20On the one hand, emotions can be characterized as concrete, cognitive and neural. On the other hand,
although rational processes occur in the newest part of the human brain, i.e. the neocortex, rationality
actually implies the collaboration of neocortical and subcortical regions. It is intrinsically related to the
biological regulation that occurs in the older brain areas, such as the brain stem and the limbic system
that is the center of emotions.
21In addition, Frijda and Mesquita (2000) argue that emotions include the formation of beliefs and
stimulate their elaboration.
22Or, as stressed in Loewenstein and Lerner (2003), emotions serve an essential function in coordinating
cognition and behavior.
23This claim is equivalent to the assertion in Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000b) that emotions provide
information and guide attention.
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control signals may be accompanied by informational ones (which gives rise to feelings),
but although this is often the case, it is not absolutely necessary.24
In the same context of the necessary and positive contribution of emotions to deci-
sion making, researchers have also focused on economical aspects, such as the decision
optimality measured in terms of opportunity costs. They show that pure rationality is
merely a theoretical abstraction and emotions can foster decision optimality in practical
situations. As already emphasized in Simon (1967), the human knowledge and informa-
tion processing capacities are limited. These limitations turn into constraints for real
decision problems and make a fully rational search through all possible alternatives – as
self-evident according to the traditional economic theory of rational agents – virtually
impossible. In practice, the search for the best decision alternative stops either when the
goal has been achieved, or when a certain amount of time has elapsed, or, in the majority
of cases, at a partial solution that is found to be satisfactory. The latter is denoted in
Simon (1967) as satisficing.25
Search and stopping rules are assessed in real life by means of “shortcut rules” called
heuristics.26 As already mentioned, the heuristics-and-biases program of Kahneman and
Tversky develops this idea focussing on cognitive heuristics and on their negative impact
on decision making. In contrast, Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC research group (eds.)
(1999) introduce the concept of fast and frugal heuristics. As models of bounded rational-
ity, they are meant to replace the theoretical idealization of decision making referred to as
unbounded rationality. Accordingly, fast and frugal heuristics guide search in twofold man-
ner: First, they define easily computable stopping rules and hence constitute one possible
form of satisficing. Second, they provide facile decision rules, that represent a trade-off
between generality and specificity. The fast and frugal heuristics are consequently rules
of thumb that can lead to accurate and useful decisions. They are considered to be a part
of the set of specialized cognitive mechanisms developed in the course of the human evo-
lution that are shaped to cope with the environmental challenges.27 Moreover, fast and
frugal heuristics perform well when their structure is adapted to the environment.28 As
24This occurs for instance in case of free-floating emotions.
25For a more detailed description of satisficing, see Simon (1982).
26According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary at www.merriam-webster.com, the term “heuristic”
comes from the Greek “heuriskein” and means “to discover”.
27This set is denoted by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) as the “adaptive toolbox”. For more details
hereon and on the fast-and-frugal heuristics program see Gigerenzer and Selten (1999).
28Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) denote such a situation as “ecological rationality”. Fast and frugal
heuristics are ecologically rational in environments with noncompensatory information, scarce informa-
tion, T-shaped distributions, or decreasing populations. Moreover, fast and frugal heuristics are consid-
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they consist of a small set of simple rules, fast and frugal heuristics are mostly robust to
environmental changes.29 Beside cognitive heuristics, emotions are considered to belong
to this type of heuristic principles. As Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002)
mention, rationality of decisions should rather be understood in terms of “deciding in
the best interests”. Since interests depend on individual and environmental constraints,
heuristics – in particular, emotions – ensure adaption and can provide the best solution
to the constrained decision problems addressed above.
Moreover, Oatley and Jenkins (1996) recall two further reasons that can additionally
impede full rationality: First, the same individual usually envisages multiple and often
contradictory goals. Second, the achievement of these goals mostly involves other people
and hence the coordination of their own and others’ actions. Since emotions provide guid-
ance in such ambiguous and complex situations, they become necessary for complementing
reasoning.30 In essence, emotions serve as judgment and decision making heuristics, espe-
cially when the analyzed situation is complex and the mental resources limited (see Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002)). They provide for the ability of deciding when
the corresponding rational decision faculty cannot act (at full power) given the internal
and external constraints. Thus, they supplement and enhance rationality, as argued in
Elster (2003).
The two different views of heuristics as biases (Kahneman and Tversky) and as adap-
tive tools (Gigerenzer and colleagues) are reconciliated in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman
(2002). The simultaneous occurrence of positive and negative effects of emotions on deci-
sion making can be accordingly explained in terms of dual processes. These processes also
shed a new light on the controversy regarding rationality and emotions and complete the
explanations given above. According to Kahneman and Frederick (2002), two systems for
judgment and choice operate in parallel and interact in generating final human behav-
iors.31 They can be described following Sloman (2002), Stanovich and West (2002), and
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002). Thus, System 1 (also called the associa-
tive or the experiential system) relies on temporal and similarity relations, in one word on
perception (or intuition). It maps the reality into images with affective load. Moreover,
ered as “socially rational”, i.e. they guide behavior in fast changing environments, where decisions have
to be coordinated with other individuals.
29The main classes of fast and frugal heuristics studied in Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) are ignorance-
based heuristics, one-reason decision making, elimination heuristics, and satisficing heuristics.
30Oatley and Jenkins (1996), argue that this guidance especially concerns our social relations. It is the
result of making available a set of action alternatives already stored in the brain.
31See also Kahneman (2003) for an overview over the two-system model.
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it mostly involves automatic (thus fast), heuristic-based, spontaneous, intuitive, and ef-
fortless processes and entails highly contextualized, personalized, and socialized inferences
and predictions. In contrast, System 2 (also the rule-based or the rational system) is based
on a set of abstract variables and rules of logic and evidence. It is deliberative, effortful,
slow, analytical, and strategic. Put in a different way, it acts in accordance with reason (or
knowledge). It mainly involves controlled (thus slow) processes and yields more general
mental representations. The interaction of these two systems complies with the principle
of collaboration, yet their responses may strongly diverge from each other. In such cases,
System 1 features primacy, since its automatic response is faster and effortless, while
System 2 controls – and can overrule – the associative reaction. Also, the two systems are
intrinsically related and support each other. For instance, rule-based reasoning is needed
to develop associative structures, whereas associative reasoning becomes necessary when
rules are inaccessible – such as in new situations or environments – and is helpful when
knowledge has been already integrated in our mental landscape.
Lo (2004) develops these ideas even further in his adaptive markets hypothesis. This
hypothesis attempts to reconciliate market efficiency with behavioral evidence that has
been originally interpreted as a counterexample of rationality and thus of efficiency. The
adaptive markets hypothesis builds on evolutionary principles, stressing that individuals
act in self-interest, make mistakes, learn and adapt. Thus, their behavior is not necessarily
intrinsic and exogenous, but evolves by natural selection and depends on the particular
environment in which the selection occurs. In this context, individuals are organisms
that attempt to maximize the survival of their genetic material (in other words, of their
species). In financial markets, survival of the fittest becomes survival of the richest. The
sole objective and the organizing principle of markets is survival, while the maximization of
profits, utility, etc. remains just an aspect of market ecology. Survival is reached through
satisficing, and stopping rules are determined through trial and error. This implies that
choices rely on past experience and best guesses of the optimum, and learning occurs by
receiving positive/negative reinforcement from the choice outcomes. Moreover, decision
rules (e.g. trading or investment strategies) consist of heuristics that provide the best
adaptation to the environment. Naturally, as the environment changes, the heuristics
employed might not be suitable anymore, so they entail “irrational” behavior. Therefore,
strategies follow cycles of profitability and loss in response to the variation of the market
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conditions.32
2.1.3 Emotional traders
As most of the findings presented above are obtained in an experimental context, the
main challenge remains to establish to what extent and how emotions become manifest
in real settings, in particular in financial markets.
Lo and Repin (2002) conduct a first field study with ten professional traders during
their trading activity.33 Using financial real-time data, they define different type of events,
such as deviations from the mean, trend reversals, or volatility events. Standard neuro-
biological measurement of psychophysiological responses34 allows for the quantification
of the real-time traders’ emotions during these events. The results point out significant
differences in mean psychophysiological responses of all traders during transient events35
and high volatility phases.36 Although the more experienced traders exhibit weaker emo-
tional reactions, it is clear that emotions always become manifest. This even occurs to
professional traders who can be considered as the most “rational” market participants
(due to their training and the resources at their disposal). Lo and Repin (2002) conclude
that emotions are significant determinants of the evolutionary fitness of financial traders.
However, this study has not allowed for measuring the impact of emotions on per-
formance, as the earning recordings were confidential data. To this end, Lo, Repin, and
Steenbarger (2002) perform another field-experiment, this time with 80 participants in a
day-trading program between July-August 2002. The emotional responses of the subjects
are measured during a month, this time indirectly, by means of a questionnaire that be-
came standard in psychology in studying emotional responses.37 The main finding is that
extreme emotional responses are contra-productive for the trading performance.38
32Lo (2004) concludes that market efficiency is highly contextual and dynamic, and that the market
equilibrium should rather be understood as a steady-state limit under constant environmental conditions.
However, markets are mostly not in equilibrium and, since evolution depends on the environmental
conditions, there is no specific direction of evolution.
33The traders are from a major financial institution in Boston.
34I.e. the responses of the autonomous nervous system, specifically the skin conductance, the blood
pressure, the heart rate, electromyographic data, the respiration rate, and the body temperature.
35Which become manifest by an increased electrodermal response.
36Where the cardiovascular response is significantly enhanced.
37I.e. the UWIST-MACL (University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Mood Adjective
Checklist). This questionnaire allows to evaluate the two major dimensions of emotions: valence and
arousal. To this end, all emotions are defined after the combinations of pleasant/unpleasant and acti-
vated/deactivated states. The measurements are performed before, during, and after the trade.
38The overall results are yet less clear: Pleasant (unpleasant) states appear to increase (decrease)
performance, but not in a significant way. Arousal is somewhat less significant as valence and top
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Furthermore, in a controversial experiment Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, and
Damasio (2000) find that emotionally impaired subjects are more willing to gamble for
high stakes than non-impaired people, as they do not experience the unpleasant feeling
of loss. Even more surprising is the fact that people with brain damages generally make
better financial decisions than those with normal IQs.
In sum, these studies, although somewhat scarce, reinforce the experimental evidence
and speak for the manifestation of emotions in real financial markets. Our model in
Section 2.2 adopts a theoretical perspective and attempts to show the important role that
emotions can play in financial decision making. In particular, we are interested in the
use of emotions as an analytical toolbox employed to establish trading strategies that
appear to be as good as – if not better than – rational ones, in order to ensure survival
in competitive environments.
To this end, we design a market where three main categories of traders confront with
each other by trading one risky asset. Two of these categories are common to market
microstructure models: the rational traders and the noise traders. The former form beliefs
by combining prior and current information in a balanced Bayesian way, and attempt to
maximize expected utility of wealth. The latter act randomly, driven by exogenous reasons
such as liquidity needs. In addition, we introduce a new category of market participants,
denoted as emotional traders, who follow their intuition in both forming beliefs with
respect to future price evolutions and formulating periodical demands. Our rational and
emotional traders typify the two-system logic addressed above in this section: While
rational traders are characterized by the deliberate rule-based System 2, the associative
and intuitional System 1 governs emotional decisions.
Although our setting is theoretical and could merely be tested by means of numerical
simulations, we believe that it does not lie so far from reality. First, the three trader
categories resemble real markets; There we can find professional traders who dispose of
sufficient resources and motivation in order to make decisions in a way approaching the
rational type, as well as trades impelled by exogenous reasons, similar to the random
actions of the noise traders in our model. Moreover, some market participants may
speculate on public information in an intuitive and affect-driven way. The motivation for
the existence of a trader category such as our emotional traders relies on the evidence
performers seem less emotionally affected. In addition, no correlation between trader profiles and certain
personality traits (such as extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness) could
be detected.
86 Chapter 2– Emotions and Financial Decision Making
presented at the beginning of this section.
Second, further assumptions of our model, such as the belief formation and the general
“logic” followed by emotional traders in shaping their demands (i.e. affect and intuition),
also receive support from neurobiology and psychology. For instance, the fact that beliefs
form by the superposition of past and current evidence is not only a theoretical idealization
that underlies the Bayes rule. Damasio (1996) argues that the acquisition of somatic-
marker signaling – that we know from the above comments in this section to guide decision
making – occurs in the prefrontal cortices. This area receives signals regarding existing
and incoming knowledge of external world, innate biological preferences, and the changes
of body states as a consequence of this knowledge and of these preferences. In other
words, prior and current information stemming from both outside and inside world is
combined here and generates somatic markers. Recall however that our mind does not
work on real information, but on individual representations of reality. They form exactly
in these prefrontal cortices and are categorized in the perspective of personal relevance. In
addition, Damasio (1996) considers a matter of individuality the extent to which decision
making depends on real somatic states or symbols of them. Hence, it is plausible to assume
that some individuals rely more than others on their mind images of reality in forming
beliefs. Also, triggering activities from the brain – specifically from “as if” body states
generated in emotional areas – can unconsciously bias the cognitive processes. According
to the same author this biasing can yet be for the better, as the chances of potentially
negative decisions are reduced and deliberation time gained. Damasio (1996) denotes
this covert mechanism as intuition and it becomes the guiding principle of our emotional
traders.
Third, in the same context of belief formation, the possibility that, in reality, some
traders may overemphasize the current evidence on the account of their affect-driven be-
havior is further supported by the remark in Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor
(2002) that the precision of the affective meaning of a stimulus influences the ability to
use information and hence its evaluability. Thus, impressions with a more intense affec-
tive load receive a higher weight in impression formation, judgment, and decision making.
Also, as previously mentioned in this section, emotions represent the key ingredient in
the formation and change of beliefs.39 Finally, the case when emotional traders can put
excessive weight on past elements of beliefs is confirmed – among others – by the remark
39The relation between emotions and beliefs is exhaustively studied in Frijda, Manstead, and Bem
(2000a).
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in Sloman (2002) that reasoning can be affected by the so called “belief bias”. Specifi-
cally, a-priori formed beliefs can inhibit logic responses that account for current evidence.
These two opposed tendencies to over- or underweight prior relative to current evidence
correspond further to the heuristics of representativeness and conservatism, respectively.40
They both become frequently manifest in real decision situations.41 Note that, since rep-
resentativeness stands for an extensive concept with multiple manifestations, we will use
in Section 2.2 the denomination of impulsiveness for the specific manifestation of rep-
resentativeness which is the neglect of prior relative to current information. Also, as
noted by Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002), both heuristics can be used simultaneously in
real decision situations, depending on the framing of the decision problem (see Hoffrage
(2004)). In other words, putting the same situation in a different light can make the same
person to act either overconfidently or conservatively.
As discussed by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002), relying on emotions
can have negative consequences. This occurs either in response to unknown stimuli, for
which the experiential system is not prepared, or when other people try to manipulate
affective reactions. The former situation receives support in our hypothetical setting:
When an excessive emphasis is put on new evidence, emotional traders are mostly worse
off than their rational peers (and even than pure noise traders). This is reasonable to
expect when, for instance, emotional traders are confronted with totally new situations,
for which they have developed no intuition, so that “following their noses” cannot be very
helpful. However, we do not account for manipulative actions, as our rational traders
do not attempt to change perceptions; They simply adapt to them, while the rest of the
traders manifest no concern with other groups’ actions.
40The representativeness is one of the three basic heuristics of Kahneman and Tversky’s program.
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), it occurs when judgments of probability are replaced by
judgments of similarity, so that objects are ascribed to categories on the basis of the correspondence
in terms of few – and often irrelevant – features of the respective category. In particular, Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) argue that representativeness entails insensitivity to prior outcomes, to sample size, to
predictability, misconception of chance, of regression, and illusion of validity.
41Teigen (2004) notes that the representativeness heuristic can be easily employed due to its minimal
requirements concerning the amount of cognitive resources. Moreover, it applies to a wide range of
situations where the objective probabilities cannot be calculated, and mostly offers the correct result
for simple problems. Therefore, in practice, people often tend to rely on representativeness instead of
probability judgements. In contrast, Wallsten (1972) argues that conservative people tend to misinterpret
information, to aggregate it in a wrong way or to manifest response biases against the use of very small
or very large probabilities.
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2.2 Emotions and financial decision making
2.2.1 Introduction
For many years, Economics has relied on the fallacy that people exclusively apply rational
calculations to economic decisions and rule their lives by economic models. A commonly
considered feature of rationality is the capacity of forming and revising beliefs by com-
bining prior information with new evidence. This process is formally described by the
so-called Bayes rule.42 It is important to note that, according to this rule, identical weights
are ascribed to the past and current elements of information that are pooled together in
the new belief.
In Economics and more specifically in Finance, the traditional theory relies on the
assumption that traders are able to process the relevant information at their disposal and
to form unbiased probability judgments based on the Bayes rule.43 As the entire market
information thus becomes part of agents’ beliefs and hence of prices, markets are efficient
and prices informative in the traditional framework (Samuelson 1965). This concept is
known as the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970). Consequently, this assumption
rules out every opportunity to make profits by forecasting future prices.
However, psychologists have wondered if the Bayes rule truly describes how people
revise their beliefs. Following Birnbaum (2004), we can classify their opinions in three
periods: An early one that supports the Bayesian rule as a rough descriptive model of
how humans combine and update evidence; A second period dominated by Kahneman and
Tversky’s assertion that people do not use base rates (i.e. prior information) or respond
to differences in validity of sources of evidence; And a more recent period showing that
people indeed rely on base rates and source credibility, but combine this information by
means of an averaging model which is not consistent with the Bayes rule.44
Another common assumption of classic economic models is that rational agents are
maximizers of utility, which is derived, for instance, from consumption or wealth. Their
42Rational decision making under uncertainty has always been associated with Bayesian inference.
This concept, named after the reverend and mathematician Thomas Bayes and first extended by Laplace
(1774), can be seen as the cornerstone of economic decision theory. In a nutshell, the Bayes rule tells how
to revise beliefs (rationally) by combining prior and new information. These two pieces of information
are described respectively by two random variable distributions, where the second is conditional on the
first one.
43See, for instance, the notes on the expected utility theory from Section 3.1.2, especially Footnote 87.
44The distinctive feature of the averaging model is that the directional impact of information depends
on the relation between the new evidence and the current opinion, as stressed in Birnbaum and Stegner
(1979) and Anderson (1981).
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actions are therefore guided by a (somewhat) strategic view over the course of action to
be taken and how this affects the entire market evolution.
However, numerous empirical studies have emphasized the perpetuated existence of
traders who employ a small number of simple and quick rules of thumb in order to make
decisions under uncertainty. These traders are referred to as “not fully” or “quasi rational”
and their action rules as heuristics. Heuristics appear to be based on strong emotional
components. They can sometimes lead to systematic mistakes, denoted as biases. Nev-
ertheless, heuristics have proved to be useful in practice, especially when decisions have
to be made under time constraints, uncertainty, or huge amounts of information. More
details on what heuristics are and on their role in decision making can be found in the
above Section 2.1.2.
Within the last years, a new paradigm which tries to integrate the classical finan-
cial theory with the behavioral perspective has been developed in Lo (2004) under the
name of the adaptive markets hypothesis. As stressed in the same Section 2.1.2, it is
based on Darwin’s theory of evolution and considers individuals as organisms that try to
maximize the survival of their species. During the decision making process, they develop
heuristics in order to maximize the efficiency of their responses to uncertainty. However,
since the environment is constantly changing, we can observe behavioral biases given the
maladaptation to new circumstances.
The natural question arising in this context is if traders who follow their intuition
and affect – in particular their emotions – and use heuristics can survive when confronted
with rational traders and if so, under which conditions. This section attempts to further
explore this question and hence to determine if the rational decision making represents
the unique path towards survival in uncertain environments such as financial markets. To
this end, we rely on market microstructure features and incorporate the role of emotions
in financial decision making.
Specifically, we design a market with three groups of traders: rational traders, emo-
tional traders, and noise traders. These categories – which can be viewed in an evolution-
ary perspective, as species – differ in the way they form beliefs and make decisions.
In essence, the belief formation is based on how information is perceived. In this con-
text, rational traders consider both prior and current information to be equally important
in order to infer price evolutions. They perform what we denote as a balanced combi-
nation of elements of information, in the Bayesian spirit. In addition, rational traders
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account for the existence of other traders with specific beliefs and their possible influence
on prices. In contrast, emotional traders remain unconcerned with the existence of other
traders and tend to under- or over-weight the prior relative to the current information.
Thus, they act either impulsively or conservatively, being guided by their affective per-
sonality traits.45 Such behaviors represent manifestations of frequent thinking heuristics.
Note that, as noise traders are assumed to trade randomly, we are not interested in their
beliefs.46
Emotional traders differ from their rational peers also with respect to the way in
which they act, in particular to their demand strategy. In the vein of classical Economics,
rational traders maximize the expected utility of wealth. Emotional traders simply follow
their intuition. Specifically, they trade in accordance with their subjective beliefs in the
price evolution. The emotional demand strategy can be considered as an example of
action heuristics. As mentioned above, noise traders act randomly. Further details on
the theoretical foundation, the intuition, and the implications of these assumptions can
be found in Section 2.1.3.
We show that emotional traders exert an important influence on prices. The market
equilibrium can be reached if rational traders adapt to the conditions created by emotional
traders and their noise peers. In other words, the best rational strategy is to take into
account the existence of other strategies. This appears to be indeed the most “rational”
way, both in the classic sense (since thereby the goal of expected utility maximization
is reached) and in an evolutionary sense (since adaption should ensure survival). How-
ever, rational traders are not necessarily accumulating the highest wealth in the market.
They can be worse off than emotional traders and even systematically lose money. We
theoretically derive the conditions under which such a situation occurs. In addition, we
empirically explore possible parameter constellations that facilitate an emotional lead over
rational traders. For instance, rational traders perform better than impulsive emotional
traders but worse than conservative ones. In sum, our results support the possibility
that emotional traders can survive – and even dominate the market – in spite of their
apparently simplistic strategy and “distorted” belief formation processes.
Moreover, our simulations indicate that market evolutions are not necessarily per-
45In essence, emotional traders can be considered to be quite young and self confident and having no
formal education concerning financial markets. Thus, they do not analyze the market development using
sophisticated tools but instead rely on their own intuition and experience in the market.
46Since these beliefs cannot affect their actions.
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turbed by the emotional presence. Our markets are always stable in response to singular
shocks (in particular, log-returns are stationary). They even come close to efficiency when
emotional traders perceive past evidence to be at least as important as new one, in other
words when they think conservatively. A too elevated presence of emotional traders in
the market can yet destabilize the trade of insufficiently liquid assets.
The remainder of the section is organized as follows: Section 2.2.2 presents our the-
oretical model following the main steps of the price emergence. In particular, we first
formalize the formation of group specific beliefs by combination of prior and current el-
ements of information. Second, we show how traders formulate their demands based on
these subjective beliefs. To this end, we detail the price setting rule and subsequently
the demand strategies of each trader group. The price formation is thirdly addressed.
Fourthly, we derive the individual wealth of the different trader categories. Finally, we
study an extension of the model in a particular case with dynamic belief updating. The
applicative Section 2.2.3 comments on the simulation results – in particular log-returns,
individual demands, and individual wealth and wealth growth – obtained under various
parameter constellations. The final Section 2.2.4 summarizes the main findings. Interme-
diate mathematical proofs and further graphical results are included in Appendix A.2.
2.2.2 Theoretical model
This section shows how the subjective beliefs of different market participants can be
translated into prices. After defining the main trader categories denoted as trader groups,
we first model their subjective beliefs about the current price evolution. These subjective
opinions originate in the mindset specific to each trader group and shape the trader
actions. Thus, we can subsequently formulate the demand strategy of each trader group.
In so doing, we rely on the assumption that prices develop proportionally to the current
total order flow received by the market maker. Finally, we show how prices result from
demands, considering that they are set by the market maker to be proportional to the
current total order flow. As a result, we can quantify the influence of different trader
groups – specifically, of their beliefs, demand strategies, and number – on market prices
and assess the evolution of their wealth. At the end of this section, we extend our
perspective by analyzing a setting with dynamic belief updating, where current subjective
beliefs serve as prior beliefs at the subsequent trade.
We consider that our population of traders is divided into three groups: rational
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traders, emotional traders, and noise traders. Formally, these groups are referred to by
the superscripts r, e, and n, respectively. We assume that each group is homogenous with
respect to thinking and actions.
In particular, the rational traders follow the basic principles of rational trading: They
form beliefs by combining prior and current information in a balanced Bayesian way and
attempt to maximize expected utility of wealth. In contrast, emotional traders merely
follow their intuition. This occurs first in evaluating the importance of different sources of
information accessed in order to form opinions, and second in translating these opinions
into periodical demands. Noise traders do not follow any particular strategy. They act
randomly, being driven by exogenous reasons, such as liquidity needs. Therefore, their
opinions play no role with respect to the price evolution.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the time is discretised. The trade develops
over t = 1, . . . , T times. The trade object is a single risky asset. At each trade t and
simultaneously, the traders submit market orders for buying or selling this asset, according
to their own strategies and hence based on their subjective beliefs. These orders are
received and (fully) executed by a market maker, whose (sole) function is to set prices.47
All traders, as well as the market maker, are risk neutral and competitive. From a
microstructural point of view, this setting resembles to Kyle (1985), as described in Section
1.1.1. We are not interested in the bid-ask spread, but in how market liquidity fluctuates
in consequence of trader actions.
Belief formation
In this subsection, we are primarily interested in how traders perceive information that
they subsequently incorporate in their trading strategies. In particular, we focus on the
mental processes developed by rational and emotional traders in order to create and revise
their beliefs. Since noise traders act randomly, we do not need to consider the way in
which they perceive information.
At each time t, every market participant has access to the public information set,
denoted as zt−1. This set consists of past prices and past total order flows. Note that
all variables employed in the subsequent calculations at date t are functions of the public
information, although we frequently omit zt−1 in our notation for the sake of simplicity.
47In our model, the market maker is not necessarily a person, but can be also an electronic system that
pools together the trader orders and uses a certain rule to fix prices, in particular that current prices are
proportional to the current total order flow.
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We denote by Pt the asset price at time t. The corresponding log-price is written pt =
log(Pt), the gross return Rt = Pt/Pt−1, and the log-return rt = pt − pt−1.
To the beliefs of each rational and emotional traders we associate a probability density
function denoted by f r and f e, respectively. These functions depend only on the public
information set zt−1 and describe how each trader group perceives the distribution of
the current gross log-returns rt. The random variables that correspond to the log-returns
in the view of the rational, emotional, and noise traders, are denoted by rrt , r
e
t , and r
n
t ,
respectively.48 For rational traders, the price of the asset should then be the random
variable P rt = Pt−1 exp(r
r
t ) and its density function can easily be computed from f
r.
Emotional traders rather expect the price to be distributed as the random variable P et =
Pt−1 exp(ret ).
Henceforth, we denote the random variable rrt as the rational subjective log-return at
time t. Similarly, the random variable ret is referred to as the emotional subjective log-
return at time t. In other words, the random variables rrt and r
e
t shall be understood
as subjective beliefs (or subjective opinions) over log-returns. Let us now focus on the
construction of their probability densities.
As underlined above, trader beliefs exclusively rely on the information publicly avail-
able at time t which consists, in fact, of the prices and total order flows up to t − 1
inclusively. Thus, the discrepancy in beliefs originates in the different interpretations
of the same public information. These beliefs can be decomposed in prior and current
elements.49
Prior beliefs exclusively originate in the available past information. This information
serves to infer so-called a-priori views concerning current log-returns. The a-priori opin-
ions originate in the past decisions of the different traders and are specific to each trader
groups. They are modelled here as random variables that we denote as rr,pt , r
e,p
t , and r
n,p
t
where the first superscript refers to the corresponding group of traders and the second
one p indicates their past nature. Traders can – but are not compelled to – estimate the
probability density functions of each prior belief variable, on the basis of past moves and
decisions (of their own and other groups). In other words, it is possible that some traders
formulate a guess about the beliefs of other market participants. We will see that this is
48Recall that merely rrt and r
e
t have a meaningful interpretation, as only rational and emotional traders
have demand strategies that are shaped according to their beliefs. In contrast, noise traders act randomly
and hence rnt is rather a formal notation meant to facilitate the model tractability.
49More exactly, pieces of perceived information.
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the case for rational traders, while their affect-driven emotional peers plunge in their own
world and account exclusively for their own opinions.
Rational and emotional traders use only those a-priori views that, in their opinion,
can have a potential impact on current prices. Formally, the prior beliefs of the trader
group i are summarized by the probability density function ϕi, where i ∈ {r; e}. Rational
traders can be considered as being aware of the existence of different strategies in the
market. Hence, they are likely to incorporate in their subjective beliefs the a-priori
opinions of all other market participants. In contrast, emotional beliefs are driven by
affect. Thus, this category of traders is probably not concerned with how other agents
form expectations. It is more reasonable to think that they exclusively employ the own
variable re,pt in the formation of their opinions. We denote by <it the set of a-priori
views that are considered by a group i to be relevant for the evolution of current prices.
In essence, <it ⊂ {re,pt , re,pt , rn,pt } and the densities ϕi represent estimations of the joint
probability density function of the relevant a-priori opinions over the group specific set
<it.
Current beliefs illustrate the view of each trader group concerning the development
of current prices in consequence of a-priori opinions. Formally, the function gi(r,<it)
describes how the trader group i evaluates the relative importance of the relevant a-priori
opinions in <it and their impact on current log-returns rt. In other words, the value gi(r, y)
indicates how likely the trader group i considers that rt ≡ r when the relevant prior beliefs
are identical to y. In order to simplify the subsequent mathematical manipulations, we
assume that the functions gi are nonnegative and normalize them such that their integral
over r equals 1.
The subjective probability densities that describe the group specific beliefs are ob-
tained by integrating the current beliefs over the set of relevant a-priori opinions. The
employed measure is the probability density function of the respective prior beliefs. For





where the integer ki represents the number of a-priori opinions that are relevant for the
group i (or the dimension of the set <it). Note that the normalization of gi ensures that
the function f i is a probability density function.
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This preliminary model complies with the traditional Bayesian framework in the fol-
lowing sense: We consider that for rational traders, both prior and current elements of
beliefs are equally important for ascertaining market evolutions. The judgements of emo-
tional traders are yet under the influence of their affective profile. They rely more on their
intuition or feeling about past and new information in order to make choices. Specifically,
emotional traders can under- or over-estimate the importance of the past with respect to
new evidence. In our model, this yields to putting distinct weights a and b – that we refer
to as the belief weights – on the perceived prior and current elements of information ϕ
and g, respectively.50 Accordingly, we modify the preliminary Equation (2.1) as follows:









where the real parameters a, b > 0 allow us to formalize the idea of affect-driven belief












and ensures that f i remains a probability density function. Rational traders i = r combine
past and current elements of information in a balanced way, so that a = b = 1. Concerning
the emotional group i = e, b > a points to what we call an impulsive reaction to current
market events, since the impact of new information prevails. In contrast, when b < a,
emotional traders consider new evidence as less important than subjective beliefs formed
in the past and act conservatively.52 As discussed in Section 2.1.3, impulsiveness (as a
type of representativeness) and conservatism represent two frequent biases of thinking
and judgment.
We subsequently specify the particular form of the density functions ϕi and gi that
underlies our theoretical analysis, focusing on two special cases. They will serve as an
example of an economy where emotional traders may perform better than their rational
50The emotional belief formation rule is inspired by the averaging model of Birnbaum and Stegner
(1979) and is formally defined in the style of Grether (1980) and Shefrin (2005). Note that we account
only for the possibility that the beliefs weights a, b stand for a psychological trait of emotional traders
that does not change over the trade interval. The case with variable at, bt is a topic of further research.
51The marginal cases a = 0 and b = 0 are only of mathematical interest. They appear to be irrelevant
from an economical perspective, as situations such as with completely uninformative prior or current
information are hardly to be expected in conjunction with real decision problems. Shefrin (2005) suggests
b > 1 and 0 < a < 1 as more realistic values of the belief weights.
52For a better understanding of how power weights can affect a pdf, see Figure A.18 in Appendix A.2.
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peers.
As a consequence of the discrepancies in the views over market evolutions, rational
and emotional traders assign different distribution laws to prior subjective beliefs. For
reasons of theoretical simplicity, we work with parameterized normal distributions. As
mentioned above, emotional traders guide their beliefs by means of their current affective
state. This leads them to focus on their own opinions, without considering those of other
trader groups. Thus, their prior beliefs exclusively depend on the random variable re,pt ,







We consider yet that rational traders take into account the a-priori opinions of all mar-
ket participants. Specifically, they estimate the a-priori random variables of the different
















We make here the simplifying assumption that rational traders are able to accurately guess
the distribution of re,pt . Given that noise traders are known to act randomly, it is natural
to consider that the estimated mean of their prior opinions reduces to zero.53 Moreover,
we assume that rational traders consider their own a-priori opinions rr,pt to be independent
of others. Indeed, they know that their thinking is sufficiently sophisticated so that it
cannot be guessed by other traders. These considerations entail rational prior beliefs with














Accordingly, rational traders also assume that the prior beliefs of the remaining partici-
pants can be related to each other, as indicated by the parameter σen.
Let us now focus on the form of the density functions of current beliefs gi. These
53For instance, prior noise trader opinions can be centered on the return of risk-free assets, in other
words on what they could gain by putting the money with the bank. Without loss of generality, we can
normalize the risk-free rate to be Rf = 1 which yields a zero mean in log-terms.
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functions describe how the corresponding trader group evaluates the relative importance of
the relevant a-priori views – the own views and those of other traders – with respect to the
market state at previous time t−1. We suppose that the evaluation occurs through linear
combination of these ingredients. For simplicity reasons, we assume that the function
gi(r,<it) is a normal probability density and encompasses an exogenous noise component
corresponding to possible exogenous market shocks. Naturally, its mean results from the
aforementioned linear combination in the view of each group i.
For the emotional traders, the function ge(r, x) can then be formulated as the the pdf
of the following normal distribution:
N
(
kt−1 + kex, σ2
)
, (2.7)
where x represents the value of the random variable re,pt , kt−1 indicates the perceived level
of the past market evolution, and ke expresses the intensity of the influence of emotional
trader views on market prices, as estimated by themselves. The parameter σ refers to the
standard deviation of the exogenous noise component.
For rational traders, the function gr(r, x1, x2, x3) corresponds to the distribution:
N
(
ct−1 + crx1 + cex2 + cnx3, σ2
)
, (2.8)
where the variables x1, x2, and x3 refer to the a-priori views of the rational, emotional,
and noise traders, respectively, as seen by the rational traders. The parameters cr, ce,
and cn reflect the relative importance of these various influences, and we will be able to
determine their exact form in the framework of our simplified model. In a more general
setting, we could assume that they are proportional to the sizes of the respective groups,
or to the amount of trades that they initiate.
At the cost of several elementary algebraic manipulations (see the proof in Appendix
A.2) and provided that the variance matrix of ϕr is invertible, we can determine the
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Equations (2.9) reveal the discrepancy between rational and emotional views over the
log-return distribution: Rational traders allow for the existence of different opinions in
the market and combine past and new elements of information in a balanced way. In
contrast, emotional traders guide their beliefs by means of their affective profile. This
leads to a focus on the own price expectations and an impulsive over- or under-weighting
of one of the sources of information considered in order to revise beliefs. Thus, the belief
weights a and b impact the variance of the emotionally perceived log-returns and therefore
on the perceived volatility - that is, the risk - of the emotional holdings of risky assets.
In our theoretical discussion, we explore two hypotheses about how rational traders
perceive the link between the a-priori views of emotional and noise traders:
1. First, we consider that rational traders regard emotional and noise trader beliefs




ct−1 + crr˜rt−1 + c
er˜et−1, σ
2 + (crσr)2 + (ceσe)2 + (cnσn)2
)
.






















The first of them ζ is denominated as exogenous noise, and the subsequent ones as
endogenous noises. The remaining ones are group specific and refer in particular to
the rational noise ²r, the emotional noise ²e, and the noise trader noise ²n.
Thus, the subjective log-returns of all three trader groups yield:
rrt = ct−1 + c
rr˜rt−1 + c
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Recall that rnt is merely a formal notation, as we are not interested in the beliefs
of the noise traders.
2. In the second setting, rational agents consider that the a-priori emotional beliefs
re,pt contain a noise component identical to that of noise traders. In mathematical






and, thus, the standard deviations of the emotional and noise trader noises are
identical σe = σn =
√
σen.
In other words, the emotional prior beliefs are considered to be related – in terms
of their variance – to the noise generated by noise traders. However, there is a
difference between emotional and noise traders: Emotional agents follow a certain
strategy which entails the deterministic parameter r˜et−1. Laxly put, the prior beliefs
of emotional traders are regarded as non-arbitrary, but yet fairly “inefficient” (as
very close to noise trading).
Formally, the prior beliefs of rational traders now depend on only two independent








and the current beliefs gr to the distribution:
N
(
ct−1 − cnr˜et−1 + crx1 + (ce + cn)x2, σ2
)
.
Using the same technique as for deriving Equations (2.11), we deduce easily that the
rational subjective log-return is normally distributed with the following parameters:
rrt ∼ N
(
ct−1 + crr˜rt−1 + c
er˜et−1, σ
2 + (crσr)2 + ((ce + cn)σe)2
)
.
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represent the endogenous noise originating respectively from the rational traders
and from their emotional peers.
Then, the subjective log-returns of all trader groups can be rewritten as follows:
rrt = ct−1 + c
rr˜rt−1 + c
er˜et−1 + ζt + c
rηrt + (c
e + cn)ηet (2.14a)











Note that the assumptions made in this section are meant to keep the mathematical
representation of the rational and emotional thinking processes as simple as possible.
Consequently, they yield a somewhat simplistic logic in a rather static framework. We
attempt to overcome this problem first at the end of this theoretical section by accounting
for a dynamic formation of prior beliefs from past posterior ones and, second, in the
applicative part by considering different possibilities of belief updating, such as quasi-
dynamic updating of the mean priors or full updating of the priors.
Price setting mechanism
Once traders have formed – respectively revised – beliefs about the price evolution, they
use them in order to decide how much of the risky asset they want to trade at the current
time t.
In order to formally develop on this decision and the resulting demands of each trader
group, it is first necessary to clarify how prices emerge in our market setting. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the price fixing instance in our model is a risk neutral and
competitive market maker. We assume that, at each trade t, she fixes current prices Pt
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to be proportional with the current total order flow Qt advanced for execution by the
traders, specifically as:
Pt = Pt−1 + λQt, (2.15)
where λ > 0 and, as in Kyle (1985), 1/λ measures the market depth.54
The total order flow Qt represents the sum of all buy and sell orders issued by the





where Qit stands for the individual demand of a trader from group i and N
i for the
dimension of group i, with i ∈ {r; e;n}, so that N r +N e +Nn = N is the total number
of traders in the market.
Note finally that we consider a fixed supply of risky asset Q > 0 and do not impose any
constraint on the quantity of risky asset traded at each time t (for instance, short-selling
is possible).
Asset demands
Equipped with these formal tools, we can now return to the traders and discuss how
they determine the direction (buy or sell) and the dimension (how much) of their current
orders. The decision thereupon follows the specific logic of each trader group, that we
henceforth refer to as demand strategy.
Similarly to the belief formation process described above, we design the rational and
emotional demand strategies to be distinct and to comply with the two-system approach
proposed by psychologists and described in Section 2.1: Rational traders act in accor-
dance with the traditional principles of maximization of wealth. Thus, rational decisions
can be considered as being dominated by reasoning. In contrast, emotional traders are
solely guided by intuition in devising their demands, so that their cognitive processes are
dominated by affect. Finally, the trading strategy of noise traders is mostly driven by
exogenous reasons, such as the need of liquidity, and therefore consists of purely random
actions.
54The market depth gives the order size necessary in order to move the market by a given amount.
According to Hasbrouck (2007), depths is – besides breadth and resiliency – a manifestation form of
market liquidity. It is thus closely related to the intensity of trading a certain asset. As this intensity is
based on the interest of the traders in the respective asset, which can change in time but yet not at a
very high speed, it is plausible to assume that λ is constant over the entire trade interval.
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We commence by presenting the rational demand strategy which aims at maximizing
expected-wealth utility. Due to the assumed risk neutrality of our market participants,
this amounts to maximizing currently expected wealth.55 Moreover, rational traders be-
lieve that the risky asset has a liquidation value V ≥ 0 that should become public in-
formation at the end of the trade. Henceforth, we refer to V as the true value of the
risky asset, as it exists only in the opinion of rational traders.56 The expected wealth of
a (single) rational agent W rt results from the stream of the quantities Q
r
t traded at each
time t = 1, . . . , T (i.e. the demands) valued at the difference between the true value V
and the price payed Pt. Then, the rational decision problem at each trade t, the result of
which is the current demand, can be formulated as follows:
Et[U(W
r
t )] = Et[W
r




t (V − Pt) −→
Qrt
max. (2.17)
From Equation (2.17) it is apparent that the rational demand depends on the current
price Pt. Since prices are set by the market maker according to the pricing rule in Equation




















under the condition – already fulfilled by the assumption in Section 2.2.2 – of a positive
inverse market depth λ > 0.
Thus, as rational traders are the single category concerned with the impact of their
55Specifically, risk neutral agents have a linear utility function U(W ) =W .
56The use of a true value can be regarded as being similar to a fundamentalist analysis. Chapter 1
considered fundamentalist strategies as examples or heuristics. This does not exclude a rational manner of
employing them. Thus, even when the rational traders in the present setting use fundamentalist methods,
they remain fully rational with respect to belief formation and continue to maximize expected wealth
utility. Moreover, it is plausible to think that traders who are concerned with what other traders do
and with the general market evolution, attempt to determine an intrinsic value of the traded assets. For
instance, Section 1.1.1 mentions several important market-microstructure settings which assume trader
rationality but also work with a “true value” and even define market efficiency with respect it.
57In practice, certain constraints may be imposed on the market, such as the fact that traders cannot
infinitely lose money. For instance, they may be allowed to borrow money from the bank in order to
invest it in the risky asset, but only up to a certain limit W . This limits then becomes a lower bound
for the current wealth. For rational traders, this can be written as W rt ≥ W . Note that augmenting the
optimization problem in Equation (2.18) by such a wealth constraint yields the same solution in Equation
(2.19).
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trades on prices,58 they maximize their expected wealth only if they shape their own
views to best fit the current market conditions. In other words, rational traders must be
sufficiently smart in order to adapt to the presence of further traders with different views
over price evolutions. In an evolutionary sense, this strategy is indeed the most rational
one and should provide the highest chances of survival.59
We now attempt to find out what exactly this adaption means, specifically how rational
beliefs need to cope with the market conditions generated by the activity of other trader
groups in order to generate a maximum of wealth. Formally, we let the rational subjective
log-returns rrt from the above section on belief formation flow into the formula of the
optimal rational demand Qrt = x
∗ from Equations (2.19) that depends on the demands of
emotional and noise traders Qet and Q
n
t . In so doing, we assume that the rational demand
linearly follows the rational subjective gross returns Rrt = exp(r
r
t ) and define:
Qrt = β + β
r(Rrt − 1)Pt−1, (2.20)
where βr 6= 0 represents the sensitivity of the rational demand to rational price expec-
tations and β an arbitrary constant showing the trade availability with invariant prices.
In equilibrium, i.e. provided that Equation (2.18) is satisfied, we obtain the following

















Let us now detail the demands of emotional and noise traders. Similarly to the way
they form beliefs, emotional traders exclusively follow their intuition also in formulating
asset demands. In so doing, they do not deliberately account for changes in the market
environment generated by the presence of different strategies – as it was the case for
rational traders – but blindly “follow their noses”.
We assume that emotional agents trade proportionally to their beliefs, without being
concerned with wealth maximization. This can be considered as a “rule-of-thumb” or, in
technical terms, a heuristic. In this section, we are interested in the effect of applying
58Recall that this assumption is also valid with respect to the belief formation: Rational traders are
the only ones who account for the existence of other market participants with different beliefs.
59Note that the adaption of rational traders cannot be related to the adaption function of emotions
discussed in Section 2.1.2. While emotions intrinsically (i.e. unconsciously) facilitate adaption, our
rational traders chose deliberately (i.e. consciously) to shape their actions in order to fit the market
conditions.
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heuristics, this time not in a rational way as in Section 1.2, but in an affect-driven way.
The emotional demand can be formulated as follows:
Qet = β
e(P et − Pt−1) = βe(Ret − 1)Pt−1, (2.22)
where βe 6= 0 stands for the emotional demand sensitivity to changes in the emotional
price expectations. Recall that Ret = exp(r
e
t ) is the emotional subjective gross return
expectation which is, according to the assumptions from the first part of this section,
log-normally distributed. Thus, the emotional demand is also log-normally distributed.




t − Pt−1 = (Rnt − 1)Pt−1, (2.23)
where – in merely formal notation as noise traders do not form beliefs – Rnt = exp(r
n
t ) is
a log-normally distributed variable.
With the assumed expressions of demands of emotional and noise traders in Equations













(Rnt − 1). (2.24)
As Rit = exp(r
i
t), where i ∈ {r; e;n} and rit are normally distributed, we can infer plausible
values for the parameters of the rational beliefs in Equation (2.9a). Specifically, Equation
(2.24) must hold in moments. Thus, we can think of the rational strategy as of a mixed
one, where the optimal behavior consists in choosing randomly between possible moves, so
that the conditions created by the demands of emotional and noise traders are satisfied in
means or in the first moments, for instance. Since Equation (2.24) also holds in variance,
rational traders are able to absorb the noise generated by other traders, which should
contribute to market stability.
However, it is not possible to derive an analytical solution for the rational belief param-
eters ct−1, cr, ce, cn in Equation (2.9a) from the moments of Equation (2.24). Therefore,
we further present an approximative solution, that holds for sufficiently low values of the
subjective log-returns and is based on the approximation Rit− 1 ≈ rit, where i ∈ {r; e;n}.
Thus, we have:
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where rit follow Equations (2.11) and (2.14), respectively, for the two employed scenarios
with independent and identical emotional and noise trader noise. Then the following must
hold approximatively for that rational traders maximize current wealth:
1. When rational traders regard emotional and noise trader beliefs as independent
σen = 0:


























































2. When rational traders regard emotional and noise trader beliefs as dependent on
each other and take σe = σn =
√
σen:



























































In other words, rational traders can maximize their current wealth if they are able
to correctly infer the actions of other traders. Specifically, they have to estimate the
proportions N e, Nn and the behavioral emotional profile given by the emotional belief
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parameters kt−1, ke, a, b and the emotional demand sensitivity βe. Note that rational
traders who perfectly adapt to the environmental conditions should discard their own
prior opinions r˜rt−1 in forming current beliefs (and replace them by other’s beliefs). This
occurs by setting cr = 0 so that the rational strategy does not induce any further specific
noise in returns (of variance (σr)2). Also, the rational demand should change in the
opposite direction with respect to the demands of other traders. Specifically, we obtain
as a result that the sensitivity to changes in own beliefs βr has the opposite sign to the
corresponding emotional sensitivity βe. However, the rational demand constant β can
be freely chosen. Finally, note that the weight b put on current emotional elements of
belief inflates all terms of the rational subjective expectations, apart from the exogenous
noise. Thus, the more impulsively emotional traders act, the higher should be the price
differences expected by rational traders and consequently the higher the rational demand
of the risky asset.
At first, the conditions in Equations (2.26) and (2.28) may appear as impossible to
meet in real settings where behavior changes over time. However, these equations merely
require that rational traders infer time-invariable features of the emotional group, except-
ing kt−1. In the static world of our setting, where traders do not enter or leave the market
and do not change strategy, assessing such features should not necessitate extremely high
skills. It may for example be carried out by repeated observation of the behavior of
market participants during prior trading intervals. Moreover, it is plausible to assume
that emotional traders treat kt−1 as constant in time kt−1 = k, given that possible past
variations that can affect their expectations in Equations (2.11b) and (2.14b) are already
encompassed by the prior mean belief r˜et−1.
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Market prices









With the demands of emotional and noise traders in Equations (2.22) and (2.23), the































In other words, the returns in equilibrium result in the sum of subjective returns of
emotional and noise traders, weighted by the respective group dimensions.
Equation (2.32) already reveals the influence of different trader categories on prices:
Emotional and noise traders impact log-returns directly proportional to their presence
in the market, specifically to their numbers N e and Nn, respectively. Moreover, when
emotional traders expect, for instance, increasing prices ret > 0, their subjective opinions
will directly translate into proportionally increasing log-returns rt, where the strength of
this relation depends on the intensity at which emotional traders incorporate beliefs into
their actions βe. Both emotional and noise trader influences are controlled by the asset
liquidity, being in particular reduced with respect to more liquid assets, i.e. for a lower
λ. Finally, rational subjective beliefs cannot directly affect prices, since they are shaped
to agree with that what other traders are supposed to do. The single trace of rational
presence is incorporated by the true risky value V and prices increase from one trading
to the other with V/2, so that too high V -values should render markets instable.
We can further develop on the approximative expression of the market log-returns
considering the two noise scenarios. Thus, we yield the following:
1. When rational traders regard emotional and noise trader beliefs as independent
σen = 0:


































2. When rational traders regard emotional and noise trader beliefs as dependent on









































The approximative expressions of log-returns in Equations (2.33) and (2.34) allow us
to analyze in more detail the emotional impact. As expected, an increased participation
of emotional traders in the market, i.e. a higher N e, yields higher but also more volatile
returns. Thus, not only the chances of making more money from the trade, but also the
risks to lose more money, are increased. The same increase in both mean and volatility
of market returns occurs for higher emotional demand sensitivities βe. Interestingly,
the more unbalanced the belief formation of emotional traders is, i.e. the higher the
belief weights a or b are, the lower should be the market volatility, other things being
equal. In addition, negative values of the emotional demand sensitivity βe or of any of
the emotional belief parameters kt−1 and ke could even induce price decreases between
subsequent trades. We denote such emotional thinking processes – with negative βe,
kt−1, or ke – as of contrarian type. They could, for instance, counterbalance the inflating
influence of a higher value V .
Note that the approximative expression of log-returns has constant variance in both
scenarios. Its mean is also constant. Thus, the approximated log-returns from Equation
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(2.32) are stationary if the following holds:




with κ an arbitrary constant. At first, it appears rather improbable that emotional traders
– who are neither concerned with beliefs of other traders nor with fundamental aspects
such as the true value of the risky asset – can form beliefs such that the above condition
is met. However, note that V is fixed and hence so is also the quantity V/(λN eβe). Thus,
this condition could be fulfilled if the mean emotional prior r˜et−1 depends on the price
Pt−1 or, in a very general sense, if emotional prior beliefs are based on (a combination of
past) market returns. Our applicative results from Section 2.2.3 show that with this type
of emotional belief formation, log-returns – not only in their approximative, but also in
their exact formulation – are stationary.
Trader wealth
In the sequel, we turn our attention to the question if and which traders could survive
in the market described by our model. As noted by Lo (2004) in his adaptive markets
hypothesis (see Section 2.1.2), in financial markets survival of the fittest becomes survival
of the richest. Therefore, the accumulated wealth can be regarded as a measure of the
survival capacity of our traders. Another such measure is the wealth growth. This section
derives and compares the individual wealth and its growth for rational, emotional, and
noise traders. Note that we work here with the realized wealth (and not with the expected
one, as used, for instance, by rational traders in the optimization problem in Equation
(2.17)).
The current individual wealth of a trader from group i ∈ {r; e;n} can be written as:




t(Pt − Pt−1) = W it−1 +Qitλ(N rQrt +N eQet +NnQnt ), (2.35)
where the last equality results from Equation (2.15). The group wealth is easily obtained
by multiplying the expression in Equation (2.35) by the corresponding group dimension
N i.
In order to theoretically compare the individual wealth of the different trader cate-
gories, it is easier to work with the variations from one trade to the other. Formally, the
110 Chapter 2– Emotions and Financial Decision Making
current change in individual wealth yields:
∆W it = W
i
t −W it−1 = Qitλ(N rQrt +N eQet +NnQnt ), (2.36)
where the total order flow follows Equation (2.30) in the linear equilibrium defined above.









− (N eQet +NnQnt )2
)
. (2.37)
Note that the change in rational individual wealth is positive ∆W rt ≥ 0, that is the wealth
of rational individual increases, as long as rational traders ascribe a sufficiently high true
value to the risky asset V ≥ λ(N eQet +NnQnt ). Specifically, this value should exceed the
price impact of the total order flow generated by emotional and noise traders. Otherwise,
∆W rt < 0 and rational traders lose money from their trades. As V is fixed, it is possible
to find values for which the negativity condition holds at each trade and thus rational
traders always register losses. This is a first interesting result: Although the strategy
adopted by our rational traders preserves important features of rationality – both in the
sense of classical Economics (rational traders maximized expected wealth utility) and
in an evolutionary sense (they adapt to the market conditions) – we can theoretically
prove that rational individual wealth does not necessarily increase at each trade in the
“emotionally noisy” environment of our model. In other words, the rational strategy does
not guarantee survival.
It is also interesting to note that the wealth change of rational individuals is inversely
proportional to the number of rational traders N r active in the market. In essence, ratio-
nal traders split profits (and losses) among themselves. Thus, profit chances of rational
individuals are higher when the rational presence is less pronounced.













Obviously, as long as Qet (V/λ + N
eQet + N
nQnt ) ≥ 0, emotional traders also earn money
from trading. Thus, a trading strategy guided by affective factors does not necessarily
entail permanent loses.
A similar result holds for noise traders, the wealth of which changes at each trade with













Another interesting conclusion is reached comparing the changes of individual wealth:
Assuming that both rational and emotional traders are gaining money between successive

















the emotional wealth varies more than the rational one ∆W et ≥ ∆W rt . Hence, when
∆W et ≥ 0, emotional traders earn more money on the current trade than their rational
peers.
















and the current change in wealth of noise traders is higher than that of rational traders
∆W nt ≥ ∆W rt .
Note that, when emotional and noise traders are for instance selling a sufficiently high
amount of the risky asset N eQet + N
nQnt ≤ V/λ, then each of these trader categories
gain more money than the rational ones, since, first, V ≥ λ(N eQet + NnQnt ) and hence
∆W rt ≥ 0, and, second, both Equations (2.40) and (2.41) are fulfilled, so that both
∆W et ,∆W
n
t ≥ ∆W rt . Moreover, the group which trades more than the other will realize
the highest profits, that is either the emotional traders if Qet ≥ Qnt or the noise traders
if, in contrast, Qet ≥ Qnt . In other words, it is possible that rational traders earn less
money than every other trader in the market, and even that noise traders are dominating
in terms of individual wealth.
In sum, we were able to find theoretical support of the possibility that rational strate-
gies do not have to be the fittest under any circumstance.
Before closing this section and following Blume and Easley (1992), we introduce an
additional measure of the traders’ fitness and their survival chances. This is the growth
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W lt is the total wealth of traders at time t. We will analyze the evolution
of the growth of individual wealth in the applicative Section 2.2.3.
An extension: dynamic belief updating
This section attempts to extend the above model in order to allow for dynamic belief up-
dating. In so doing, we follow the logic described in the above section on belief formation
and preserve most of the respective assumptions.
In particular, the specification of our dynamic structure can be described as follows:
We merely develop on the first scenario, in which emotional and noise trader noises are
independent of each other. At each time t, the prior beliefs (of rational and emotional
traders) are set identical to the posterior beliefs at the previous trade. In the formal
notation used in the first part of Section 2.2.2, ri,pt = r
i
t−1, for i ∈ {r; e}, and hence prior
beliefs have time-changing mean and variance.
Let us first formalize the dynamic formation of prior beliefs in the case of emotional
traders. Emotional agents start trading with fixed initial beliefs which we continue to
assume to be normally distributed and formally write them as:
re0 ∼ N(re, (σe)2). (2.43)
As mentioned above, the posterior beliefs at t − 1 serve as prior information at t to
emotional traders. Thus, the prior emotional beliefs are normally distributed with the











As far as the rational traders are concerned, their belief formation follows a more
complex logic, as already underlined above. In particular, rational beliefs arise from the
combination of different pieces of information: first, the rational own prior opinions rr,pt
of the price evolution. Such opinions can be, for instance, the result of a more complex
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analysis, that possibly includes market exogenous information and is performed before
trading, conducted by rational traders in order to determine the true risky value V .
Thus, the own prior opinions are rather independent of the market evolution and can be
written as:
rr,pt ∼ N(rv, (σr)2), (2.45)
where rv stands for the log-return on the true risky value (e.g. V valued at the risk-free rate
Rf ) and σ
r for the standard deviation of the prior rational beliefs. The second element
of information entering the rational beliefs consists of an estimation of how emotional
traders expect prices to evolve. Similarly to the first part of Section 2.2.2, we assume that
rational traders are able to correctly guess the emotional subjective prior re,pt , but recall
that this prior is now the result of the dynamic updating process described by the above
Equation (2.44). Third, rational agents also account for the influence of noise traders. As
they are certain that noise traders act randomly, the noise trader a-priori opinions can be
formally rendered as:
rn,pt ∼ N(0, (σn)2). (2.46)
Furthermore, as rr,pt most probably represents information that has nothing in common
with how the market evaluates the risky asset, we can consider this random variable to
be independent of the priors of emotional and noise traders re,pt and r
n,p
t . All priors r
i,p
t ,
where i ∈ {r; e;n}, are assumed to be i.i.d. and, according to the first noise scenario, re,pt
and rn,pt are independent of each other.
Concerning the current beliefs, we work with the same Equations (2.8) and (2.7). Also,
the formation of posterior beliefs continues to follow Equation (2.2), where a = b = 1 for
rational traders, but different belief weights a and b can be ascribed to the prior and
current elements of belief by the emotional traders.
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Similarly, the rational subjective log-returns have the following distribution:
rrt ∼ N
(
ct−1 + crrv + cer˜et−1, σ



































For finite trade intervals t = 1, . . . , T and |ke| ∈ R\{1;√a}, we obtain the dynamical
equivalent of Equations (2.9) as:
rrt ∼ N
(
ct−1 + crrv + cekt−1
1− (ke)t











































Since all above further considerations regarding trader demands and price formation
continue to hold, the market returns in Equation (2.32) can be approximated, under







































Recall that the random variable ζt stands for exogenous noise, ²
e
t for emotional noise and
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The ratio V/Pt−1 can be further understood as the return on the true value. Thus,
denoting the log-return on the true value by rvt−1, we can approximate it by V/Pt−1 ≈









































Recall that rational traders maximize expected wealth and the market is in equilibrium
if Equation (2.25) holds. Thus, the rational strategy amounts to adapting to the market
conditions created by other traders. This is possible if rational traders are able to infer,
with sufficient accuracy, the impact of emotional agents and noise traders on prices.
With dynamic belief updating and for finite T , this occurs only if the emotional agents
limit their actions in a somewhat drastic way. One possibility is that emotional traders
continue to account for their own mean priors in updating beliefs and hence ke 6= 0.
In this case, the only solution to Equation (2.25) requires that βe = 0 (and implicitly
βr = 0). In other words, emotional traders do not take part in the trade since, according
to Equation (2.22), their demand is always nil Qet = 0. Moreover, by Equation (2.20),
rational traders can trade only constant quantities Qrt = β. Eventually, this implies that
also the noise trader demand Qnt is constant in equilibrium, according to Equation (2.19).
Obviously, this is not a realistic assumption.
The other situation in which rational traders succeed in maximizing expected wealth
requires that their emotional peers ignore their own mean prior information in updating
opinions, i.e. ke = 0. Then, the rational belief parameters must satisfy according to
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Equation (2.26) the following conditions:
























while ce can be freely chosen. Consequently, there exists not a single, but multiple strate-
gies that can be adopted by rational traders in order to adapt and hence maximize ex-






























Note that in this case the emotional impact on prices is not anymore carried out by means
of the specific noise ²et , and the weight of prior elements of belief a plays no further role
in this context. The emotional impact reduces to the influence of the constant kt−1, of
the demand sensitivity βe, and of the number of emotional traders N e.
Increasing the length of the trade interval T →∞ yields – for sufficiently small values
of the emotional parameter ke, more exactly if |ke| < min{1;√a} – the following limit-




ct−1 + crrv +
cekt−1
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Note that, at the limit, the influence of the emotional noise – of variance (σe)2 – is entirely
eliminated. Moreover, both limit-distributions of the rational and emotional subjective
log-returns exhibit time-constant variances, while their means depend on time-varying
parameters such as ct−1 and kt−1. Nevertheless, it is plausible that at least the emotional
traders do not account for the “constants” in their linear combination of information
that serves as support for their beliefs, so that kt−1 = 0. In such a case, the emotional
log-returns become stationary at the limit.60



















which is stationary if:
λN eβekt−1
1− ke = κ− (r
v
t−1 + 1), (2.57)
with κ an arbitrary constant.
Letting T →∞ should give to the rational traders sufficient time to learn the emotional


























































Again, the choice of the weight accorded to emotional elements of belief ce is free. The
60Since we are working with normal distribution, the constance of the mean and variance ensures not
only weak, but also strong stationarity.
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)ζt + λNn2 ²nt . (2.60)
Note that the results obtained for finite T in Equations (2.52)-(2.54) are identical to the
results obtained at the limit from Equations (2.58)-(2.60), when taking ke = 0.
2.2.3 Application
This section analyzes, by means of simulation techniques and for various parameter con-
stellations, the evolution of market returns and of the rational and emotional wealth that
results from the theoretical setting developed in Section 2.2.2.
In order to keep the exposition as clear as possible, we present here only the most
important results. The particular assumptions and values – more exactly, value ranges –
of the behavioral parameters that underlie these results are enumerated first. All further
deviations from these assumptions and values are explicitly indicated in the text.
The subsequent findings map average values obtained over n = 10 rounds of each
T = 100 trade times. Results are made comparable by setting the initial seed to the same
value for all cases.
Our population consists of N = 100 traders, out of which the number of noise traders
is fixed at Nn = 5, while that of rational and emotional traders can vary. In particular, we
refer to three different cases denoted as low, middle, and high proportions of emotional
traders: N e ∈ {25; 50; 75}, respectively. The remaining N r = N − N e − Nn traders are
rational.
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Furthermore, our individual agents start trading (at time t = 0) with identical en-




0 = Q/N , as well as with identical wealth





61 We account for two situations of starting the trade of each
parallel round j = 1, . . . , n: either from identical initial values, namely unitary (sub-
jective and market) prices and gross returns, and nil log-returns, which is equivalent to
having independent rounds, or from the values at which the last round j − 1 closed. In
the latter situation, trade starts at j = 1 again with unitary prices and gross returns, and
with nil log-returns.
In line with Hasbrouck (2005), we fix the inverse market liquidity at λ = 0.08. As
this is not sufficient for Cases B and C, we will also work with λ = 0.008. The standard
deviations of the exogenous, rational, emotional, and noise trader noise are taken to be
respectively σ = 0.01, σr = 0.02, σe = 0.03, σn = 0.03.
The three types of emotional weighting of beliefs mentioned in Section 2.2.2 – impul-
sive, balanced, and conservative – are accounted for by considering adequate belief weight
ratios a/b, namely over-unitary, unitary, and sub-unitary. Specifically, we fix the weight
of prior elements of belief to be a = 1 and let the weight put on current elements of belief
vary in the set b ∈ {100; 1; 0.01}. In addition, we work with the following values of the
emotional belief parameters: The sensitivity of emotional demand to subjective-return
changes is βe = 1, the belief constant kt−1 = 0 at each trade, and the weight of prior
beliefs ke = N e/N . We also include some further results for other values of these param-
eters. According to the last part of Section 2.2.2, we set ke = 0 for the case with dynamic
belief updating and finite rounds of trade T = 100.
The rational belief parameters ct−1, cr, ce, cn and the rational demand sensitivity βr
are approximated depending on the assumed noise scenario, with independent or identical
emotional and noise trader noise. Specifically, they result from Equations (2.26) and (2.28)
for our initial setting, and from Equations (2.52) and (2.58) for the dynamic setting.
Recall that the dynamic setting merely accounts for the first scenario, with independent
emotional and noise trader noise. When the rounds of trade are independent of each
other, the rational demand constant is set at β = 0.5. For continuing rounds of trade, the
rational demand constant β is fixed at 0.5 in the first round j = 1, while in the subsequent
ones 1 < j ≤ n, we estimate β based on the previous round and in line with the following
idea: At the end of trade T , rational traders expect the price to equal the true risky value
61We have also considered the possibility that the initial endowment and the wealth is identical among
trader-groups. The result are qualitatively similar.
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P rT = V . Therefore, their demand at T should equal zero Q
r
T = 0. Then, according to
Equation (2.20), the rational demand constant β yields:
β = −βr(V − PT−1),
where PT−1 stands for the last but one price of the current trading round. It is plausible
to assume that rational traders have already formed an opinion on PT−1 from the previous
rounds of trade in which they took part. For instance, they may set PT−1 to be equal
with the last price of the previous round, which is the case when the trade is continued
from one round to the other.
In addition, beliefs can be updated according to different rules. First, we work in our
initial setting and consider that rational and emotional traders update merely the mean
prior beliefs r˜rt−1 and r˜
e
t−1, respectively. This setting denoted as “quasi-dynamic”. In this
context, we subsequently refer to the following two possibilities:
(a) The mean prior beliefs are inferred from previous market returns. Specifically, we set
the prior means to be:
r˜rt−1 = mean[rt−s], ∀s = 1, . . . , t− 1







, S2 = t− 1, for Type i






, S2 = t− 1, for Type c ,
and thus the emotional prior mean depends on the emotional type. Obviously, for the
balanced Type b, the rational and emotional prior means are identical r˜rt−1 = r˜
e
t−1.
(b) The mean priors are obtained from what we denote as past demands, in particular
from past order flows and past demands. Specifically, r˜rt−1 results from an approximation
of Equation (2.30) that is Qr(t) ≈ Pt−1(β + βrrrt ), where Qrt takes the form in Equation
(2.20). Moreover, we approximate r˜et−1 from the emotional demand Q
e
t in Equation (2.22),


















2.2– Emotions and financial decision making 121
The rationale for these assumptions is that rational traders are deeply concerned with
what other market participants are doing, so that they might reformulate prior beliefs
in dependency on the newest public information (i.e. on the last total order flow). In
addition, emotional traders account only for their own actions, so that we can imagine
a situation when they update their beliefs on average, considering the last quantity they




beliefs can be fully updated in the sense considered in the last part of Section 2.2.2. In
this context, we work with the corresponding formulas and account for the following two
rules that we denote as “dynamic”: with finite T = 100 and with a very high T = 10000.
The latter is aimed at better resembling the limit-case with infinitely long trading rounds.
In so doing, we set the initial mean priors of rational and emotional traders in Equations
(2.44) and (2.45) to rv = 1 and re = 0, respectively. We chose the same ce = N e/N and
σ = 0.01, σr = 0.02, σe = 0.03, σn = 0.03. Recall also that the dynamic updating with
finite rounds of trade assumes ke = 0.
In sum, we resolve for analyzing the following:
• Three cases describing the composition of the trader population:
Case A: Low proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 25%.
Case B: Middle proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 50%.
Case C: High proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 75%.
• Two scenarios regarding the correlation of noise terms:
Scenario 1 : Independent emotional and noise trader noise σen = 0.
Scenario 2 : Identical emotional and noise trader noise with σe = σn =
√
σen.
• Two streams of belief-updating rules:
◦ Quasi-dynamic, i.e. updating of mean priors:
Rule qd-1: From previous market log-returns rs, where 0 < s < t.
Rule qd-2: From current demands (in particular from the current total order
flow Qt for the rational traders and from the current subjective log-return
ret for the emotional traders).
62We have also employed further belief rules. Accordingly, both rational and emotional mean priors
of the next period are obtained: from current demands, as expectations or as averages of the respective
subjective log-returns at the current trade, or from cumulated past returns. The results are qualitatively
similar.
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◦ Dynamic:
Rule d-1: With finite rounds of trade T = 100 (and ke = 0).
Rule d-2: With very long rounds of trade T = 10000 (at the limit).
• Three emotional trader types with respect to belief formation:
Type i: Impulsive b/a = 100.
Type b: Balanced b/a = 1.
Type c: Conservative b/a = 0.01.
• Two manners of organizing the trade:
◦ Independent parallel rounds (and β fixed).
◦ Continuing parallel rounds (and β based on the previous round).
We commence by generating the normally distributed noise terms with the considered
standard deviations σ, σr, σe, σn. Using the above parameter values, we subsequently
derive the emotional subjective returns both in logarithmic form ret and as gross returns
Ret . To this end, we employ Equations (2.11b) and (2.14b) for the quasi-dynamic updating,
and Equations (2.53b) and (2.59b) for the dynamic updating. Then, Equations (2.11c)
and (2.14c) deliver estimated of rnt and R
n
t . The rational subjective returns in equilibrium
rrt and R
r
t result from the adaptation conditions in Equations (2.26) and (2.28) for the
quasi-dynamic belief rule, and from Equations (2.52) and (2.58) for the dynamic belief
updating. After computing the current subjective returns, the demands of each trader
group are calculated according to Equations (2.19), (2.22), and (2.23). Equation (2.31)
delivers values for the equilibrium gross returns. We also compute the approximative
log-returns according to the adequate Equation (2.33-2.34), (2.54), or (2.60). The mean
priors are then ascertained according to the different belief rules. Finally, the wealth of
individual traders from each group i ∈ {r; e;n} is derived from Equation (2.35) and the
corresponding group wealth by multiplying the individual wealth by the corresponding
group dimension N i. We also compute the wealth growth according to Equation (2.42).
Wealth and its growth can be regarded as measures of trader survival.
In the sequel, we focus on Scenario 1, for which Rules (qd-1) and (d-1) can easily be
compared. Moreover, we present only the results obtained for a true risky value V = 1,
an initial rational demand constant β = 0.5, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0,
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ke = N e/N , and βe = 1. We exemplify how trade evolves when performing independent
and continuing parallel rounds of trade for the same Scenario 1 and Rule (qd-1). The
differences among the Cases A, B, and C are detailed for each of the Rules (qd-1) and
(d-1). The corresponding figures for Scenario 2, as well as other figures referred to in the
text, can be found in Appendix A.2. Log-returns and demands are depicted with means
and confidence bands.
Case A: Low proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 25%.
Rule (qd-1): Quasi-dynamic belief updating from previous market returns.
Let us start the exposition of our findings for Case A. Relative to Cases B and C, the
dimension of the emotional group is smallest, so that the influence of emotional traders on
market evolutions should be minimal. As mentioned above, we focus on Scenario 1 and
hence assume independent emotional and noise trader noises, and on the quasi-dynamic
belief updating Rule (qd-1). We work with the usual values of the rational and emotional
parameters V = 1, β = 0.5, kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N , and βe = 1, and consider independent
parallel rounds of trade. This combination of cases, scenarios, rules, and parameter values
is henceforth referred to as our benchmark.
The evolution of the log-returns, individual demands, individual wealth, and the
growth of individual wealth in Case A, under Scenario 1, Rule (qd-1), and when the
n = 10 rounds of trade are independent of each other, are illustrated in the following
Figures 2.9-2.12.
As observed in the theoretical part, the market volatility should be lower when the
asymmetry in the emotional way of combining past and current elements of belief is more
pronounced. This is what Figure 2.9 shows under the assumption that a = 1: Log-returns
become more volatile for lower ratios b/a, in other words when emotional traders for beliefs
conservatively.63 This occurs as higher weights are assigned to the exogenous noise term
ζt in the final log-return expression approximated by Equation (2.33).
Several further statistical investigations are performed in order to analyze the stability
and efficiency of a market where log-returns evolve as in the same Figure 2.9. For all three
emotional types, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (abbr. ADF) rejects the hypothesis of
unit roots, already at 1% confidence, thus speaking for stationarity.64 Log-returns exhibit
63Specifically, Type i yields a standard deviation of log-returns of 0.066083, Type b of 0.067460, and
Type c of 0.07666.
64In particular, ADF=-7.682851 for Type i, ADF=-4.756128 for Type b, and ADF=-6.232654 for Type
c, where the test is based on the Schwartz information criterion with maximal 12 lags and the values are
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yet positive autocorrelation and hence are predictable. The time interval on which the
serial dependency stretches appears yet to be substantially shorter when emotional traders
behave conservatively.65 Moreover, the hypothesis of normally distributed log-returns is
dismissed by the Jarque-Bera test (abbr. JB) for all emotional types.
In very general terms, we can conclude that markets where an emotionally guided
activity induces specific conditions to which rational traders adapt, appear to be stable in
front of non-recurring shocks but rather inefficient, in the sense that prices are predictable
to a certain degree. A conservative belief formation on the part of the emotional traders
may reduce the inertia of price movements and hence the predictability.
The demands of individuals belonging to each trader group are depicted in Figure 2.10.
The emotional demand Qet is on average positive, pointing out the fact that emotional
traders mostly prefer to buy the risky asset. This demand becomes more volatile and
follows a more pronounced up-sloping path for lower b/a-ratios. Note that the individual
activity of rational traders remains low in all cases compared to that of the emotional
or noise trading individuals. Indeed, the rational group has to face an increased total
order flow issued by the other traders, but it is at the same time sufficiently numerous
(recall that in Case A rational agents form the majority of traders) for the individual
participation of each rational individuum to remain at low levels.
Since profit chances – as well as loss dangers – are higher in more volatile markets,
individual traders from all groups accumulate higher wealth when emotional beliefs are
conservative b/a = 0.01, as apparent in Figure 2.11. Note that in the analyzed Case
A, under Scenario 1, and with Rule (qd-1), and irrespective of the emotional type, the
emotional individual gain is highest. Eventually, rational individuals even lose money.
Unreported results confirm that the same holds also with respect to the group wealth,
although the rational group is almost three times as numerous as the emotional one.
The dominance of emotional traders is reinforced by the growth of individual wealth
from Figure 2.12. The growth ratios start from negative values for emotional traders, but
pass fast into the positive domain and remain on average above zero, while the evolution
of the rational wealth growth follows the opposite course. However, the discrepancies
between rational and emotional traders in terms of growth of their individual wealth
significant at all levels.
65Specifically, log-returns for Types i, b, and c are sufficiently well described by respectively
ARMA(5,1), ARMA(6,1), and ARMA(1,1) processes. The first order autocorrelation coefficients AC(1)
are always positive and a positive constant appears to significantly contribute to each of these specifica-
tions.
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reduce towards the end of the trade.
Thus, it appears that emotional traders can make money from their trades in markets
similar to those modeled in our setting. Moreover, in the short run they can even come
best off in terms of wealth – individually and group specifically – as well as with respect
to the growth of individual wealth. In the long run, their chances of survival, measured by
the growth of individual wealth, become yet comparable to those of their rational peers.
126 Chapter 2– Emotions and Financial Decision Making













(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.1: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.2: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.3: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.4: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), in-
dependent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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In the sequel, we continue to analyze Case A but turn our attention, one at a time,
to the following alternative market conditions: Scenario 2, continuing parallel rounds of
trade, further belief updating rules such as Rules (qd-1), (d-1), and (d-2), and different
values of the behavioral parameters βe, ke, kt−1, β, and V . These situations are charac-
terized by the change of a single element – scenario, rule, parameter, assumption, etc. –
with respect to our benchmark, other things being equal.
Scenario 2 : Identical emotional and noise trader noise with σe = σn =
√
σen.
The corresponding evolutions of prices, demands, and wealth under Scenario 2 are
presented in Figures A.19-A.22 in Appendix A.2. The similarity between emotional and
noise traders in terms of noise appears to exhibit a low influence on market and individual
evolutions and is almost unnoticeable on optical inspection.
Independent vs. continuing rounds of trade.
Let us now compare our benchmark case (with n = 10 independent rounds of trade
starting from identical conditions) with the situation when the trade starts, in round
1, from the same initial conditions, but continues from one round to the other in the
remaining rounds. Rational traders adjust their demand constant β from one round to the
other. The trade continuation is, in essence, equivalent to much longer trading rounds, so
that traders should have the opportunity to “learn” from past rounds, increasing efficiency.
As usual, we will average the values of log-returns, demands, and wealth across all n
rounds.
Indeed, continuing rounds reduce both the market volatility66 and the time span over
which serial dependencies in log-returns stretch.67 It also accentuates the discrepancies
engendered by the different emotional types. For instance, the increase in log-return
volatility with the importance ascribed by emotional traders to prior relative to current
beliefs is more substantial, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Moreover, although log-returns
remain stationary for all emotional types, the conservative behavior appears to foster the
market efficiency even more evidently: For Type c, and under both scenarios, we can
66Specifically, the standard deviations of log-returns for Types i, b, and c are respectively 0.007599,
0.00894, and 0.034093.
67For Types i and b, log-returns are sufficiently well described by ARMA(1,1) processes. They remain
yet non-normally distributed (JB). The usual ADF-test based on the Schwartz information criterion
with maximal 12 lags delivers the following test values: ADF=-6.492826 for Type i, ADF=-6.162888 for
Type b, and ADF=-9.424551 for Type c. Thus, the hypothesis of no units roots cannot be rejected at
any significance level. For Type c, log-returns do not significantly serially correlate, nor deviate from
normality.
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detect no significant serial correlation in log-returns (neither in their mean nor in their
variance), neither departures from normality.
Regarding the average demands, emotional traders mostly buy the risky asset, while
rational ones sell it, and the average demands of rational and emotional traders are no
longer diverging from each other within the T = 100 trades.
Finally, the wealth of emotional individuals in Figure 2.7 remains higher than the
rational one, but it is the highest in the market only as long as the emotional profile is
of Type c. When emotional traders think impulsively, the market is dominated by noise
traders. In terms of growth of individual wealth, as illustrated in Figure 2.8, emotional
traders appear to be better off more frequently than rational ones, but this relation changes
periodically. In general, the wealth growth of all trader categories converges to common
values soon after the trade starts, and the convergence speed increases from Type i to
Type c.
Relative to our benchmark case, Scenario 2 appears to generate somewhat more notice-
able changes when the rounds of trade are continuing, as apparent in Figures A.23-A.26
in Appendix A.2. The evolution patterns observed for Scenario 1 are conserved, but for
Type c the mean log-returns attain only half of those observed under Scenario 1,68 and
the growth of individual wealth of emotional traders is highest at the beginning of the
trade.
In sum, the trade continuation appears to foster the market efficiency and stability.
This might rely, among others, on the increased accuracy of the rational adaptation, given
by the fact that rational traders can adjust one more parameter from one round to the
other, specifically their demand constant β. Thus, the market returns are less volatile
in general and even unpredictable when emotional traders think conservatively. Conser-
vatism also represents the sole emotional profile that guarantees the highest individual
wealth. In terms of individual wealth, rational traders remain worst off in the market, but
in terms of growth of individual wealth, all traders obtain identical results by the end of
the trade. The convergence to common values of the growth of individual wealth appears
to be much faster for conservative emotional profiles.
68Specifically, the mean log-returns for Type c under Scenario 1 (Scenario 2) is 0.012616 (0.006633).
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.
















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.5: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.



















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.6: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.7: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.


























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.8: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), in-
dependent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel rounds of trade, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
136 Chapter 2– Emotions and Financial Decision Making
Rule (qd-2): Quasi-dynamic updating of mean prior beliefs from current demands.
The following Figures 2.9-2.12 present the evolutions of log-returns, and of individual
demands and wealth when rational and emotional beliefs are quasi-dynamically updated
from current demands according to Rule (qd-2).
Rule (qd-2) does not entail noticeable differences in log-returns relative to our bench-
mark Rule (qd-1).69 More substantial changes are yet to be noticed with respect to
individual demands: Rational traders are buying on average the risky asset, while the
mean demand of emotional traders unfolds in both positive and negative domains. The
corresponding changes in the mean demand of individual emotional traders are easier to
recognize for Type c.
Consequently, emotional traders accumulate the highest individual wealth during the
entire round of trade only when they behave conservatively. For impulsive and even
balanced emotional belief formation, rational traders dominate the market, at least over
the first half of the trade. The individual emotional wealth grows constantly, but, again,
this growth is always positive only for Type c. Similar patterns emerge under Scenario 2
and are illustrated in Figures A.27-A.30 in Appendix A.2.
In sum, the updating of mean beliefs based on current demands appears to entail no
relevant changes in terms of efficiency with respect to our benchmark case. Nevertheless,
this is not the case as far as financial success is concerned: In the short run and as long as
emotional traders think either impulsively or in a balanced way, the rational strategy now
offers the best profit chances in the market. Yet, in the longer run, or for conservative
emotional profiles, not the rational, but the emotional traders perform best.
69Specifically, Types i, b, and c yield the following average standard deviations of log-returns: 0.058195,
0.056342, and 0.069264, which are somewhat lower than under Rule (qd-1). They are sufficiently well
described by respectively ARMA(5,1), ARMA(6,1), and AR(5) processes. They are all stationary, as the
ADF-test values, based on the Schwartz information criterion with maximal 12 lags, are significant at
all levels. Specifically, these values yield ADF=-6.797712 for Type i, ADF=-4.527510 for Type b, and
ADF=-7.244705 for Type c. Moreover, log-returns are not normally distributed, according to the JB-test.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.9: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.10: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.























(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.11: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.12: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for differ-
ent emotional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N =
25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent emotional and noise trader noise
(Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from current demands (Rule qd-
2), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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Rule (d-1): Dynamic belief updating.
Let us now compare the quasi-dynamic and the dynamic belief updating exemplified
by Rules (qd-1) and (d-1). This is interesting since, in our opinion, the dynamic updating
gives a better description of real situations. We remain at analyzing our benchmark Case
A, under Scenario 1, and with independent parallel rounds of trade. Recall however that
now, according to the theoretical considerations, emotional traders do not account for
their own mean prior beliefs ke = 0. In order to ensure the direct comparability, we run
simulations under Rule (qd-1) taking ke = 0, the results of which can be observed in
Figures A.31-A.34 in Appendix A.2. The main findings for Rule (d-1) are illustrated in
the subsequent Figures 2.13-2.16.
Contrary to the above discussed continuation of the rounds of trade – which is another
situation lying closer to reality – Rule (d-1) appears to deteriorate stability in terms of
volatility, but to improve efficiency as far as log-return predictability is concerned. For
Types i and b, the standard deviation of log-returns is comparable with that obtained
under Rule (qd-1) and ke = 0, but for Type c it attains considerably higher values.70
Yet, for the latter Type c we cannot find any significant evidence for departures from
stationarity or from normality of log-returns, the less for serial correlation. Also for
Types i and b log-returns remain stationary,71 but their distributions significantly differ
from normal and serial dependence can be detected at different lags.72
The trade activity of the impulsive emotional traders is very low and rational traders
appear to buy on average the risky asset, irrespective of the emotional profile. All traders
earn money from the trade, but now the impulsive emotional strategy is clearly the worst
in the market, and the conservative one, as usual, the best. Balanced emotional traders
outperform their rational peers in terms of individual wealth in the second half of the
trade, but gain less than the pure noise traders. These evolutions are confirmed also
by the growth of individual wealth and are comparable to those under Rule (qd-1) and
ke = 0.
70Specifically, Type i yields with Rule (d-1) (Rule (qd-1) for ke = 0) a standard deviation of log-returns
of 0.057898 (0.057929), Type b of 0.058299 (0.058299), and Type c of 0.307146 (0.68114).
71In particular, ADF=-6.153836 for Type i, ADF=-4.896707 for Type b, and ADF=-10.20728 for Type
c, where the test is based on the Schwartz information criterion with maximal 12 lags and are significant
at all levels.
72Specifically, we can fit ARMA(6,1)-specifications for each emotional type.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.














(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.














(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.13: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), indepen-
dent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating
(Rule d-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
2.2– Emotions and financial decision making 143

















(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.




















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.14: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief up-
dating (Rule d-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.15: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), inde-
pendent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating
(Rule d-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.16: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
A), independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief up-
dating (Rule d-1), over n = 10 independent parallel rounds of trade, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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Rule (d-2): Dynamic belief updating in the very long run.
The main qualitative patterns in the evolution of log-returns, individual demands, and
individual wealth, observed for the previous cases are preserved for very high lengths of a
round of trade. The results for T = 10000 are depicted in Figures A.35-A.38 in Appendix
A.2.
A more detailed analysis of log-returns show that they remain stationary,73 not-
normally distributed, but are considerably less volatile and exhibit more complex patterns
of serial dependency. In particular, for Types i and b we can detect serial correlation in
variance, while Type c is characterized by very small positive autocorrelations in means.74
With impulsive emotional agents, both rational and emotional traders are losing money
from their trades. In terms of individual wealth, the winners of the course for survival are
the noise traders. They also make the highest profits when emotional traders of Type b
are active in the market. Such emotional traders are better off than their rational peers,
who constantly register losses, and accumulate positive wealth. As usual, the conservative
emotional traders are clearly dominating the market. After few trades, the growth of the
individual wealth of noise traders exhibits the highest fluctuation in the market.
In the long run, markets where beliefs are dynamically updated according to Rule
(d-2) appear to offer better profit chances to those traders who act arbitrarily.
Rule (qd-1) and different behavioral parameters.
Before presenting Cases B and C, we consider how the market evolution changes
for different values of the behavioral parameters, such as the (initial) rational demand
constant β, the true risky value V in the view of rational traders, the emotional demand
sensitivity βe, and the emotional belief parameters kt−1 and ke. We refer again to Scenario
1, Rule (qd-1), and independent rounds of trade.
Our previous results for our benchmark Case A, Scenario 1, and Rule (qd-1) appear
to be almost invariant to changes in the rational demand constant β. Therefore, we do
not further report on them.
According to Equation (2.31), prices should increase for higher risky values in the
73In particular, ADF-tests based on the Schwartz information criterion with maximal 12 lags deliver
the following test values: ADF=-97.75469 for Type i, ADF=-30.42287 for Type b, and ADF=-20.03438
for Type c. These values are significant at all levels.
74Specifically, Types i, b, and c yield an average standard deviation of log-returns of 0.007251, 0.007920,
and 0.033171, respectively. The log-returns can be described by the following processes: ARMA(1,1) in
mean and ARCH(2) in variance for Types i and b, and a simple ARMA(1,1) for Type c, while the
autocorrelation coefficients for the row log-return series are significant but already very low (under 3.5%)
for Type c.
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opinion of rational traders V . This is indeed what Figures A.39-A.42 in Appendix A.2
show for a value of V = 10. Demands and wealth courses are similar in shape, but
amplified, relative to the case with V = 1, so that emotional traders succeed in dominating
the market in terms of individual wealth, irrespective of their psychological profile. The
growth of individual wealth attains much faster common levels among all trader categories.
We can yet note important qualitative changes in results when emotional traders think
or act in what we denoted to be a contrarian way, in particular when they employ either
negative belief parameters ke or negative demand sensitivities βe. Such reactions prove to
be disadvantageous for impulsive or balanced emotional traders, who constantly register
loses. Although the rational strategy creates positive capital, the individual wealth of
rational traders is eventually exceeded by that of pure noise traders. In terms of the
growth of individual wealth, emotional traders appear yet to recover in time and get to
dominate their rational peers after almost two-thirds of the trade. Conservative emotional
traders preserve their lead upon other traders, both with respect to the level as well as to
the growth of their individual wealth. These results are depicted in Figures A.43-A.50 in
Appendix A.2 for negative βe = −1 and ke = −N e/N .
Note also that for βe = −1, the average level of all analyzed variables lowers which
points to a reduction of the trading activity. As expected, emotional traders are now
mostly selling the risky asset. Unreported results for βe = 2 suggest further that an
increase in the emotional demand sensitivity renders more pronounced the patterns in
returns, demands, and wealth observed for βe = 1. Emotional traders clearly dominate
the market in terms of individual wealth, irrespective of their psychological profile. The
same occurs for higher emotional belief constants kt−1, the overall influence of which is
more substantial than that of βe.
Case B: Middle proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 50%.
Let us now consider the Case B, where half of the traders are emotional. The first
consequence of this increased activity of emotional traders is that the market with λ = 0.08
becomes instable. Therefore, we resolve for analyzing more liquid assets and henceforth
work with λ = 0.008. For the purpose of quantitative comparability, we include the results
for case A and λ = 0.008 in Appendix A.2.
The market evolution in Case B is depicted in Figures 2.17-2.20 for Scenario 1, and in
Figures A.59-A.62 in Appendix A.2 for Scenario 2. The main variation patterns underlined
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above are preserved: When emotional beliefs are of the conservative Type c, log-returns
are most volatile but exhibit the smallest serial correlation, and the emotional strategy
is the most fruitful.75 Log-returns remain stationary but not normally distributed for all
emotional types.76 Again, the change in scenario appears to entail no noticeable influence
on market evolutions.
Several differences are yet worth to be noted: First, both rational and emotional
traders are sooner buying the risky asset. Rational traders are always buying higher
average quantities only for emotional profiles of Type i. For Types b and c, the emotional
demand starts lower but exceeds the rational one in less than one-fifth of the trade interval.
Second, the monetary success of the different strategies appears to change to a certain
extent. Thus, when emotional traders act impulsively, rational traders dominate the
market in terms of individual wealth. When rational traders resolve to adapt to the
presence of emotional traders of Type b, they succeed in being better off than their
emotional peers only during the first one-third of the trade. Finally, with emotional belief
formation of Type c, rational traders lose money from their trades and emotional ones
dominate the market.77 Merely during very short intervals (of less than 5 trades) at the
beginning of the trade, rational traders outperform emotional ones in terms of growth
of individual wealth. Afterwards, the individual wealth of all three trader categories
converges towards identical values. This convergence is faster for Types i and b, but not
full for Type c. The individual wealth of conservative emotional traders grows at highest
soon after the trade starts, while the wealth of their rational peers fluctuates by negative
amounts.
75Specifically, the standard deviations of log-returns for Types i, b, and c are respectively 0.060899,
0.061688, and 0.063002. The corresponding processes that fit sufficiently well the data are ARMA (5,1),
ARMA(6,1), and ARMA(1,1) in mean and ARCH(1) in variance.
76The ADF-test based on the Schwartz information criterion with maximal 12 lags delivers the following
test values for Types i, b, and c, respectively: -10.61510, -5.259028, and -6.084258. They are significant
at all levels.
77Unreported results confirm all these findings also with respect to the group wealth.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.17: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case B),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.18: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case B),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.



















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.19: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case B),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
152 Chapter 2– Emotions and Financial Decision Making





















(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.20: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case B), independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating
of mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent
parallel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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Case C: High proportion of emotional traders N e/N = 75%.
The evolutions of prices, demands, and wealth for the highest participation level of
emotional traders in the market of 75% and for the same benchmark Rule (qd-1), and
an increased liquidity λ = 0.008 are depicted in Figures 2.21-2.24. The corresponding
graphical results for Scenario 2 can be observed in Figures A.63-A.66 in Appendix A.2.
As expected, log-returns are somewhat more volatile than in Case B, but remain
stationary and non-normally distributed, which has been so far the case for Rule (qd-1).78
Individual rational and emotional demands clearly diverge for other emotional profiles
than Type i, where emotional traders mostly buy and rational ones mostly sell the risky
asset.
Emotional traders clearly impose their dominance in terms of wealth within a round
of trade. This holds over the entire trading round for Types b and c. Balanced or
conservative emotional traders always accumulate higher individual wealth than their
rational peers, the individual wealth of which decreases. Emotional traders of Type i get
to earn higher profits than rational traders after around two-thirds of the trade.79 The
growth of individual wealth of all trader categories converge to zero, in particular faster
for Type i and the slowest for Type c. After the first few trades, the wealth growth of
emotional individuals becomes the highest in the market.
In sum, the increased presence of emotional traders in the market appears to preserve
the general price-related conditions, but to change the situation as far as survival – in
terms of both individual and group wealth – is concerned. As noted in the theoretical
section, the profit chances of rational individuals are fostered by a lower participation
N r, which indeed occurs when going from Case A to Case B and from Case B to Case
C. Emotional traders lose the advantage of being the most numerous in the market in
front of their rational peers only if they ignore the importance of prior information. In
particular, impulsive emotional traders gain less than the rational ones during the entire
trade. For balanced emotional profiles, this handicap persists only during the first half of
the trade. Finally, conservative emotional traders dominate the market as measured by
either individual wealth, or group wealth, or growth of individual wealth.
78Specifically, the standard deviations of log-returns for Types i, b, and c are respectively 0.065751,
0.067286, and 0.068738. The corresponding ADF-test values are: -6.873652, -3.653596, and -7.450117,
where the second one is significant only at 5%-level and the other two at all levels. The corresponding
processes that fit the data sufficiently well are ARMA (5,1) for Type i, ARMA(5,1) for Type b, and
ARMA(1,1) for Type c.
79Identical results are obtained with respect to the group wealth.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.21: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case C),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.

















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.22: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case C),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.


















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.23: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case C),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure 2.24: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case C), independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating
of mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent
parallel rounds of trade, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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In sum, our simulations suggest that markets where emotional agents represent at
least one-fourth of the traders, can exhibit a stable evolution. Moreover, under certain
circumstances, this evolution can even be close to efficient. Emotional strategies are not
necessarily ruled out by rational ones and emotional traders can make even higher profits
than their rational peers.
In unexpectedly many situations, emotional traders are better off than their rational
peers in terms of individual wealth. The “key to success” appears to be conservatism,
which predisposes emotional traders to ascribe higher weights to the prior information
relative to the current one, in forming beliefs. The individual wealth of conservative
emotional traders is always the highest in the market and grows at the most elevated rate.
For balanced emotional traders, this holds only on certain conditions and exclusively in
the last part of the trade. This is an interesting result since such balanced emotional
traders are the closest to rational ones in terms of belief formation,80 so that we might
expect that they have the best chances of success.81 In the presence of impulsive emotional
traders, all trader categories have the opportunity to accumulate positive wealth in most
of the cases, although impulsive traders mostly lose money in front of their rational peers.
Irrespective of the emotional type, in the long run the individual wealth of all traders
tends to grow at identical rates and hence offers similar survival chances to all rational,
emotional, and even noise traders.
Moreover, the emotional mark on the price evolution is more pronounced in each of
the following situations, other things being equal: when the trade continues from one
round to each other, when rational and emotional beliefs are dynamically updated, when
emotional traders are more numerous, or when they are more sensitive to their own
beliefs in thinking (i.e. for higher ke) or acting (higher βe). Moreover, the conservative
type appears to foster the market efficiency as well. For Type c, the serial dependency
patterns of prices are less complex or even not existent.
Therefore, the most important factor that impacts general and individual evolutions –
80Specifically, the balanced way of forming beliefs is identical to the rational one, since both trader
groups put identical weights on prior and current information. However, the relevant informational set
of emotional traders merely includes the own beliefs. Also, the emotional demand strategy remains
radically different of the rational one, as it does not result from any optimization problem, but simply
evolves proportionally to the emotional subjective beliefs.
81However, it is true that in markets with Type b, the monetary results of emotional and rational
traders are somewhat better balanced. Specifically, these emotional traders start by being worse off
but end up better off than their rational peers. Furthermore, it appears reasonable to assume that
conservative behaviors may positively contribute to improving market stability and efficiency and that
emotional impulsiveness should be arbitraged out easier by rational strategies.
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namely, prices and monetary results – appears to be the psychological profile of emotional
traders. It is even more important than the number of these traders, since an increased
emotional participation to trading does not necessarily improve their profits if, for in-
stance, they think impulsively. The dependency between the emotional and noise trader
noise (i.e. the chosen scenario) also plays a secondary role. It becomes almost irrelevant
when, for instance, the mean rational and emotional beliefs are updated from past market
returns according to Rule (qd-1).
2.2.4 Summary and conclusions
The goal of this section is to model the role of emotions in financial decision making. To
this end, we advance a market setting where three distinct categories of economic agents
trade a unique risky asset: rational traders, emotional traders, and noise traders. Prices
are set by a competitive market maker to be proportional to the current total order flow.
We formally represent and study the formation of individual beliefs, the trader demand
strategies, their individual and group wealth, and finally the price formation process.
What makes the distinction among our trader categories is, first, the way in which
they interpret public information in order to form subjective beliefs, and, second, the
strategy they pursue in order to determine the risky-asset amount to be traded. In
particular, rational traders combine past and current information in a traditional Bayesian
manner. In so doing, they account for the presence of other trade strategies and for
their impact on prices. Moreover, rational demands are shaped to maximize expected
utility of wealth. In contrast, emotional traders form beliefs in an unbalanced manner,
putting different weights on diverse information sources. Thus, they are prone to thinking
heuristics commonly met in practice, such as representativeness and conservatism. Also,
emotional traders are not concerned with the existence of other agents. Furthermore,
emotional traders blindly follow their beliefs in formulating demands and hence make use
of heuristics (in the sense of simplifying rules) also in acting. Noise traders act randomly.
The belief formation relies on the interpretation of information. Our interest is in
the role of emotional traders as a distinct type of traders driven by affect and intuition.
We suggest a way to quantify the emotional process of belief formation, showing how
emotional traders may balance between past information and new evidence in contrast to
the traditional updating employed by rational traders.
Once formed in the trader minds, beliefs flow into demands. In particular, trade
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strategies are shaped in linear dependence on subjective opinions. Prices are set to be
proportional to the current total order flow and depend thus on the demands of each
trader group. We show how the distinct beliefs of different market participants are directly
reflected in the informational content of prices. Given the rational strategy and the price
setting rule, we derive the equilibrium condition of the market: Rational traders should be
able to anticipate the total order flow emanating from the other traders, in other words to
adapt to the conditions created by other traders, especially by the emotional ones. Such
a strategy appears to be rational not only in classic, but also in an evolutionary sense.
Moreover, we measure the survival chances of our different trader categories by their
individual and group wealth, the wealth variation between successive trades, and the
growth of individual wealth as a part of the total trader wealth. We infer theoretical
conditions on which rational wealth decreases and fluctuates less than the emotional one.
This corresponds to the possibilities that rational traders lose money or make lower profits
than their emotional peers, respectively.
The somewhat static setting described sofar is subsequently extended to a particular
case of dynamic belief updating. We derive the corresponding market prices both in the
short and the long run.
Finally, our model is tested by numerical simulations for different parameter con-
stellations and in different market settings. Specifically, we examine the evolution of
log-returns, trader demands, and trader wealth for various proportions of rational and
emotional traders, distinct behavioral profiles of emotional traders, different relations be-
tween the actions of emotional and noise traders, various belief updating rules, and several
trade organization possibilities.
Our simulations suggest that markets in which emotionally driven agents are active,
can reach stable and closely efficient states. A necessary premise appears to be the
existence of other traders, who rationally maximize expected utility of wealth and, in
consequence, adapt to the conditions created by emotional trades. Rational traders of
this type commit to absorbing the uncertainty generated by other non-strategic trades.
Therefore, their presence guarantees – or at least facilitates – the market stability.
In spite of their simplistic thinking processes and action strategies, emotional traders
appear to be not only able to survive, but even to dominate such markets. They are
best off – in terms of individual and group wealth, as well as of the growth of individual
wealth – when they think conservatively, ascribing a higher importance to past evolutions
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than to current information. Markets with conservative emotional traders are closest to
efficient, and rational agents constantly lose money. However, when emotional traders are
impulsive (and hence more similar to noise traders), rational traders make higher profits
but all traders are able to accumulated positive wealth from the trade. With balanced
emotional traders (who come thus closest to the rational way of thinking, although in a
more simplistic manner), rational traders dominate the market only in the short run but
are eventually overtaken by their emotional peers.
These findings support the idea that, under certain circumstances, emotional traders
have high chances of continued existence while rational traders might be even forced to
quit the market in consequence of too high loses. This comes to contradict the traditional
conviction that rational traders can be the sole survivors in financial markets.
CHAPTER3
How Investors Face Financial Risk:
Loss Aversion and Wealth Allocation
“[...] it is not the loss itself, but the estimate of the loss that troubles us.”
Seneca.
T HIS CHAPTER focuses on the attitude of non-professional investors towards fi-nancial losses and their decisions on wealth allocation, and how these changesubject to behavioral factors. We first revise relevant findings related to possible
quantifications of risk as a main constraint of capital allocation, as well as to modelling
investors’ perceptions and attitudes.
Our contribution concerns the integration of behavioral elements into the classic portfolio
optimization. We extend a VaR-portfolio model in order to account for individually per-
ceived risk. Individual perceptions are modeled according to an extended prospect-theory
framework: Losses loom larger than gains of the same size (loss aversion) and the past
risky-portfolio performance changes the subjective valuation of risky investments. The
utility of financial investments is overemphasized (myopia). The portfolio model with indi-
vidual VaR delivers an optimal wealth assignment between risky and risk-free assets.
We proceed in two steps: First, we assume that non-professional investors derive utility
exclusively from financial wealth fluctuations. In consequence, they are interested in split-
ting their wealth between risky and risk-free assets. We analyze how the past performance
and the evaluation frequency of risky performance impact non-professional investors’ be-
havior. Estimations based on real market data suggest that myopic loss aversion holds
at different evaluation frequencies. One year is the optimal evaluation horizon at which,
under practical constraints, risky holdings are maximized. Classic settings using standard
VaR-significance levels may underestimate the loss aversion of individual investors.
Second, utility is derived from a twofold source: financial wealth fluctuations and con-
sumption. Wealth has to be split now between consumption and financial assets in to-
tal. The aggregate market equilibrium is obtained in two distinct settings: under the
maximization of expected and of non-expected utility. Our estimations indicate that the
non-expected utility setting is more robust and describes better the behavioral profile of
non-professional investors. Compared to their peers in the expected-utility setting, the
maximizers of non-expected utility are more averse towards financial losses, and allocate
lower percentages of their total wealth to financial investments in total, but higher ones
to risky assets in particular. With two-dimensional utility, myopic loss aversion is mostly
rejected.1
1This chapter is based on joint work with Erick Rengifo.
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3.1 Theoretical overview
This section introduces theoretical notions – in particular, the Value-at-Risk, the prospec-
tive value, and the myopic loss aversion – that underlie our models from Sections 3.2 and
3.3. As measure of market risk, the former notion has gained its importance in theoretical
Finance, among other things, in the context of capital allocation decisions. In spite of
the wide practical use of VaR, the formal complexity of this construct and its (possibly)
problematic implications in terms of accuracy require a more deeper understanding. The
latter two notions, the prospective value and the myopic loss aversion, describe behavioral
aspects of financial decisions that are directly related to subjective perceptions. They rely,
at least in part, on theoretical instruments which are external to the field of Economics.
3.1.1 Value-at-Risk
We commence by explaining the notion of Value-at-Risk (abbr. VaR) as a measure of
market risk and showing its importance and its wide-spread use in practice. Subse-
quently, we present various methods of computing VaR. The focus lies thereby on asset
portfolios. These methods can be mainly divided in parametric, non-parametric, and
semi-parametric, and exhibit specific advantages and weaknesses. Further, we address
the use of VaR in portfolio optimization, namely as a risk constraint, then turn to the
drawbacks of VaR and the need to develop further related risk measures. The section
closes by a summary of several papers applying VaR to the portfolio optimization, the
results of which come closely to our model in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Overview and definition
The Value at Risk (abbr. VaR) is a highly aggregated measure of market risk that
was developed in response to numerous financial disasters in the early 90s.2 The ensuing
reaction of the private sector and the regulators attempted to better keep financial risk
under control, turning VaR into a veritable industry standard and a part of the industrial
regulatory mechanism.3 Thus, the 1993 land-mark report dedicated to derivative dealers
and end-users issued by the so-called Group of Thirty (G30) recommends the use of VaR
2These numerous scandals involved big corporations from almost all industrial sectors, as well as
banks, local governments, etc. and were mostly caused by derivative deals. Please refer to Jorion (2001)
for a summary and to Partnoy (2003) for a more detailed presentation.
3See Jorion (2001) for an overview.
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for assessing market risks.4 In 1995, six major Wall Street companies that are members
of the Derivatives Policy Group commit to evaluating and reporting risk in relation to
capital on the basis of a 99% VaR over two weeks.5 Along with this initiative comes the
RiskMetrics service of J.P. Morgan. The corresponding database6 is made freely available
at the end of 1994 and serves as support to institutional clients for the assessment of
their own VaR.7 At the same time, the regulators8 react by recommending a more strict
control as well as transparent and pertinent reporting on the balance sheet of derivative
deals. Moreover, in 1997 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduces rules
that stipulate the quantitative disclosure of market risks in the form of either tabular
presentations, or of sensitivity analyzes, or of VaR measures.9 Finally, the requirements
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued in 1996 adopt VaR as the major
determinant of the capital that banks are obliged to subscribe in order to cover potential
losses from carried risks.10
The applications of VaR are multiple, especially since its initially passive function as a
reporting tool extended fast to more elaborate control and allocation purposes, as noted
in Jorion (2001). Also, VaR was adapted for quantifying and preventing not only market
risk – which was its original purpose – but also other types of financial risks, such as
credit, liquidity, operational, or legal risk.11
Henceforth, we concentrate on the main application field of VaR that refers to the
quantification of market risk. While traditional measures – such as the standard deviation
– merely capture the risk itself,12 VaR accounts for the combined effect of market risk
and the exposure to it.13 These two elements reveal the twofold origin of financial losses:
4G30 is an international consultative body of financiers, bankers, and academics from leading industrial
nations. The report can be found in Group of Thirty (1995).
5See Derivatives Policy Group (1995).
6This data base contains mainly variance-covariance matrices of risk and correlation measures at
different points in time.
7See J.P. Morgan (1995). In 1997, the RiskMetrics Group develops the CreditMetrics system dedicated
to credit risk measurements in a portfolio framework, while the CorporateMetrics issued in 1999 adapts
the original RiskMetrics approach to the needs of non-financial corporations by extending it for longer
time spans.
8Such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) or the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
9See Securities and Commission (1995).
10See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
11According to Manganelli and Engle (2001), themarket risk results from uncertain future earnings as a
consequence of changing market conditions. Credit risk arises when partners do not meet their obligations,
while liquidity risk is related to large negative cash-flows over short periods, generated by disadvantageous
sells of illiquid assets. Finally, operational risk emerges when performing market operations, such as
instructing payments or settling transactions.
12Moreover, the standard deviation accounts for symmetric risk profiles, while VaR measures the down-
side risk (i.e. losses).
13The exposure comes from the positions in different assets summarized in the company portfolio.
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from general factors (i.e. the market volatility) and from factors that can be controlled by
companies (i.e. the exposure). According to Jorion (2001), the main sources of market risk
can be generated by movements in equities (systematic risk), in interest rates (duration),
in duration itself (second order movements or gamma risk), in the underlying assets
of derivatives (delta), etc. VaR can be used for quantifying each of these market risk
categories.
Specifically, VaR can be defined following Duffie and Pan (1997) and Jorion (2001),
as the maximum (or worst) expected loss from a financial investment over a given time
horizon and at a given confidence level.14 In other words, it provides a measure for
downside risks.15 In general, regulators require that VaR represents a fraction of the
available capital. Due to the easiness of use, its apparent precision, and the forward-
looking approach it provides, VaR became a risk measurement tool widely accepted in
practice.16
In mathematical terms, VaR is obtained by setting the probability that the change in
the investment value during the indicated period T is lower than the maximum expected
loss, identical to the required confidence 1− α (or, equivalently, to the significance α):17
P (W0(RT − µT ) ≤ −VaRα) = α⇔ VaRα = −F−1(α) = −qα, (3.1)
whereW0 stands for the initial investment, RT for the returns after the fixed period T and
µT for the corresponding return mean. Moreover, F represents the cdf of the investment
value W and qα its α-quantile.
18 Thus, VaR is set to be equal to the α-quantile of the
14This definition implicitly assumes stable market conditions over the designed interval. As noted in
Jorion (2001), the length of the time horizon and the level of confidence depend on the purpose of the
VaR’s use: as a measure for potential losses, as a benchmark for comparing risks across markets, as
a criterium for setting the equity capital, or for model-validity checks (backtesting). For instance, the
Basel Committee Derivatives Policy Group (1995) imposes a time horizon of two weeks (corresponding
to ten business days) and a confidence level of 99% for the calculation of VaR. The minimum capital
requirement is obtained by multiplying the obtained VaR by a safety factor of 3. This factor should
account for additional risk that cannot be captured by VaR. In contrast, in order to increase the test
power, the Basel Committee applies for backtesting the limits of one day and 95% confidence. Moreover,
J.P. Morgan’s RiskMetrics require computing VaR with 95% confidence over one single day.
15As noted in Huschens (2000), VaR should be understood as the loss threshold that can be crossed
with probability α. Yet the definition of VaR as a maximum loss is intuitively more appealing, especially
for laymen such as non-professional investors. It is hence commonly adopted in practice and can generate
a false perception of VaR.
16Smithson and Minton (1996) report various surveys showing a strong increase in the use of VaR as
a risk measure among dealers, non-financial end-users, and institutional investors.
17Usually, the investment stretches across different assets grouped in a portfolio. Alternatively,
VaRα(x) = −VaR1−α(−x) as demonstrated in Pflug (2000).
18Specifically, Equation (3.1) defines the so-called relative VaR. Analogously, the absolute VaR relates
to absolute changes in the investment value, i.e. changes are calculated with respect to zero instead of
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Figure 3.1: VaR for symmetric distributions.
Computing VaR
Due to the complexity of financial market evolutions, the computation of VaR represents
a difficult task in practice. To this end, several techniques have been developed. In the
following, we present the most widespread ones, which also comply with the different
industry standards in risk management in force nowadays.
One important category of VaR-computation methods is represented by parametric
approaches. They consider that a certain parametric distribution underlies the observed
sample. The most common assumption in this vein is that of (log-)normally distributed
returns. Accordingly, VaR yields proportional to the return standard deviation over the
horizon T , σT :
VaRα = −W0Φ−1(α)σT , (3.2)
where Φ stands for the normal cdf.20 For i.i.d. returns, the parameter σT can be approx-
imated as σ
√
T , where σ is assessed by the empirical mean of returns computed over one
the mean value. In line with Jorion (2001), this amounts to P (W0RT ≤ −VaRabsα ) = α. For short time
horizons (over which the expected portfolio value E[W ] ≈ 0), the absolute VaR can be considered to be
an acceptable approximation.
19Note that the definition in Equation (3.1) does not work for ambiguous quantiles, such as those of non-
injective or discontinuous cdf. In this case, there exists no inverse F−1 in the strict sense. According to
Huschens (2000), quantiles can be more generally defined as P (W < qα) ≤ α ≤ P (W ≤ qα). Equivalently,
F−1 can be viewed as the generalized inverse of F , i.e. F−1(α) = inf{x|F (x) ≥ α}. Thus, VaR results
in the lowest α-quantile of the loss distribution taken with negative sign, VaRα = inf{−F−1(α)}.
20Note that Equation (3.2) is equivalent to Equation (3.3), where the quantiles qα can now be easily
derived for the normal distribution.
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unit of time.21 It is yet a well established fact that, in practice, returns often follow other
distributions than normal.22 In this case, Equation (3.2) does no longer hold and more
complicated methods involving suitable quantile estimation are required.23
As a summary measure of risk, VaR found wide application in portfolio manage-
ment. The portfolio VaR expresses the combined risks affecting the portfolio components.
The easiest way to compute the portfolio VaR relies on the assumptions of linearity and
normal distribution.24 Denoting the vector of portfolio weights by w and the portfolio




where W0 is now the initial portfolio value and qα the α-quantile of the component return
vector. Obviously, the portfolio VaR is smaller than the sum of the single-component
VaRs. From Equation (3.3), it is apparent that VaR entails a multiple of the portfolio
standard deviation which is the measure of risk in the traditional mean-variance frame-
work.26
According to Jorion (2001), the portfolio VaR is primarily used for quantifying market
risks, while further measures – such as the marginal,27 the incremental,28 or the component
VaR29 – can support the active risk management.
21Usually, the time unit is taken to be one day. Note that this formula for time scaling cannot be
applied when returns are not i.i.d., such as for options.
22Returns exhibit positive kurtosis, that is their pdf shows higher peaks at the mean coupled with
fatter tails relative to the normal pdf. Positive kurtosis can originate in jumps or stochastic volatility.
23Butler and Schachter (1998) develop an estimation procedure that combines smoothing techniques
and quantile estimation from historical returns. A more sophisticated technique that accounts for varia-
tion in volatility includes GARCH models, as suggested in Manganelli and Engle (2001).
24Asset payoffs are assumed to be linear functions of the risk factors, which are considered to be
normally distributed.
25Note that when the vector of component returns has the mean µ and the variance-covariance matrix
Σ, the portfolio returns have E[R] = w′µ and V ar[R] = w′Σw. Henceforth, we omit the superscript p
when referring to the portfolio returns and VaR, but add a subscript i for denoting the returns and the
VaR of the i-th asset in the portfolio.
26This framework was introduced in Markowitz (1952) and developed by Markowitz (1959).
27The marginal VaR that quantifies changes in the portfolio VaR induced by incremental changes of







. Moreover, it is indissolubly related to the measure β of systematic risk in CAPM.
28According to Jorion (2001),the incremental VaR expresses the change in VaR due to a new position
iVaR = VaRnew pos.α −VaRα. By Taylor expansion, it is approximatively proportional to the vector of the
marginal VaRs, where the proportionality factor is given by the new position. In the context of active risk
management, it allows to compute the variance-minimizing position to be adopted (the so-called “best
hedge”).
29The component VaR is defined in Jorion (2001) as the approximate change in portfolio VaR if
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With direct regard on portfolios, parametric methods enable the derivation of the
portfolio VaR when the portfolio instruments are non-linear in the market variables or
when the latter are not normally distributed.30 The goal is to infer analytically, by means
of local derivatives, possible future movements of the portfolio value.31 This is facilitated
by assumptions on the return distribution, the most common of which being normality.
The easiest and most used parametric portfolio method is the Delta valuation. It
merely considers first derivatives of the portfolio value W with respect to the price
vector (or, equivalently, to the return vector R) in order to compute potential losses.






. For normally distributed returns, the delta valuation represents a direct
application of the traditional mean-variance approach in Markowitz (1952).32 The Delta
valuation simplifies calculations by assuming linear exposure in a limited number of risk
factors. As noted in Duffie and Pan (1997), it can be considered to be satisfactory only
over short time intervals and in the absence of jumps in prices. It can be extended in order
to allow for multiple sources of risk by adding the second derivative of the portfolio value
with respect to prices Γ =
∂2W
∂P 2
, which amounts to the use of the so-called Delta-Gamma




and accounts for the time decay of option values, or a changing volatility σt.
34
A second category of VaR-computation techniques consists of non-parametric (or
sampling) approaches. In essence, they rely on historical and/or simulated data, from
which empirical return distributions can be derived. VaR is then directly obtained from
the corresponding sample quantiles. The apparent advantage of such methods is that no
distributional assumptions are needed, hence the respective model errors can be avoided.
However, the approximation error increases for more extreme quantiles.35




where ρi stands for the correlation of the component i returns with the portfolio returns.
30In such cases, there exists no exact VaR-formula such as that in Equation (3.3).
31To this end, the Taylor-expansion of the portfolio value provides a linear approximation to possible
non-linearities in portfolio returns as a function of market variables.
32According to Equation (3.3), VaR represents the product of the α-quantile and the standard deviation
of value changes, hence can be delta-approximated by VaRα = −|∆0|qασR0. The portfolio delta yields
to the sum of the component deltas. For portfolios of derivatives, σ represents the standard deviation of
the underlying spot return vector.
33Note that the portfolio gamma encompasses the component gammas and the cross derivatives over
each pair of components.
34In general, the Cornish-Fisher expansion can be used when one has to compute more than two
moments. This expansion allows for the transformation of moments in quantiles and hence provides a
good approximation of quantiles in most practical cases, according to Jaschke (2001).
35According to Kendall (1994), the asymptotic variance of the quantile estimator qˆ(α) is α(1 −
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Concerning portfolios, the non-parametric methods facilitate the derivation of the
portfolio VaR from the empirical distribution of portfolio values obtained by simulation
for different scenarios. Thus, the historical method generates hypothetical price paths
from historical returns.36 In contrast, the Monte Carlo simulation relies on a parametric
stochastic process. According to Hager (2006), the exposure to multiple risk factors can
be handled in the context of the historical simulation either by the so-called factor ap-
proach (that computes VaR-levels for each factor and then aggregates them into a total
VaR according to historical correlations) or by the portfolio approach (that reevaluates
the entire portfolio for certain past values of risk factors). One way to simulate correlated
risk factors within the Monte Carlo framework relies on the transformation of independent
into correlated random numbers. The hybrid method designed by Boudoukh, Richardson,
and Whitelaw (1998) enables stochastic volatility and represents a variation of histori-
cal simulation with weighted returns, where weights depend on the time interval from
observation to current date.37
Another classification of the methods for computing the portfolio VaR is proposed in
Jorion (2001) and concentrates on how the portfolio value is evaluated.38 Thus, local-
valuation methods are characterized by a unique portfolio valuation at the initial po-
sition. Approaches belonging to this category are the Delta method and its above men-
tioned variants that include higher order derivatives. In contrast, full-valuation meth-
ods entirely reprice the portfolio over various scenarios,39 thus applying non-parametric
approaches.40
α)/(Tf2(q)), where f stands for the return pdf.
36According to Duffie and Pan (1997) and Hull and White (1998a,b), the historical return distribution
can be updated for changing volatility and correlations, in that scaling market factors are scaled by means
of estimated past and current covariances.
37Accordingly, the return quantiles are estimated from historical data using declining exponential
weights. Thus, the method gets around the necessity of employing large data sets specific to historical
simulation and the normality assumption of exponential approaches. It captures at the same time the
volatility pattern. Due to minimal assumptions and flexible model specification, this method is considered
an improvement by Manganelli and Engle (2001). However, Hull and White (1998a) stress that the hybrid
method inefficiently incorporates stochastic volatility.
38Our classification comes in line with Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005) and Manganelli and Engle (2001).
It complies with the categories of methods for assessing VaR in general. Jorion (2001)’s categorization
refers strictly to the portfolio VaR.
39The scenarios can be more or less complex, in the sense that they account for different kinds of expo-
sure (such as the exposure to multiple risk factors or the cross-market exposure) and/or for simultaneous
changes in several risk factors. See Duffie and Pan (1997). According to Jorion (2001), full-valuation
considers the variation of the portfolio value dV = V (P1)− V (P0) for a wide range of price levels, where
P1 represents the future price vector and can be simulated according to different methods.
40Engle and Manganelli (2004) suggest a somewhat similar classification in factor models (where VaR
is considered to be proportional to the portfolio standard deviation that depends on volatilities and
correlations of different factors) and portfolio models (where VaR is parametrically constructed for instance
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Finally, various semi-parametric approaches to VaR are possible, such as the com-
bination of local-valuation with the simulation of risk factors, as undertaken in the context
of the partial-simulation approach of RiskMetrics.41 Also, Hull and White (1998b) de-
velop a conditional-distribution approach that allows to close the gap between model- and
simulation-based methods.42 Hull and White (1998a) by incorporating volatility updating
into historical simulation.43 A further semi-parametric approach is the conditional au-
toregressive value at risk (CAViaR) of Engle and Manganelli (1999) that directly models
the time-evolution of quantiles and not the entire distribution of portfolio returns.44 Also,
the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) GARCH developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge
(1992) represents a combination of GARCH returns and historically simulated residu-
als.45 Moreover, Kaplanski (2005) proposes an analytical method for constructing VaR
for general (i.e. non-normal) distributions.46
Each of these methods has its strong and weak points. In general, parametric methods
are prone to model misspecification errors.47 According to Jorion (2001), the Delta-normal
method is efficient for large portfolios without substantial option components48 and few
sources of risk. This is due to the fact that the delta-valuation is computationally fast
but does not account for fat tails or asymmetries in the return distribution. With various
sources of risk, the delta-gamma approach performs better. The return asymmetry be-
from historical data and the quantiles are estimated by means of rolling windows, GARCH, or extreme
values theory).
41Local-valuation methods are employed in order to generate an analytical approximation of VaR,
while returns and covariances are obtained by simulation. For this simulation, RiskMetrics employs an
IGARCH(1,1)-model for returns and assume residuals to be normally distributed. Specifically, it takes
σ2t = λσ2t−1 + (1 − λ)²2t−1, where λ = 0.94. The use of the analytical formula saves on computations by
avoiding the portfolio reevaluation on each trial, as mentioned in Hull and White (1998b).
42They propose mapping the residual distribution – obtained by either model assumptions or simulation
- into a multivariate normal one. This procedure enables higher order return moments to be reflected in
VaR. This approach is also applied to the Riskmetrics database.
43The main assumption of this model is that market factors scaled by their volatility, that is measured
by the standard deviation, are stationary.
44CAViaR models the portfolio quantiles as an autoregressive process that also depends on lagged
returns. The specific estimator accounts for volatility clustering and is shown to be consistent and
asymptotically normal. A consistent variance-covariance estimator is also provided. In particular, four
different model specifications are estimated using the regression quantile method and checked by means of
an especially developed test, the so-called dynamic quantile test, for performance in- and out-of-sample.
45A brief survey over semi-parametric methods can be found in Manganelli and Engle (2001).
46This method is based on the conditional distributions of the portfolio components (that has thus to
be known). It has a straightforward application to problems involving few assets but of high practical
interest, such as optimizing portfolios for shares and bonds, analyzing the impact of adding an asset to
an existent portfolio, or minimizing the portfolio VaR with a put option.
47E.g. deriving from the (conditional) multivariate normality assumption that usually does not hold
in practice.
48E.g. Pearson (2002) advances that the delta approximation underestimates (overestimates) VaR for
portfolios of written (purchased) options.
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comes a serious problem in case of non-linear instruments such as options. Consequently,
for option portfolios full valuation may be necessary, given that it enables the derivation
of the complete multivariate distribution. Finally, note that the time adjustment sug-
gested for the estimation of Equation (3.2) (e.g. from daily to ten-days volatility) is more
complex in the case of options. Specifically, it does not reduce to the multiplication with
the squared root of the time interval.49 Hence, VaR has to be directly computed over the
desired time horizon and not scaled out of the daily measure.
In spite of their accuracy, full-valuation methods are much more costly in terms of
computations and, due to the limited number of replications, can also be subject to
sampling variation. Although historical simulations exhibit the advantage of accurately
reflecting the historical distribution of market variables, they require an adequate amount
of past data50 and become tedious for large portfolios. In addition, the historical method
works with fixed rolling windows, which reduces to assuming i.i.d. returns and that
past evolutions represent the unique set of future-relevant alternatives.51 As it cannot
account for volatility changes (i.e. for the theta risk), this method is in itself not well-
suited to portfolios of derivatives. Besides, it can deliver VaR estimates that exhibit
jumps. Moreover, the Monte Carlo simulation captures well complex risks that cannot
be covered by other methods, but involves itself a model risk, i.e. the risk of specifying a
false stochastic process from which hypothetical returns are generated.
Furthermore, semi-parametric methods retain some of the disadvantages of the pro-
cedures on which they rely (e.g. of the parametric assumptions or of the non-parametric
choice problems).
Further risk measures
In spite of the large scale use of VaR in practice, researchers have signalled several draw-
backs concerning its appropriateness as a risk measure.52 First, Jorion (2001) notes that
49According to Duffie and Pan (1997), this is an acceptable approximation as long as there is no
significant variation in standard deviations, no correlation in price changes over the considered time
period, neither non-linear dependence of derivative prices on the underlying market prices.
50As specified in Hager (2006), representative and sufficiently accurate results necessitate rather large
data sets, while the relevance of current evolutions cannot be ensured for observations that lie too far
away in the past. In effect, choosing the length of the rolling window is the most difficult problem posed
in the context of historical simulation, as emphasized in Manganelli and Engle (2001).
51Thus, it does not account for potentially important events that have not occurred in the past, as
argued in Manganelli and Engle (2001).
52However, Pfingsten, Wagner, and Wolferink (2004) reach the conclusion that the application of
different (downside) risk measures – such as VaR and ES – to real trading-book data does not entail high
discrepancies in the ranking of risky distributions (as measured by the Spearman-correlation coefficient
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according to the VaR-definition, the investment (portfolio) is considered to be “frozen”
over the specified time horizon, i.e. the market conditions are taken as constant. However,
this rarely holds in practice, as the portfolio composition constantly changes. Second, VaR
does not consider, by construction, the impact of extreme events, i.e. those located in the
tails of the return distribution.53 Such events may be rare but are of acute importance.
Third, VaR is not a coherent risk measure in the sense of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and
Heath (1999), in particular it does not recognize the addition and the concentration of
risks, and hence can even prevent diversification.54 Also, Szego¨ (2002) claims that the
non-convexity of VaR renders the implementation of usual – and very efficient – con-
vex optimization settings impossible and the existence of many local extremes makes the
VaR-ranking unstable. However, Pflug (2000) proves that the VaR-optimization problem
can be reformulated as a fixpoint problem of solutions of linear optimization problems
and Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005) suggest feasible algorithms for computing mean-VaR
efficient portfolios based on historical data.55
According to Pearson (2002), some of these shortcomings can be counterbalanced
by applying stress tests. Such tests simulate portfolio performance for various scenarios
reflecting particular changes in market conditions.56 Stress testing should compensate for
the lack of information on the magnitude of losses occurring when VaR is exceeded, on the
direction of the risk exposure (i.e. whether the loss quantified by VaR emerges in a rising
or falling market), or on risks encompassed in other factors than the ones considered to
be relevant.
Another possibility is to replace VaR by further risk measures as amply proposed in the
literature. On the one hand, extended-tail measures – and note that VaR itself is one of
them – such as the tail conditional expectation (TCE) or the worst conditional expectation
of the resulting rankings).
53In mathematical terms, VaR is not smooth. Events with a probability lower than α remain unconsid-
ered as long as the significance level is higher than α, a situation that immediately changes by choosing
another confidence level, as shown in Rau-Bredow (2002). According to Rockafellar and Uryasev (2001),
VaR represents only the lowest loss bound being biased towards optimism.
54In mathematical terms, VaR is not subadditive. According to Szego¨ (2002), the only exception is the
case with an elliptic joint distribution – such as the normal distribution – of the addition terms, when
the VaR-minimizing portfolio is identical to the Markowitz variance-minimizing solution. In practice, the
non-subadditivity implies that the global risk can be higher than the sum of the component risks. In
such a case, it would be possible to reduce risk by splitting the investment (e.g. the portfolio) or the
business with respect to different risk sources (e.g. components).
55Please refer to Footnote 69 for further details on the algorithm in Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005).
56The scenarios can be based on past market events, on hypothetical shocks applied to certain market
risk factors (that can be further extended by considering the correlations of these core factors with other
factors), or on implications of possible events for more major markets.
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(WCE), perform somewhat better.57 As shown in Acerbi and Tasche (2002), they are
yet non-continuous in α and hence cannot be applied to non-continuous distributions.58
On the other hand, there is one alternative measure that proves to be coherent for all
distributions, namely the expected shortfall (ES). It represents the limit in probability of
the expected losses in α% worst cases. For continuous distribution, ES coincides with the








in line with the notation from our above Equation (3.3). For normally distributed portfolio





w′Σw − w′µ, (3.5)
where φ stands for the standard normal pdf. When applied to portfolio optimization,
ES entails identical results to VaR for normal distributions, according to Rockafellar
and Uryasev (2001). Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005) argue that, for general distributions,
ES can be converted to the target variable of a convex optimization problem for which
efficient algorithms exist.60 In addition, it can be expressed in a minimal form that saves
computations, with respect to which Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2001) show how
57Please refer to Acerbi and Tasche (2002) for the mathematical definitions of TCE and WCE.
58These denominations are alternately and often misleadingly used in the literature. We follow here
the suggestions in Acerbi and Tasche (2002), though our definition of VaR corresponds to the lower
quantile in their Definition 2.1. Specifically, the lower and upper quantile VaR can be defined as VaRα =
−qα = − inf{w|P (W ≤ w) ≥ α} and VaRα = −qα = − inf{w|P (W ≤ w) > α}, respectively. The
lower and upper tail conditional expectations stand for the average loss in the worst α% cases and
amount to TCEα = −E[W |W ≤ −VaRα] and TCEα = −E[W |W ≤ −VaRα], respectively. The worst
conditional expectation introduced in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) can be formally stated
as WCEα = − inf{E[W |A]|P (a) > α}.
59According to Acerbi and Tasche (2002), the conditional VaR is mostly defined as CVaRα =
inf{E[(W − s)−]/α − s|s ∈ R}, where (x)− denotes the negative part of a number. A general defi-
nition of the expected shortfall (or tail mean) is ESα = −TMα = {E[W1W≤−VaRα ]− VaRα[α − P (w ≤
−VaRα)]}/α. For non-continuous distributions, Pflug (2000) shows that ESα = TCEα+(β−1)(TCEα−
VaRα), where β = P (W ≤ −VaRα(W ))/α. As demonstrated in De Giorgi (2002), for continuous dis-
tributions ES is identical to TCE. Also, Acerbi and Tasche (2002) prove that, in general, ES yields the
maximum of WCE and the two measures are identical for continuous distributions. Moreover, the fol-
lowing identity holds for integrable random variables: ESα = CVaRα = −{E[W1W≤s] + s[α − P (W ≤
s)]}/α, s ∈ [qα, qα].
60The conversion is possible due to the fact that ES represents the smallest convex majorant of VaR as
shown in Pflug (2000). Hence according to Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev (2001), the minimization of
ES - or, equivalently, of a continuously distributed CVaR – leads to near optimal solutions for VaR as well.
In essence, replacing VaR by ES (or CVaR) strengthens capital requirements. The same representation
as a convex optimization problem can be found in the classical mean-variance framework, where the
employed risk measure is the standard deviation of portfolio returns. This is not the case of VaR, of
which the optimization is non-convex and hence can lead to multiple local minima.
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ES can be computed without first having to calculate VaR61 and for distributions with
jumps. Also, Manganelli and Engle (2001) demonstrate that ES can be derived according
to different semi-parametric approaches, as soon as it is stated in terms of standardized
residuals. In spite of these more desirable properties, neither ES nor CVaR have yet
replaced VaR as a standard measure in the financial industry.62
Portfolio optimization under VaR-constraints
Another application of VaR consists of portfolio optimization where market risk is mea-
sured by VaR. In essence, it follows the same steps as the classic mean-variance optimiza-
tion procedure. In particular, the risk measure – now VaR – has first to be minimized
for various expected portfolio returns. This secondly allows the derivation of the mean-
VaR feasible set. Finally, the mean-VaR efficient frontier can be inferred.63 Comparisons
of mean-variance and mean-VaR efficient frontiers performed in Gaivoronski and Pflug
(2005) show that the latter approximates quite well the former one and entails a better
equivalent VaR.64
However, the portfolio optimization with VaR proves usually to be more difficult with
respect to the classic procedure of Markowitz which considers the standard deviation as
a risk measure. The motivation is that finding the optimal portfolio implies working
with the multivariate distribution of portfolio returns. As noted in De Giorgi (2002), this
distribution cannot be analytically formulated for other cases than normally distributed
component returns. Numerical approximation becomes hence necessary. In addition,
Gaivoronski and Pflug (2005) stress that the VaR-optimization can yield non-convex prob-
lems of high computational complexity.65 Various optimization algorithms proposed
in the literature address these problems and facilitate the work with non-normal multi-
variate distributions, and can be found in the papers of Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000),66
61This would be necessary according to the definition in Equation (3.4).
62According to Embrechts, Klu¨ppelberg, and Mikosch (1999), CVaR is however widely accepted in the
insurance industry.
63Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev (2001) apply an equivalent formulation of the problem of finding
the efficient frontier. This formulation relies on fixing the risk and maximizing returns.
64Specifically, the VaR of mean-VaR efficient portfolios provides an improvement of over 10% over the
VaR computed in the mean-variance framework in more than 50% of the cases studied in Gaivoronski
and Pflug (2005).
65There is a vast literature on solving convex optimization problems. See Rockafellar and Uryasev
(2000) for further references. The goal of most of papers is to reduce the mean-VaR problem to a
convex one that can be efficiently solved. (Note that the mean-variance problem is convex.) However,
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) underline the fact that, for hedges with relatively few instruments, non-
smooth optimization techniques can compete with linear programming.
66Specifically, they design a method to optimize ES (see Equation (3.4) and the comments at the end
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Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev (2001),67 Rockafellar and Uryasev (2001),68 or Gaivo-
ronski and Pflug (2005)69. Alternatively, the univariate distributions of the single portfolio
assets can first be considered separately and then integrated through a copula function,
as demonstrated in Embrechts, Ho¨ing, and Juri (2003).70 Another – and more general –
difficulty with the portfolio calculations resides in the identification of the relevant mar-
ket factors of which the changes generate risks. Pearson (2002) advises the use of factor
models for this purpose.
Several approaches attempt to solve the problem of portfolio optimization under VaR
– or VaR-related – constraints, that is also addressed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Campbell,
Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) are among the first to develop a portfolio selection model
with VaR-constraints.71 They find that the optimal portfolio composition72 derived from
historical returns73 under the constraint of a 95%-VaR reaches from 36% in stocks for
daily data to 90% for monthly data (the rest being allocated to bonds). When the future
returns are assumed to follow a normal (Student-t) distribution, these percentages change
to 38.22% (40.38%) stocks for daily data.74 In addition, a performance index similar to
of this section). This method has as a byproduct the value of VaR for continuous distributions. To this
end, both risk measures are reformulated in terms of a convex and continuously differentiable function,
the minimization of which is equivalent to the minimization of the ES. In essence, ES amounts to the
minimum value of this function and the VaR to the left point of the argument set of minima. Finally,
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) apply this approach to portfolio optimization and compare among the
solutions of optimization problems with VaR, ES, and standard deviation as objective functions, as well
as to hedging.
67They extend the approach in Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) is extended to optimization problems
with ES constraints. See the end of this section for more details on this model. A case study shows that
the algorithm is stable, efficient, and flexible, and is able to handle a large number of instruments and
scenarios.
68In particular, the approach in Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) is now extended for general distribu-
tions, e.g. with jumps, as it it often the case in scenario models. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2001) restate
ES as weighted average of VaR and what they define as the upper ES. This procedure is well suited to
optimization problems with ES both as an objective function and as a constraint.
69In essence, their method is based on the observation that VaR can be split into two components: a
first smooth and convex one that can hence be efficiently minimized, and a second irregular and non-
differentiable one that can thus entail multiple local minima. The proposed algorithm proceeds by first
filtering out the smooth component, then convexly optimizing for it by standard procedures, and finally
improving the so obtained approximation.
70They propose a general method for constructing optimal bounds for risk measures that relies on the
theory of copulae. (A copula represents a distribution function that captures the dependence structure
among marginals and the corresponding multidimensional distribution. Thus, knowing the copula and the
marginal distributions allows inferring the joint distribution. This is yet not the case for most practical
applications. Hence, giving bounds for the joint distribution becomes an issue of great interest.) This
method is exemplified for VaR, in which case it helps avoiding the lack of subadditivity of this measure
and hence determining the value at risk of a joint position from the VaR-s of the marginal positions.
71This model underlies our theoretical framework and will be referred in more detail in Section 3.2.2.
72In their setting, investors can merely chose between stocks and bonds.
73The data set encompasses prices of US bonds, treasury bills, and the S&P 500 index between 1990-
1998.
74The VaR is estimated from historical returns for different confidence levels ranging from 95-99%.
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the Sharpe-ratio is defined in order to comply with the VaR-framework and allows for
the comparison of the optimal VaR- and mean-variance portfolios in case of normally
distributed returns.75
Basak and Shapiro (2001) solve a similar portfolio optimization problem under VaR-
constraints. They observe that, when investors dispose of low monetary resources (i.e. in
low-wealth states), VaR entails lower wealth levels with respect to the benchmark without
risk-constraints. The use of VaR in such situations increases the credit and solvency
risk.76 Basak and Shapiro (2001) consequently propose and evaluate an alternative risk
measure aiming at limiting expected losses denoted as limited expected losses (LEL).77
Since LEL results in higher wealth (hence smaller losses) in bad states of the world,
LEL-oriented managers never take extreme leveraged positions in such states.78 The
analysis is subsequently extended to a general equilibrium setting where VaR-restricted
agents and non-risk agents are faced to each other. The goal is to assess the impact of
VaR-constraints on prices. Relative to normal agents, VaR-agents are shown to weight
consumption before and after the VaR planning horizon differently. Before the VaR-
horizon, values and volatilities of VaR-agents’ portfolios are higher than the corresponding
ones for non-risk agents. In fact, higher volatilities occur in transition from intermediate
to bad states (i.e. in falling stock markets). Thus, VaR-agents take more risk than normal
agents do, and this exactly during these bad periods, which yields an increased market
volatility.
Further interesting conclusions concerning the VaR-efficient portfolio set are reached
by De Giorgi (2002). When portfolio returns are multivariate-normally distributed and
Daily, bi-weekly, and monthly data, as well as different expected return distributions (historical, normal,
and Student-t) serve for analyzing the evolution of the optimal portfolio composition and determining
efficient portfolio frontiers.
75Specifically, this index equals the ratio of the return premium and a measure of risk calculated as
the difference between the initial portfolio valuated at the risk-free rate and VaR. Further conclusions
refer to the fact that larger deviations from normality entail increased risk underestimation, as higher
VaR-confidence levels are chosen. The use of the Student-t distribution yields lower (higher) portfolio
VaR for lower (higher) confidence, where these changes are more pronounced for shorter time horizons
and are maximal for one day.
76Specifically, agents are assumed to be maximizers of (CRRA) expected utility over a certain horizon
and to comply with VaR-constraints imposed on that horizon. Their optimal wealth at the end of the
planning horizon decomposes into three domains, namely good states of the world (where VaR-agents
behave like the benchmark with no constraints), intermediate states (against which VaR-agents fully
insure), and bad states (that are left uninsured).
77The reason for the VaR-underperfomance would be that it concentrates on probabilities instead of
the magnitude of losses. The authors claim that LEL is subadditive, as well as positively homogenous
and monotonic, but not translation-invariant, as required in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999)
for coherent risk measures.
78With LEL instead of VaR as a risk measure, agents partially insure also in the bad states and the
pdf of the terminal wealth becomes continuous.
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no risk-free asset is present in the market, the set of mean-VaR efficient portfolios forms
a subset of the efficient portfolios under ES. This latter set is itself contained in the set of
classic mean-variance efficient portfolios. In addition, when both risky and risk-free assets
can be traded all these three efficient portfolio sets become identical.79 Consequently, the
Tobin (or two fund) separation theorem – which stresses that the efficient portfolio is a
combination of the risk-free asset and the tangency portfolio80 – holds also when investors
use VaR or ES for quantifying market risk. As in the long-run returns appear to be
normally distributed, De Giorgi (2002) concludes that there is no significant improvement
in using one of these more sophisticated risk measures instead of the standard deviation.81
In the same spirit, Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev (2001) construct the efficient
frontier of a portfolio of stocks in the SP100 index and the risk-free asset, subject to various
constraints on CVaR82 and generating scenarios from ten-day historical returns. This
frontier is subsequently compared to the equivalent mean-variance frontier of the standard
Markowitz-approach.83 The results show that for non-normal return distributions the
mean-variance and mean-CVaR frameworks entail distinct results, where the discrepancy
increases subject to the chosen confidence level.84
The alarm signals pulled by scholars in showing the drawbacks of VaR face yet massive
difficulties in getting through to the real financial world. On the one hand, the legislation
in force and the plain business practice compel to employ VaR as a risk measure. The
bottom line is that VaR has already been established as a widely accepted and imple-
mented standard in risk management. This turns it into a veritable mental anchor for
portfolio managers. On the other hand, the lack of sufficient competencies necessary for
understanding and tackling all mathematical subtleties of more refined risk measures can
only encourage the use of easy-to-implement measures such as VaR. (Recall that, as long
79Of course, this holds unless one of the sets is not empty. Emptiness can occur for e.g. too high α, as
first shown in Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000).
80The tangency portfolio represents a portfolio that is optimal under both situations with and without
risk-free assets. When investors hold homogenous probability beliefs, it yields to the normalized optimal
portfolio with risk-free assets.
81Furthermore, he develops a linear programming algorithm for approximating efficient mean-ES port-
folios for other distributions than normal.
82In addition to the usual risk constraint –where the measure of risk in this case is CVaR – Krokhmal,
Palmquist, and Uryasev (2001) also incorporate constraints on transaction costs and on individual values
and positions.
83The equivalency is ensured by using identical historical returns.
84In principle, the discrepancy is due to the fact that the variance represents a symmetric measure
of risk that equally accounts for high gains and high losses. In contrast, VaR and CVaR refer only to
the left tail of the distribution corresponding to losses. This suggests a close connection to the distinct
subjective perception of gains and losses modelled in the prospect theory.
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as the normal distribution can be considered as an acceptable approximation of the rele-
vant risk factors, the use of VaR for selecting optimal portfolios is not incorrect, although
it can unnecessarily complicate the optimization procedure. However, if this is not the
case, managers should be aware of the biases in assessing risk that follow from the use of
VaR and replace VaR by other more appropriate measures of risk.)
Our analysis from Sections 3.2 and 3.3 is based on the portfolio selection under VaR,
since this appears to remain the perspective actually adopted by most managers in prac-
tice. Yet, we are sooner concerned with the attitude and decisions of non-professional
investors (and not of professional managers). As non-professional investors are not bound
by any written or unwritten laws of business practice, one could ask why such investors
should also work with VaR. The motivation resides in a sort of “contamination”: As ex-
plained in Section 3.2, most non-professional investors – who are, in essence, non-experts
– hire professional managers for providing technical assistance concerning investment de-
cisions. Accustomed to think in terms of VaR, managers ask their non-professional clients
to indicate a maximum acceptable level of risk (which further enters the portfolio opti-
mization procedure in the form of the usual risk constraint).85 Thus, non-professional
investors are forced to adopt a VaR perspective and made part of the “VaR-chain”. Of
course, non-professional investors may face even higher difficulties in rigorously under-
standing the concept of VaR and its implications. For them, the subjective perceptions
are susceptible to play a determinant important role in this respect, as we will discuss
later. Our work focusses on the non-specialist individuals’ perceptions of the maximum
acceptable loss, and on their further impact on the final capital allocation decision.
3.1.2 Prospect theory
Before presenting our main model where VaR serves non-professional investors to allo-
cate money among different utility sources, it is important to address the problem of
perception. The motivation resides in the fact that these usually non-trained investors
perceive financial market risks – and hence VaR – in a subjective way which may deviate
substantially from the formal definitions summarized in Section 3.1.1. We formalize the
perceptions of non-professional investors in terms of the prospect theory, the main issues
of which are addressed in this section.
85It is also plausible to think that mangers explain to their clients some details of the procedure used for
reaching the optimal asset composition. Since VaR is a key variable of this procedure, non-professional
investors will be learning even more about the meaning and use of VaR.
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The prospect theory (abbr. PT) of Kahneman and Tversky constitutes a corner-
stone of behavioral finance. Introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and extended
in Tversky and Kahneman (1992),86 as well as in many further papers by different au-
thors, PT rebuts the basic principles of the expected utility theory (abbr. EUT), the major
approach regarding decision making under risk in neoclassical Economics.87 The need to
change the traditional framework came in consequence of the fact that deviations from
theoretically prescribed behaviors were repeatedly observed in real decision situations
(above all in financial markets).88
Specifically, experiments and empirical observations reveal different effects that violate
the basic normative axioms imposed by EUT on human preferences and choices.89 Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) summarize them as framing effects,90 non-linear preferences,91
source dependence,92 risk seeking,93 and loss aversion.9495
86The extension is referred to as the cumulative prospect theory (abbr. CPT) and exhibits additional
features, such as the usage of cumulative instead of separable decision weights, the coverage of decision
problems under both risk and uncertainty and with any number of outcomes, the formulation of distinct
weighting functions for gains and losses, and the introduction of diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion.
87EUT assumes that investors behave as perfectly rational maximizers of the expected utility of wealth.
They are able to process the entire information at their disposal and form unbiased judgments. Thus,
they assess the expected utility as a linear combination of final states (or outcomes), weighted by the
probabilities of the corresponding events with these outcomes. These probabilities are mostly updated
by means of the Bayes rule and must be well-known to the investors. The utility function is taken to
be unique for all possible outcomes. Moreover, investors exhibit consistent preferences and risk-averse
behaviors, so that the utility function is concave in wealth.
Specifically, EUT postulates the valuation of a future situation – i.e. choice alternative or prospect –
as the mathematical expectation of its monetary values. This expectation is defined as the weighted
sum of the outcome utilities (reference dependence). The gains and losses are evaluated symmetrically
(symmetry of valuation) and proportionally to the accordant expectations (non-proportional marginal
sensitivity). The weights represent outcome probabilities that sum up to 1 and are independent of the
origin of uncertainty. Accordingly, the utility function depends only on final states. The risk is captured
by means of a unique and constant risk coefficient. This renders the entire utility function linear for
risk-neutral subjects, concave for risk-averse, and convex for risk-seeking ones, respectively.
88Thaler (1985) devises the so-called behavioral decision research by enunciating and refuting 15 prin-
ciples of the classic utility theory: the choice dependence on outcomes and generally on final states, the
formulation of decision weights as outcome probabilities and their independence of the source of uncer-
tainty, the independence of preferences of their representation, the preference of dominating alternatives,
the equivalence of opportunity and out-of-pocket costs, the optimal search, the influence of sunk costs
on decisions, the exclusive dependence of preferences on the qualities of an alternative and not on its
perceived merits, the consistency and lack of bias (i.e. the full rationality) of probabilistic judgments,
and the Bayesian learning.
89These axioms refer to: completeness (that also implies reflexivity), transitivity, the Archimedean
property, and independence. The fulfillment of the first two is denoted as rationality.
90Different presentations (framing) of the choice problem can entail distinct preferences. This contra-
dicts the assumption of description invariance in the rational theory.
91Specifically, utility is non-linear in the outcome probabilities.
92Not only the degree but also the source of uncertainty can influence preferences. One classic example
is the paradox by Ellsberg (1961).
93Namely for losses and for low probable high gains relative to the expected value.
94That is, the asymmetry in the perception of gains and losses. More details are given in the text
below.
95The original Kahneman and Tversky (1979) paper addresses more specifical effects, such as the cer-
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PT attempts to incorporate these psychological aspects in the decision making process
that is considered to rely on the individual perception of reality. In essence, PT was not
intended to be a normative theory based on axioms as EUT, but rather a descriptive
approach attempting to capture empirically observed behaviors.96 Thus, PT stresses that
decisions are in fact rarely based on final states (outcomes), but sooner on subjectively
perceived changes in welfare generated by these outcomes. Perceptions are formulated
relative to a subjective reference point,97 so that deciders distinguish between positive
and negative wealth changes (i.e. gains and losses).
According to the original Kahneman and Tversky (1979) paper, the human choice
process develops in two stages. The first one refers to editing of choice alternatives (or
prospects) and entails a mental representation of them. It implies different operations,
such as coding,98 combination (of probabilities of prospects with identical outcomes), seg-
regation (of the risk-free component from the risky one), cancellation (of components or of
outcome-probability pairs that are common among prospects), simplification of prospects
(e.g. by probability or outcome rounding), and detection of dominance (where the domi-
nated alternatives are rejected). Naturally, the sequence of these editing operations influ-
ences the final edited prospect, hence the preference order.99 The second stage consists of
the evaluation of the edited prospects and of the final choice (which is the prospect with
the highest ascribed value).
The evaluation phase implies the assessment of an overall value of each choice alter-
native, denoted as prospective value. Formally, it represents the weighted sum of the
values subjectively assigned by each individual to the possible outcomes, where outcomes
are separately treated as gains (henceforth denoted by a symbol +) or losses (denoted by –
tainty effect (i.e. the preference of certain smaller to uncertain higher gains which violates the substitution
axiom and relates to the well-known Allais (1953) paradox), the reflection effect (i.e. the fact that high
risky losses are preferred to certain smaller ones), the probabilistic insurance (i.e. the preference for con-
tingent insurances that provides certain coverage vs. probabilistic insurances, that is due to the fact that
different formulations entail distinct preferences over prospects with identical outcomes and probabili-
ties), the isolation effect (according to which prospects appear to be often decomposed and people focus
merely on the components that distinguish choice alternatives; as different decompositions are possible,
preferences can revert and become inconsistent which violates the completeness and transitivity).
96Axiomatizations of CPT for decisions under uncertainty and risk are provided in Wakker and Tversky
(1993) and Chateauneuf and Wakker (1999), respectively, and extended in Schmidt (2003) in order to
capture the impact of shifting reference points.
97As underlined in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the reference point can be the status quo (e.g. the
current asset value) but also an aspiration level. Its shift is possible and affects the preference order.
98This assumes defining the reference point and perceptually separate outcomes in gains and losses
with respect to it.
99This phenomenon is also known as the framing of the problem.
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).100 According to Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the prospective value V of outcome i,
















where v stands for the value function and pi for the decision weights, both of which being





indicates the domain of gains (losses).
The subjective value of outcomes is encompassed by the so-called value function
which exhibits several particular features. First, it addresses the perceptional segmen-
tation into two domains with different evolutions. These domains correspond to gains
and losses, so that the value function is asymmetric. The delimitation of the loss and
gain domains takes place with respect to a subjective reference point.101 Moreover, the
value function exhibits diminishing sensitivity in both domains, i.e. its variation decreases
with the magnitude of gains and losses, respectively. In addition, as people appear to be
more reluctant to incur losses compared to gains of the same size – a property denoted
as loss aversion -, the value function presents a kink at the origin. Consequently, the
value function has to be zero at the reference point, steeper for losses than for gains,
as well as concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses (in sum,
s-shaped).102 The CPT of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) formulates the value function
v of an individual (investor) k. For simplicity reasons, we henceforth omit the subscript
k. This convention will apply to all variables except for the outcome xi. The CPT-value
function yields:
v(xi) =
 A(xi − x
0
i )
α, ifxi ≥ x0i ≡ (x+i )
−B(x0i − xi)β, ifxi < x0i ≡ (x−i ),
where x0i stands for the subjective reference point. In addition, 0 < α, β ≤ 1 are specifical
100The prospective value is the counterpart of the expected utility function in EUT. Thus, the concept
of “utility”, defined in EUT in terms of net wealth is replaced by the one of “value”, defined in PT in
terms of relative wealth.
101Formally, the value function is a function of two variables: the reference point and the magnitude of
changes with respect to this reference. CPT considers the reference point to be fixed, e.g. corresponding
to the status quo or initial endowment. Schmidt (2003) develops an extended axiomatization for variable
references, that accounts for the derivation of both value function and decision weights. Davies (2005)
extends the notation in Schmidt (2003) in order to allow for the independence of the reference point and
hence of the initial endowment and thus provides a basis for the unification of the frameworks for risky
and risk-free choices.
102Norsworthy, Gorener, Schuler, Morgan, and Li (2004) find empirical evidence on the US-market for
reference dependence, asymmetric valuation of gains and losses and diminishing sensitivity.
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parameters describing risk aversion,103 and B ≥ A > 0 point to loss aversion. Often, the
above defined value function is “normalized” by taking x0i = 0, A = 1 and changing the





i , forxi ≥ 0
−λ(−xi)β, forxi < 0.
(3.6)
The specific parameters of the value function are estimated in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) to be α = β = 0.88 and λ = 2.25.104 The corresponding course is illustrated in
Figure 3.2.





















Figure 3.2: The PT-value function, for λ = 2.25, α = β = 0.88
According to PT, the outcomes that enter the prospective value may not be weighted
by their simple probabilities as in the standard EUT, but by the subjectively perceived
counterparts of these probabilities. The latter are denoted as (cumulative) probability
weighting functions (or decision weights) and represent complex, non-linear func-
tions of probabilities. This idea originates in the findings of various psychological ex-
103The risk aversion is captured through the concave-convex form of the value function which points
to an increased perceived value of every change in wealth due to the risky investment. This change
is distinct in the two domains of gains and losses. In mathematical terms, this form is obtained for
sub-unitary α and β. Accordingly, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion defined in Arrow
(1965) −xv′′(x)/v′(x) yields 1− α (1− β) for gains (losses).
104The result that α, β < 1 confirms the diminishing sensitivity of the value function in both domains.
Further estimates of the curvature parameters are computed in Wu and Gonzales (1996) both for their
own data set (α = 0.52) and for the data set in Camerer and Ho (1994) (α = 0.37). The estimation
of λ conforms to median responses obtained in an experiment concerning two-outcome prospects with
monetary outcomes and numerical probabilities conducted in Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
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periments showing that individuals manifest the tendency to overweight (underweight)
small (moderate to large) probabilities. Formally, the weighting functions are designed to
be increasing in probability and to exhibit diminishing sensitivity (i.e. steeper evolution)
at (both of) the endpoints of the probability scale, i.e. in 0 and 1.105 This yields the
specifical inverted S-shape (concave for small and convex for large probabilities), with an
inflection point between 0.30− 0.40.106 Also, the decision weights are mostly sub-certain
(i.e. add up to a value less than 1).107 CPT describes the weighting function pi of the
outcome i as a difference in functions of the outcome probabilities w(p):108
pi+i = w
+(p1 + . . .+ pi)− w+(p1 + . . .+ pi−1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ I
pi−i = w







where w+ and w− are strictly increasing on [0, 1] and:
w+(0) = w−(0) = 0, w+(1) = w−(1) = 1
w+(p) =
pγ
[pγ + (1− p)γ]1/γ
w−(p) =
pδ
[pδ + (1− p)δ]1/δ .
(3.8)
The curvature parameters in Equations (3.8) are estimated to be γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69.109
105The introduction of decision weights of this form is considered to be necessary by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992), as the monotonic transformation of outcome probabilities initially suggested in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) does not hold for choice problems with more than two outcomes. This transformation
should be replaced by a broader applicable one which can be used for the entire cumulative distribution
function, should account separately for gains and losses, and should satisfy stochastic dominance.
106Specifically, Wu and Gonzales (1996) find a value of around 0.40 using non-parametric estimation,
while in Prelec (1998), parametric estimates of the inflexion point yield 0.37 for the own data set and
0.34 (0.38) for gains (losses) of the data in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Also, Camerer and Ho (1994)
assess the inflexion probability to be 0.30 for the functional form in Equation (3.8).
107Prelec (1998) summarizes the properties of the weighting function: it is regressive (which generates
the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes: risk-seeking for small-probability gains and large-probability losses
and risk-averse for high-probability gains and small-probability losses), asymmetric (which increases
risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses), s-shaped (which enhances the impact of changes in
probability at the ends of the probability interval), and reflective (i.e. it assigns identical weights to given
loss- and gain-probabilities).
108Numerous further papers investigate the weighting functions. Thus, Tversky and Wakker (1995)
confront risk with uncertainty and introduce a method for comparing weighting functions of the same
individual for different sources of uncertainty based on the property of subadditivity. Wu and Gonza-
les (1996) propose and test preference conditions (stronger than subadditivity) that are necessary and
sufficient for explaining the concavity-convexity of decision weights. Prelec (1998) suggests a family of
so-called “compound invariant functions” that fulfill the empirical requirements of weighting functions.
They also show how to generate sub-proportional weighting functions and estimate the inflexion point.
109Further estimates are assessed in Camerer and Ho (1994) (i.e. γ = 0.56), obtained for a power value
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Further qualitatively similar formulations are proposed in Prelec (1998)110 and yield:
w+(p) = w−(p) = exp[−(− ln p)²] (3.9)
or:
w+(p) = pγ, w−(p) = pδ. (3.10)
The respective courses are depicted in Figure 3.3.111
























Figure 3.3: Possible PT-weighting for the gain domain w+ (left panel) and
loss domain w− (right panel) from Equations (3.8) (continuous line), (3.10)
(dashed line), and (3.9) (dotted line), for γ = 0.61, δ = 0.69, ² = 0.65
Therefore, in line with the expressions for the value function and the decision weights





i − pi−i λ(−xi)β. (3.11)
The concept of prospective value is central to the models in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. We
rely yet on linear value functions α = β = 1 and simple probability weights pi(p) = p.
function (xαi , where α = 0.225).
110Prelec (1998) also suggests more general functionals that belong to the same family of compound
invariant functions, namely w+/−(p) = ψ+/− exp[−ξ+/−(− ln p)²+/− ], but considers the form in Equation
(3.9) as more stable with respect to the inflection point over different levels of non-linearity.
111Further functionals are estimated in Wu and Gonzales (1996), in particular pγ/[pγ+(1−p)γ ]δ, where
γ = 0.721 and δ = 1.565, and δpγ/[δpγ + (1− p)γ ], where γ = 0.68 and δ = 0.84.
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3.1.3 Loss aversion and Myopia
As stressed above, one of the main innovations of PT is to introduce the notion of loss
aversion as a common feature of decision making under uncertainty. This concept stands
for the empirically observed asymmetric impact of losses and gains on behavior.112
In general, loss aversion is modeled in parallel with risk aversion. According to Ra-
bin (2000a,b), this is necessary as EUT cannot properly describe the risk aversion over
modest stakes.113 Two main reasons speak in favor of this assertion and became thus the
main points in which PT disagrees from EUT: First, the investor risk attitude cannot
be fully described by means of a sole parameter, which is the risk aversion.114 This idea
underlies in PT to the formulation of the value function. Second, preferences are not
necessarily linearly dependent on the outcome probabilities, an idea that has fostered the
introduction of the probability weighting functions.
Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) consider loss aversion as a natural component of the
risk attitude. It can be clearly delimited from two further components, namely the utility
(expressed by the value function) and the probability weighting (reflected in the decision
weights). Being related to the kink of the value function at the origin, the loss aversion
can be measured by the ratio of the left and right derivatives of the value function at the
reference point. This ratio corresponds to the coefficient λ of the PT-value function in
Equation (3.18) and is referred to as the index of loss aversion.115 For linear specifications
of the value function, the index of loss aversion is identical to the loss aversion coefficient λ.
Various estimators of the coefficient of loss aversion λ are to be found in the literature.
The first of them is provided in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is inferred on the basis
of an experimental sample of untrained students and, under the assumption of a power
value function as in Equation (3.18), amounts to λ = 2.25. Moreover, Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) assess the parameter λ of a piecewise linear value function116 to be 2.77.
The estimations rely on Monte Carlo replications of real market data – of stocks, bonds,
and treasury bills – between 1926-1990. In the context of an original procedure designed
112In other words, the decrease in utility generated due to the marginal loss is higher in absolute value
than the increase from a marginal gain of the same size. As underlined in Hastie and Dawes (2001), losses
hurt more than gains (specifically twice as much, since the estimated λ > 2).
113In particular, EUT predicts either absurdly high risk aversion over large stakes, or risk-neutrality
over small stakes.
114The risk aversion is fully described in the EUT framework by the marginal utility of wealth.
115Note that the index of loss aversion cannot be defined for CRRA utility functions, but is well com-
patible to CARA specifications.
116That is equivalent to the expression in Equation (3.18), where α = β = 1.
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to test for loss aversion, Schmidt and Traub (2002) obtain λ = 1.43 from experimental
data. The same estimate amounts to 2.87 when merely loss averse choices are considered.
The subjects (students) are assumed to perceive choice alternatives according to CPT, i.e.
with the specific value function and non-linear decision weights.117 Furthermore, the loss
aversion coefficient obtained by Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004) amounts to 2.50
for a piecewise concave power utility function with a kink at the reference point.118 For
the same utility function but as a result of simultaneous GMM estimation of both the loss
aversion parameter λ and the risk aversion parameter γ, they derive λ = 2.711. Contrary
to the previously mentioned studies that draw back on numerical estimation, Berkelaar,
Kouwenberg, and Post (2004) derive closed-form solutions for the optimal portfolio of
the representative loss averse agent in a discrete one-period equilibrium setting.119 Their
estimations are based on historical US stock market data between 1927-2002.
The concept of loss aversion has been further extended in the literature in order to
(better) accommodate with empirically observed anomalies such as the equity premium
puzzle.120 One popular extension introduced in Benartzi and Thaler (1995), and referred
to as myopic loss aversion (abbr. mLA), relies on the joint effect of loss aversion and
narrow framing. Once more, loss aversion refers to the increased discomfort generated by
losses compared to the pleasure of making gains of the same size. The narrow framing
represents an aspect of mental accounting,121 that accounts for the tendency to evaluate
performance more frequently. This tendency results from the excessive attention paid to
financial prospects.122 Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997) define myopic
investors as traders who narrowly frame both decisions and outcomes. The former type
of narrow framing manifests with respect to short-term choices and the latter one con-
cerns frequent evaluations of performance. For example, regarding the criticism expressed
117A further interesting conclusion in Schmidt and Traub (2002) is that loss aversion may be due to the
extent rather than to the occurrence of loss averse choices. In the considered sample, women appear to
perform more and higher loss averse choices compared to men.
118Specifically, this function is U = λW γ/γ+(1−λ)θγ/γ, forW ≤ θ andW γ/γ, forW > θ, where γ = 1.
119More details on this model are given at the end of this section.
120This anomaly is first revealed in Mehra and Prescott (1985) and refers to the reluctance to invest
in stocks in spite of their higher premium relative to bonds. In EUT terms, this corresponds to a
tremendously high risk aversion and hence contradicts the estimates obtained from historical market
data.
121Introduced in Thaler (1980), mental accounting denotes the perception (i.e. the encoding and eval-
uation) of current and future financial outcomes in mentally distinct partitions to which different levels
of utility are assessed. Due to the presence of loss aversion, the aggregation of these different accounts
over outcomes (cross-sectionally) and over time is dynamic.
122According to Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), the isolated evaluation of single risky prospects prevents
the reduction of risk obtained by pooling together different risk sources.
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above that EUT cannot give a clear account of the risk-averse behavior with respect to
small risks, Rabin and Thaler (2001) stress that this behavior precisely originates in the
excessive focus on small risks due to their isolated consideration.
There has been numerous attempts to study the (myopic) loss aversion and its im-
plications. Thus, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) show how this phenomenon can explain
the equity premium puzzle123 and becomes manifest not only for individual investors, but
also for institutions, such as pension funds, or foundations and endowment funds. In their
work, one year is considered to be the optimal frequency with which investors check their
risky portfolios.124 For a piecewise linear value function and linear probability functions,
they show that this frequency explains the empirical equity premium of 6.5% per year.
Simulating returns from real market data, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) also provide evi-
dence for how the prospective utility of pure stock portfolios overpasses the one of bonds
only for revision frequencies higher than eight months. Finally, they derive the composi-
tion of an optimal portfolio of risky and risk-free assets that, for an evaluation horizon of
one year, amounts to approximatively 30− 55% stocks.
Furthermore, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) investigate the price evolution in an
aggregated equilibrium setting where investors derive utility from two sources: consump-
tion and fluctuations in financial wealth. They account therefore for a narrow framing
that gives rise to the fact that financial investments are considered as an equally im-
portant determinant of individual utility besides consumption. The loss aversion in the
original PT terms – described by the coefficient λ – is extended in order to allow for the
influence of past performance, i.e. for past series of gains and losses resulting from past
market movements. This extension provides for explaining the empirically found equity
premium.125 The results are extended in Barberis and Huang (2004a,b) for the case when
non-expected – instead of expected – utility is maximized.126
123Benartzi and Thaler (1995) stress that loss aversion determines investors to shift their attention from
utility of consumption to utility of returns. Thus, higher returns are demanded in exchange for the higher
volatility perceived in consequence of more frequent portfolio evaluations.
124Intuitively, yearly evaluations are motivated by the fact that individual investors fill taxes annually
and most reports (of brokers, mutual funds, retirement accounts, etc.) are issued with this frequency.
125In essence, they derive aggregate equilibrium prices first for the case when consumption and dividends
follow identical processes, then for the more realistic situation with distinct but correlated processes. The
model generates high returns as well as excessive return volatility, long-term predictability in returns,
high equity premiums, and weak correlation of returns and consumption growth, as observed in practice.
The results are tested for a wide range of parameter values and starting from US stock and bond prices,
as well as consumption data between 1926-1995. This setting underlies our theoretical framework and
will be detailed in Section 3.2.
126As shown in Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006), the maximization of non-expected utility complies
better with the common empirical finding that people who reject small-stakes gambles accept riskier
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McQueen and Vorkink (2004) adapt the preference-based equilibrium model in Bar-
beris, Huang, and Santos (2001) in order to capture the investor sensitivity to news.127
Thus, they explain the volatility clustering of low-frequency returns,128 as well as other
stylized facts on returns, such as the time-varying excess returns, the high risk premia,
and the skewness.129
Several direct experiments confirm mLA. Thus, Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and
Schwartz (1997) design an experimental setting that allows to perform separate tests on
loss aversion and myopia. The results of their tests confirm these two phenomena, as well
as the role of loss aversion vs. risk aversion.130 At the same time, Gneezy and Potters
(1997) directly test mLA on a group of students whose evaluation horizon (i.e. degree
of myopia) is manipulated through the supplied feedback information. Their results are
extended to a competitive (experimental) setting in Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003),
where agents face each other by trading units of one risky asset during several successive
large-stakes gambles. The latter from the following three possible specifications is found to perform
well: recursive utility with expected-utility certainty equivalent; non-recursive utility with non-expected
utility, second-order risk averse certainty equivalent; and non-recursive utility with non-EU, first-order
risk averse certainty equivalent. Yet on average, if narrow framing is not taken into account, all of
these specifications appear to have difficulties in explaining the attitude to large- vs. small-scale risks.
Considering both narrow framing and non-expected recursive utility with first-order risk aversion proves
to be sufficient for elucidating the stock market participation and the equity premium puzzles. Barberis
and Huang (2004a,b) formalize these ideas in an equilibrium setting and apply them for deriving optimal
consumption and portfolio choices. To this end, they rely on the data set in Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001) and perform robustness checks for various values of the model parameters.
127In particular, investors derive utility from consumption and changes in financial wealth, as in Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001). In addition, the financial wealth and its utility depend not only on loss
aversion, but also on a so-called mental scorecard that captures the attentiveness payed by investors to
news that affect their portfolios. Positive (negative) news surprises increase (decrease) the scorecard,
and there is gradual adaptation to new scorecard levels. Investor responses to news depend further on
the past portfolio performance, so that cumulated shocks of the same sign make them more attentive to
subsequent shocks.
128The tests are performed for monthly and quarterly data.
129The equilibrium equations are derived and the model numerically solved for values of the observable
parameters that are in line with previous work, and for model-specific parameters that best match
historical data. The model predicts that negative news pose a triple threat to prices: by themselves
and by the resulting increases in risk aversion and in sensitivity to news. In contrast, positive shocks
represent just a double threat, since the resulting price increase is counterbalanced by the higher expected
volatility. This explains the asymmetric impact of news on volatility. The conditional expected returns
decrease subject to increasing scorecards, while the expected standard deviation increases more for more
negative (than for more positive) scorecards and is minimal for zero scorecards. The skewness also
increases with news surprises, namely more for negative than for positive shocks. It also varies with
the loss aversion coefficient, the memory of the scorecard, and the sensitivity to past performance. For
simulated (exponential GARCH) returns, the model is proved to perform better than other approaches
in explaining volatility clustering. Finally, volatility predictions and the performance of the chosen
scorecard equation in explaining conditional excess returns, clustered volatility, and skewness, yield good
performance according to several different tests.
130Myopia is controlled by compelling subjects to hold their investments for certain periods and by
providing information on outcomes with different frequencies, such as one month, one year, and five
years. The experience of losses that can induce risk aversion is eliminated by translating all outcomes
into the gain domain.
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auctions. The results reinforce the existence of mLA and point out a positive impact on
prices.131 Haigh and List (2005) adapt the setting in Gneezy and Potters (1997) in order
to accommodate for the behavior of real players in financial markets. Their combined
lab-field experiment compares the behavior of professional futures and option traders at
the Chicago Board Exchange with the one of students. Apparently, professional traders
suffer from mLA to an even greater extent than students.132
However, these empirical tests investigate mLA by isolating it from other decisional
elements of potential importance. New research replicating some of the empirical stud-
ies mentioned above reach different conclusions in this regard. Thus, Langer and Weber
(2005) demonstrate theoretically133 and provide empirical evidence for the fact that the
interaction of different PT-factors such as loss aversion (formalized in Equation (3.18) as
λ > 1), diminishing sensitivity (expressed by the condition α < 1), and non-linear proba-
bility weights (pi) can entail situations when myopia causes an increase of the willingness
to invest.134 In addition, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2005) draw attention to the fact
that the non-linear perception of probabilities manifests simultaneously but contrary to
loss aversion and can even reverse the effect of the latter when probability distortions are
sufficiently pronounced.135 Also, Fellner and Sutter (2005) conclude that mLA depends
131In particular, prices are found to be higher when the evaluation is aggregated over longer time
intervals.
132The difference in behavior between more and less frequent feedback is found to be statistically sig-
nificant for all traders and only for a part of the students. This result is supported by further panel
regressions.
133They draw back on the theoretical results in Langer and Weber (2001) who prove that lotteries
with low probabilities of high losses (e.g. bank loans) can be perceived as less attractive in aggregated
than in segregated presentation. This contradicts the general finding that segregation entails unfavorable
valuations, which intuitively complies with mLA. In particular, Langer and Weber (2001) use the original
CPT value function that exhibits both loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, i.e. α = β = 0.88 and
λ = 2.25 in Equation (3.18). They study two-outcome lotteries with a fixed difference (of 2500) between
outcomes. The theoretical results receive support from simulations and two empirical studies and are
extended for larger lottery portfolios.
134Accordingly, myopia increases the attractiveness of investments with low probabilities of high losses,
such as bonds. The empirical support of this finding consists of feasible combinations of parameters
(α, λ) generated for lotteries considered in previous empirical studies such as Samuelson (1963), Gneezy
and Potters (1997), as well as by the direct reinterpretation of the results of these studies. However, a
student experiment directly conducted in Langer and Weber (2005) suggests that lotteries with high gain
probabilities but small gain sizes are preferred when the feedback is more frequent, which comes in line
with the results in Gneezy and Potters (1997).
135In particular, their critic addresses the experimental studies (conducted in the laboratory) of Gneezy
and Potters (1997) and those (implemented in the field with professional traders) of Haigh and List (2005).
These studies find evidence of mLA considering piecewise linear value functions and simple probability
weighting. These appear to be at odds with the random sampling of subjects, but can be fully explained
if non-linear probability weighting functions, as in CPT, are taken into account. In essence, mLA and
non-linear probability weighting exhibit opposed effects, where the latter prevails for high probability
distortions (i.e. for high curvature parameters of the weighting functions). In general, the combined
effect of loss aversion and non-linear probability weights can become non-linear.
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not only on the feedback frequency, but also on the length of the investment horizon
(i.e. of the investment flexibility).136 However, an experimental test meant to disentangle
between feedback frequency and investment flexibility conducted in Bellemare, Krause,
Kro¨ger, and Zhang (2005) confronts with these findings indicating that mLA can be rather
attributed to the feedback frequency as assumed in earlier empirical tests.
Further works address the formation of an optimal portfolio for loss averse investors
in specific equilibrium settings. In this vein, Gomes (2005) develops a general equilibrium
model where traditional risk averse investors (i.e. with CRRA power utility) meet loss
averse investors (with PT-utility).137 He shows that loss-averse investors switch between
a low-wealth strategy (with possibly nil risky investments) and a high-wealth strategy
(that resembles the portfolio insurance commonly used in practice). Thus, they formulate
discontinuous demands on risky assets. Moreover, the presence of loss-averse investors
yields an increased trading volume that attains its maximum at the strategy switching
point. The trading volume is shown to be positively (negatively) correlated with return
volatility when loss averse investors follow the portfolio insurance strategy (the low-wealth
strategy).138 This model provides possible explanations for several puzzling phenomena
observed in practice, such as the low rate of stock market investments, the use of portfolio
insurance strategies, or the disposition effect.139
Moreover, Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004) provide an exact solution on port-
folio optimization in complete markets with continuous prices and loss-averse investors.
136Their experimental setup accounts for two treatments: an exogenous one, similar to Gneezy and
Potters (1997), and an endogenous one, where the subjects can choose between long and short revision
horizons. When the choice can be made once at the beginning of the trade, subjects prove to be indifferent
between the two alternatives on average. When subjects are first faced with a default horizon and then
given the possibility of switching at a fixed cost, they mostly prefer to switch (specifically, they switch
sooner to the shorter horizon when the longer horizon is given by default). This reduces – but does not
fully eliminate – the effects of mLA. Another finding is that subjects with endogenous investment horizons
(i.e. with the possibility of switching) react to previous performance, that is more intensely compared to
the case when the investment horizon is predetermined. Specifically, subjects in the endogenous treatment
respond positively (negatively) to a higher total number of previous gains (number of gains in the previous
three rounds).
137In particular, an extended definition of the value function is used here. It adds a domain of extremely
high losses to the original gains and loss domains. For extreme losses, the decreasing marginal utility of
consumption dominates the psychological effect of losses. Also, Gomes (2005) considers the implication
of a dynamic reference that is designed as the linear combination of the last-period reference point and
the current wealth.
138Specifically, the optimal portfolios of both investor categories are first derived in a static one-period
setting with binomial risky returns for four different cases: CRRA utility, and an extended value function
for zero, negative, and positive surplus wealth. Subsequently, equilibrium returns and volumes are com-
puted in a more general setting (first with two, then with T periods) and compared between the cases
when investors have low and high surplus wealth.
139Shefrin and Statman (1985) define this effect as the disposition to sell winning stocks too early and
to hold losers too long.
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The loss aversion is is formalized by the kink of the utility function at the origin. Hence,
it can be accounted for in twofold manner: first through a concave kinked power utility,
and second by the two-piece power function of PT.140 The results are further extended
for dynamic (i.e. stochastic) reference points.141 The wealth percentage invested in risky
assets is shown to decrease, for sufficiently high initial wealth, as investors approach the
end of the trading horizon. Subsequently, the same authors estimate the aggregate level
of loss aversion from historical US market data by first fixing the level of risk-aversion and
then using a joint estimation GMM procedure.142 Empirically, loss aversion cannot be
distinguished from risk-aversion, i.e. the two concepts can be considered to be empirical
substitutes.
Finally, Berkelaar and Kouwenberg (2006) extend the setting in Berkelaar, Kouwen-
berg, and Post (2004) and prove that the presence of myopic loss averse investors entails
both high levels and high changes in volatility of equilibrium prices. However, the loss
aversion heterogeneity – given by different initial wealth levels – appears to smooth out
these extreme movements.143
140The derivation relies on the martingale methodology that allows to reexpress the dynamic optimiza-
tion problem in static terms. The static problem is solved following the technique for non-concave and
non-differentiable problems implemented in Basak and Shapiro (2001). In good states of the world, the
kinked-power utility investors behave similar to the classic CRRA investors, while the wealth of loss averse
investors with PT-utility drops discontinuously to zero. In intermediate and bad states, both types of
loss averse investors act like portfolio insurers. Also, for both investors, the wealth fraction invested in
risky assets follows a U-pattern, being higher in extreme (bad or good) states of the world.
141They restate the optimization problem with dynamic reference into an equivalent one with static
reference.
142To this end, they apply a discrete one-period representative agent setting. The loss aversion coefficient
can be derived from the ratio of the upside and downside expectations of excess returns. The estimate
derived for a fixed risk aversion level amounts to λ = 2.50. However, as loss aversion appears to decrease
subject to higher risk aversion, they also apply a simultaneous estimation procedure for both parameters
and obtain non-significant simultaneous estimates, but a significant λ = 2.711 for γ = 1 and a significant
γ = −0.916 for λ = 1.
143Their setting represents a pure-exchange economy with continuous prices. First, Berkelaar and
Kouwenberg (2006) consider the case when loss averse agents exhibit homogenous reference points, i.e.
have identical levels of initial wealth. The price evolution follows a threefold pattern ranging from
extremely high to extremely low levels in good and bad economic states, respectively, while the volatility
takes the opposite course. In the sequel, the model is extended in order to allow for heterogeneity, in that
it considers two distinct groups of loss-averse agents. Accordingly, heterogenous reference points cannot
be acceptably substituted by one representative loss averse investor. The price and volatility changes are
now lower, yet the volatility is higher on average.
192 Loss Aversion and Wealth Allocation
3.2 One-dimensional utility: risky vs. risk-free finan-
cial assets
3.2.1 Introduction
The main concern of investors in financial markets is how to optimally allocate money
among different types of assets. Portfolio theory teaches us that the optimal allocation
results from the maximization of expected portfolio returns subject to given levels of
market risk. In spite of the appealing intuition, such an optimization is not an easy
task, especially for laymen. The reason is that it involves the selection from a huge
variety and quantity of financial instruments existent in practice, and it often requires
advanced mathematical skills. The natural response of real financial environments to this
difficulty has been the specialization of the investment activity between professional and
non-professional investors. Non-professional investors – in other words people whose main
occupation does not concern financial investing and/or who lack the necessary knowledge,
expertise, time, or any combination of them for making more sophisticated investment
decisions – rely often on the help of professional portfolio managers in devising an optimal
mix of risky assets. In other words, they often delegate the security and asset allocation
to professional managers.144
In particular, one can think of the decision process of non-professional investors as
unfolding in two main steps: First, they determine the total sum of money to be invested in
financial markets (in technical terms, the budget constraint). Second, in order to optimally
split this money among different financial instruments, they ask for professional advice.
In so doing, non-professional investors commit the technical details of the optimization
of their asset portfolio to professional managers, who dispose of sufficient resources to
this end. Moreover, non-professional investors provide managers with information about
the level of risk they are ready to bear (the risk constraint). Acting on this information,
144In essence, this practical tendency of work division between non-professional investors and profes-
sionals conforms with portfolio theory. According to the top-down strategy, portfolio optimization can
be described by means of a threefold decision procedure: A first step, referred to as the capital allocation
decision, deals with the choice between risky and risk-free assets. A second so-called asset allocation
decision focuses on the further selection of different classes of risky assets. The third security allocation
decision is concerned with the specific securities to be held within each particular risky asset class cho-
sen before. In practice, the last two decisions are usually made by professional portfolio managers with
no intervention of their (non-professional) clients. In contrast, as far as the first decision is concerned,
the participation of these non-professional investors becomes necessary, since it allows to managers to
determine the capital allocation that best fits the individual risk-profiles of their clients.
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managers finally derive the optimal capital allocation for their particular clients. What
is important for non-professional investors in this context is simply how their wealth can
be (optimally) split between risky and risk-free assets.
It is the decision process of the non-professional investors that our work focuses on.
This process – although of indisputable practical importance – has been somewhat ne-
glected in the literature so far. The extensive research on portfolio optimization deals
with more sophisticated details, such as of choosing among different categories of risky
assets, that we consider to usually be the responsibility of the portfolio managers.
In particular, we are interested in this section in how non-professional investors split
their money between risky and risk-free assets. Since this decision depends on the indi-
vidual risk profile, we also study the investor attitude towards financial losses. Note that
our work does not contribute to the understanding of professional investor decisions, but
gives insight into how non-professional ones “operate” on financial markets. In our setting,
non-professional investors start from questioning what is their acceptable monetary loss
from risky investments. This information depends on individual risk profiles that affect
the quantity of money that they are going to invest in risky assets. Also, the frequency
of evaluating risky portfolio changes the risk profile and hence their overall performance.
Our work extends the portfolio optimization setting in Campbell, Huisman, and
Koedijk (2001), where risk is quantified in form of Value-at-Risk, by explicitly accounting
for the formation of what we denote as the individual VaR (abbr. VaR*). Our VaR* relies
on the subjective perceptions of non-professional investors and expresses the maximum
loss that is acceptable for each individual. It is formulated in line with the extended
prospect theory in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
We first analyze how non-professional investors set their subjective VaR*, specifically
contingent upon their loss aversion, the past performance of the risky portfolio, the cur-
rent value of the risky investment, and the expected risk premium. We show how VaR*
flows into the portfolio optimization undertaken by the professional manager in form of
a risk constraint. We derive the optimal wealth percentages to be invested in the risky
portfolio and in risk-free assets and study how they vary in time and subject to different
portfolio evaluation frequencies. Furthermore, we introduce an extended measure, termed
as the global first-order risk aversion (gRA), that attempts to provide additional informa-
tion concerning the loss attitude of non-professional investors. We comment on how the
frequency of evaluating risky performance can directly and indirectly impact the investor
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attitude towards risky investments and on how this twofold influence can be estimated.
Our theoretical results are supported and amended by findings relying on the S&P 500
index and the US three-month treasury bills between 1982-2006. The past performance
appears to drive the current perception of the risky portfolio. Investors allocate on average
between 1-35% of their wealth to risky assets, where the main source of this substantial
fluctuation is the portfolio evaluation frequency. The proportion of risky investments
decreases fast when portfolio performance is checked more often than once a year, which
complies with the notion of myopic loss aversion introduced in Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
Furthermore, we conduct an extended analysis of the perceived utility of the risky
portfolio and of the loss attitude in what we denote as the evaluation-frequency domain.
Specifically, we propose a twofold segmentation in dependence on the portfolio evaluation
frequency of both the prospective value and the global first-order risk aversion. Only
evaluation frequencies higher than once a year are of practical relevance. In this con-
text, both variables suggest annual evaluations as being optimal for generating positive
attitudes towards risky investments.
Finally, variables aimed at providing an equivalence between the traditional VaR-
approach and the estimates in our VaR*-framework – such as equivalent significance
levels, loss aversion coefficients, and investments in risky assets – point out that the actual
reluctance towards financial losses of non-professional investors might be underestimated.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 3.2.2 presents the main
theoretical considerations. We start with a brief review of the optimal portfolio selection
model with exogenous VaR* by Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), then take on the
value function formulation in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). The notion of VaR* is
subsequently introduced. Finally, concentrating on how individual investors perceive the
value of the risky portfolio, we derive the prospective value and introduce our extended
measure of loss aversion. Section 3.3.3 illustrates the implementation of our theoretical
model. We discuss the impact of the evaluation frequency and of the past performance
on the wealth percentages invested in the risky portfolio. Also, we extensively investigate
the evolution of the prospective value and of the extended loss-attitude measure subject
to various evaluation frequencies. Our model is further restated in terms of established
models with VaR risk constraints. Section 3.2.4 summarizes the results and concludes.
Mathematical proofs and further findings are included in Appendix A.3.2.
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3.2.2 Theoretical model
This section contains the main theoretical considerations of our work. We start by review-
ing the portfolio selection model in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001). This model
uses VaR as its measure of risk. Our own setting, subsequently formulated, incorporates
the individual perception of risky projects as captured in the extended prospect theory
framework of Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). We detail the construction of our
measure of individual loss aversion VaR* and its implications for the wealth allocation
decisions of non-professional investors. We also add to the formal representation of in-
vestor attitudes towards financial losses by introducing the notion of global first-order risk
aversion (gRA). Moreover, we briefly address how the prospective value and this extended
loss-attitude measure may vary subject to different portfolio evaluation frequencies.
Optimal portfolio selection with “exogenous” VaR
The model in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) follows the common procedure of
portfolio optimization, where market risk is assessed by means of Value-at-Risk (abbr.
VaR). In particular, financial assets are chosen in order to maximize expected returns,
subject to a twofold restriction: the budget and risk constraints. Investors can borrow or
lend extra money at the fixed market interest rate – which is equivalent with an investment
in risk-free assets. The maximum expected loss from holding the risky portfolio should
not exceed what we call an exogenous VaR (abbr. VaRex). This VaRex stands for the risk
level that the non-professional client is disposed to bear. It is indicated to the portfolio
manager in form of a single, fixed number.145 In this model, managers do not account for
how VaRex forms in the client perception. They consider it as constraint, exogenous to
the optimization problem.146
The objective of the optimization problem in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001)
is maximizing the next-period wealth Wt+1. This wealth results from what the compo-
nents of the risky portfolio and the risk-free assets are expected to return. The risky
portfolio consists of i = 1, . . . , n financial assets with single time-t prices pi,t and portfolio
weights wi,t, such that
n∑
i=1
wi,t = 1. Moreover, ai,t is the number of shares of the asset i
145The VaRex further enters the portfolio optimization problem in form of a threshold level, being thus
exogenous to it.
146Specifically, managers interpret the client indication (a single number) in terms of the theoretical
concept of VaR, i.e. of two elements: a confidence level and an investment horizon.
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contained in the portfolio at time t.147 Formally, we can state the portfolio optimization
problem as follows:










Pt[Wt+1(wt) ≤ Wt − VaRex] ≤ 1− α (risk constraint),
(3.13)
where Rt+1(wt) stands for the portfolio gross returns at the next trade and Et[Rt+1(wt)]
for the corresponding expected returns. Henceforth, we refer to the gross returns of the
risky portfolio by “returns” or “portfolio returns” .
In the above Equations (3.12) and (3.13), Bt denotes the risk-free investment, i.e. the
sum of money that can be borrowed (Bt > 0) or lent (Bt < 0) at the fixed risk-free gross
return rate Rf . Note that the maximization in Equation (3.12) is carried over the weights
of the risky portfolio wt but not over Bt. The risk-free investment results as a by-product
of the optimization procedure.148 Finally, Pt denotes the conditional probability given the
information at time t, and 1− α the chosen confidence level.
After some manipulations, Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) obtain the optimal




WtRf −Wtqt(wt, α) , (3.14)
where qt(wt, α) represents the quantile of the distribution of portfolio gross returnsRt+1(wt)
for the confidence level 1 − α (or significance α), i.e. Pt[Rt+1(wt) ≤ qt(wt, α)] ≤ 1 − α.
Thus, the optimal mix of risky assets depends merely on the distribution of the portfolio
gross returns and on the significance level α.
Equation (3.14) shows that, similarly to the traditional mean-variance framework,
the two-fund separation theorem applies: Neither the (non-professional) investors’ initial
wealth nor the desired risk level VaRex affects the maximization procedure. In other
words, investors first determine the optimal risky portfolio (i.e. the optimal allocation
among different risky assets) and second, they decide upon the extra amount of money
147Clearly, ai,t = wi,t(Wt +Bt)/pi,t.
148See the comments concerning the two-fund separation below.
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to be borrowed or lent (i.e. invested in risk-free assets). The latter reflects by how much





t , α)− 1
)
, (3.15)
varies according to the investor degree of loss aversion measured by the selected (desired)
VaRex-level.149
The optimal investment in risk-free assets can be then written as:
Bt =
VaRex +VaRt
Rf − qt(woptt , α)
, (3.16)
and hence the value of the risky investment at time t+ 1 yields:
St+1 = (Wt +Bt)Rt+1. (3.17)
Since we consider that non-professional investors are mainly concerned with how to
split their money between risky and risk-free assets, the optimal investments in risk-free
and risky assets in Equations (3.16) and (3.17) represent fundamental variables in our
model. Note that we do not further elaborate on the optimal weights of the risky assets
in Equation (3.14), as the details of wealth allocation among the different risky portfolio
components are assumed to be left in charge of portfolio managers.
The individual loss level VaR*
Coming from the main ideas of the setting in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), our
model goes a step further by asking how non-professional investors actually arrive at their
desired level of loss aversion. We elaborate on the construction of an individual loss level,
that we denote as VaR*, and on its implications for the wealth allocation between risky
and risk-free assets. As far as the optimization procedure presented above is concerned,
we can think of VaR* formally replacing VaRex in the above equations, but remaining
an exogenous input (or constraint). However, the value of this risk constraint forms
in our approach on the basis of individual behavioral parameters and affects the final
149Note that VaRex is imposed by the client prior to the portfolio formation and enters the portfolio
optimization problem in form of a constraint. In contrast, the portfolio VaR is an output of this opti-
mization and measures the actual maximum loss that can be incurred at time t at the confidence level
1− α for the obtained optimal portfolio woptt .
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wealth allocation between risky and risk-free assets, as apparent from Equation (3.16).
This extension of the allocation problem motivates us to denote VaR* as the endogenous
individual loss level.150
The value function Investors’ desires and attitudes – hence their subjective loss level
VaR* – depend on their perception of the value of financial investments. The prospect
theory (abbr. PT) in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
suggests how individual perceptions of financial performance can be formalized by means
of the so-called value function v.151 Accordingly, human minds take for actual carriers of
value not the absolute outcomes of a project, but their changes defined as departures from
an individual reference point. The deviations above (below) this reference are labeled as
gains (losses). Thus, the value function is kinked at the reference point and exhibits
distinct profiles in the domains of gains and losses, being steeper for losses (a property
known as loss aversion). It also shows diminishing sensitivity in both domains, i.e. it is
concave for gains but convex for losses. More details on the PT-value function can be
found in Section 3.1.2.
As noted in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), individual perceptions can be addi-
tionally influenced by the past performance of risky investments. This past performance
is captured by the cushion concept. Formally, the cushion corresponds to the difference
between the current value of the risky investment St and a historical benchmark level of
the risky value Zt (that can e.g. be the price at which the assets were purchased, a more
recent value of the risky holdings, or a combination of them).152 When this difference is
positive, investors made money from investing in risky assets in the past, otherwise they
made losses.
Our approach relies on the extended formulation of the value function proposed in
Equations (15) and (16) by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). In the following, we
refer to xt = Rt+1−Rft as the risk premium, to St−Zt as the (absolute) cushion, and to
zt = Zt/St as the relative cushion. The positive (negative) past performance corresponds
150The allocation problem is extended to incorporate not only the portfolio optimization in the strict
sense, as performed by managers, but also the earlier decision of non-professional investors with respect
to the desired risk level.
151Note that the concepts on which we base our setting are not entirely elaborated until the CPT of
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Since we are not particularly interested in the formal details and most
of these concepts are already present in the original PT in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we henceforth
refer to both theories by the global denomination of PT.
152For more details with respect to the interpretation of Zt see Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),
p. 9.
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to a positive (negative) cushion that can be termed as Zt ≤ St (Zt > St) or equivalently
as zt ≤ 1 (zt > 1). The value function takes different courses in dependence on the past




t+1 , for zt ≤ 1




Stxt+1 , for xt+1 + (1− zt)Rft ≥ 0λStxt+1 + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft , for xt+1 + (1− zt)Rft < 0, (3.19)
and
vprior lossest+1 =
Stxt+1 , for xt+1 ≥ 0λStxt+1 + k(Zt − St)xt+1 , for xt+1 < 0. (3.20)
The parameter λ in Equations (3.19) and (3.20) is termed the coefficient of loss aver-
sion. According to PT, investors are loss averse when λ > 1, while λ = 1 points to loss
neutrality. The parameter k ≥ 0 captures the influence of previous losses on the percep-
tion of current ones: The larger the previous losses are, the more painful the next losses
become. We denote it as the sensitivity to past losses.
Note that the gain branches of both value functions in Equations (3.19) and (3.20)
are invariable to the past performance zt. The loss branches are yet distinct. However,
they both contain a first term λSt(Rt+1 − Rft) that resembles the original PT, but also
a second one revealing the impact of the cushion St − Zt. Also, the reference point shifts
in dependence on the past performance.154
Henceforth, we use the following probability notations:
pit = Pt(zt ≤ 1)
ωt = Pt(xt+1 ≥ 0|zt > 1)
ψt = Pt(xt+1 + (1− zt)Rft ≥ 0|zt ≤ 1),
(3.21)
153Where we restate the term in the condition of Equation (15) by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)
as Rt+1 − ztRft = xt+1 + (1− zt)Rft.
154The reference point can be observed in the conditions of the two value functions in Equations (3.19)
and (3.20).
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where pit stands for the probability of past gains, and ωt for the probability of a positive
premium given past losses. Finally, we can term ψt as the probability of obtaining a risk
premium xt+1 + (1 − zt)Rft, higher than the risk premium xt+1, that expresses raised
expectations resulting from recurrent gains.
The derivation of VaR* In Equation (3.16), the risk-free investment depends, among
others, on the risk level VaRex indicated by the non-professional client to the portfolio
manager. The traditional approach does not account for the way in which non-professional
investors ascertain this level. This ascertainment should take place according to individual
perceptions of financial losses which can, in line with PT, substantially differ from the
actual losses. In this section, we define a new measure of the individual loss level (more
specifically, the individually accepted or desired loss level) that we denote as VaR*.
In so doing, we start from the literal definition of VaR*: the maximum loss that
can be a-priori expected by someone investing in risky assets. We concentrate on the
terms “loss”, “individual”, and “maximum” encompassed by this definition. First, VaR*
quantifies losses. According to PT, what actually counts for individual (non-professional)
investors is not the absolute magnitude of a loss, but rather the subjectively perceived
one, as captured by the value function described above. Hence, VaR* should rely on the
subjective value of losses expressed in the loss branches of the value functions in Equations
(3.19) and (3.20). It thus depends on individual features, originating in the subjective
view over gains and losses, and can vary over time, for instance with the past performance
of risky investments. Moreover, we are looking for a maximal value. This is obtained in
that, in calculating VaR*, investors ascribe a maximal occurrence probability (of 1) to
the losses in the value function, so that pit(1−ψt)+ (1−pit)(1−ωt) != 1.155 Finally, VaR*
should correspond to the concept of Value-at-Risk and hence represent a quantile, namely,
according to the above considerations, a quantile of the subjective loss distribution.
155This condition requires that the absolute probability of making a loss, i.e. irrespective of the prior
performance, is one.
3.2– One-dimensional utility: risky vs. risk-free financial assets 201
Therefore, we suggest the following formal definition for the individual loss level:156
VaR∗t+1 = Et[loss-valuet+1]− ϕ
√
V art[loss-valuet+1]


















where “loss-value” stands for the subjective value ascribed to financial losses according to
the loss branch of the value functions in Equations (3.19) and (3.20), and the subjectively
perceived losses are assumed to follow a distribution (e.g. normal or Student-t) with
the lower quantile ϕ.157 Moreover, Et[xt+1] = Et[Rt+1] − Rft denotes the expected risk










We distinguish two terms of the VaR*-expression in Equation (3.22): The first one
accounts for the expected risky return (relative to the risk-free rate) StEt[xt+1], weighted
by the loss aversion coefficient λ. As it consequently resembles the prospective value
according to the original PT, we denote this term as the PT-term. The last term is
responsible for the influence of the previous performance captured by the cushion St−Zt
in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). For this reason, we denote it as the cushion term.
The corresponding weight is a linear combination of the expected risky and the risk-free
returns.
Once non-professional investors set their minds about the desired VaR*, they com-
municate it to the portfolio manager. In the view of the latter, this client indication
represents an exogenous risk level that corresponds to VaRex in Equation (3.16) and is
applied in order to determine the optimal level of borrowing or lending Bt. When VaR* is
lower in absolute value than the portfolio VaR, Bt is negative, which formalizes the profile
of more risk-averse investors who prefer to increase the proportion of wealth invested in
risk-free assets. In contrast, for a VaR* higher than VaR in absolute value, investors
156The derivation of the expectation and the variance of the loss utility is deferred to Appendix A.3.2.
Note that we also worked with an alternative specification that fully corresponds to the literal of VaR*, i.e.
the maximal expectation of sustainable losses Et[loss-utilityt+1] and hence does not adjust for variance.
The simulation results are similar.
157Recall that, as already discussed in Section 3.1.1, although VaR is a very popular risk measure, it
does not satisfy one of the four properties of coherent risk measures, namely subadditivity. However, VaR
becomes subadditive and hence coherent for elliptic joint distributions, such as normal and Student-t with
finite variance.
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augment their risky investments by borrowing extra money, i.e. they are less risk averse.
Thus, analyzing the evolution of Bt (or equivalently of St/Wt, as in the subsequent Section
3.3.3) can shed some light on the behavior of non-professional investors confronted with
financial losses.
A further interesting topic to investigate lies in estimating the equivalent loss aversion
parameter λ∗t that can be obtained for a fixed VaR
∗ under the traditional approach.158
Common assumptions of this approach are significance levels of 1%, 5%, or 10% and no
dependency on past performance k = 0. The formula of λ∗ is then immediate from the
definition in Equation (3.22) for k = 0.159 This yields:
λ∗t+1 =
VaR∗ + ζtRft(St − Zt)
StEt[xt+1] + ζtRft(St − Zt) .
(3.23)
The prospective value of the risky investment
The estimation of the individually maximum acceptable loss level VaR* represents only
the first step in our analysis. As discussed above, it directly enters the optimal risk-
free investment derived (by the professional manager) as a byproduct of the portfolio
optimization procedure. Thus, VaR* dictates the optimal choice of the non-professional
investors in terms of wealth percentages allocated between risky and risk-free assets.
However, we are also interested in the attitude of non-professional investors towards
financial losses in general, as this attitude influences the level of the individual VaR*.
The loss attitude results from the perception of the utility generated by financial invest-
ments.160 The corresponding PT-concept of (subjectively) expected utility is the so-called
prospective value V and has been discussed in Section 3.1.2.
158In other words, the loss aversion that equivalently results under the manager assumption of a fixed,
exogenous risk level.
159This holds since λ∗t+1 depends on the fixed VaR
∗.
160In contrast to Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), our investors are not concerned with consumption
and derive utility merely from financial wealth fluctuations.
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In our framework, the prospective value of the risky portfolio can be formulated as:161
Vt+1 = pitEt[v
prior gains
t+1 ] + (1− pit)Et[vprior lossest+1 ]
= pit[ψtStEt[xt+1] + (1− ψt)(λStEt[xt+1] + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft)]
+ (1− pit)[ωtStEt[xt+1] + (1− ωt)(λStEt[xt+1] + k(Zt − St)Et[xt+1])]
=
(









Note the existence of a twofold effect in the prospective-value formula, that is similar to
the one discussed for VaR*: The first term of the last expression in Equation (3.24), that
we subsequently denote as the PT-effect, captures the expected risky-investment value
relative to the safe bank investment StEt[xt+1]. The corresponding probability weight is
the sum of perceived gain and loss probabilities, laxly put Pt(gain) + λPt(loss). It points
out that, as in PT, losses loom larger than gains, being additionally penalized by the loss
aversion coefficient λ.
The last term of the prospective value in Equation (3.24) covers the cushion influence
and we refer to it as the cushion effect. The weight of the cushion St − Zt is in this term
a combination of expected losses obtained under the consideration of the performance
history. Specifically, when current losses follow past gains – which occurs with the joint
probability pit(1 − ψt) – the past performance (given by the cushion) is valued at the
risk-free rate Rft and is amended by how much the loss aversion coefficient λ exceeds the
loss-neutral value of 1. Indeed, if risky investments were successful in the past, a current
loss has value only compared to the alternative of having put the entire money in risk-free
assets. When losses extend from past to present – where (1 − pit)(1 − ωt) is the joint
probability of current and past losses – the valuation implies a comparison of the risk-free
rate to the risky performance −Et[xt+1] in view of the sensitivity to past losses k.
We are interested in the evolution of the prospective value not only in time but also for
different portfolio evaluation frequencies. The rationale for this is that revising portfolio
performance at different time intervals implies, first, drawing back on distinct return values
161This definition follows Equation (3.1.2) in Section 3.1.2, where the weights are taken to be identical
to the outcome probabilities. We have also applied a slightly different definition of the prospective value.
Accordingly, gains continue to be considered as possible events and hence are weighted by the respective
occurrence probability. Losses are instead assessed in what we can call a “worst case scenario”, i.e. with
maximum probability. This is equivalent to saying that losses are accounted for in the form of VaR*.
The obtained results are qualitatively similar to applying Equation (3.24).
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(and hence on different risk premia). Second, these return changes implicitly impact, at
later times, on further model parameters, such as the cushion and the probabilities of
past and current gains and losses. Therefore, the prospective value in Equation (3.24) is
affected in multiple ways. We analyze this topic theoretically at the end of this theoretical
section and in an applied context in Section 3.3.3.
In so doing, we apply a further notion referring to the investor attitudes towards finan-
cial risks that attempts to capture more complex dependencies than the simple coefficient
of loss aversion λ. According to PT, loss aversion corresponds to risk aversion of first or-
der in the loss domain. In the same spirit, we term the first derivative of the prospective
value with respect to the expected risk premium as the global first-order risk aversion






pitψt + (1− pit)ωt + (pit(1− ψt) + (1− pit)(1− ωt))λ
)
St
− (1− pit)(1− ωt)k(St − Zt).
(3.25)
Thus, gRA reflects the sensitivity – in terms of first-order changes – of the prospec-
tive value to the variation of expected returns (or equivalently to the expected risk pre-
mium).162 Due to the linearity of our prospective value in the expected risk premium
Et[xt+1], gRA is independent of this premium.
Moreover, since gRA directly reflects changes in the prospective value – which is
proportional to the attractiveness of financial investments – higher gRA-values point to
a more relaxed loss attitude. This can be formally recognized in Equation (3.25): The
first term increases with the sum invested in risky assets St; The second is inversely
proportional to the cushion St − Zt. Note yet that this second term accounts for the
situation when past losses are followed by current losses, which occurs with the probability
(1−pit)(1−ωt). In such a case, cushions are most probably negative St−Zt ≤ 0. Smaller
(negative) cushions will then render this second term higher. In sum, gRA grows both
when investors put more money in risky assets and when they manage to reduce recurrent
losses.
162As the prospective value is the PT-counterpart of the classic concept of investment utility, gRA is
the pendant of a marginal utility with respect to the expected premium.
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The impact of the portfolio evaluation frequency
We assume that the frequency at which the risky-portfolio performance is evaluated affects
the loss attitude and leads to different investment decisions. Intuitively, the higher is the
frequency of performance checks, the higher will be the volatility of the risky portfolio.
This makes risky returns less likely to be significantly different from the risk-free rate.
In consequence, the investor disappointment concerning the risky portfolio performance
becomes more pronounced. Since, according to PT, registered losses are perceived as
more painful than gains of similar size, risky investments become even less attractive.
The tendency of performing such frequent checks is termed as myopia or narrow fram-
ing and has been addressed in more detail in Section 3.1.3.163 The idea that the joint
effect of the myopia over financial decisions and the reluctance to make losses can dramat-
ically affect the risk perception and hence the subjective desirability of risky investments
comes in line with the concept of myopic loss aversion (mLA) by Benartzi and Thaler
(1995).
We are interested in testing for mLA in our framework and, more generally, in ob-
serving how decisions on wealth allocation and loss attitudes vary at different portfolio
evaluation frequencies. To this end, the applicative section examines how the wealth al-
location to risky and risk-free assets given by St and Bt, the prospective value V and,
the extended measure of the loss attitude gRA change at various evaluation horizons τ
or, equivalently, at various evaluation frequencies 1/τ . In particular, we will work with
τ -values ranging from one day to eight years, where the focus lies on short time lengths
(up to one year), which we consider to be more plausible in practice.
The evaluation frequency affects our variables – and hence investors’ decisions and
attitudes – in two ways: First, through expected returns, which are themselves directly
influenced by the evaluation frequency (the direct transmission mechanism). Second,
through past returns which impacts on several model variables (such as the cushions, the
past and current gain probabilities, etc.) and turn them to be indirectly depended on the
evaluation frequency (the indirect transmission mechanisms).
Theoretically, the direct dependence (i.e., on returns) could be studied by holding
163According to Barberis and Huang (2006), myopia refers strictly to annual evaluations of gains and
losses, hence the term of narrow framing would be better suited to describing the underlying phenomenon.
In a financial context, narrow framing illustrates the isolated evaluation of stock market risk (i.e. unrelated
to the overall wealth risk). As underlined in Barberis and Huang (2004), this isolated evaluation entails
an underestimation of the stock desirability, even though, viewed in a wide utility-risk frame, stocks
represent a good diversification modality.
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all model parameters, besides current return expectations, invariable to the evaluation
frequency. This is yet technically impossible, as multiple other parameters are indirectly
affected by the evaluation frequency. Nevertheless, the direct effect can be discarded
by eliminating the current returns. This is rendered possible by gRA, that represents
by definition a derivative with respect to expected returns, where the direct impact is
no longer contained. Consequently, studying how the prospective value and gRA vary
with respect to the evaluation frequency amounts to examining the total and the indirect
mechanism, respectively and we present this in the applicative section.
The same section will analyze a further related issue: Given that the portfolio eval-
uation frequency appears to affect investor perceptions of financial losses (and thus the
level of risky investments), could the reverse causality hold as well? In other words, for
a certain loss aversion value (at time t), is there an evaluation frequency that is optimal
in the sense that it leads to the most relaxed attitude towards risky investments? If this
is the case, financial advisors – whose interest is to attract clients, thus to raise capital
– could for instance recommend to their clients to undertake performance checks with
this “optimal” frequency that maximizes their risky investments and hence the budget at
the manager’s disposal.164 We will search for the “optimal” evaluation frequency τ ∗ in
terms of the maximization, first, of the perceived risky value V (τ ∗) and, second, of the
loss acceptance gRA(τ ∗).
3.2.3 Application
This section presents findings complying with the theoretical results derived in Sec-
tion 3.2.2 and based on market data. In particular, we consider daily values of the S&P
500 index, corrected for dividends and stock splits, and of the US three-month treasury-
bill nominal returns. These two financial instruments – the stock index and the T-bill –
serve as proxies for the risky and the risk-free investment, respectively. Both data series
range from 01/02/1962 to 03/09/2006 (11,005 observations).165
As a consequence of the financial reform in 1979, which significantly changed the trad-
ing conditions, the early 80s mark the beginning of a new era of financial markets. We
therefore reckon that only the second part of the data is relevant for inferring current
market evolutions and divide our sample into two parts: The “active” data set (from
164In the same context, Gneezy and Potters (1997) suggest that managers could manipulate the evalu-
ation period of prospective clients.
165Descriptive statistics can be found in Tables ?? and ?? of the Appendix A.3.1.
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03/01/1982 to 03/09/2006, 6,010 observations)166 and the “inactive” data (consisting of
the first part of the sample from 01/02/1962 to 03/01/1982). The subsequent investi-
gations are based on the active set, while the previous observations provide a basis for
estimating the empirical mean and the standard deviation of the portfolio returns at the
“date zero” of trade (03/01/1982). The data contains an outlier, corresponding to the
October 1987 market crash, which may distort the results. Since market data serves in our
work merely as support for simulating trading behaviors – that we view as more general
– this outlier is smoothened out by replacing it with the mean of the ten before and after
data points.167
We consider that non-professional investors perceive risky investments according to
the value functions in Equations (3.19) and (3.20) and calculate their maximum expected
loss level according to Equation (3.22). The active data set allows us to run the above
presented model and to derive the desired VaR*, as well as the wealth proportion invested
in the risky portfolio (i.e., in the S&P 500 index). The remaining money is assumed to
be automatically put in the risk-free 3-months T-bill. Moreover, we assume that at date
zero the investors’ initial wealth is evenly allocated between the risky portfolio and the
risk-free asset.168 We also take the number of investors to be constant, i.e., no investors
can enter or exit the market during the trading interval.169
We construct daily, weekly, monthly, and up to eleven months (increasing one month
at a time), then yearly and further lower frequency returns ranging from one to eight years
(with a one-year increment). The case commented throughout the application section of
this section relies on values considered in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) for the loss
aversion coefficient and the sensitivity to past losses, namely λ = 2.25 and k = 3.170 The
expected portfolio gross returns are taken to be the unconditional mean returns until the
last date before the decision time.171 Further details with respect to the parameter choice
166We start from 1982 and not from 1979, since it took several years until the financial reform became
operative.
167We consider this method to be appropriate for preserving some of the particularities of less probable
market events such as crashes. At the same time, it allows for the circumvention of the excessive impacts
of extreme outliers.
168A similar assumption is made in Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997).
169This assumption implies that the evaluation period is shorter than the lifetime of our loss averse
agents or, equivalently, that investors are long-lived beyond the VaR horizon. Identical assumptions
are made in Basak and Shapiro (2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), and Berkelaar and
Kouwenberg (2006).
170We performed simulations for each λ ∈ {0.5; 1; 2.25; 3} and k ∈ {0; 3; 10; 20}. The results are quali-
tatively similar to those commented below.
171We also performed simulations for the cases when expected portfolio gross returns were computed as
a zero mean process, or as an AR(1) process. The results are qualitatively similar. As unsophisticated
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for the presented results will be given in the text.
The evolution of the risky investment
In this section we address how the risky investment develops subject to different portfolio
evaluation frequencies and to distinct ways of assessing the cushion.
According to Benartzi and Thaler (1995), loss-averse investors – who evaluate the
performance of their portfolios once a year and employ linear value functions with con-
ventional PT parameter values – give rise to a market evolution that can explain the
equity return premium observed in practice. In the same spirit, we analyze how wealth
allocation decisions of our non-professional investors change due to variations in the port-
folio evaluation frequency. As in our framework these decisions are intrinsically linked to
the past performance of the risky portfolio, we study at the same time the cushion impact.
In particular, we are interested in how different ways of assessing cushions contribute
to determining the amount of wealth to be split between risky and risk-free assets at
different evaluation frequencies. To this end, we apply two cushion definitions: myopic
and dynamic cushions.172 In calculating myopic cushions, we fix the benchmark level
of past performance to be identical to the last-period risky holdings Zt = St−1, so that
the myopic cushion expression yields St − St−1. The dynamic cushions are based on
Equation (18) in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), which assumes a more complicated
benchmark formula, in particular Zt = ηZt−1R¯ + (1− η)St. Hence, the dynamic cushion
results in η(St−Zt−1R¯), where the parameter η measures how far in the past the investor
memory stretches.173 In line with the same authors, we subsequently concentrate on the
case where η = 0.9.174 We moreover take the variable R¯ in the definition of the dynamic
cushion as the mean gross return.175
investors (such as our non-professional traders) are more likely to rely on simple descriptive statistics
from past data, we concentrate here on the case when expected returns are derived from average past
returns.
172We also consider other cushion definitions. For instance, cumulative cushions amass from the date
zero of the trade, so that Zt = Z1 = S0 (e.g. the purchase price). Moreover, we also define new myopic
cushions assuming Zt = Zt−1Rt. They attain several less plausible results and hence we do not further
report on them.
173See Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). This parameter allows for adjustments of the benchmark,
wherefrom the denomination of “dynamic”. Specifically, lower η-values ascribe an increased weight to
the current risky value St relative to past evolutions captured by Zt−1R¯, which corresponds to a more
myopic view. In contrast, higher η-values denote a more pronounced conservativeness in assessing the
past performance benchmark, as the current term St losses in importance relative to the past-oriented
Zt−1R¯.
174In fact, we have considered three values η ∈ {0.1; 0.5; 0.9}. Results are qualitatively similar to each
other.
175As no dividend data is available to our analysis, we could not apply the simultaneous estimation
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Following Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), we start by computing the portfo-
lio VaR in Equation (3.15) for gross returns of the risky portfolio that are either (standard)
normally or Student-t (with five degrees of freedom) distributed, and for a significance
level of 5%. We take pit, ψt, and ωt to be the empirical frequencies of the cases where
zt ≤ 1 (i.e. past gains), xt+1+(1− zt)Rft ≥ 0|zt ≤ 1 (a premium that is acceptable under
a history of gains), and xt+1 ≥ 0|zt > 1 (a positive premium, conditional on the cases
with past losses), respectively. We derive VaR* according to Equation (3.22) using either
myopic or dynamic cushions. This value is then plugged into Equation (3.16) in order to
determine the optimal level Bt of borrowing (Bt > 0) or lending (Bt < 0), that depends
on the degree of loss aversion of non-professional investors.
Table 3.1 presents averages of the wealth percentages St/Wt invested in the risky
portfolio, for both myopic and dynamic cushions, normally distributed and Student-t
distributed portfolio gross returns Rt, and at different portfolio evaluation horizons τ up
to one year. The current value of the risky investment St is derived from Equation (3.17).
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 34.51 25.79 30.50 24.48
6 months 20.23 15.67 19.92 16.08
4 months 16.96 13.23 16.30 13.16
3 months 13.42 10.55 13.00 10.52
1 month 7.70 6.21 7.69 6.29
1 week 3.85 3.13 3.85 3.15
1 day 1.90 1.55 1.90 1.56
Table 3.1: Average wealth percentages invested in risky assets.
Accordingly, our non-professional investors allocate from almost no money to over 30%
of their wealth to risky assets. The substantial fluctuation of these sums is mainly caused
by the evaluation frequency of risky performance. Specifically, more frequent checks entail
lower investments in the risky portfolio, irrespective of the way in which our investors
account for past performance (i.e., of the type of cushion). This result is consistent with
previous findings on mLA, such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001). It suggests that loss-averse investors who narrowly frame financial projects
procedure of Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). Note also that due to the fact that the mean and median
of our return sample lie very close to each other, the results with R¯ = mean[Rt] and R¯ = median[Rt] are
almost identical.
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– by overly focusing on long series of past performances – become extremely loss averse
when performing performance evaluations at a high frequency.
At an annual evaluation frequency, non-professional investors who dynamically assess
cushions appear to be more loss averse than their myopic peers, and allocate less money
to the risky portfolio. This difference becomes however negligible at higher evaluation
frequencies. Moreover, irrespective of the type of cushion, the investor reluctance to-
wards risky investments is higher for normally distributed than for Student-t distributed
portfolio gross returns.
Since our VaR* is a VaR-type measure and VaR has been proven to be an adequate
market-risk quantifier for normal distributions,176 we henceforth focus on the case with
normally distributed returns.
In the sequel, we study the importance of the past risky performance – a concept added
to the initial PT representation by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and formalized by
the notion of cushion – with respect to the wealth allocation.177 In contrast to the above
findings in this subsection, we are now interested in the magnitude of the cushion effect
and its evolution over time.
In order to analyze this issue, we fix the evaluation horizon at one year and plot in
Figure 3.4 (Figure A.67 in Appendix A.3.2) the annual returns of the index S&P 500,
the evolution of the myopic (dynamic) cushion generated by a series of past gains or
losses, and the resulting yearly wealth percentages invested in the risky portfolio. These
figures point to a positive correlation of the three variables (returns, cushions, and risky
investments).
In line with the idea that loss aversion is sensitive to past performance, we observe
in panels c of Figures 3.4 and A.67 that the lower the cushions are, the more loss-averse
investors become, since they dispose of less back-up for later contingent losses.
176Please refer to Section 3.1.1.
177Gneezy and Potters (1997) test for the influence of experienced gains and losses on risk behavior, but
find no significant effect. However, as they note on p. 641, their experimental framework deviates from
real market settings.
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(a) Yearly S&P 500 log-returns.












(b) Yearly myopic cushions.

















(c) Yearly wealth percentages invested in S&P 500.
Figure 3.4: Evolution of risky returns, myopic cushions, and wealth per-
centages invested in the risky portfolio for yearly portfolio evaluations.
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At this point, a further interesting empirical question arises: How long does it take
for an investor performing frequent evaluations to quit the risky market? Figure 3.5
(Figure A.68 in Appendix A.3.2) emphasizes the dramatic effect of high evaluation fre-
quencies when investors assess myopic (dynamic) cushions (see panels c). Specifically,
non-professional investors who check their portfolio performance every single day put less
than 5% of their wealth in risky assets. The reason is that each day can bring substantial
changes in the perceived past performance. Therefore, although non-professional investors
do not completely quit the risky market, their risky holdings are kept at very low levels
during the entire trading interval.
The evolution of the prospective value
Let us now analyze the prospective value changes in time and with the evaluation fre-
quency. As observed in the theoretical part, the impact of the evaluation horizon τ is
twofold: direct, i.e. through expected returns (and thus the expected risk premium), and
indirect, i.e. through other model parameters influenced by past returns, such as the
cushion or the probabilities of past and current gains and losses. Thus, the prospective
value sheds light on the total impact of the evaluation frequency on investors’ behav-
ior. Henceforth we refer to the descriptions of variables in dependence on the frequency
at which the risky performance is checked as representations in the evaluation-frequency
domain.
We commence our analysis by shortly considering the time evolution of the prospective
value in Equation (3.24) and its two components, in order to ascribe the importance of
the cushion and PT-effects. Figure 3.6 (Figure A.69 in Appendix A.3.2) illustrates these
variables for myopic (dynamic) cushions and evaluation horizons of one year and one
day. Note that at both evaluation frequencies, as long as cushions are sufficiently high in
absolute value, it is the cushion effect that dictates the shape of the prospective value.
This lead role is even more pronounced for daily evaluations, when the expected risk
premium is very small and hence the PT-effect weak.178
178Specifically, in this case the prospective value (black) cannot be visually disentangled from the cushion
effect (blue).
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(a) Daily S&P 500 returns.
















(b) Daily myopic cushions.




















(c) Daily percentage investments in S&P 500.
Figure 3.5: Evolution of risky returns, myopic cushions, and percent-
ages invested in the risky portfolio for daily portfolio evaluations.
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Figure 3.6: Prospective value evolution for yearly and daily evaluations.
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In Figure 3.7 (Figure A.70, panel a, in Appendix A.3.2), we plot the prospective value
and its two components again, but now as functions of the evaluation horizon τ . This
horizon ranges from one month to eight years, where we consider monthly increments of
up to one year and yearly increments thereafter.179
















Figure 3.7: Prospective value evolution for my-
opic cushions and different evaluation frequencies.
It is apparent in Figures 3.7 and A.70 that up to two years the perceived attractiveness
of financial investments increases with the evaluation horizons. This tendency is consis-
tent with mLA and characterizes the evolution of both the PT-effect and the cushion
effect at higher evaluation frequencies. In fact, the PT-effect is upward sloping over all
considered evaluation frequencies, which supports the coherency of mLA within the initial
PT-framework.
However, for higher evaluation horizons (such as three, five, or six years), the prospec-
tive value yields even negative values. This is motivated by the leading role of the cushion
effect discussed above, and by the fact that for lower evaluation frequencies cushion val-
ues are negative and sufficiently high in order to counterbalance the PT-effect and to
dramatically reduce the perceived value of risky investments. Intuitively, when risky per-
formance is checked at longer time intervals, the decision flexibility is lower, since current
decisions set the portfolio composition over the entire coming interval of several years.
Thus, at lower evaluation frequencies investors would be more wary of registering current
losses. As the cushion effect accounts for the perception of possible current losses – a
perception which varies depending on the past performance, see the cushion weight in
Equation (3.24) – it increases in absolute value for more seldom portfolio checks, but its
179In order to obtain a suggestive graphic representation, we consider all evaluation horizons from one
to twelve months and discard the observations at one day and one week. An evaluation horizons of
eight years implies that investors can only make three portfolio checks during the entire trading interval.
Therefore, a further increase of the evaluation horizon would be senseless.
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sign is given by the sign of the cushion. Our investors create negative cushions, which
gives rise to the observed drop in the cushion effect magnitude and consequently in the
prospective value. In sum, checking risky performance less often than once every one or
two years appears to deteriorate the perception of the risky investment utility.
Indeed, as documented in Benartzi and Thaler (1995) a decade ago, in practice in-
vestors used to perform yearly portfolios checks. Nowadays, due to the high amount of
information available at almost no cost and to the enhanced dynamics of market events,
financial decisions may be reconsidered more often. However, one year remains as an
important anchor in the investors’ minds given that, on one hand, various events (such
as the release of annual activity reports, taxes, etc.) take place with this frequency and,
on the other hand, non-professional investors may not be sufficiently impatient (perhaps
because they do not dispose of sufficient time, financial resources, knowledge, experience
or the combination of any of them) to perform much more frequent portfolio checks. In
our opinion, non-professional investor perceptions reasonably rely on evaluation horizons
of one year and less.
Based on these ideas, we delimitate two distinct segments of the prospective value in
the evaluation horizon domain depicted in Figures 3.7 and A.70. These segments meet at
the “critical” horizon of one year and are characterized by different evolutions. We denote
the segment with evaluation horizons lower than one year as the left segment and, as we
view it as the (only) one relevant in practice, our subsequent analysis will concentrate on
it. The part of the prospective value in the frequency domain encompassing evaluation
horizons higher than one year is referred to as the right segment. Figure 3.8 (Figure A.70,
panels b and c, in Appendix A.3.2) illustrate these two segments separately, for myopic
(dynamic) cushions.
















(a) τ ≤ 1 year.
















(b) τ ≥ 1 year.
Figure 3.8: Prospective value evolution on the two evaluation-frequency segments.
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In the left segment, the perceived risky value appears to increase on average with
the evaluation horizon. In effect, the curve V (τ) in panel a of Figure 3.8 (panel b of
Figure A.70) is acceptably well described by a polynomial of first order.180 Accord-
ingly, the subjectively perceived utility of the non-professional investors – captured by
the prospective value – should be maximized at the highest frequency of this domain,
which is once a year.181 One year can be hence designated as the optimal evaluation
horizon with respect to minimizing loss aversion and hence maximizing risky investments
V (τ ∗ = 1 year) = max.
In the same spirit, the lowest evaluation horizon that we consider, namely of one day,
entails a minimal expected value of the risky portfolio, pushing investors to step out of the
risky market and to allocate (almost) all their money to risk-free assets. In other words,
loss-averse investors should check the performance of their risky investments as seldom as
possible in order to maximize the corresponding prospective value of their investments.
Under the practical informational constraints that govern financial markets nowadays, one
year appears to be the most reasonable evaluation time that would increase the perceived
returns of risky investments.
The evolution of the global first-order risk aversion
In this section, we extend the analysis in the frequency domain to our new measure of
loss attitudes gRA. In so doing, we study the indirect transmission mechanism mentioned
at the end of Section 3.2.2. As a derivative of a linear variable, gRA does not contain
any direct influence of the evaluation frequency (i.e., through the expected risk premium).
The variation of gRA captures thus the collateral impact of τ on other model parameters,
such as the cushion S − Z, the probability of past gains pi, the probability of a positive
risk premium given past losses ω, and that of an acceptable premium given past losses ψ.
Panel a of Figure 3.9 (Figure A.71 in Appendix A.3.2) illustrates the gRA course
for evaluation horizons ranging from one month to eight years and myopic (dynamic)
cushions.182 On average, gRA appears to increase with the evaluation horizon, pointing
180Specifically, the adjusted R-squared yields 91.69% (77.44%) for myopic (dynamic) cushions. The
estimations are based on polynomial regression fitting performed with the Matlab Curve Fitting Toolbox.
All findings in this section are robust across different parameter specifications, such as of the loss aversion
coefficient, the sensitivity to past losses, the cushion, returns distribution, expected returns, etc.
181In fact, the prospective value in the left segment in Figures 3.8 and A.70 attains its maximum at
eleven months. As this value lies closely to the predicted maximum point of one year and as this is a much
more noticeable value in investor perception, we consider one year as a sufficiently good approximation
of the optimum.
182All findings in this section are robust across different parameter specifications.
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to a more relaxed attitude towards financial losses as the risky performance is checked
less often. Note that this occurs at all frequencies and not only in the left segment, as was
the case for the prospective value. Thus, while the impact of the evaluation frequency
on the loss perception can be ambiguous in a context where both direct and indirect
transmission mechanisms are considered (i.e. for V ), the indirect mechanism (captured
by gRA) consistently supports the concept of mLA.


























(a) All evaluation frequencies.






























(b) τ ≤ 1 year.




























(c) τ ≥ 1 year.
Figure 3.9: Evolution of the global first-order risk aver-
sion for different evaluation frequencies and myopic cushions.
The ambiguity of the total transmission mechanism reported for the prospective value
appears to be therefore given by its direct component, i.e. manifests through expected
returns. The cushion effect, that is highly dependent on returns, distorts the evolution of
the prospective value for very seldom portfolio checks and renders it extremely sensitive
to the past performance.
Similarly to the prospective value, we consider a segmentation of gRA around one
year (see panels b and c in Figure 3.9). In the left segment (panel b), simple lines appear
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to fit the data acceptably well.183 Our measure gRA attains its maximum for the lowest
frequency of this segment of once a year gRA(τ ∗ = 1 year) = max.184
As mentioned in the theoretical part, higher gRA-values represent the result of a
more relaxed attitude towards financial losses. Thus, minimizing the loss aversion – as
measured by gRA – requires again that portfolio performance should be checked as seldom
as possible. For the left segment, this is consistent with the recommendation derived with
respect to the perception of risky investments captured by the prospective value.
In the right evaluation-frequency segment, the course of gRA is more complex, so
that second-order polynomials are necessary for describing the data acceptably well.185
The maximum of these parabolas is achieved at an evaluation horizon of around five
years, which might recommend five-yearly revisions as optimal in this segment.186 Recall
nevertheless that we consider the right segment to be of less practical importance.
In sum, both the total and the indirect mechanisms by which the evaluation frequency
impacts on perceptions and decisions suggest that, under practical information con-
straints, an improvement in the investor attitude towards risky holdings can be achieved
for yearly performance evaluations.
A comparison with the “exogenous” portfolio optimization framework
This section proposes a way to “translate” the results obtained in our framework in terms
of the “portfolio optimization language” spoken by professional managers. Recall that
our investors ascertain individually the maximum sustainable level of losses VaR* on the
basis of subjective behavioral parameters. In contrast, managers mostly standardize the
risk definition, (e.g., when risk is measured by means of the VaR concept), to specific
confidence levels and time horizons. In order to provide a comparison of these two frame-
works – termed as “endogenous” and “exogenous”, respectively – we confront the VaR*
in our model with the standard VaR used by portfolio managers.
In particular, we perform twofold equivalence computations: First, we start from
our VaR*-estimates and derive equivalent significance levels α from the VaR-formula.
Second, we apply confidence levels traditionally used in previous research (such as 1%
and 10%) to the same VaR-formula and obtain equivalent average coefficients of loss
183Specifically, the adjusted R-squared yields 90.5% (91.57%) for myopic (dynamic) cushions.
184This statement is now consistent both with the data and the fitted curve.
185In particular, the adjusted R-squared yields 49.61% (60.74%) for myopic (dynamic) cushions.
186Specifically, the maximum is attained for an evaluation horizon of 4.9859 (5.3178) years for myopic
(dynamic) cushions.
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aversion and equivalent wealth percentages invested in the risky portfolio, on the basis of
the corresponding formulas and estimates in our model.
VaR*-equivalent significance levels Recall that portfolio managers consider the risk
level indicated by their clients VaR∗ in terms of the standard concept of VaR, specifically
as VaRex. In other words, VaR* is equated with the lower quantile of the portfolio gross
returns at a given (i.e. fixed) significance level that we denote by α∗ (or confidence
1 − α∗). According to Equation (3.16), if the portfolio VaR at time t corresponds to
an αt > α
∗ (or equivalently, to a confidence level 1 − αt < 1 − α∗), then too much risk
would arise by putting the entire wealth in the risky portfolio. The portfolio manager
will conclude that a percentage of the investor wealth should be lent (i.e. invested in the
risk-free asset) Bt < 0. On the contrary, if αt < α
∗, the portfolio risk meets the individual
risk requirements – being lower than the subjective risk threshold – and investors should
borrow extra money Bt > 0 and increase their S&P 500-holdings.
In this section, we apply the formulas suggested by portfolio theory in order to de-
termine those significance levels that correspond to the estimates of VaR∗t+1 derived from
Equation (3.22) on the basis of real market data. The corresponding averages of α∗
over time are listed in Table 3.2 for different portfolio evaluation frequencies, normally
distributed and Student-t distributed gross returns, myopic and dynamic cushions.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 months 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 months 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 months 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 month 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 day 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3.2: Portfolio-equivalent significance levels α∗ of the estimated VaR∗t+1.
The results are striking: The equivalent significance level α∗ lies below the commonly
acceptable interval (being practically zero). Thus, the assumption of classical portfolio
selection models based on the VaR-concept that investors choose significance levels α in
the interval [1, 10]% appears to be at odds with the findings in our VaR*-framework, for
any evaluation horizon lower than one year. Even the lowest significance level of 1% used
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in standard portfolio models is not able to capture the loss aversion of non-professional
investors acting according to our setting. In other words, investors may be substantially
more risk averse in practice than considered in theory.
Portfolio-equivalent coefficients of loss aversion The same equivalence issue can
also be addressed from the opposite viewpoint: We determine the values of λ∗t+1 in Equa-
tion (3.23) and the average investment in risky assets that result from our VaR*-formula in
Equation (3.22). These values correspond to the risk levels used (by managers) according
to the conventional VaR-procedure at usual significance levels α of 1% and 10%.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.3.2) present the results of
this analysis for normal and Student-t portfolio returns and myopic (dynamic) cushions.
Recall that the portfolio VaR in Equation (3.15) is estimated using a 5% significance that
is considered the benchmark for the values in these tables (i.e., it corresponds to 100%
risky investments).
Wealth % λ∗
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 60.99 36.48 1.02 1.01
6 months 59.72 34.63 0.91 0.90
4 months 59.40 34.17 1.00 0.82
3 months 59.30 34.01 1.43 1.67
1 month 59.04 33.65 0.90 1.62
1 week 58.82 33.34 0.80 0.58
1 day 58.70 33.20 1.00 1.02
Table 3.3: Wealth percentages invested in S&P 500 and
the average λ∗, for α = 1% and myopic cushions.
Accordingly, the equivalent recommendations concerning the money to be invested
in risky assets that result from the optimal portfolio allocation under VaR at 1% (10%)
significance lie well below (above) the benchmark VaR at 5%. This points to a higher
(lower) loss aversion in our endogenous VaR*-framework – after restating it in terms of
the exogenous-VaR model – relative to the portfolio risk measured by VaR. Comparing
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.3.2), we can observe that the
lower the significance (or the higher the confidence level) is, the more risk averse the non-
professional investors become, as the proportion of wealth to be put in the risky portfolio
is smaller than 100%. However, even the lowest percentages in Tables 3.3 and A.2 are
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Wealth % λ∗
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 120.80 125.37 1.20 1.02
6 months 121.47 126.11 0.88 1.06
4 months 121.64 126.29 1.00 1.00
3 months 121.70 126.36 1.00 1.00
1 month 121.84 126.50 1.00 1.00
1 week 121.96 126.63 1.00 1.00
1 day 122.00 126.67 1.00 1.00
Table 3.4: Wealth percentages invested in S&P 500 and
the average λ∗, for α = 10% and myopic cushions.
still much higher than those in Table 3.1, where VaR* is treated as endogenous, mainly
for high-frequency revisions.
Interestingly, the results for α = 1% are qualitatively consistent with our previous
findings supporting mLA, since the wealth percentages dedicated to risky assets decrease
for higher evaluation frequencies, although their variation is much weaker than for the case
with α = 5% considered in the first part of the applicative section. In contrast, when the
confidence level increases to α = 10%, this phenomenon is reversed and investors appear
to allocate slightly more money to the risky portfolio for more frequent evaluations. As
mLA is a widely documented phenomenon, we can conclude that the traditional portfolio
optimization framework fails once more to capture the real investor behavior in a consis-
tent way. This problem appears to become more acute for more relaxed assumptions on
the risk attitude.
Similar conclusions are reached with respect to the equivalent loss aversion coefficient
λ∗ derived for conventional significance levels assumed in previous research. Its values in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.3.2) for myopic (dynamic) cushions
are much lower than the empirical level of 2.25 estimated in the original PT and largely
used in previous empirical research.187 For the majority of the considered combinations
of α-values and evaluation frequencies, we obtain λ∗ ≈ 1, a level that indicates identical
perception over gains and losses according to the value function from Equation (3.24)
(and recalling that k = 0, i.e., past losses have no influence). Actually, the “neutral” level
of 1 is rarely exceeded over the considered evaluation frequencies, for each α = 1% and
10%. This reinforces our earlier claim that even for low significance levels (e.g. α = 1%,
187Such as Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
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as is the common case in previous portfolio optimization research) the loss attitude of real
investors captured by the specific coefficient λ is underestimated.
3.2.4 Summary and conclusions
This section investigates the behavior of non-professional investors facing the problems
of fixing a maximal acceptable level for their financial losses and of optimally allocating
wealth between a risk-free asset and a risky portfolio. We assume that these investors are
loss averse, narrowly frame financial investments, and perceive future portfolio returns as
being influenced by past portfolio performance. Their single source of utility consists of
financial wealth.
We extend the portfolio allocation model developed in Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk
(2001) in order to incorporate the effect of a desired risk level that is now subjectively as-
sessed (VaR*). The first task of our non-professional investors consists of fixing their
individual VaR*-level. This is subsequently communicated to professional portfolio man-
agers in charge of finding the optimal composition of the risky portfolio. Based on VaR*,
portfolio managers derive the optimal sum of money to be invested in risk-free assets.
The non-professional clients are thus provided with a recommendation on how to allocate
money between risky and risk-free assets that corresponds to their personal perceptions
and preferences.
In modeling investor perceptions over the risky investment that yield the subjective
VaR*, we employ the extended subjective valuation of prospective risky investments pro-
posed in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and rely on the notion of myopic loss aversion
introduced in Benartzi and Thaler (1995). The contribution of our work is to integrate
these behavioral explanations in the portfolio decision framework mentioned above. More-
over, we enrich the two models with original findings that stem both from theoretical
considerations and results obtained on the basis of real market data (specifically, the S&P
500 and the US 3-months T-bill returns).
Considering that investors are merely concerned with financial investments as a source
of utility, we build on the theoretical modelling of their perceptions of risky assets (the
value function) and define the maximum individually sustainable level of financial losses
(VaR*). This VaR*-level serves in deciding upon the optimal amount of money to be
invested in the risky portfolio. Also, we propose a way in which non-professional investors
can assess the utility of risky prospects (the prospective value). Moreover, we introduce
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an extended measure, the global first-order risk aversion, that attempts to better capture
the actual attitude towards financial losses of real investors. We finally investigate how the
portfolio evaluation frequency impacts, through different mechanisms, on the prospective
value and on this further measure of the loss attitude. In this context, we also suggest a
way to derive the horizon of performance revisions that maximizes risky investments.
The theoretical results are supported and extended by our application. We show that,
in sum, our non-professional investors demonstrate myopic loss aversion. They allocate
the main part of their wealth to risk-free assets, while a smaller sum (always lower than
35% of wealth) is put into the risky portfolio. This latter sum substantially decreases at
higher frequencies at which the risky performance is evaluated.
Furthermore, financial wealth fluctuations determined by the success or failure of pre-
vious decisions (the cushion) exert a significant impact on the current portfolio allocation.
They make investors without substantial cushion gains firmly refuse holding a large frac-
tion of risky assets.
One year appears to be a critical evaluation horizon under practical market constraints,
commonly used in practice, and optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing risky hold-
ings in consequence of a more relaxed attitude towards such holdings. The individual
perception of risky investments, captured by the prospective value, and the loss attitude
measured by the global first-order risk aversion can be split into two segments with qual-
itatively distinct evolutions around the annual frequency. Myopic loss aversion holds for
the segment of evaluation frequencies of at least one year that can be considered as being
the only one of practical relevance. However, the prospective value, which reflects the
total impact of the evaluation frequency, reveals a somewhat ambiguous behavior when
portfolio performance is checked at time intervals longer than one year. This is apparently
due to the direct component of this total impact (i.e. the manifestation through expected
returns), since the indirect component (that can be measured by means of the global
first-order risk aversion) shows a more consistent evolution over all analyzed evaluation
frequencies.
Finally, we carry out estimations aimed at establishing an equivalence between the
theoretical portfolio optimization under exogenous VaR-constraints and our extended
framework with individual VaR*. The estimated variables (such as significance levels,
loss aversion coefficients, and investments in risky assets) suggests an underevaluation of
the attitude of non-professional investors towards financial losses.
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3.3 Two-dimensional utility: consumption vs. finan-
cial assets
3.3.1 Introduction
One of the common decisions in everyday life is the optimal allocation of resources among
different activities that generate utility. For all individuals, the first and most impor-
tant source of utility is consumption. Additionally, people who are active in financial
markets derive utility from their investments. This section addresses the behavior of
non-professional investors who derive utility from both consumption and financial wealth
fluctuations. In other words, we aim at enlarging the perspective provided in Section 3.2
to what we denote as two-dimensional utility. Specifically, we account for consumption
as additional source of utility besides financial investments.
Similarly to the previous investigations, we are first interested in the attitude of non-
professional investors towards financial losses, knowing that they narrowly frame financial
investments and change current perceptions subject to the past performance of these
investments. Equally, we analyze how non-professional investors split their money between
consumption and (risky and risk-free) financial projects as a consequence of their loss
attitude.
Our non-professional investors have now to decide upon the optimal wealth allocation
between consumption and financial investments in total. The latter category offers a
further choice between a risky portfolio and a risk-free asset. We adopt the formal views
in Section 3.2 regarding the subjective perception of risky vs. risk-free investments – i.e.
the prospective value – and how it enters the wealth-allocation problem of non-professional
investors. In this context, loss aversion is quantified by two measures: the loss-aversion
coefficient and the global first-order risk aversion gRA. Wealth allocation is expressed
by the wealth percentages dedicated to consumption and to (different types of) financial
assets. In addition, we rely on the theoretical approach of Barberis, Huang, and colleagues
(2001, 2004, 2006), according to which investors decisions rely on the maximization of
either expected utility or of recursive non-expected utility with first-order risk aversion.
In both cases, the utility function is shaped in order to account for the excessive focus (in
technical terms narrow framing or myopia) on financial investments and for the influence
of past portfolio performance on the current perceptions of risky investments.
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We analyze the loss attitude and wealth allocation in the aggregate equilibrium with a
representative investor. The two settings with expected and non-expected utility require
specific conditions for attaining this equilibrium: For instance, under non-expected utility
the acceptable values of some behavioral parameters are constrained to belong to smaller
sets and the actual influence of past performance must be nil. We derive the equilibrium
equations in each setting and then infer the variables of interest from these equations. The
single variable for which both settings deliver expressions in equilibrium is the prospective
value. It further serves for obtaining equilibrium-equivalent measures of the loss attitude,
specifically the loss-aversion coefficient and gRA. The expected-utility setting entails, in
addition, estimates of the discounting factor. In the same setting, the wealth-allocation
variables can only be assessed on average. Under non-expected utility, the percentages of
total wealth allocated to consumption and of post-consumption wealth invested in risky
assets are, besides the prospective value, direct equilibrium estimates.
The theoretical part is implemented based on the same data set as in Section 3.2. In
particular, we consider S&P 500 and 3-months T-bill nominal returns as proxies for a
well-diversified risky portfolio and the risk-free investment, respectively. In addition, we
employ quarterly data of the aggregate per-capita consumption that provide for consump-
tion values at (only) two different evaluation horizons of the risky-portfolio performance:
one year and three months. This allows us to analyze the myopic aversion, i.e. the
enhanced reluctance towards financial investments in general and risky investments in
particular, manifested at higher evaluation frequencies.
We simulate how non-professional investors behave in an environment where consump-
tion and financial markets are characterized by general parameters, such as the risk-free
returns and the dynamics of consumption and of expected returns, derived from the
sets of real data at hand. We account for various investor profiles by choosing different
combinations of our behavioral parameters, such as the degree of narrow framing, the
consumption-related risk aversion, the weight of financial utility, the sensitivity to past
losses, the way of accounting for past performance, etc. Moreover, in order to avoid the
impossibility of covering current consumption needs from financial revenues over the entire
investing interval, we consider that investors periodically dispose of exogenous additional
incomes, the level of which can vary as well.
The numerical findings can be directly compared – that is, as values – between set-
tings only for the cases based on identical assumptions. Therefore, our comments on
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the differences and resemblances of expected and non-expected utility maximization refer
first to general aspects that should be understood in a qualitative sense. Then, we briefly
examine quantitative aspects.
In essence, the two settings deliver different recommendations based on the two mea-
sures of loss aversion – the loss-aversion coefficient and gRA –, These settings agree yet,
in the main, with respect to the findings on wealth allocation. In particular, loss aversion
can manifest in multiple ways and depends on the measure used to quantify it. Thus,
the maximizers of expected utility are less reluctant towards financial losses and allocate
higher percentages of their total wealth to financial assets in total. At the same time, they
are yet willing to invest less money in risky assets in particular. Myopic loss aversion can
be tested only over two evaluation frequencies, but in multiple ways. It is supported only
under expected-utility maximization and only when loss attitudes are measured by the
loss-aversion coefficient (what we denote to be myopic loss aversion in the strict sense); It
also holds with respect to the perception of risky investments captured by the prospective
value (that is, in the large sense), but this time exclusively under non-expected utility;
None of the two settings provides evidence for myopic loss aversion with respect to the
money dedicated to risky assets (in other words, in the monetary sense). Moreover, the
non-expected utility maximization appears to be somewhat better suited to describe indi-
vidual behaviors, based on the robustness of the estimates and the more intuitive economic
interpretation.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 3.3.2 builds upon the
theoretical framework. In particular, we commence by a brief review of the general pur-
pose of the model in Section 3.2, where the focus is on the variables of interest for the
present section. Then, this model is extended to allow for two-dimensional utility and the
approaches with expected and non-expected utility are detailed. Section 3.3.3 presents
the implementation of our theoretical model first for expected utility and second for non-
expected utility. The main findings in these two settings are subsequently confronted
with each other. Finally, Section 3.3.4 summarizes our findings and concludes. Further
numerical results are included in Appendix A.3.3.
3.3.2 Theoretical model
This section presents the theoretical framework describing how non-professional investors
perceive financial risks and accordingly allocate their wealth between consumption and
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financial assets in order to maximize perceived utility. In line with Barberis and Huang
(2004, 2006), we adopt two distinct formulations of the maximization problem: first
around expected utility and second, around recursive non-expected utility with first-order
risk aversion. Both settings account for the narrow framing of financial projects and for
the influence of past performance on the perceived value of risky investments.
A one-dimensional utility framework
One of the most important human decisions is how to allocate resources, in particu-
lar money, among different type of activities. These activities may be either necessary
and/or can generate further revenues. In the latter category, investing in financial assets
has nowadays become one of the most popular alternatives. This widespread trend of
ordinary people turning into “investors” is due, at least in part, to the formidable ac-
cessibility of information concerning financial markets, at almost no cost and almost in
real time. Under the pressure of the huge amount and intensity of such information, even
non-professional investors may have no choice but to become “overly concerned” with
their financial investments. This phenomenon of putting excessive emphasis on financial
investments is denoted in technical terms as narrow framing or myopia. Under narrow
framing, the central decision refers to how to allocate the “right” amount of money first
to financial investments in general, then across different financial assets. Also, financial
investments are perceived as distinct and overly important generators of individual utility.
This dissociates the decisions upon wealth allocation from the naturally larger context
with multiple generators of utility (such as consumption or other factors that do not
exclusively apply to financial markets).
Drawing on this idea, Section 3.2 has modelled the attitude towards financial losses and
the decision making of non-professional investors regarding the optimal wealth allocation
among different financial assets. Non-professional investors have been defined as people
whose principal concern is not financial investing and who lack of necessary resources
for making more sophisticated investment decisions. It has also been assumed that they
derive utility merely from financial investments.
The present section extends the model in Section 3.2 for the case when not only
financial investments, but also consumption, generate utility. In the sequel, we briefly
review the above model structure and variables that serve as support for the present
two-dimensional utility framework.
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Investor attitudes depend on the subjective perception of financial investments and
on the possible losses associated with these investments. In Section 3.2, perceptions have
been modeled according to the extended prospect-theory framework by Barberis, Huang,
and Santos (2001). Accordingly, risky performance is mentally split – with respect to a
subjective reference point – in gains and losses; Moreover, losses loom larger than gains
of the same size, and past performance influences current perceptions.
In Section 3.2, we have explained that decisions on wealth allocation often imply the
aid of professional managers. In essence, non-professional investors are interested in how
to split their money between the two main categories of financial assets: risky and risk-
free. The more refined decision upon the composition of the risky portfolio is committed
to professional portfolio managers. They find a solution for the optimal wealth allocation
among different risky assets and a risk-free one in a portfolio optimization framework
based on Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001), where market risk is measured by
the Value-at-Risk (VaR). We have introduced an individualized VaR-level, denoted as
VaR*, which is based on the psychological profile of non-professional clients and hence
on their subjective perceptions of financial risk, and considered its implications on wealth
allocation.
As mentioned above, the assignment of the individual loss level VaR* in investors’
minds can be formalized following Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001). Thus, the subjec-
tive perception of one unit of risky investment (relative to the risk-free rate) is captured
by the extended value function v. As in the original prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (abbr. PT),188 this value function accounts for the distinct perception of gains
and losses with respect to a subjective reference point and for the higher reluctance to-
wards losses. In addition, the extended value function is designed to capture the possible
influence of past performance on current risk perceptions.189 We further apply the value
function definitions proposed in Equations (3.18-3.20) in the above Section 3.2.
Section 3.2 has extensively analyzed the cushion St − Zt, defined as the difference
between the current value of the risky investment St and a benchmark level for the past
portfolio performance Zt. In so doing, we have considered two distinct cushion definitions:
the myopic cushions for which the benchmark level of past performance was taken to be
identical to the last-period risky holdings Zt = St−1; and the dynamic cushions which
188Please refer to Section 3.1.2 and specifically to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) for more details on PT.
189Which makes, among others, the reference point vary subject to past losses or gains.
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assumed the same benchmark to be a combination of past references and current risky
investment values Zt = ηZt−1R¯ + (1− η)St, where the parameter η measured how far in
the past the investor memory stretches. Hence, myopic cushions amount to St−St−1 and
dynamic ones to η(St − Zt−1R¯).
Based on the perception of financial investments captured by the value function, Equa-
tion (3.22) further defined the individual loss level VaR* of non-professional investors as
the quantile of the subjective loss distribution. Once being formed in investors’ minds,
VaR* is communicated to the portfolio managers in the form of a fixed number. Managers
interpret it as a fixed risk level and incorporate it into the problem of optimal capital allo-
cation among financial investments as a risk constraint. This problem is solved following
the portfolio optimization model with VaR as a risk measure by Campbell, Huisman,
and Koedijk (2001). The optimization procedure delivers first the optimal weights w∗t
of the risky portfolio components from Equation (3.14), and second the optimal amount
of money Bt to be borrowed or lent from Equation (3.16). The latter variable plays an
important role for non-professional investors, who are above all interested in how to split
their money between risky and risk-free assets. Therefore, it represents one of the main
variables in the subsequent model and gives account of the wealth-allocation decisions of
our investors in the market equilibrium.
Central to the above analysis, therefore also to the following, is the derivation of the
so-called prospective value V from Equation (3.24). This variable captures the subjectively
perceived utility of the risky portfolio (relatively to the risk-free rate) and hence is related
to the attitude adopted towards financial losses. One goal of the present work is to
determine the prospective value ascribed – in the equilibrium of the aggregate market – to
financial investments by investors who derive utility from two main sources (consumption
and financial investments).
Drawing on the idea that individual attitudes towards financial losses can be measured
by means of the loss-aversion coefficient, it is interesting to compute a loss-aversion coef-
ficient λ¯ that is equivalent to the prospective value V¯ in the market equilibrium. From








pit(1− ψt)Rft + (1− pit)(1− ωt)kEt[xt+1]
)
(St − Zt)(
pit(1− ψt) + (1− pit)(1− ωt)
)
StEt[xt+1] + pit(1− ψt)Rft(St − Zt)
.
(3.26)
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The coefficient λ¯ plays a central role in our model, as it stands for an equilibrium-
equivalent measure of the attitude towards financial losses. Note that established research
(based on PT) works often with values of 2.25 for the loss-aversion coefficient.
However, the simple loss-aversion coefficient fails to capture the influence of past
performance that is yet explicitly considered in the extended PT by Barberis, Huang,
and Santos (2001). Consequently, Equation (3.25) has introduced a further measure of
the loss attitude denoted as the global first-order risk aversion (abbr. gRA). It is formally
defined as the first derivative of the prospective value with respect to the expected risk
premium. In the applied part of the present section, we analyze the evolution of gRA
in the two-dimensional utility equilibrium. In essence, higher gRA-values point to more
relaxed loss attitudes, as this measure directly reflects changes in the attractiveness of
financial investments captured by the prospective value.
A two-dimensional utility framework
As already mentioned, Section 3.2 considers that investors are merely concerned with
financial investments and the utility they generate. However, in practice, such consid-
erations – that is, focusing on financial utility alone – appear to be better suited to
professional investors than to non-professional ones. The activity of the former demands
a strictly investment-oriented perspective, and their main task reduces to making money
that is going to be reinvested in financial markets. In contrast, non-professional investors
sooner regard financial investments as a source of income dedicated to covering consump-
tion needs.190 In other words, consumption should be the main generator of individual
utility for non-professional investors. However, financial investments might be perceived
as an equally important source of utility. The main reason resides in the above mentioned
narrow framing, i.e. the excessive focus on financial investments, which appears to be
driven by the fear of registering losses when faced with financial risks.
Based on these considerations, we now extend the setting in Section 3.2 by allowing
for two sources of individual utility: financial wealth fluctuations and consumption. In so
doing, we rely on Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), Barberis and Huang (2004), and
Barberis and Huang (2006). The present section details the theoretical background of our
contribution.
190Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk (2001) note that the simple VaR-framework without consumption
is sufficiently informative for describing decision making of (non-professional) investors under risk.
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In essence, the above wealth allocation problem based on one-dimensional utility is
augmented with an additional step: splitting money between consumption and financial
investments. Strictly speaking, our non-professional investors decide first on how much
money should be dedicated to consumption needs and to financial assets in total ; Only
afterwards they can partition the latter sum between risk-free and risky assets, as shown
in Section 3.2. As the performance of risky investments is mostly measured with respect to
risk-free assets,191 we can formally merge these two successive steps into a single decision.
The common goal is then the maximization of total utility derived from consumption and
risky – relative to risk-free – financial investments.
Following Barberis and Huang (2004), we consider an aggregate market which lacks
perfect substitution. Thus, we can focus on absolute pricing and avoid possible arbitrage
opportunities generated by narrow framing. The total utility is formulated in order to
account for the above-mentioned two-dimensional origin and yields the sum of discounted
utilities of consumption U(C) and of perceived values of financial investments V˜ , that
is:192








where ρ is referred to as the discounting factor and 0 < ρ < 1.193 According to Equation
(3.27), at each time t the current consumption is discounted with ρt, while the prospective
value – that encompasses subjective perception of the next-period performance194 – has
to be provided with a corresponding ρt+1.
In line with Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), bt is an exogenous scaling factor
designed to map the perceived value of gains and losses into consumption units. It follows
the rule stated in their Equation (11), namely bt = b0C¯
−γ
t , where C¯t represents the
exogenous aggregate per-capita consumption at time t,195 and b0 measures the degree of
narrow framing. Finally, we denote γ is as the consumption-related coefficient of risk
aversion.
191Recall that the reference points of the perceived risky value from Equations (3.19) and (3.20) include
the risk-free rate Rft.
192Strictly speaking, V˜ corresponds to the prospective value V from Equation (3.24), before taking expec-
tations. Recall that the prospective value stands for the perceived utility of financial investments. Being
obtained from the value functions weighted by the pure occurrence probabilities of possible outcomes, it
is equivalent to an expected value.
193In the applied part, we consider a finite investment duration T that is yet sufficiently long in order
to allow for reaching an equilibrium.
194Recall that the prospective value encompasses the future returns Rt+1.
195The exogeneity is related here to the subjective viewpoint of the individual investor. It points out
the fact that bt is independent of every individual feature related to risk aversion or loss aversion.
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In line with Barberis and Huang (2006), it is now possible to develop an equilib-
rium framework in the aggregate market with a representative investor.196 We derive the
equilibrium conditions in two different settings: first, when investors maximize expected
utility, and second, when a recursive non-expected utility function with first-order risk
aversion is optimized. Throughout, we formally incorporate the assumptions of narrow
framing and dependence of current decisions on past portfolio performance.
We are furthermore interested in the phenomenon of myopic loss aversion (mLA).
Introduced by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and supported by numerous experimental tests
(as detailed in Section 3.1.3), mLA refers to the fact that narrow framing (or myopia)
strengthens the loss aversion, so that investors reduce their risky investments when risky
performance is checked on more frequently. In view of the manifold possibilities to quantify
the loss attitude, we refine the notion of mLA in the following sense: We denote as mLA in
the strict sense the enhancement of loss aversion with the evaluation frequency. According
to our model, the loss aversion can be quantified either by the loss-aversion coefficient
or by the extended measure gRA. Thus, mLA in the strict sense holds if either the loss-
aversion coefficient increases or gRA decreases with the evaluation frequency. As both
loss-aversion measures are derived from individual perceptions of risky investments, we
can also measure mLA in the large sense with respect to the prospective value. We
can support mLA in the large sense if the prospective value falls at higher evaluation
frequencies. Finally, mLA in the monetary sense is defined as the decrease of monetary
risky holdings – in percentages of the total wealth – in consequence of more frequent
portfolio evaluations. In addition, we can speak about myopic aversion towards financial
investments when the wealth percentages dedicated to consumption increase with the
evaluation frequency. All these different aspects of myopic aversion will be analyzed in
Section 3.3.3. Note that our data sets constrain us to check on mLA only at two evaluation
frequencies.
The expected-utility approach We commence by considering the approach of Bar-
beris, Huang, and Santos (2001), where the representative investor aims at maximizing
total expected utility generated by both consumption and financial wealth changes.197
196Henceforth, we use the denominations of “representative investor” and “investors” interchangeably,
drawing upon the idea that the latter stands for a group with homogenous preferences. In essence, the
actions of all investors in equilibrium can be summarized by the corresponding choices of the representative
investor.
197As demonstrated in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), this framework can explain the emergence
of equity premiums of the magnitude observed in practice.
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We refer to the utility of consumption in the traditional CRRA-terms and hence as-
sume U(Ct) =
C1−γt
1− γ . The utility of financial investments is measured by the prospective
value in Equation (3.24). Then, the maximization problem of the non-professional in-
vestors from Equation (3.27) results in:












where v is the value function from Equation (3.18).
Moreover, Gt+1 represents the next-period value of the risky investment and yields:
Gt+1 = θt(Wt − Ct)(Rt+1 −Rft), (3.29)
where Wt stands for the total wealth and θt for the fraction of post-consumption wealth
allocated to the risky portfolio.
The following equations provide for the formal compatibility of the one-dimensional
utility framework in Section 3.2 and the current two-dimensional utility framework. Specif-
ically, the post-consumption wealth proportion put in risky assets θt, the current value
of the risky investment St, as well as the amount of money Bt borrowed (Bt > 0) or
lent (Bt < 0) are reformulated in order to correspond to the total wealth Wt that now
encompasses not only financial wealth, but also consumption. They yield:
θt =
Wt − Ct +Bt
Wt − Ct (3.30a)
St = θt(Wt − Ct) (3.30b)
Bt = (Wt − Ct) VaR
∗ +VaR
(Wt − Ct)Rft − VaR . (3.30c)
and thus the post-consumption wealth fraction allocated to risk-free assets entails
1 − θt = − Bt/(Wt − Ct). In addition, the next-period total wealth results from the
current financial investment and can be expressed as:198
Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct)
(
θtRt+1 + (1− θt)Rft
)
. (3.31)
Note that the maximization in Equation (3.28) is carried out with respect to both the
198A part Ct+1/Wt+1 is subsequently allocated to consumption, but consumption only generates utility
and no wealth.
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consumption Ct and the wealth fraction invested in risky assets θt (and hence to the value

















t E[v¯(Gt+1)] = 1. (3.32b)
According to our approach, E[v¯(Gt+1)] represents the prospective value at equilibrium
that we denote by V¯ . Our goal is to provide an empirical estimate Vˆ of this prospective
value from which we can derive the equilibrium-equivalent loss-aversion coefficient λˆ that
follows Equation (3.26).
In order to perform the estimation of V¯ , additional assumptions concerning the con-
sumption and return dynamics are necessary. In line with Equations (68)-(70) in Barberis






= c+ σc²t+1 (3.33a)








 , i.i.d. over time. (3.33c)
Thus, for a constant risk-free rate Rf , the expected-equilibrium Equations (3.32) en-
199See Equations (27) and (28) in Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001).
200Note that Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assume that returns develop following the dividends
payed by the risky asset Rt+1 = (Pt+1 +Dt+1)/Pt. If this can be considered as a sound assumption on
an annual basis, the following problem emerges in terms of higher portfolio evaluation frequencies: While
prices vary daily, dividends are released only once every three months or even at longer time intervals. (For
instance, according to data from finance.yahoo.com, the mean frequency of dividends releases amounts to
approximatively 4.5 months.) This generates a non-smooth dividend evolution that accounts, on the one
hand, for the dates of dividend release (when dividends truly change in value) and, on the other hand, for
the in-between periods (when no dividends are distributed to investors, meaning that dividends can be
considered as constant from one trade to the other). Formally, between two successive dividend releasing
times (u, u+ 1], we have:
Dt+1 =
{
Du, for t ∈ (u, u+ 1)





1, for t ∈ (u, u+ 1)Du+1
Du
, for t = u+ 1.



























The non-expected utility approach Although the expected-utility maximization
represents the most widespread theoretical approach so far, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler
(2006) claim that another specification captures better the utility of decisions under risk:
the non-expected recursive utility with first-order risk aversion (abbr. R-FORA). Yet,
simple R-FORA specifications account merely for loss aversion and hence have to be ex-
tended in order to accommodate with both loss aversion and narrow framing, since these
two phenomena appear to be crucial in financial markets. Henceforth, we refer to the
R-FORA setting with narrow framing as the non-expected utility approach.
We rely on the approach proposed in Barberis and Huang (2006), according to whom
investors maximize a recursive utility-function Ut, that is defined as:
Ut = ¦
〈




¦ 〈C, y〉 =
(
(1− β)C1−γ + βy1−γ
) 1
1−γ






, for 0 < γ 6= 1 (3.36b)
Gt+1 = θt(Wt − Ct)(Rt+1 −Rft) (3.36c)
v(y) =
y, for y ≥ 0λx, for y < 0, for λ > 1. (3.36d)
Here, ¦〈., .〉 is an aggregator function, µ(.) the certainty equivalent of the distribution
of future utility conditional on the information zt at time t and Gt+1 the next-period
value of the risky investment. The parameter β is henceforth referred to as the weight of
201The derivation is easy under the partial result that, for x ∼ N(µ, σ2), we have E[exp(x)] = exp(µ+
σ2/2). Also, for xi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ), where i = 1, 2, i.i.d. over time and with covariance σ12, we can write
E[exp(x1 + x2)] = exp(µ1 + µ2 + (σ21 + σ
2
2)/2 + σ12).
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financial utility.
According to Barberis and Huang (2004), the certainty equivalent µ(.) is assumed to
be homogenous of degree one and, in order to ensure tractability, the individual value
function v must also be homogenous. Consequently, for the equilibrium conditions to be
necessary and sufficient, v has to take the piecewise-linear form in Equation (3.36d).202
In other words, a good behaved equilibrium with non-expected utility does not allow for
the influence of past performance on current perceptions of financial risk as proposed in
the extended PT-framework by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), but merely for loss
aversion as in the initial PT of Kahneman and Tversky.
Therefore, the non-expected utility equilibrium reduces to imposing the condition of
nil cushions St = Zt in all equations of the theoretical model in Section 3.2. This condition
can be interpreted as a particular case with dynamic cushions η(St−Zt−1R¯), where η = 0
or, in other words, when investors have no memory of the past performance. It is this
case that we extensively study in the applicative section and which provides a basis for
the comparison between the settings with expected and non-expected utility. Obviously,
all influence of the sensitivity to past losses k on our model estimates is discarded.
Coming back to the non-expected utility maximization, we again restrict our analysis
to the general equilibrium for aggregate markets with a representative investor, in line with
Equations (60)-(62) and with the subsequent Example 6.1 for stock markets in Barberis
and Huang (2004). Our focus remains on non-professional investor decisions concerning
wealth allocation among consumption, the risky portfolio with gross returns Rt, and the
risk-free asset with the gross return Rft.





When a fraction θt of post-consumption wealth is to be invested in the risky portfolio and
another fraction of total wealth αt to be consumed, the following (Euler) equations yield
202For more details on this specification, see Barberis and Huang (2004). The same authors demonstrate
that the two fund separation theorem continues to hold with the above specification of recursive non-
expected utility.
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θtEt[v(Rt+1 −Rft)] = 0,
(3.38c)
where Rtott+1 = θtRt+1+(1−θt)Rft is the total gross return of financial assets.203 Equation
(3.38c) is derived from (3.38b) by multiplying it with θt.
The next period financial wealth formulated in Equation (3.31) can be now rewritten







Assuming time constancy for the portfolio wealth fraction θ, the consumption ratio α,






⇒ log(Rtott+1) = − log(1− α) + c+ σc²t+1. (3.40)
203Specifically, the total return of the combination between risky and risk-free assets.
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Thus, the equilibrium Equations (3.38) yield:
β
1



















































θE[v¯(Rt+1 −Rf )] = 0.
(3.41c)
We proceed similarly to the expected-utility setting by assuming the same parameter
dynamics of consumption and returns as in Equations (3.33). Also, we consider that
V¯ = E[v¯(Rt+1 − Rf )], where v corresponds to the value functions in Equation (3.18)
under the condition that St = Zt, are equivalent in expectation to the prospective value
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3.3.3 Application
This section presents numerical findings based on the theoretical results from the above
Section 3.3.2. We first review the general assumptions made in order to facilitate the
estimation procedure and to render comparable the two settings with expected and non-
expected utility. The estimation results are subsequently detailed for each of these settings
separately. The exposition focuses on two main aspects: On the one hand, we address the
evolution of the attitude towards financial losses. This attitude is described first by the
loss-aversion coefficient and second by our extended measure gRA. On the other hand,
we examine the decisions on wealth allocation among consumption, risky, and risk-free
assets. This is quantified by the wealth fractions dedicated to the respective sources of
utility. Throughout, we are also interested if mLA (in the strict, large, and monetary
sense) continues to manifest in equilibrium.
General assumptions
The first data set that underlies our estimations is that considered in Section 3.2. It
includes nominal returns of the stock index S&P 500 and of the three-months treasury
bill – as proxies for the risky and the risk-free investment, respectively – from 01/02/1962
to 03/09/2006 (11,005 daily observations). This data is again divided into two parts:
The observations before 03/01/1982 serve to estimate the empirical mean and the stan-
dard deviation of the portfolio returns at the date considered to be the beginning of the
trade, namely on 03/01/1982; The second part, from 03/01/1982 to 03/09/2006 (6,010
observations), is the actual data used for performing simulations.
Additionally, aggregate per-capita consumption data between 01/02/1962 and 12/31/2005
sampled at quarterly intervals, provide a basis for the calculation of the log-consumption’s
mean and variance.204 Note that the consumption data set only allows to assess consump-
tion values corresponding to portfolio evaluations horizons of one year and three months.
Consequently, we cannot replicate the more detailed analysis in Section 3.2 regarding the
impact of the evaluation frequency on investor decisions. We will, however, analyze how
the recommendation of our model changes for these two evaluation frequencies.
After smoothing out the outlier corresponding to the October 1987 market crash,205
quarterly and yearly returns are constructed from the actual data set and used to derive
204This data was provided by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau
of the Census. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.3.1.
205Specifically, the outlier is replaced with the mean of the ten before and after data points.
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the main variables that describe the loss attitude and the optimal wealth allocation of our
non-professional investors. In so doing, we assume that investors start by spreading their
wealth equally between consumption and financial assets. The latter fraction is further
allocated in equal parts to the risky index and the risk-free T-bill. Our investors are long-
lived beyond the VaR-horizon and are not allowed to quit the market during the trading
period. Portfolio gross returns are assumed to be normally distributed, and future port-
folio returns to be estimated as the unconditional mean of past returns. In addition, the
risk-free returns, the mean log-consumption, and the mean risky returns are set identical
to the means of the corresponding variable, computed over the actual trade period from
03/01/1982 to 03/09/2006, specifically as Rˆf = mean[Rft], cˆ = mean[log(Ct+1)− log(Ct)],
and rˆ = mean[log(Rt)], respectively.
A final and more specific assumption, common to both approaches with expected and
non-expected utility, tackles an issue emerging from our considerations that investors are
long-lived and view financial investments as single source of wealth:206 It is possible that
financial investments do not generate sufficient revenues in order to cover consumption
needs over the entire trade interval. We circumvent this potential problem by consid-
ering that, at each time t, investors dispose of additional incomes It.
207 Such incomes
represent, for instance, the wages earned by non-professional investors from their main
employment.208 They are exogenous, that is, they stem from outside of those investments
that constitute the decision making object at hand. Under this assumption, the total
wealth in Equation (3.31) results from both financial investments and additional incomes
and yields at t+ 1:
Wt+1 − It+1 = (Wt − Ct)
(
θtRt+1 + (1− θt)Rft
)
. (3.43)
The additional income It may cover a part of the consumption needs of the current
206Recall that both consumption and financial investments generate utility, yet only the latter is “pro-
ductive” and can effectively augment wealth.
207Note that Barberis and Huang (2004, 2006) avoid this problem by fixing the percentage of post-
consumption wealth invested in risky assets θ. We consider this as rather inappropriate in our framework
for two reasons: First, Barberis and Huang (2004, 2006) exclusively work with non-expected utility, while
our aim is to render comparable two settings, namely those with expected and non-expected utility.
Second, our model relies on the idea that θ depends on the subjective VaR* (see Equations (3.30)).
Hence, imposing constancy on this parameter would eliminate the whole analyzed mechanism of how
individual perceptions of financial investments are reflected in the wealth allocation.
208As their name indicates, non-professional investors mainly earn their living from other activities
(developed for example as employees of a company) than from financial investments. The latter merely
represent a secondary source of revenues.
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where α represents the percentages of total wealth dedicated to consumption and δ is an
arbitrary constant. Of course, both α, δ > 0.
Apparently, for δ ≤ 1/α (δ > 1/α) the additional income exceeds (does not entirely
meet) the consumption needs of the period It ≥ Ct (It < Ct). We distinguish two
particular cases which, due to their lack of practical meaning, are of no interest in the
present framework: First, for δ = 1, the current additional income yields a fraction of the
consumption needs It = Ct/α and investors should assign no money to financial assets in
total Rtott+1 = 0.
210 Second, for δ = 1/α the additional income covers exactly the current
consumption It = Ct. Then, the total financial investment would be R
tot
t+1 = Ct+1/Ct
and hence independent of α, which eliminates any connection between the investment
decision and the subjective perception of financial investments in the non-expected utility
equilibrium.211 Consequently, we should be looking for values of δ ∈ R+ \ {0, 1, 1/α}.212
We choose α-values that conform with the equilibrium estimates of the total-wealth
percentages allocated to consumption in the non-expected-utility setting.213 In particu-
lar, we vary the level of the additional income It by changing the parameters β and δ.
The rationale is that α depends on the financial weight parameter β, according to Equa-
tions (3.41). We observe that It increases (decreases) subject to higher values of β (δ),
as higher additional incomes are equivalent to more relaxed requirements for financial
209This assumption permits an easy formal manipulation and ensures the comparability of the two
settings. At the same time, it allows for sufficient flexibility with respect to the choice of the income
magnitude.
210Moreover, in this case the percentage of post-consumption wealth assigned to risky assets in equilib-
rium from Equation (3.48b) yields θ = Rf/(Rf − exp(r + σ2r/2 − γσcr)) ≥ 1. This induces investors to
throw caution to the wind, borrowing even more money, which is then channeled into the risky portfolio.
211Recall first that V relies on subjective perceptions and is derived on the basis of behavioral parameters
according to Equation (3.24). Then this connection is ensured by the interdependency of α and V¯ from
Equations (3.48). This interdependency is central to our work since we assume that all decisions rely on
individual perceptions and attempt to analyze how they change subject to different perception parameters.
For δ = 1/α, the percentage of post-consumption wealth allocated to risky assets in equilibrium from
Equation (3.48b) becomes independent of α, specifically θ = (Rf − exp(c+(1− 2γ)σ2c/2))/(Rf − exp(r+
σ2r/2− γσcr)).
212Note that for the purpose of comparability, we consider identical additional incomes in both settings
with expected and non-expected utility.
213We are forced to do so, as this setting is the only one that delivers direct values of this variable in
the market equilibrium. Under expected utility, the percentages of total wealth to be consumed can be
only assessed on average from the equilibrium estimates.
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investments.214 We take β ∈ {0.1; 0.5; 0.9; 0.98}, where the last value is the one esti-
mated in Barberis and Huang (2004), and δ ∈ {0.1; 0.5; 0.9; 2; 10; 100}. Note that, in the
expected-utility setting, β has no direct intuitive meaning and thus it is easier to interpret
the changes in the additional income resulting from different (β, δ)-combinations.
Further assumptions concern the remaining model parameters, that are in the main
of behavioral nature and that we vary in order to study their influence on our main
equilibrium variables. In particular, we work with different values for the initial loss-
aversion coefficient λ ∈ {1; 2.25; 3}, where only the latter two corroborate with the
non-expected equilibrium according to Equation (3.36d). We rely on Barberis, Huang,
and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2006) in choosing the risk-aversion degree
γ ∈ {0.5; 1; 1.5} for the expected-utility setting, where higher values point to increased
aversion. In line with the condition γ 6= 1 from Equation (3.36a), we use γ ∈ {0.5; 1.5}
in the non-expected-utility setting. Furthermore, we consider narrow-framing degrees
b0 ∈ {0.001; 0.1; 0.5; 1; 5; 10; 100; 1000}, where the first value stands for the situation with
(almost) no narrow framing since b0 6= 0 according to Equation (3.45).215 Following the
same authors, we also account for no, moderate, and high influence of past losses on the
perception of risky investments k ∈ {0; 3; 10}. Recall yet that k plays no role in the
non-expected utility equilibrium. Finally, the maximizers of expected utility are assumed
to assess cushions either myopically as St − St−1 or dynamically as η(St − Zt−1R¯) with
different memory-length parameters η ∈ {0; 0.1; 0.5; 0.9; 1} and with R¯ = mean[Rt]. The
non-expected utility equilibrium allows only for memoryless dynamic cushions η = 0.
Since the lack of space does not allow for an extensive presentation of all obtained
results, we subsequently focus on few cases that appear to be the most realistic and
that entail plausible estimates in both settings, thus providing a support for comparison.
Further interesting situations are explicitly indicated.In particular, we refer to risk-averse
investors γ = 0.5 who narrowly frame financial investments b0 ≥ 1. We furthermore
214Due to our assumption that It = Ct/(αδ) and according to α = 1− β 1γR
1−γ
γ
f exp((1− γ)σ2c/2) in the
subsequent Equation (3.48a).
215In so doing, we are in line with Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and less with Barberis and Huang
(2004, 2006) who choose b0 < 1. The reason is the following: Recall that the weight bt of the utility derived
from risky investments in Equation (3.27) is defined as the product of the narrow-framing coefficient b0
with the perceived aggregate consumption C¯−γt . Thus, this weight falls with the consumption-related
risk aversion γ and hence higher b0-values are required in order to generate reasonable values. In our
sample mean[Ct] ≈ 46000, so that yet the highest considered b0 = 1000 yields for γ = 1 a contribution of
around 0.02174 of the perceived risky utility to the total utility, while for γ = 1.5 this contribution drops
to 0.0001. Similarly for γ = 0.5, b0 = 1 is the lowest value that yields reasonable mean[bt] = 0.00466.
Indeed, the estimates obtained for b0 < 1 are in the main part implausible.
244 Loss Aversion and Wealth Allocation
consider three qualitatively different levels of the average additional income I, i.e. low,
middle, and high, that correspond to the combinations (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9), (β = 0.5, δ =
0.5), and (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1), respectively. Also, we briefly address the middle-range income
combination (β = 0.9, δ = 2) at the end of the applicative sections on the expected and
non-expected utility equilibriums.216 In addition, we merely refer to the value of the initial
loss-aversion coefficient the most used in literature λ = 2.25.217 In line with Section 3.2,
our expected-utility maximizers use long-memory dynamic cushions with η = 0.9.
The expected-utility approach
We start by estimating the main variables that quantify the loss attitude and the wealth
allocation in the expected-utility equilibrium. Our interest lies in how they change subject
to different psychological profiles of the representative investor. In the sequel, we report
on average changes of these variables subject to the ceteris paribus variation of chosen
parameters.
The main equilibrium variables in the expected-utility setting are the discounting
factor ρ and the prospective value V¯ .218 They are obtained by plugging in the parameter




























From the expression of the prospective value in equilibrium in Equation (3.45b), we can
further assess the corresponding loss-aversion coefficient λ¯ according to Equation (3.26).
All estimates are henceforth denoted by a .ˆ symbol.
Before detailing the estimation results, let us make an important remark regarding the
interpretation of the prospective value in equilibrium: Combining the above Equations
216The main part of the model estimates obtained for δ > 1, result in implausible values of our variables
in at least one of the settings. The single exception is the combination (β = 0.9, δ = 2). It corresponds
to additional incomes of middle level, specifically somewhat higher than those give by (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5).
217This is not to be mistaken for the equilibrium estimate λˆ from Equation (3.26). Recall that the initial
coefficient λ is employed in order to derive VaR* from Equation (3.22), that affects the optimal wealth
allocation in Equation (3.16) and hence all further model variables.
218Of course, we could also fix ρ and estimate γ. However, this procedure proves to be more delicate,
given that Equation (3.34a) is a second-order equation in γ, such that the existence and number of real
roots depends on the sign of its determinant c2 − 2σ2c log(ρRf ). In the case with either none or two
distinct real solutions, we cannot provide an economic interpretation of the equilibrium.
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This expression is proportional to a factor that indicates the trade-off between the rev-
enues from risk-free vs. risky investments, which is the last right-hand term in parentheses
Rf − exp(r + σ2r/2 − γσcr).219 This term decreases as risky investments become more
profitable and so also does V¯ . In other words, the prospective value is directly propor-
tional to the profitability of risky with respect to risk-free assets taken with negative sign.
Recall now that the prospective value stands for the perceptions of the benefits of risky
investments – being, as its name says, a “value” – and hence it is expected to grow as
risky assets become more profitable. Therefore, only the absolute values of the prospective
value in equilibrium |V¯ | can be meaningfully interpreted and our subsequent comments
will exclusively refer to such absolute values.220
The main equilibrium estimates under maximization of expected utility for yearly
(quarterly) portfolio evaluations and our usual parameter values, that is λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5,
b0 ≥ 1, myopic and long-memory dynamic cushions, and low, middle, and high additional
incomes I, are illustrated in Table 3.5 (Table 3.6).
First, as implied by Equation (3.45a), the estimates ρˆ of the discounting factor do not
vary with any of our behavioral parameters b0, β, δ, k, or the type of cushion, and hence
we discard them from Tables 3.5 and 3.6. In particular, ρˆ = 0.99059 (0.95685) for yearly
(quarterly) evaluations. The decline of ρˆ with the frequency of the risky-performance
evaluation can be intuitively explained by the fact that the notion of immediacy might
change its meaning when investors check more often on their portfolios: Perceived time
intervals are shorter and thus the preference for immediacy should drop.
Thus, our estimates ρˆ of the discounting factor lie close to the value of 0.98 assumed
by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Barberis and Huang (2006), speaking for the
validity of our approach. Unreported results show also that the discounting is weaker for
higher consumption-related risk-aversion γ. However, γ = 1.5 entails ρ-values that lie
219We can approximate this factor by Rf − exp(r + σ2r/2) ≈ Rf − Et[Rt+1], which is the expected
risk premium taken with a negative sign. This approximation holds in our data set, since the correlation
between risky returns and consumption takes a very low value σcr = 0.0168 (0.0056) for yearly (quarterly)
evaluations.
220This effect is specific to the present equilibrium framework (independently of whether expected or
non-expected utility is maximized), since in the one-sided utility framework from Section 3.2 we also
obtain negative estimates Vˆ , but there, these values are meaningful as such.
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8
λˆ 0.88272 0.69103 0.52197 0.040833 -0.013175 -0.079496
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961
λˆ 0.55173 0.51857 0.49687 0.098019 0.08707 0.073462
Low I b0 = 10
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) |Vˆ | 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98
λˆ 0.51035 0.49702 0.49373 0.10517 0.099601 0.092582
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298
λˆ 0.47311 0.47762 0.49091 0.1116 0.11088 0.10979
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298
λˆ 0.46939 0.47568 0.49062 0.11224 0.11201 0.11151
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8
λˆ 0.61664 0.59439 0.57693 0.15208 0.14411 0.13325
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961
λˆ 0.49851 0.49925 0.50786 0.12027 0.11853 0.11601
Middle I b0 = 10
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) |Vˆ | 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98
λˆ 0.48374 0.48735 0.49923 0.11629 0.11533 0.11386
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298
λˆ 0.47045 0.47665 0.49146 0.11271 0.11245 0.11192
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298
λˆ 0.46912 0.47558 0.49068 0.11236 0.11216 0.11172
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8
λˆ 0.47727 0.48285 0.4968 0.11589 0.11545 0.11465
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961
λˆ 0.47064 0.47694 0.49183 0.11303 0.1128 0.11229
High I b0 = 10
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) |Vˆ | 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98
λˆ 0.46981 0.4762 0.49121 0.11267 0.11246 0.112
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298
λˆ 0.46906 0.47553 0.49065 0.11235 0.11216 0.11173
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298
λˆ 0.46898 0.47547 0.4906 0.11232 0.11213 0.1117
Table 3.5: The main variable estimates in the expected-utility equilibrium
for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion
γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-
loss sensitivity k, additional-income levels I, and narrow-framing degrees b0.
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89
λˆ 2.8189 2.499 1.9725 -0.77164 -0.84913 -0.98526
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179
λˆ 3.4252 3.1768 2.6648 -1.3932 -1.4394 -1.7254
Low I b0 = 10
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) |Vˆ | 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089
λˆ 3.5009 3.2616 2.7514 -1.4709 -1.5132 -1.8179
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089
λˆ 3.5691 3.3378 2.8293 -1.5409 -1.5796 -1.9011
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089
λˆ 3.576 3.3454 2.8371 -1.5478 -1.5863 -1.9095
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89
λˆ 3.4378 3.1978 2.6327 -1.4292 -1.4706 -1.6006
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179
λˆ 3.5489 3.3166 2.7734 -1.5247 -1.5637 -1.6614
Middle I b0 = 10
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) |Vˆ | 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089
λˆ 3.5628 3.3314 2.791 -1.5367 -1.5754 -1.669
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089
λˆ 3.5753 3.3448 2.8068 -1.5474 -1.5858 -1.6758
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089
λˆ 3.5766 3.3461 2.8084 -1.5485 -1.5869 -1.6765
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89
λˆ 3.5729 3.3423 2.8038 -1.545 -1.5834 -1.6729
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179
λˆ 3.576 3.3455 2.8077 -1.5479 -1.5863 -1.6758
High I b0 = 10
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) |Vˆ | 6.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089
λˆ 3.5763 3.3459 2.8081 -1.5483 -1.5866 -1.6762
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089
λˆ 3.5767 3.3463 2.8086 -1.5486 -1.587 -1.6765
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089
λˆ 3.5767 3.3463 2.8086 -1.5486 -1.587 -1.6766
Table 3.6: The main variable estimates in the expected-utility equilibrium for
quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion
γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-
loss sensitivity k, additional-income levels I, and narrow-framing degrees b0.
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slightly above 1, suggesting that a too high consumption-related risk-aversion might be
incompatible with our expected-utility framework.221 Henceforth, we concentrate on the
case with γ = 0.5 that appears to be the only one plausible and common to both expected
and non-expected utility approaches.
Let us secondly analyze the subjective utility of financial investments quantified by
the prospective value. As expected, the corresponding estimates in the aggregate equi-
librium Vˆ are indeed negative across all considered configurations of parameters. This is
exemplified in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 for our usual cases. Note also that the evolution of |Vˆ |
is independent of each the sensitivity to past losses k, the additional-income levels given
by the (β, δ)-combinations, and even the way in which cushions are assessed. However,
|Vˆ | decreases considerably subject to higher narrow framing b0, so that a more intense
focus on financial investments appears to worsen the perception of the utility they are
generating. Moreover, |Vˆ | is smaller for quarterly data. Thus, the perceived utility of
financial investments ameliorates when the risky performance is evaluated more often, a
result that is at odds with the concept of mLA considered in the large sense.
We subsequently turn our attention to the investor attitude towards financial losses.
One variable that captures this attitude is the loss-aversion coefficient and we denote its
estimates by λˆ. Table 3.5 reveals that, when risk averse investors revise risky performance
yearly, λˆ lies substantially below the value of 2.25 advanced in the original prospect
theory and in various subsequent theoretical and experimental studies. This situation
changes yet radically for quarterly evaluations, as can be observed in Table 3.6. Now,
investors who assess cushions myopically are clearly loss averse. This holds across all
considered combinations of parameters and underpins mLA in the strict sense: (Even) in
the aggregate equilibrium, investors become more reluctant to financial losses when they
check on risky performance more often.222
Note also that the values of λˆ for yearly evaluations and myopic cushions are smaller
than 1, thus speaking for loss-loving attitudes. Earlier findings show that such attitudes
are not very likely to occur in practice. We can interpret this somewhat puzzling result in
221Specifically, for yearly (quarterly) evaluations ρˆ amounts to 0.99842 (0.98208) for γ = 1 and to 1.0063
(1.0079) for γ = 1.5. Further implausible results are obtained for γ = 1.5 with respect to the wealth
percentages dedicated to consumption C¯/Wˆ (please refer to the comments below).
222Unreported results show that, for yearly (quarterly) data and other things being equal, λˆ increases
(decreases) with γ and even becomes extremely high (and negative) for γ = 1.5, at least for lower values
of the narrow-framing coefficient b0. This underlies our assumption that higher γ-values are meaningful
only when coupled with sufficiently high b0-values. Merely the variation observed for quarterly data
appears to be intuitively meaningful: Investors who are less risk averse should be also less loss averse.
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manifold ways: for instance, as a necessary condition for reaching the market equilibrium
under maximization of two-dimensional expected utility. Markets with investors who are
reluctant to financial risks (and behave according to our model) might then not attain
a steady state. It is nevertheless possible that λˆ does not accurately measure the actual
loss attitude. This reinforces the potential relevance of our second loss-attitude measure,
gRA, on the estimates of which we comment below.223
As anticipated, having more money – from exogenous sources – at their disposal,
renders investors less loss averse and λˆ diminishes, on average, with the additional income
I. However, this holds only for yearly and not for quarterly data. The frequency of
performance checks thus appears to overcome the role played by additional incomes and
hence to drive loss aversion.
The influence of the narrow focus on loss aversion appears to be also dependent on
the portfolio evaluation frequency: λˆ decreases (increases) with b0 for yearly (quarterly)
evaluations, other things being equal. In other words, it is not the importance ascribed
by investors to financial investments as a source of utility, the one that changes their
attitude towards possible losses, but how often they check on the risky performance.
Frequent checks and a pronounced narrow framing result in a high loss reluctance, while
seldom checks, even under an increasing narrow framing, entail a lower reluctance. This
corroborates with mLA in the strict sense.224
In addition, λˆ clearly diminishes subject to higher sensitivities towards past losses
k for quarterly portfolio evaluations. This is somewhat counterintuitive, since investors
who behave aversely towards past losses (i.e. have a high k) should remain averse towards
future ones as well (high λ).225 The evaluation frequency plays yet a very important role
also in this respect: For yearly evaluations, the same type of variation can be observed
only for lower narrow framing b0 and/or lower additional incomes I.
226
223Another possible explanation would be that an equilibrium framework with CRRA expected utility
might not be able to capture the actual behavior of investors confronted with financial losses, possibly
due to the incompatibility of such an aggregate perspective and the individually oriented framework with
VaR*-based decisions. However, we discard such an alternative, due to the straightforward intuition of
the results obtained for quarterly data.
224Moreover, λˆ is extremely high (positive or negative) for b0 = 0.001 and hence implausible. This
supports our assumption that the lack of narrow framing is incompatible with the present framework.
225Also, the other loss-aversion measure gRA constantly falls with k across all considered combinations
of parameters (see the comments on gRA below), pointing to a relaxation of the loss attitude.
226A possible explanation for the opposite change of the loss-aversion coefficient λˆ with the sensitivity
to past losses k could be that investors who are less sure of being able to cover current consumption needs
might be guided by the principle “all or nothing”: They take the chance of investing in financial assets, as
this chance – in other words gambling – hides not only the danger of losses, but also the promise of gains.
Indeed, for yearly data, the average percentages of total wealth dedicated to risky assets (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ
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Assessing cushions dynamically with η = 0.9 appears to worsen the situation and to
render investors even more loss reluctant. The same Tables 3.5 and 3.6 reveal that the
corresponding loss-aversion coefficient λˆ is substantially lower than with myopic cushions
when the risky performance is evaluated once a year. The evolution patterns observed for
myopic cushions are reversed.227 In addition, quarterly portfolio checks entail negative
and hence implausible estimates of the loss-aversion coefficient. In sum, this type of
cushion appears to be less compatible with our expected-utility equilibrium setting.228
As mentioned above, we attempt to refine the analysis of loss attitudes by means
of our extended measure gRA. Table 3.7 (Table 3.8) presents the estimates of gRA for
yearly (quarterly) evaluations, and our usual case with different cushion-types and levels
of additional income. Recall that these estimates are obtained by plugging the prospective
value in equilibrium Vˆ into Equation (3.25).
For the majority of cases with myopic cushions, the evolution of the estimated gRA is
opposite to that of λˆ: Other things being equal, gRA augments with the degree of narrow
framing b0, as well as with the additional income given by the (β, δ)-combinations, but
declines when higher penalties k are imposed on past losses.229 This radical difference
between the courses of gRA and λˆ is yet consistent with the design of these two measures:
Recall that gRA reflects first-order changes in the perceived utility of financial investments
and hence higher values of gRA point to a more relaxed loss attitude; In contrast, higher
λˆ reveals less acceptance of possible losses. However, gRA grows – and hence reveals a
higher loss acceptance – for more frequent portfolio evaluations, which contradicts mLA
in the strict sense.
Similarly to λˆ, gRA mostly takes negative values for quarterly data and high sensitivity
to past losses k > 0, when cushions are dynamically assessed with η = 0.9.230 Interestingly,
relative to myopic cushions, the long-memory dynamic cushions yield lower gRA-values,
from Table 3.9 increase with k. However, the changes are extremely small. Moreover, the opposite occurs
for quarterly data, as apparent in Table 3.10.
227Specifically, λˆ under long-memory dynamic cushions is lower for higher degrees of narrow framing
b0, higher additional incomes given by the considered (β, δ)-combinations, and higher sensitivity to past
losses k.
228From all considered types of dynamic cushion, only η ≥ 0.5 entails plausible estimates for γ = 0.5,
when portfolio evaluations are performed once every three months, and across all considered combinations
of the remaining parameters. For other γ-values, the variations of λˆ under dynamic cushions are mostly
irregular.
229Moreover, extremely risk-averse investors with γ = 1.5 exhibit negative gRA-values.
230Note however that negative values of gRA are not necessarily implausible, they simply reflect de-
creases in the perceived utility V with the expected risk premium, which might occur under less common
market conditions.
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1 14663 14444 13954 10078 10210 10531
Low I b0 = 5 19317 19098 18608 14246 14378 14699
(β = 0.1, b0 = 10 19898 19680 19189 14767 14899 15220
δ = 0.9) b0 = 100 20422 20203 19713 15236 15368 15689
b0 = 1000 20474 20255 19765 15283 15415 15736
b0 = 1 216770 214900 210630 162420 164300 168780
Middle I b0 = 5 221420 219560 215280 166590 168470 172950
(β = 0.5, b0 = 10 222000 220140 215860 167110 168990 173470
δ = 0.5) b0 = 100 222520 220660 216380 167580 169460 173940
b0 = 1000 222580 220720 21644 167620 169500 173980
b0 = 1 7099800 7043500 6913400 5355200 5418000 5567000
High I b0 = 5 7104500 7048200 6918000 5359400 5422200 5571200
(β = 0.9, b0 = 10 7105100 7048800 6918600 5359900 5422700 5571700
δ = 0.1) b0 = 100 7105600 7049300 6919100 5360400 5423200 5572200
b0 = 1000 7105600 7049400 6919200 5360400 5423200 5572200
Table 3.7: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-
utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of
past-loss sensitivity k, additional-income levels I, and narrow-framing degrees b0.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1 177320 164150 146660 27621 23117 15123
Low I b0 = 5 190580 177410 160360 11010 6506.2 -2495.4
(β = 0.1, b0 = 10 192240 179070 162070 8933.2 4429.8 -4697.8
δ = 0.9) b0 = 100 193730 180560 163610 7064.4 2561 -6679.9
b0 = 1000 193880 180710 163770 6877.5 2374.2 -6878.1
b0 = 1 1286300 1216000 1065900 33238 3879.1 -60680
Middle I b0 = 5 1299600 1229300 1079200 16627 -12732 -77291
(β = 0.5, b0 = 10 1301300 1230900 1080800 14551 -14808 -79368
δ = 0.5) b0 = 100 1302800 1232400 1082300 12682 -16677 -81236
b0 = 1000 1302900 1232600 1082500 12495 -16864 -81423
b0 = 1 47725000 45387000 40072000 54100 -1011100 -3384700
High I b0 = 5 47738000 45400000 40085000 37488 -1027700 -3.401300
(β = 0.9, b0 = 10 47739000 45402000 40087000 35412 -1029800 -3403400
δ = 0.1) b0 = 100 47741000 45403000 40088000 33543 -1031700 -3405300
b0 = 1000 47741000 45404000 40088000 33356 -1031800 -3405500
Table 3.8: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-
utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of
past-loss sensitivity k, additional-income levels I, and narrow-framing degrees b0.
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which suggests that the acceptance of financial losses depreciates when investors pay more
attention to the past performance.
In general, gRA supports the above findings for the case when loss attitudes are
captured by the simple loss-aversion coefficient λˆ, with the exception of mLA which is
now contradicted. It also behaves somewhat more consistently to the variation of the
behavioral investor profile.
In the sequel, we turn to the problem of wealth allocation in equilibrium. The
expected-utility setting does not allow for the direct derivation, i.e. from the Euler equa-
tions, of any relevant wealth-allocation variable. Consequently, we compute the average
values of the wealth proportions dedicated to consumption and to different types of fi-
nancial assets.
The mean fractions of total wealth to be consumed C¯/Wˆ and of the post-consumption
wealth assigned to risky assets θˆ are exemplified in Table 3.9 (Table 3.10) for yearly (quar-
terly) portfolio evaluations, in our usual cases with myopic and long-memory dynamic
cushions, and for the three additional income levels. Note that these tables do not any-
more contain the narrow-framing coefficient b0, as all variables that refer to the wealth
allocation are independent of it. Moreover, the wealth allocation can be considered to be
robust, on average, with respect to the type of cushion, as the corresponding changes are
of at most 0.1 percentage points.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
Low I C¯/Wˆ 0.14555 0.14576 0.1462 0.14574 0.14594 0.14637
(β = 0.1, θˆ -0.034714 -0.034729 -0.034818 -0.039377 -0.039509 -0.039873
δ = 0.9) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ -0.029661 -0.029667 -0.029727 -0.033638 -0.033743 -0.034037
Middle I C¯/Wˆ 0.020167 0.02018 0.020209 0.020182 0.020195 0.00011144
(β = 0.5, θˆ 0.11555 0.11573 0.11612 0.11151 0.11165 0.11193
δ = 0.5) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.11322 0.1134 0.11377 0.10926 0.10939 0.10966
High I C¯/Wˆ 0.00080024 0.00080057 0.0008013 0.00080065 0.00080099 0.00080177
(β = 0.9, θˆ 0.1338 0.13397 0.13433 0.12978 0.12993 0.13023
δ = 0.1) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.13369 0.13386 0.13422 0.12968 0.12982 0.13013
Table 3.9: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equi-
librium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment meth-
ods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, and additional-income levels I.
For additional-income levels corresponding to β ≤ 0.9, investors who evaluate the
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
Low I C¯/Wˆ 0.22693 0.22883 0.23078 0.22418 0.22671 0.22965
(β = 0.1, θˆ 0.11972 0.11396 0.10677 0.078252 0.07101 0.060977
δ = 0.9) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.092553 0.087881 0.082134 0.060709 0.054911 0.046974
Middle I C¯/Wˆ 0.050256 0.050422 0.050783 0.050175 0.050396 0.050873
(β = 0.5, θˆ 0.31304 0.31143 0.30617 0.27412 0.27242 0.26694
δ = 0.5) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.29731 0.29573 0.29062 0.26037 0.25869 0.25336
High I C¯/Wˆ 0.0032122 0.0032145 0.0032205 0.0032133 0.0032159 0.0032221
(β = 0.9, θˆ 0.35583 0.35572 0.35458 0.31859 0.31878 0.3184
δ = 0.1) (1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.35469 0.35457 0.35344 0.31757 0.31776 0.31738
Table 3.10: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equilib-
rium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-
aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of
past-loss sensitivity k, additional-income levels I, and narrow-framing degrees b0.
financial performance once every year (three months), are risk averse with γ = 0.5, and
loss averse with λ = 2.25, dedicate to consumption average percentages of their total
wealth C¯/Wˆ of up to 14.7% (23.1%). The same investors appear to behave myopically
averse towards financial investments in total: They allocate less money to financial assets
– and implicitly more to consumption – for more frequent portfolio evaluations.
The computed mean percentages C¯/Wˆ fall for higher additional incomes, since cover-
ing current consumption needs from financial revenues becomes less stringent. Note that
this decline of C¯/Wˆ with I is extremely pronounced. It should be recalled that the total
wealth includes not only financial revenues, but also the additional income. As the latter
is sufficient for fulfilling consumption needs, the remaining part of total wealth becomes
available for being invested in financial assets. This makes the total wealth increase faster
than consumption, which is even more pronounced for higher β-values, resulting in small
ratios C¯/Wˆ .
When investors are more reluctant to past financial losses, they might also allocate
less money to financial ventures and proportionally more to consumption, and indeed we
observe that C¯/Wˆ rises with k. The changes are yet very small, especially for higher
additional incomes that allow investors to be more “generous” with financial investments
in total. As expected, the mean wealth percentages dedicated to consumption decrease
for γ = 1, other things being equal, that is when investors are more reluctant towards the
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risks related to consumption.231
Moreover, when cushions are myopically accumulated and yearly (quarterly) portfolio
checks performed, between 7.1-13.4% (10.6-35.7%) of the wealth remaining after consump-
tion θˆ is allocated, on average, to risky assets. The corresponding values for long-memory
dynamic cushions are only slightly lower, specifically 6.4-13.1% (6.1-32.1%). The values
of θˆ grow with the magnitude of the additional income. Again, this holds across all con-
sidered configurations of parameters for γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ 0.9, with a single exception:
For γ = 0.5, the combination (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) entails negative θˆ < 0. According to
Equation (3.30a), this shows the preference for risk-free vs. risky assets: After putting
aside the sum necessary for consumption, risk-averse investors who dispose of very scarce
additional revenues prefer to lend (save at the risk free rate) money (Bt ≤ Ct −Wt < 0)
instead of investing it in risky assets. This situation changes as soon as the additional in-
comes are sufficiently high. Furthermore, the mean post-consumption wealth percentages
to be invested in risky assets do not change very much with the consumption-related risk
aversion γ, other things being equal.232
Finally, recall that in the present two-dimensional utility setting θˆ stands for the por-
tions of post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets. The corresponding percentages
of total wealth assigned to risky investments can be obtained by multiplying (1− C¯/Wˆ )
by θˆ. Across all considered additional incomes, the average values (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ amount
to 6.7-13.5% (8.2-35.5%) for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations and myopic cushions,
while the corresponding percentages for long-memory dynamic cushions are again slightly
lower, namely 6-13% (4.7-32%), showing that investors split their money between con-
sumption and risk-free assets. The sole exception is again the case with lowest additional
incomes (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9), where for yearly data (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ ≈ −3%. Having more
money from investment-exogenous sources at their disposal augments the investor open-
ness towards risky assets and hence (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ grows with I. The changes with k are
very small, so that we can consider the average percentages of total wealth dedicated to
risky assets to be invariant to the sensitivity to past losses. Moreover, when investors are
more wary towards consumption-related risks, i.e. for higher γ, the mean total-wealth
231Specifically, C¯/Wˆ rises up to 10% (18.7%) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations and γ = 1. Note that
for γ = 1.5 these percentages rise again, which reinforces our earlier claim that such high values of the
consumption-related risk aversion are incompatible with the present framework.
232For instance, for γ = 1 and across both types of cushion we obtain θˆ between 1.7-13.5% (11.4-35.7%)
for yearly (quarterly) evaluations.
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portions invested in risky assets decrease, other things being equal.233
We can hence conclude that mLA in the monetary sense does not hold under the
maximization of two-dimensional expected utility: Average deposits in risky assets, as
portions of total wealth, increase for more frequent evaluations of the risky portfolio.
In addition, for yearly (quarterly) portfolio revisions the maximizers of two-dimensional
expected utility allocate smaller (higher) sums to risky assets than their peers from Sec-
tion 3.2 who are merely concerned with financial utility.234 Although consumption clearly
plays an important role in changing attitudes towards risky investments and hence deci-
sions on wealth allocation, the evaluation frequency of the risky performance is again the
driving factor in this respect.
We close this section by some brief comments on the robustness checks performed first
for further values of the initial loss-aversion coefficient λ, and second for middle additional
incomes resulting from the combination (β = 0.9, δ = 2).235
As expected, the estimates describing loss aversion and wealth allocation in the expected-
utility equilibrium vary proportional with λ.
The above results are replicated for (β = 0.9, δ = 2) in Tables A.4-A.9 in Appendix
A.3.3. In the main, the variation patterns observed for our usual cases with δ < 1 are
preserved. Regarding the variables’ values, they mostly come close to those for middle-
range additional incomes given by (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) for myopic cushions, but, under
long-memory dynamic cushions, they sooner resemble those for the high additional income
with (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1). This underlines the importance of β in the latter case and,
correspondingly, the relative insensitivity to δ of the estimates obtained with dynamic
cushions.236 Interestingly, the equilibrium-equivalent loss-aversion coefficient λˆ in the
case with myopic cushions is noticeably higher for lower degrees of narrow framing b0 = 1
233For instance, γ = 1 yields across both types of cushion values of (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ between 1.5-13.5%
(9.32-35.6%) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations, where the values are, on average, lower for dynamic
cushions.
234Recall that, according to Table 3.1 in Section 3.2, 34.51% (13.42%) of wealth is invested in risky
assets when utility is one-dimensional, portfolios are evaluated yearly (quarterly), cushions are myopic,
and expected returns normally distributed. Note that such a comparison is possible only for similar
parameter values, such as a sensitivity to past losses k = 3, and myopic cushions and long-memory
dynamic cushions η = 0.9, and hence only in the expected utility framework.
235Recall that the initial loss-aversion coefficient is employed in order to derive VaR* from Equation
(3.22) and the prospective value from Equation (3.24) and that we consider further values λ ∈ {1; 3}.
Regarding the combination (β = 0.9, δ = 2), recall also that this is the single additional income with
δ > 1 that yields plausible estimates in both settings, as mentioned in Footnote 216.
236Of course, the values for myopic cushions are slightly higher for (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1), as the correspond-
ing additional incomes are also somewhat higher than those for (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5). For dynamic cushions,
the variables attain values that are almost identical to those for (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1).
256 Loss Aversion and Wealth Allocation
than what we observed before; Specifically, it lies above 1 even for yearly data and hence
shows loss aversion. With dynamic cushions, λˆ is almost stable with respect to b0 for
yearly evaluations. Moreover, the percentages of total wealth to be put in risky assets
(1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ are lower (higher) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations and myopic cushions
than those corresponding to (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5).
The non-expected utility approach
In this section, we proceed analogously to the expected-utility approach by estimating
the main variables in the equilibrium with non-expected utility and analyzing how they
change on average subject to the ceteris paribus variation of chosen parameters.
Recall that in the non-expected equilibrium, cushions are the result of a memoryless
dynamic assessment, i.e. with η = 0, so that the sensitivity to past losses k exerts no
influence on the equilibrium variables. Moreover, from the test values of the consumption-
related risk aversion and of the initial loss-aversion coefficient, the non-expected equilib-
rium allows only for γ ∈ {0.5; 1.5} and λ ∈ {2.25; 3}, respectively. Finally, the parameter
β can be directly interpreted in the context of Equation (3.36a) as the weight put on that
utility piece which stems from financial investments.
The main equilibrium variables are now the percentage of total wealth dedicated to
consumption α, the post-consumption wealth invested in risky assets θ, and the prospec-
tive value V¯ .237 They are derived under the assumption of periodical additional incomes of














⇒ log(Rtott+1) = log(δ − 1)− log(δ)− log(1− α) + c+ σc²t+1.
(3.46)
and hence the equilibrium Equation (3.42c) changes to:
− δ − 1
δ(1− α) exp
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237Again, it is possible to proceed in the opposite way: fixing α and θ and deriving γ from Equation
(3.42a). However, the double or possibly non-real roots of the resulting quadratic equation in γ are
difficult to interpret from an economical point of view. Equation (3.42a) has real roots if and only if
βRf ≥ exp(−(2 log(1− α) + 2rf − σ2c )2/(8σ2c )).
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For a fixed weight of financial utility β in Equation (3.36a), we derive α and θ by
dividing Equations (3.42b) and (3.47) and plugging the result into Equation (3.42a).
Equation (3.42b) is reformulated in order to obtain an expression for V¯ . We obtain the
following expressions:

























































































Unlike with expected utility, the non-expected utility equilibrium provides direct es-
timates of the main wealth-allocation variables, namely the proportion of total wealth
dedicated to consumption α and the post-consumption wealth fraction to be put in risky
assets θ.
Note that the percentages θ from Equation (3.48b) are inversely proportional to each
the additional-income parameter δ and the total-wealth percentage dedicated to consump-
tion in equilibrium α. Thus, according to Equation (3.48a) and to our assumption that
It = Ct/(αδ), θ increases for each higher weight β and higher δ-value.
Some further observations regarding the interpretation of V¯ and θ have to be made: In
both Equations (3.48b) and (3.48c) we observe the presence of the same term that stands
for the profitability, taken with inverse sign, of risky investments, that is Rf − exp(r +
σ2r/2−γσcr). The prospective value is directly proportional to this term, according to the
first-line expression in Equation (3.48c), while the post-consumption wealth percentages
invested in risky assets evolve inversely proportional to it, as implied by Equation (3.48b).
In our data set, this term is always negative. Highly negative values in fact arise in
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situations of higher profitability, when, in consequence, both V¯ and θ should be highly
positive. Thus, a meaningful interpretation can be given only to the absolute values
|V¯ | and |θ|. Note also that values of |θ| > 1 point to the fact that investors borrow
extra-money at the risk-free rate and invest it in the risky portfolio.
One more note on how to interpret the results in the non-expected-utility setting re-
gards the following: We expect that the estimated loss-aversion coefficients in equilibrium
take negative values λˆ < 0. This negative sign is imposed, so to speak “by theoretical
construction”, namely by the sign of V¯ and the condition that η = 0. In particular, the nil
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The prospective value V¯ always dominates the second term in the numerator of this
expression.238 Therefore, our negative – and hence meaningful – equilibrium estimates
Vˆ < 0 necessarily imply negative values of λˆ from the above expression, although the
negative sign is only artificial. Again, an economic interpretation can be given only to
the absolute values |λˆ|. This is always true with η = 0.239
Let us now analyze the obtained estimates and their variation with the chosen behav-
ioral parameters. In so doing, we concentrate again on the case with investors who are
both risk- and loss-averse, i.e. with γ = 0.5 and an initial λ = 2.25, narrowly frame finan-
cial investments b0 ≥ 1, and dispose of investment-exogenous incomes I of low, middle,
or high magnitudes given by the combinations (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9), (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5), and
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1), respectively.240
Table 3.11 (Table 3.12) presents the equilibrium estimates of the variables in Equations
(3.48) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations of risky performance.
Similarly to the expected-utility setting, the prospective value |Vˆ | decreases subject to
the intensity of narrow framing b0, so that the perception of financial investments depre-
ciates when more attention is payed to these investments. However, financial investments
238This second term is always smaller than 1 due to the combination of probabilities pitψt + (1− pit)ωt.
239And will be used in the comparative section at the end of the applicative part.
240Unreported results show that the highest value of the weight of financial utility β = 0.98 yields
implausible estimates of the wealth fraction dedicated to consumption in equilibrium αˆ < 0. Naturally,
in this case the consumption is almost irrelevant as source of utility in investors’ perception relative to
financial investments.
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b0 = 1 b0 = 5 b0 = 10 b0 = 100 b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.16819 0.033638 0.016819 0.0016819 0.00016819
Low I |λˆ| 2.0141 2.0145 2.0146 2.0146 2.0146
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) αˆ 0.98927 0.98927 0.98927 0.98927 0.98927
|θˆ| 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843
|Vˆ | 0.63158 0.12632 0.063158 0.0063158 0.00063158
Middle I |λˆ| 2.0143 2.0145 2.0146 2.0146 2.0146
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) αˆ 0.73178 0.73178 0.73178 0.73178 0.73178
|θˆ| 2.7058 2.7058 2.7058 2.7058 2.7058
|Vˆ | 1.2705 0.25411 0.12705 0.012705 0.0012705
High I |λˆ| 2.0146 2.0146 2.0146 2.0146 2.0146
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) αˆ 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095
|θˆ| 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843 6.4843
Table 3.11: The main variable estimates in the non-expected util-
ity equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion
λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memoryless dynamic cushions with
η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 b0 = 5 b0 = 10 b0 = 100 b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.15926 0.031851 0.015926 0.0015926 0.00015926
Low I |λˆ| 1.2486 1.2547 1.2555 1.2561 1.2562
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) αˆ 0.98982 0.98982 0.98982 0.98982 0.98982
|θˆ| 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149
|Vˆ | 0.58727 0.11745 0.058727 0.0058727 0.00058727
Middle I |λˆ| 1.2532 1.2556 1.2559 1.2562 1.2562
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) αˆ 0.74562 0.74562 0.74562 0.74562 0.74562
|θˆ| 2.8611 2.8611 2.8611 2.8611 2.8611
|Vˆ | 0.89663 0.17933 0.089663 0.0089663 0.00089663
High I |λˆ| 1.2561 1.2562 1.2562 1.2562 1.2562
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) αˆ 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581
|θˆ| 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149 6.9149
Table 3.12: The main variable estimates in the non-expected util-
ity equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion
λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with
η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
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are now subjectively considered to be less attractive when the risky performance is eval-
uated more often, i.e. |Vˆ | is lower for quarterly portfolio evaluations. This comes in line
with mLA in the large sense.
We again study the attitude towards financial losses resorting to our two specific
measures: the loss-aversion coefficient and gRA. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 suggest that the
equilibrium-equivalent loss-aversion coefficient |λˆ| is almost invariant with respect to the
degree of narrow framing b0, but only as long as there is indeed narrow framing b0 > 0.001.
The same invariance holds approximatively, with respect to the average additional income
I, too.241 Finally, |λˆ| grows just slightly for higher γ = 1.5 and thus can be considered to
be robust to the consumption-related risk aversion as well.
In essence, |λˆ| lies above the value of 1 across all considered configurations of parame-
ters, as long as there is narrow framing b0 > 0.001.
242 For the cases considered in Tables
3.11 and 3.12, |λˆ| ≈ 2 (1.25) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations, which speaks for loss
aversion. The smaller values obtained for quarterly portfolio revisions contradict mLA in
the strict sense.
We refine our analysis concerning the loss attitude by focusing on the extended mea-
sure gRA. It can be derived from the main equilibrium estimate Vˆ in Equation (3.48c),
according to Equation (3.25). The corresponding gRA-values for yearly (quarterly) data
and our usual cases are included in Table 3.13 (Table 3.14).
Relative to the simple loss-aversion coefficient, our extended measure gRA appears
again to capture more consistently the loss attitude subject to individual behavioral pro-
files: Its values in the non-expected equilibrium setting are always positive and change
with the behavioral parameters for both evaluation frequencies, as it is to be intuitively
expected. In particular, gRA falls with the degree of narrow framing b0, other things
being equal, showing that a narrower focus on financial investments is coupled with a
higher reluctance towards potential losses from these investments. Moreover, gRA grows
with the magnitude of the average additional income I. In particular, it is insensitive to
the free-choice parameter δ, but grows with the weight β of the financial utility. This
comes in line with the idea that more relaxed attitudes towards risky investments are to
be expected when investors perceive the importance of these investments to be higher.
Unreported results suggest that extremely risk-averse investors with γ = 1.5 fear possible
241Strictly speaking, |λˆ| grows in each b0 and I, but the changes are of the order 10−3 and smaller.
242Specifically, |λˆ| ∈ [1.0561, 2.0146] ([1.1114, 1.2562]) for yearly (quarterly) data and b0 > 0.001. In
contrast, b0 = 0.001 yields very high values of λˆ.
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b0 = 1 18.654
Low I b0 = 5 3.7308
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) b0 = 10 1.8654
b0 = 100 0.18654
b0 = 1000 0.018654
b0 = 1 70.05
Middle I b0 = 5 14.01
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) b0 = 10 7.005
b0 = 100 0.7005
b0 = 1000 0.07005
b0 = 1 140.92
High I b0 = 5 28.184
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) b0 = 10 14.092
b0 = 100 1.4092
b0 = 1000 0.14092
Table 3.13: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the non-
expected utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aver-
sion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memoryless dynamic cushions
with η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 54.682
Low I b0 = 5 10.936
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) b0 = 10 5.4682
b0 = 100 0.54682
b0 = 1000 0.054682
b0 = 1 201.64
Middle I b0 = 5 40.329
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) b0 = 10 20.164
b0 = 100 2.0164
b0 = 1000 0.20164
b0 = 1 307.87
High I b0 = 5 61.573
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) b0 = 10 30.787
b0 = 100 3.0787
b0 = 1000 0.30787
Table 3.14: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the non-
expected utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss
aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions
with η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
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financial losses to a greater extent, as the corresponding gRA-estimates are lower. Finally,
gRA is higher for quarterly performance evaluations, which is again at odds with mLA in
the strict sense.
Having analyzed the investor attitude towards financial losses in the non-expected
utility equilibrium, we turn now to the problem of wealth allocation among consump-
tion, risky, and risk-free financial assets. Our equilibrium fractions of total wealth to be
consumed αˆ and of post-consumption wealth to be invested in risky assets θˆ are partic-
ularized in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 for our usual cases. They are both independent of the
narrow-framing coefficient b0.
Moreover, Equation (3.48a) indicates that α does not vary with δ. Therefore, the
weight of financial utility β is the only parameter that dictates the changes of α with
the magnitude of the additional income I. In particular, the estimated wealth fractions
dedicated to consumption αˆ are considerably lower when investors ascribe a higher impor-
tance β to financial investments as a source of utility. Specifically, when β grows from 0.1
to 0.9, these wealth fractions drop from over 98.9% to around 13.1% (17.6%) for yearly
(quarterly) checks on the risky performance. Note also that αˆ is slightly higher for in-
creased evaluation frequencies, which underpins the idea of myopic aversion with respect
to financial investments in general. Finally, extremely risk-averse investors with γ = 1.5
allocate less money to consumption (and proportionally more to financial assets).243 This
counterintuitive result leads to the conclusion that, similarly to the expected utility frame-
work, too high a consumption-related risk aversion might be incompatible with the present
framework.
Concerning the post-consumption wealth percentages to be put in risky assets, Tables
3.11 and 3.12 suggest that investors who have more money at their disposal, i.e. higher
additional incomes I, allocate smaller fractions of their wealth after consumption |θˆ| to
risky assets. Moreover, recall that |θˆ| > 1 stands for the case when investors enhance
their investments in risky assets by borrowing additional sums of money at the risk-free
rate. This appears to be the case for all combinations (β ≥ 0.5, δ = 0.9) and both
evaluation frequencies. In particular, |θˆ| lies above 65.3% (65.6%) for yearly (quarterly)
portfolio evaluations. Thus, |θˆ| is somewhat higher, on average, for more frequent portfolio
evaluations, which are the only relevant ones as far as the aversion to financial risks is
concerned. The differences are yet very small and do not reflect how the total wealth is
243Specifically, αˆ ∈ [0.78957, 0.08951] ([0.7858, 0.073222]) for yearly (quarterly ) evaluations and γ = 1.5.
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split between risky and risk-free assets.
Note also that |θˆ| takes extremely high – and hence implausible – values for the
combinations (β = 0.1, δ <= 0.5).244 The reason is that β = 0.1 stands for the case when
investors consider consumption as the main source of utility and consequently allocate
the main part of their wealth α to it. Then, these tremendously high percentages of
remaining wealth entail reasonable values for the percentages of total wealth dedicated to
risky assets (1− αˆ)|θˆ| (see also the subsequent comments referring to this latter variable).
The same should be kept in mind when we observe that |θˆ| falls when investors are
extremely risk-averse γ = 1.5.
In order to analyze mLA in the monetary sense, we estimate the fractions (1 − αˆ)|θˆ|
of total wealth dedicated to risky assets in equilibrium. The results for our usual case
with λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5 and for yearly (quarterly) portfolio evaluations are to be found in
Table 3.15 (Table 3.16).
Low I (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) 0.069569
Middle I (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) 0.72575
High I (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) 5.6351
Table 3.15: The estimated total-wealth fractions dedicated to risky assets
(1 − αˆ)|θˆ| in the non-expected utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio eval-
uations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memo-
ryless dynamic cushions with η = 0, and various additional incomes I.
Low I (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) 0.07036
Middle I (β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) 0.72782
High I (β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) 5.6991
Table 3.16: The estimated total-wealth fractions dedicated to risky assets
(1 − αˆ)|θˆ| in the non-expected utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio eval-
uations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-
less dynamic cushions with η = 0, and various additional incomes I.
Across all considered configurations of parameters, multiplying 1 − αˆ by |θˆ| amounts
to around 6.96-563.5% (7-569.9%) of total wealth dedicated to risky assets when their
performance is evaluated yearly (quarterly). Thus, mLA in the monetary sense does not
hold in the non-expected-utility setting either: When investors revise risky performance
244Specifically, |θˆ| ∈ [53.716, 478.8] ([57.586, 513.63]) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations.
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more often, they dedicate similar to slightly higher portions of their total wealth to risky
assets.
The estimated percentages (1− αˆ)|θˆ| grow dramatically for higher additional incomes
I, which shows that having more money at their disposal renders investors much more
open to risky investments. This variation can be split, ceteris paribus, into an increase
in β and a decrease in δ. The intuition for the change with β is straightforward: The
chances that risky assets are perceived as more attractive should be higher when investors
manifest a more pronounced inclination to financial investments in general – that is when
these investments are considered as a sufficiently important source of utility relative to
consumption. Moreover, when investors dispose of more money in consequence of lower
δ-values, other things being equal, their attitude towards financial assets in total does not
change, as α is independent of δ. However, when investors are confronted with the more
refined choice between risky and risk-free assets, they decide to put more money in the
former category. Thus, their reluctance towards financial risk appears to fall.245
Surprisingly, (1− αˆ)|θˆ| are higher for γ = 1.5, although extremely risk-averse investors
should be disposed to allocate less money to risky investments.246 This supports our
earlier claim that γ = 1.5 does not fit in our equilibrium framework.
Furthermore, note that the estimates of all variables are almost identical to those
presented above for higher initial λ = 3.
The results for (β = 0.9, δ = 2) are included in Tables A.10-A.14 in Appendix A.3.3.
Although the additional income corresponding to this (β, δ)-combination is of middle level,
most estimates resemble rather those for high additional incomes given by (β = 0.9, δ =
0.1). This supports the findings in the expected-utility setting for dynamic cushions, where
the free-choice parameter δ appears to play a secondary role compared to the weight of
financial utility β with respect to investors’ decisions. Noticeable discrepancies emerge
only for the wealth variables related to the investment in risky assets: For δ = 2, |θˆ| lies
substantially below the corresponding values for δ ≥ 0.5 and even below 1. This attests
the fact that investors borrow money in order to put it in risky assets. Moreover, (1−αˆ)|θˆ|
are also much lower than for our usual δ ≥ 0.5 and also decline for quarterly evaluations
of the risky performance, which underpins mLA in the monetary sense. Thus, investors
who ascribe higher weights β = 0.9 to the financial utility and dispose of scarce additional
245Note that the ceteris paribus influence of δ is more pronounced that the one of β.
246Specifically, (1− αˆ)|θˆ| varies between 19-581% and the differences between the evaluation frequencies
are very small.
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incomes δ = 2 appear to be identically reluctant towards financial investments in total
(as αˆ remains at the same level), but less open to risky investments (since (1 − αˆ)|θˆ| is
lower) with respect to their peers who have more money from exogenous sources δ = 0.1.
Expected vs. non-expected utility
A last question emerging in the present context is which of the two settings with expected
and non-expected utility describes better the behavior of non-professional investors who
derive utility from both consumption and financial investments, narrowly frame the latter,
and reluctantly perceive financial losses. On the one hand, the expected-utility setting
offers the advantage of being formally less complex and more intuitive. On the other
hand, the non-expected utility approach provides immediate estimates of more variables
of interest, especially of those related to the optimal wealth allocation.
A rigorous comparison of these two settings is yet not straightforward. In spite of
the “preventive measures” adopted in order to ensure such a comparison (namely taking
similar parameter values), they rely on different equilibrium conditions, employ distinct
estimation procedures, and hence deliver different results.
This section attempts to put together the pieces of evidence gathered so far and to
enrich them with further comparative results. We commence by a brief confrontation, in
a qualitative sense, of the common and specific results under expected and non-expected
utility. In particular, we rely on the general conclusions and recommendations of the
two settings underlined in the above applicative sections. A comparison in a quantitative
sense can only be based on the case that is common to both frameworks, namely that with
memoryless dynamic cushions η = 0. We close this section with some remarks referring
to the findings for this case under expected-utility maximization.
A qualitative comparison First, our qualitative findings with respect to the subjective
value of financial investments for individual investors are, in main, consistent between the
settings: A more intense narrow framing of financial assets b0 yields higher prospective
values in equilibrium |Vˆ |. However, mLA in the large sense holds only under non-expected
utility, in that the perception of financial investments depreciates at higher performance-
evaluation frequencies, which is yet not the case under expected utility.
Second, recall that we measure the loss attitude by means of two variables: the loss-
aversion coefficient and the global first-order risk aversion. Within each setting, these two
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measures are consistent with each other: The estimated loss-aversion coefficient – that
is λˆ with expected utility and |λˆ| with non-expected utility – and gRA vary in opposite
directions subject to behavioral parameters (such as the narrow-framing degree b0, and
the sensitivity to past losses k) and to the additional income I. This is to be expected,
since the former coefficient is proportional to the loss reluctance and the latter to the
loss acceptance. However, this does not necessarily hold with respect to the evaluation
frequency: When the loss attitude is measured by the loss-aversion coefficient, mLA in
the strict sense holds with expected utility (and hence the loss aversion increases with
the portfolio evaluation frequency), but not with non-expected utility. When, in contrast,
gRA quantifies the loss attitude, both settings reject mLA in the strict sense. We also
note some problems encountered with respect to the loss-aversion coefficient, for instance
its inconsistent variation with k under the maximization of expected utility; Also, this
coefficient is very low for yearly evaluations in the expected-utility setting and indicates
a loss-loving attitude. In light of its more clear and intuitive variation patterns, gRA
appears to be somewhat better suited as a measure of loss attitudes in both settings.
Third, the wealth allocation is quantified by means of the wealth fractions dedicated to
consumption and to risky financial assets. Under expected utility, we can merely approx-
imate these variables, while under non-expected utility they result as equilibrium values.
In spite of this fundamental discrepancy in the methodology, the estimates provided by
the two settings behave similarly: The wealth allocation is invariant with respect to the
degree of narrow framing b0 in both settings. As shown by the wealth fractions dedicated
to consumption, C¯/Vˆ with expected utility and αˆ with non-expected utility, investors
are myopically averse towards financial investments in general, since they allocate more
money to consumption – and proportionally less to financial assets in total – when the
risky performance is evaluated more often. This aversion decreases when higher additional
incomes I are available. This behavior is more pronounced for expected-utility maximiza-
tion. Moreover, mLA in the monetary sense does not hold in any of the two settings, since
constant to higher total-wealth fractions – that is (1 − C¯/Vˆ )θˆ with expected utility and
(1− αˆ)|θˆ| with non-expected utility – are dedicated to risky assets. The only exception is
observed for δ = 2 under non-expected utility. The part of total wealth to be put in risky
assets grows with the additional income I. However, both maximizers of expected and of
non-expected utility appear to behave myopically averse towards financial investments in
general, since they dedicate larger fractions of their total wealth C¯/Vˆ and αˆ respectively
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to consumption and hence proportionally less to financial investments.
Finally, both settings speak rather against the compatibility of too high consumption-
related risk aversion coefficients γ with the equilibrium framework. In particular, γ = 1.5
mostly delivers implausible estimates of certain variables. The dynamic cushion appears
to be less well suited to the estimations under expected utility. Also, from the two
parameters that determine the change in the additional income I, β appears to be more
important than δ in eliciting investor reactions in both settings. Recall yet that β can
be directly interpreted as the weight of financial utility only with non-expected utility.
Note also that too high values of each β, such as β = 0.98, and δ, such as δ > 2, deliver
implausible results in both settings.
Note that, in general, the estimates under non-expected utility maximization are ro-
bust to changes in the behavioral profile. This is indeed the expected result, as we analyze
here the aggregate market with a single representative investor (and hence pool consider
behavioral profiles “on average”). Therefore, we incline to sustain the claim of Barberis,
Huang, and Thaler (2006) that non-expected utility better describes decision making
under risk.
A quantitative comparison The direct comparison of the two theoretical approaches
is possible only under identical parametric assumptions. The most important of them
regards the memoryless dynamic cushions with η = 0, which is the sole case when the
non-expected utility equilibrium has a solution. Appendix A.3.3 presents average estima-
tion results under the maximization of expected utility, when investors assess cushions
dynamically with η = 0, and for the usual values λ = 2.25, γ = 0.5, and the various
degrees of narrow framing b0 and of the additional income I. Obviously, all variables are
now independent of the sensitivity to past losses k and in consequence of the nil cushions
induced by η = 0.
Note first that the prospective value in equilibrium entails much higher estimates
|Vˆ | under expected than under non-expected utility, as revealed by Tables 3.11 and A.15
(Tables 3.12 and A.16) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations. The similarity among the values
of |Vˆ | in the expected-utility setting for different types of cushion confirms the dominant
role of the theoretical setting in which the estimations are performed. It appears thus
that, compared to expected-utility maximization, the non-expected utility substantially
depreciates the perception of financial utility. As in general with expected utility, mLA
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in the large sense does not hold for η = 0, since |Vˆ | is lower at higher frequencies of the
risky-performance evaluation.
Secondly note that, mostly, the two measures of the loss attitude – the loss-aversion
coefficient |λˆ| and gRA – continue to evolve consistently with each other, but contrary
to the corresponding non-expected utility estimates. Yet, gRA exhibits again clearer
variation patterns.
Recall that, as discussed in the applicative section on the non-expected utility equi-
librium, only the absolute values |λˆ| have economical meaning for η = 0, irrespective
of which type of utility is maximized. Table A.15 shows that the combination of yearly
portfolio evaluations, low degrees of narrow framing b0 ≤ 5, and low additional-income
levels (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) yield implausible estimates |λˆ|. Since these appear to be isolated
cases, we consider that the investor interest in financial assets in general might be simply
too low for applying our equilibrium framework. All other values of |λˆ| in Tables A.15 and
A.16 are positive. Moreover, for quarterly evaluations, these values vary much more with
each of the additional income I and the degree of narrow framing b0 compared to the non-
expected utility estimates from Table 3.12. Specifically, |λˆ| under expected utility starts
lower but exceeds then the non-expected utility estimates when either I or b0 increase,
other things being equal. For yearly performance checks, |λˆ| is mostly smaller under ex-
pected than under non-expected utility. On average, in the expected-utility setting for
memoryless dynamic cushions, |λˆ| is mostly higher than 1, showing thus loss aversion. In
addition, |λˆ| augments with the evaluation frequency, suggesting mLA in the strict sense.
The extended loss-attitude measure gRA in the expected-utility equilibrium with mem-
oryless dynamic cushions can be observed in Tables A.17 and A.18 for our usual cases.
Surprisingly, gRA does not vary with the additional income I. Its values are substantially
higher than with non-expected utility for both evaluation frequencies, which outlines the
picture of less loss-reluctant investors. As in the non-expected-utility setting, gRA de-
creases here with the degree of narrow framing b0. It is also lower for yearly evaluations
which comes once again at odds with mLA in the strict sense.
Third, the wealth-allocation variables with expected utility and memoryless dynamic
cushions, although they are derived indirectly in the form of mean values, change similarly
to the corresponding non-expected utility estimates subject to the behavioral parameters.
The average total-wealth percentages dedicated to consumption C¯/Wˆ are much lower than
3.3– Two-dimensional utility: consumption vs. financial assets 269
αˆ.247 The investors in the expected-utility setting with memoryless dynamic cushions are
thus more open to financial investments in general.
Also, the percentages of post-consumption wealth to be invested in risky assets θˆ with
expected utility are considerably lower than the direct estimates |θˆ| with non-expected
utility.248 They never exceed the limit of 1 showing that investors put only a part of the
money for financial projects in risky ones and the rest with the bank.
Finally, the average fractions of total wealth dedicated to risky assets (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ
in the expected-utility setting with memoryless cushions lie substantially below the cor-
responding direct estimates (1 − αˆ)|θˆ| under non-expected utility. This attests a higher
reluctance towards risky assets. It holds for both yearly and quarterly risky performance
evaluations, and the differences become considerable for increased additional incomes I.
The estimates (1 − C¯/Wˆ )θˆ for memoryless dynamic cushions remain yet lower for less
frequent portfolio revisions. This speaks once against mLA in the monetary sense.249
In sum, when cushions are memoryless dynamic, both expected and non-expected-
utility settings point to similar evolutions of the main variables subject to behavioral
profiles. Investors who maximize expected utility appear to be substantially less loss-
reluctant, as measured by gRA, and substantially more risk-reluctant as measured by the
total-wealth percentages dedicated to risky assets.
3.3.4 Summary and conclusions
This section extends the model in Section 3.2 to a two-dimensional utility framework.
We are interested in how non-professional investors, who now derive utility from both
consumption and narrowly-framed financial investments, behave when faced with financial
risk. We also study how these investors change their perception of losses and how they
consequently split their money between consumption, and (risky vs. risk-free) financial
assets.
Following Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2004, 2006),
we consider an aggregate market with a representative investor who maximizes subjective
utility. The equilibrium is derived in two distinct settings, in particular considering the
247Specifically, the maximum C¯/Wˆ lies around 14.6% (21.8%) of total wealth for yearly (quarterly)
evaluations, γ = 0.5, and β ≤ 0.9.
248Mostly, θˆ yields 6.4-12.7% (6.9-30.5%) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations. The only exception is found
for the lowest additional incomes (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) for which θˆ ≈ −4.3%.
249In particular, (1 − αˆ)|θˆ| yields 6-12.7% (5.4-30.4%) for yearly (quarterly) evaluations. Only for the
lowest additional incomes (β = 0.1, δ = 0.9), we obtain θˆ ≈ −3.7%.
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maximization of either expected or non-expected utility. In both situations, we explicitly
account for the narrow framing of financial investments, as well as for the impact of past
performance on current perceptions. Note that each of the two settings requires specific
conditions in order to attain the aggregate equilibrium. For instance, the non-expected
utility equilibrium does not allow for the influence of past performance. It also restricts the
set of feasible values of several behavioral parameters, such as the risk- and loss-aversion
coefficients.
Both settings deliver direct equilibrium estimates of the prospective value, i.e. of
the subjective utility of financial investments. From this variable, we obtain equilibrium-
equivalent measures of the loss attitude, such as the loss-aversion coefficient and the global
first-order risk aversion. In addition, the expected-utility setting provides estimates of the
coefficient by which utility is discounted in time. Byproducts of the estimation procedure
in the non-expected-utility setting are wealth-allocation variables, such as the percentages
of total wealth dedicated to consumption and of post-consumption wealth to be invested
in risky assets.
The theoretical results are subsequently tested and extended in an applied context. We
use the S&P 500 and the 3-months T-bill nominal returns, as proxies for a well diversified
risky portfolio and the risk-free investment, respectively, as well as quarterly aggregate
per-capita consumption data between 1982-2006. In order to avoid the impossibility of
covering current consumption needs from financial revenues throughout the entire invest-
ing period, we also consider that investors dispose of exogenous additional incomes at each
decision time. These incomes are shaped in order to ensure the equivalency of the two
settings with expected and non-expected utility. General market parameters (such as the
risk-free returns and the dynamics of consumption and of expected returns) are estimated
on the basis of the above real data. As such an estimation is not possible for the behav-
ioral parameters (such as the degree of narrow framing, the risk aversion to consumption,
the weight of financial utility, the sensitivity to past losses, the way of accounting for
past performance, etc.), we work with wide value-sets of these behavioral parameters in
order to detect plausible (combinations of) values. We investigate how the main variables
that express loss attitudes and wealth allocation, change subject to different behavioral
profiles of non-professional investors, at different levels of the additional income, and for
two distinct horizons of risky performance evaluation, specifically of one year and three
months.
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The two settings with expected and non-expected utility can be straightforwardly
compared only in a qualitative sense, that is with respect to their general recommendations
and to the variation patterns of the main variables. A quantitative comparison of the
variable values is possible only for the cases based on common identical assumptions,
from which the most important regards the memoryless cushions.
The common and specific numerical findings of the two settings can be summarized
as follows: First, the prospective value mostly grows with the narrow-framing degree of
financial investments under the maximization of both expected and non-expected utility,
showing an improvement in the perceived benefits of such investments. Moreover, myopic
loss aversion in the large sense, i.e. the depreciations of the perceived financial utility in
consequence of the more frequent evaluation of risky performance, manifests only under
non-expected utility maximization.
Second, the two measures of the loss attitude are consistent with each other within
each setting, but exhibit contrary variation patterns between the settings. In particular,
myopic loss aversion in the strict sense, i.e. the increase in the loss reluctance with the
evaluation frequency, holds only under the maximization of expected utility and only for
the loss-aversion coefficient. Relative to this coefficient, gRA appears to be better suited as
a measure of loss aversion. The direct comparison that is merely possible across common
cases suggests that maximizers of expected utility are substantially less loss reluctant than
their non-expected utility peers.
Third, while the non-expected-utility setting allows for the direct derivation – i.e.
in the form of equilibrium values – of wealth-allocation variables, in the expected-utility
setting these variables can be assessed only on average. However, both the mean estimates
under expected utility and the direct estimates under non-expected utility vary in similar
directions between the two settings. Thus, wealth allocation is invariant with respect to
the narrow-framing degree but strongly influenced by the additional income. Investors
who check on risky performance more often allocate less money to financial assets in total,
so that they behave myopically averse towards financial investments in total. Myopic loss
aversion in the monetary sense, i.e. the decline of the total-wealth percentages to be put in
risky assets for higher evaluation frequencies, does not hold in any of the two settings. The
direct comparison points at an increased monetary openness towards financial investments
in total under expected utility, coupled with a substantially lower acceptance of risky
investments in particular.
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Note also that too high degrees of consumption-related risk aversion appear to be
incompatible with the present equilibrium framework. Moreover, accounting for con-
sumption as an additional source of utility appears to play an important role with respect
to wealth allocation. Relative to the case discussed in Section 3.2, when investors are
merely concerned with financial utility, the maximizers of two-dimensional expected util-
ity allocate substantially less (more) money to risky assets when their performance is
revised yearly (quarterly).
Since the estimates under non-expected utility are more informative, more robust, and
change more intuitively with the behavioral investor profile, we consider this setting to
be better suited to describe behavior and decision making of non-professional investors.
APPENDIXA
Appendix
A.1 Imperfect information, practical trading rules,
and asset prices
A.1.1 Proofs
We make the following notations for the denominators of XBt and X
S
t :
ΠB = 1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
ΠS = 1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb.
(A.1)
We observe that, due to the fact that we work with probabilities (i.e. variables that lie
in [0, 1]), the variables defined in Equations (A.1) are positive.
Proposition 1
The proof is trivial by law of iterated expectations:
Et[Xt+1] = E[E[V |ht+1]|ht] = Et[V ] = Xt.
Proposition 2
The proof is trivial by the fact that the ask and bid prices in Equations (1.12) depend
on the probabilities qHt and q
L
t . If these probabilities are history dependent, so will be
transaction prices as well.
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Proposition 3
The proof of the first part of Proposition 3 is trivial from Equations (1.9):
XBt
(1)
= V L + (V H − V L)Pt(V = V H |xit = B) ≤ V L + (V H − V L)1 = V H
XSt
(1)
= V L + (V H − V L)Pt(V = V H |xit = S) ≥ V L + (V H − V L)0 = V L.
For the second part, observe that according to Equations (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9), the spread
is proportional to:
Pt(xit = B|V = V H)− Pt(xit = B|V = V L) = αtna + βt(qHt − qLt )nb ≥ 0.
Corollary 3.1
When there are no informed traders trading in the market, i.e. nc = 1 (or equivalently





V Hpt + V
L(1− pt) and the spread is nil St = 0.
If there are merely perfectly informed traders trading in the market, i.e. na = 1, the bid





as well as the spread St = V
H − V L.
In contrast, with exclusively imperfectly informed traders active in the market, i.e. nb = 1,
the value of the spread depends on the accuracy of the trader information and is lower
than for na = 1:
XBt = V
L + (V H − V L) q
H
t pt





L + (V H − V L) (1− q
H
t )pt
1− qHt pt − qLt (1− pt)
≥ V L.
Finally, with both fully and imperfectly informed traders but no liquidity traders active
in the market, i.e. na + nb = 1, the spread depends again on the accuracy of the trader




= V L + (V H − V L)pt αtna + βtq
H
t nb






= V L + (V H − V L)pt βt(1− q
H
t )nb
αt(1− pt) + βt(1− qHt pt − qLt (1− pt))nb
≥ V L.
Note that the spread is lower than for na = 1 but higher than for nb = 1.
For the latter cases with nc = 0,






= (V H − V L)(Pt(V = V H |xit = B)− Pt(V = V H |xit = S)),
which, by reexpressing Pt(V = V
H |xit = B) and Pt(V = V H |xit = S) as posterior
probabilities in line with Equations (1.10) and going back on Formulas (1.11), reduces to
comparing:
Pt(xit = B|V = V H)Pt(xit = S|V = V L)− Pt(xit = B|V = V L)Pt(xit = S|V = V H)
= (1− (2αt − 1)na + (2βtqHt − 1)nb)(1− (2αt − 1)na + (2βt − 1)nb)
− (1− na + (2βtqLt − 1)nb)(1− na + (2βt − 1)nb)
to zero.
In sum, when the market maker fears higher informational asymmetries relative to traders,
the spread is enhanced.
Proposition 4
Equations (1.14) and (1.12) yield for perfectly informed traders:
Et[Gat|xat = B] = V H −XBt
= (V H − V L)(1− pt) 1− na + (2βtq
L
t − 1)nb
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
≥ 0
Et[Gat|xat = S] = XSt − V L
= (V H − V L)pt 1− na + (2βt(1− q
H
t )− 1)nb
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
≥ 0.
1However, our assumption nc > 0 excludes the realization of one of the latter three situations. We
analyze them here only with the purpose of revealing the importance of adverse selection costs.
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In contrast, imperfectly informed traders obtain:
Et[Gbt|xbt = B]
= (V H − V L)pt
(
qHt
qHt pt + q
L
t (1− pt)
− 1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βtq
H
t − 1)nb
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
)
=
(V H − V L)pt(1− pt)((qHt − qLt )(1− na − nb)− 2αtqLt na)(




1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
)
Et[Gbt|xbt = S]
= (V H − V L)pt 1− na + (2βt(1− q
H
t )− 1)nb
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
− (V H − V L)pt 1− q
H
t
(1− qHt )pt + (1− qLt )(1− pt)
=
(V H − V L)pt(1− pt)((qHt − qLt )(1− na − nb)− 2αt(1− qHt )na)(
(1− qHt )pt + (1− qLt )(1− pt)
)(
1 + (2αt(1− pt)− 1)na + (2βt(1− qHt )pt + 2βt(1− qLt )(1− pt)− 1)nb
) ,
where the conditions stated in Remark 4.1 entail positivity.
The liquidity traders make losses by each trade:
Et[Gct|xct = B] = V Hpt + V L(1− pt)−XBt
= −2(V H − V L)pt(1− pt) αtna + βt(q
H
t − qL)nb
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
≤ 0
Et[Gct|xct = S] = XSt − V Hpt − V L(1− pt)
= 2(V L − V H)pt(1− pt) αtna + βt(q
H
t − qL)nb
1 + (2αtpt − 1)na + (2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)− 1)nb
≤ 0.
Proposition 5





(V H − V L)(1− na − nb + 2αtna + 2βtqHt nb)
Π2B





(V H − V L)(1− na − nb + 2βt(1− qHt )nb)
Π2S
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With the notations:
Υ1 = 1− na − nb + 2βtqLt nb





t − qLt )nb
)
,
pmaxt solves the following equation:
(Υ1 +Υ2)Υ3
(
Υ3(Υ1 −Υ2 +Υ3)p2 − 2Υ1Υ2p+Υ1Υ2 = 0
)
.
Under the conditions that:2
Υ1 +Υ2 > 0
Υ3 > 0
Υ1Υ2(Υ1 +Υ3)(Υ2 −Υ3) ≥ 0,










Υ3(Υ1 −Υ2 +Υ3) , for Υ1 −Υ2 +Υ3 6= 0
0.5, for Υ1 −Υ2 +Υ3 = 0,
s.t. pmaxt ∈ [0, 1].
Obviously, from Equations (1.12) the spread St = 0 for both extreme values of the prior
probability pt ∈ {0; 1}.
In the particular case with αt = 0.20, βtq
H
t = 0.67, and βtq
L





1 and hence Υ2 −Υ2 +Υ3 = 0, so that pmaxt = 0.5.
Proposition 6
Writing:
pt+1 = Pt+1(V = V
H) = Pt(V = V





















2Obviously, Υ1,Υ2,Υ3 > 0.











For instance, when the true risky value is high V = V H (low V = V L), the ratios Rt
of the probabilities that the current spread emerges subject to a high with respect to a
low risky value eventually converge to infinity (zero). Thus, pt+1/(1− pt+1) becomes the
product of higher and higher (lower and lower) values and converges to infinity (zero).
In essence, the market maker infers valuable information from trades (which are public
information) and all market participants should be able to recognize the true value after
a sufficient number of transactions.
Proposition 7.1






L − V H)(1− pt)
Π2B
(







(V L − V H)(1− pt)
Π2S
(







H − V L)pt
Π2B
(
1 + (2αt − 1)na + (2βtqHt − 1)nb
)





(V H − V L)pt
Π2S
(
1− na + (2βt(1− qHt )− 1)nb
)































































and no clear-cut conclusion can be formulated about the curvature of the spread.
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Proposition 7.2





















t − qLt )(1− na) + αt(1− 2βt(1− qHt ))na
)
,
where the assumptions in Proposition 7.2 and Remark 7.2.1 result in positivity (nega-
tivity) of the ask (bid). Note that more general positivity (negativity) conditions are
βt (q
H
t − qLt ) (1 − na) + αt(1− 2βtqLt )na (βt(qHt − qLt )(1− na) + αt(1− 2βt(1− qHt ))na)
for ask (bid). Moreover, for αt = 0,
∂XBt
∂nb



















1− 2βt + 2βtqHt pt + 2βtqLt (1− pt)
ΠS
,
which, given that the denominators of both ask and bid prices are strictly positive, yields







≥ 1 implies that 2βt
(
1 − qHt pt − 2βtqLt (1 − pt)
)
≤ 1 and similarly 2βt
(











< 1 which yields the last statement
in Remark 7.2.2.
Proposition 8.1












H − V L
Π2S
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Proposition 8.2





















































Obviously, as stated in Remark 8.2.1, as long as the probability that perfectly informed
traders receive information αt ≤ 0.5pt, the ask evolves convexly. In addition, for αt ≤
0.5(1 − pt), the bid is concave. As α ≤ 1, the second affirmation in Remark 8.2.1 holds
trivially, due to the fact that 2αtpt ≥ 1 implies that 2αt(1 − pt) ≤ 1, and similarly,
2αt(1− pt) ≥ 1 results in 2αtpt ≤ 1.
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A.1.2 Graphics































Figure A.1: The evolution of prices and public beliefs in time, in a bad
economy V = V L, for proportions of informed traders na = 20% and
nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20, and ac-
curacies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
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Figure A.2: The evolution of prices and public beliefs in time, in a bad
economy V = V L, for proportions of informed traders na = 20% and
nb = 75%, a random probability of perfect information αt, and random
accuracies of imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.




Figure A.3: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracies of imper-
fect information βqH and βqL, in a good economy V = V H , for pro-
portions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, public be-
liefs pt = 0.50, and a probability of perfect information α = 0.20.




Figure A.4: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imperfect infor-
mation in a good economy βqH and to the proportion of imperfectly informed
traders nb, in good economy V = V
H , for a fixed proportion of perfectly informed
traders na = 20%, public beliefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, and an accuracy of imperfect information in a bad economy βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.5: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imperfect infor-
mation in a good economy βqH and to the proportion of imperfectly informed
traders nb, in a good economy V = V
H , for a fixed proportion of liquidity
traders nc = 5%, public beliefs pt = 0.50, probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, and an accuracy of imperfect information in a bad economy βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.6: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imperfect informa-
tion in a bad economy βtq
L
t and to the proportion of imperfectly informed traders
nb, in a good economy V = V
H , for a fixed proportion of perfectly informed
traders na = 20%, public beliefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, andan accuracy of imperfect information in a good economy βtq
H
t = 0.67.




Figure A.7: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imperfect infor-
mation in a bad economy βtq
L
t and to the proportion of imperfectly informed
traders nb, in good economy V = V
H , for a fixed proportion of liquidity traders
nc = 5%, public beliefs pt = 0.50, a probability of perfect information α = 0.20,
and an accuracy of imperfect information in a good economy βtq
H
t = 0.67.




Figure A.8: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imper-
fect information in a good economy βtq
H
t and to the public beliefs pt, in a
good economy V = V H , for proportions of informed traders na = 20%
and nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information α = 0.20, and
an accuracy of imperfect information in a bad economy βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.9: Price evolution at time t subject to the accuracy of imper-
fect information in bad economy βtq
L
t and to the public beliefs pt, in a
good economy V = V H , for proportions of informed traders na = 20%
and nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information α = 0.20, and
an accuracy of imperfect information in a good economy βtq
H
t = 0.67.




Figure A.10: Price evolution at time t subject to the public beliefs pt and to the
proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb, in a good economy V = V
H , for a fixed
proportion of perfectly informed traders na = 20%, a probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.11: Price evolution at time t subject to the public beliefs pt and to the
proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb, in a good economy V = V
H , for a
fixed proportion of liquidity traders nc = 5%, a probability of perfect information
α = 0.20, and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.12: Price evolution at time t subject to the probability of perfect in-
formation αt and to the proportion of perfectly informed traders na, in a good
economy V = V H , for public beliefs pt = 0.5, a fixed proportion of imperfectly
informed traders nb = 75%, a probability of perfect information αt = 0.20,
and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.13: Price evolution at time t subject to the probability of perfect infor-
mation αt and to the proportion of perfectly informed traders na, in a good econ-
omy V = V H , for public beliefs pt = 0.5, a fixed proportion of liquidity traders
nc = 5%, and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.




Figure A.14: Price evolution at time t subject to the probabilities of perfect
and imperfect information αt and βt, in a good economy V = V
H , for propor-
tions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 75%, public beliefs pt = 0.50,
and accuracies of imperfect information βtq
H
t = 0.67 and βtq
L
t = 0.33.
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(a) High proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 75%.

















(b) Middle proportion of imper-
fectly informed traders nb = 50%.

















(c) Low proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 25%.
Figure A.15: Price evolution for the momentum strategy (TA-1) for dif-
ferent proportions of imperfectly informed traders nb, in a good econ-
omy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect information αt ∼
U [0, 1], a proportion of liquidity traders nc = 5%, and random proba-




t of middle accuracy 0.50.
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(a) High proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 75%.

















(b) Middle proportion of imper-
fectly informed traders nb = 50%.

















(c) Low proportion of imperfectly informed traders nb = 25%.
Figure A.16: Price evolution for the fundamentalist strategy (FA) for
different proportions of imperfectly informed traders nb, in good econ-
omy V = V H , for a random probability of perfect information αt ∼
U [0, 1], a proportion of liquidity traders nc = 5%, and random prob-
abilities of imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
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(a) Momentum strategy (TA-1), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtqLt of middle accuracy 0.50.





















(b) Moving-average strategy (TA-2), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βtqHt and βtq
L
t of middle accuracy 0.50.
















(c) Fundamentalist strategy (FA), for random probabilities of
imperfect information βqH and βqL of middle accuracy 0.50.
Figure A.17: The evolution of individual cumulated gains for all three imperfectly
informed strategies, in a good economy V = V H , for a probability of perfect infor-
mation α = 0.20, and proportions of informed traders na = 20% and nb = 25%.
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A.2 Emotions and financial decision making
The Equations (2.9) are an immediate consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let a, µ ∈ Rn, β ∈ R, and Σ be a positive definite n × n matrix. Then we
have:
(x− µ)TΣ−1(x− µ) + (aTx− β)2 = (x− µ+)TΣ−1+ (x− µ+) + ∆,
where:
Σ+ = Σ− (Σa)(Σa)
T
aTΣa+ 1












It is easy to check that Σ−1+ = Σ
−1+aaT . Then the first statement of the above Lemma 1
can be proven by simply replacing on the right-hand side Σ+, µ+, and ∆ by their values,









All the eigenvalues of this last matrix equal 1, except one of them, which equals 1 / ( aT Σ a+ 1 ).
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(a) The original pdf (power-weighted by 1).







(b) The pdf power-weighted by 4.







(c) The pdf power-weighted by 1/16.
Figure A.18: Changes of a pdf under different power weights.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.19: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical emo-
tional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from past
returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.20: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.21: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.


























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.22: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.
















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.23: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical emo-
tional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from past
returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel trade rounds, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.24: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.25: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.26: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 continuing parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.27: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical emotional
and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from current
demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.28: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.29: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), identical
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs from
current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.30: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean prior beliefs
from current demands (Rule qd-2), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.














(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.














(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.31: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.32: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.33: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.34: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior
beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds,
for a true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = 0, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.














(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.














(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.35: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating at limit (Rule
d-2), over n = 10 independent and long rounds of T = 10000 trades, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.




















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.36: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating at limit (Rule
d-2), over n = 10 independent and long rounds of T = 10000 trades, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.























(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.37: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating at limit (Rule
d-2), over n = 10 independent and long rounds of T = 10000 trades, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.38: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), dynamic belief updating at
limit (Rule d-2), over n = 10 independent and long rounds of T = 10000 trades, for a
true risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.










(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.










(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.39: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 10, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.40: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 10, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.41: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 10, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.42: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior
beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for
a true risky value V = 10, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.43: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = −1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.44: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = −1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.



















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.45: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = −1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.46: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), in-
dependent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = −1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.47: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with trader
proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = −N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.
















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.48: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = −N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.49: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), independent
emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs from
past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = −N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.50: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emotional
types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A), in-
dependent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean prior beliefs
from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent parallel trade rounds, for a true
risky value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = −N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.51: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.52: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
334 Appendix: Emotions and financial decision making























(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.53: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.54: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case A), independent emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 1), updat-
ing of mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 indepen-
dent parallel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky
value V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.55: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case A),
identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.




















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.56: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
A), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.






















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.























(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.57: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
A), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.58: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 70%, N e/N = 25%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case A), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of
mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent par-
allel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.59: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
B), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.




















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.60: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
B), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.



















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.






















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.61: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
B), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.62: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 45%, N e/N = 50%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case B), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of
mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent par-
allel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.













(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.













(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.63: The evolution of log-returns for different emotional types, with
trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
C), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.

















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.

















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.64: The evolution of individual demands for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
C), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.


















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.



















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.65: The evolution of individual wealth for different emotional types,
with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5% (Case
C), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of mean
prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent paral-
lel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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(a) Impulsive emotional traders (Type
i) with belief weight ratio b/a = 100.





















(b) Balanced emotional traders (Type
b) with belief weight ratio b/a = 1.





















(c) Conservative emotional traders (Type
c) with belief weight ratio b/a = 0.01.
Figure A.66: The evolution of the growth of individual wealth for different emo-
tional types, with trader proportions N r/N = 20%, N e/N = 75%, Nn/N = 5%
(Case C), identical emotional and noise trader noise (Scenario 2), updating of
mean prior beliefs from past returns (Rule qd-1), over n = 10 independent par-
allel trade rounds, in a more liquid market λ = 0.008, for a true risky value
V = 1, and emotional belief parameters kt−1 = 0, ke = N e/N, βe = 1.
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A.3 How non-professional investors face financial risk:
loss aversion and wealth allocation
A.3.1 Descriptive statistics
S&P 500 3-month T-bill Consumption
Evaluation frequency Evaluation frequency Evaluation frequency
Quarterly Yearly Quarterly Yearly Quarterly Yearly
Mean 0.017 0.066 0.017 0.073 0.016 0.052
Median 0.018 0.071 0.017 0.070 0.001 0.049
Std.Dev. 0.079 0.136 0.006 0.026 0.008 0.022
Kurtosis 2.661 -0.9659 0.623 0.974 0.673 -1.084
Skewness -0.671 -0.205 0.951 1.042 -0.018 0.165
Max. 0.290 0.345 0.036 0.142 0.042 0.090
Min. -0.302 -0.207 0.009 0.037 -0.010 0.011
Obs. 175 43 175 43 175 43
Table A.1: Log-differences of the S&P 500 index and of the 3-
month T-bill returns for quarterly and yearly portfolio evaluations.
A.3.2 One-dimensional utility: risky vs. risk-free financial as-
sets
According to Equations (3.19) and (3.20), we have:
Et[loss-valuet+1] = pit(1− ψt)(λStEt[xt+1] + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft)





pit(1− ψt)((λ− 1)Rft + kEt[xt+1])− kEt[xt+1]
)
(St − Zt).




t+1] = pit(1− ψt)(λStEt[xt+1] + (λ− 1)(St − Zt)Rft)2









pit(1− ψt)((λ− 1)Rft + kEt[xt+1])− kEt[xt+1]
)
λStEt[xt+1](St − Zt),
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and:







(λ− 1)Rft + kEt[xt+1]
)2
(St − Zt)2.
The variance of the loss value is exclusively based on past performance, being generated
only by the cushion St − Zt.
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(a) Yearly S&P 500 log-returns.
















(b) Yearly dynamic cushions.



















(c) Yearly wealth percentage invested in S&P 500.
Figure A.67: Evolution of risky returns, dynamic cushions, and wealth per-
centages invested in the risky portfolio for yearly portfolio evaluations.
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(a) Daily S&P 500 returns.















(b) Daily dynamic cushions.




















(c) Daily percentage investments in S&P 500.
Figure A.68: Evolution of risky returns, dynamic cushions, and per-
centages invested in the risky portfolio for daily portfolio evaluations.
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Figure A.69: Prospective value evolution for dy-
namic cushions and yearly and daily evaluations.
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(b) τ ≤ 1 year.


















(c) τ ≥ 1 year.
Figure A.70: Prospective value evolution for dy-
namic cushions and different evaluation frequencies.
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(a) All evaluation frequencies.





























(b) τ ≤ 1 year.




























(c) τ ≥ 1 year.
Figure A.71: Evolution of the global first-order risk aver-
sion for different evaluation frequencies and dynamic cushions.
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Wealth % λ∗
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 61.00 36.48 1.10 1.04
6 months 59.73 34.63 0.96 0.94
4 months 59.40 34.17 0.81 0.94
3 months 59.30 34.01 0.82 1.39
1 month 59.04 33.65 0.97 1.05
1 week 58.82 33.34 1.03 0.99
1 day 58.70 33.20 1.01 0.98
Table A.2: Wealth percentages invested in risky assets and
the average λ∗, for α = 1% and dynamic cushions.
Wealth % λ∗
Evaluation Portfolio returns Portfolio returns
frequency Normal Student-t Normal Student-t
1 year 120.80 125.37 1.09 1.03
6 months 121.47 126.11 1.01 0.99
4 months 121.64 126.29 1.00 0.99
3 months 121.70 126.36 1.00 1.00
1 month 121.84 126.50 1.00 1.00
1 week 121.96 126.63 1.00 1.00
1 day 122.00 126.67 1.00 1.00
Table A.3: Wealth percentages invested in risky assets and
the average λ∗, for α = 10% and dynamic cushions.
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A.3.3 Two-dimensional utility: consumption vs. financial assets
The expected and non-expected utility approaches with δ = 2
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8 229.8
λˆ 1.7282 1.8298 2.2411 0.11589 0.11545 0.11465
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961 45.961
λˆ 0.72081 0.74632 0.8407 0.11303 0.1128 0.11229
b0 = 10
|Vˆ | 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98 22.98
λˆ 0.59489 0.61089 0.66565 0.11267 0.11246 0.112
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298 2.298
λˆ 0.48157 0.489 0.5081 0.11235 0.11216 0.11173
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298 0.2298
λˆ 0.47024 0.47682 0.49234 0.11232 0.11213 0.1117
Table A.4: The main variable estimates in the expected-utility equilibrium for yearly
portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using
various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1
|Vˆ | 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89 460.89
λˆ 3.4758 3.2393 2.6812 -1.545 -1.5834 -1.6729
b0 = 5
|Vˆ | 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179 92.179
λˆ 3.5565 3.3249 2.7831 -1.5479 -1.5863 -1.6758
b0 = 10
|Vˆ | 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089 46.089
λˆ 3.5666 3.3356 2.7959 -1.5483 -1.5866 -1.6762
b0 = 100
|Vˆ | 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089 4.6089
λˆ 3.5757 3.3452 2.8073 -1.5486 -1.587 -1.6765
b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089 0.46089
λˆ 3.5766 3.3462 2.8085 -1.5486 -1.587 -1.6766
Table A.5: The main variable estimates in the expected-utility equilibrium for quarterly
portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using
various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1 228020 226180 221900 5355200 5418000 5567000
b0 = 5 232680 230830 226560 5359400 5422200 5571200
b0 = 10 233260 231410 227140 5359900 5422700 5571700
b0 = 100 233780 231930 227660 5360400 5423200 5572200
b0 = 1000 233830 231990 227710 5360400 5423200 5572200
Table A.6: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the
expected-utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss
aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-
assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-income lev-
els I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
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Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
b0 = 1 1758500 1671900 1474900 54100 -1011100 -3384700
b0 = 5 1771700 1685200 1488100 37488 -1027700 -3401300
b0 = 10 1773400 1686900 1489800 35412 -1029800 -3.403400
b0 = 100 1774900 1688300 1491300 33543 -1031700 -3405300
b0 = 1000 1775000 1688500 1491400 33356 -1031800 -3405500
Table A.7: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the
expected-utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss
aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and using various cushion-
assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-income lev-
els I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
C¯/Wˆ 0.024975 0.024985 0.025009 0.00080065 0.00080099 0.00080177
θˆ 0.10957 0.10973 0.11008 0.12978 0.12993 0.13023
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.10683 0.10699 0.10733 0.12968 0.12982 0.13013
Table A.8: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equilibrium for
yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and
using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
Myopic cushions Dynamic cushions with η = 0.9
k = 0 k = 3 k = 10 k = 0 k = 3 k = 10
C¯/Wˆ 0.098052 0.098111 0.098267 0.0032133 0.0032159 0.0032221
θˆ 0.3911 0.39106 0.39003 0.31859 0.31878 0.3184
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.35276 0.35269 0.3517 0.31757 0.31776 0.31738
Table A.9: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equilibrium for
quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and
using various cushion-assessment methods, degrees of past-loss sensitivity k, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
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b0 = 1 b0 = 5 b0 = 10 b0 = 100 b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 1.2705 0.25411 0.12705 0.012705 0.0012705
|λˆ| 2.0139 2.0143 2.0145 2.0146 2.0146
αˆ 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095 0.13095
|θˆ| 0.25236 0.25236 0.25236 0.25236 0.25236
Table A.10: The main variable estimates in the non-expected utility equilib-
rium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion
γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, additional-income lev-
els I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 b0 = 5 b0 = 10 b0 = 100 b0 = 1000
|Vˆ | 0.89663 0.17933 0.089663 0.0089663 0.00089663
|λˆ| 1.2451 1.254 1.2551 1.2561 1.2562
αˆ 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581 0.17581
|θˆ| 0.22905 0.22905 0.22905 0.22905 0.22905
Table A.11: The main variable estimates in the non-expected utility equilibrium
for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion
γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, additional-income lev-
els I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 140.92
b0 = 5 28.184
b0 = 10 14.092
b0 = 100 1.4092
b0 = 1000 0.14092
Table A.12: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the non-expected
utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 307.87
b0 = 5 61.573
b0 = 10 30.787
b0 = 100 3.0787
b0 = 1000 0.30787
Table A.13: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the non-expected
utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, additional-
income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2), and various narrow-framing degrees b0.




Table A.14: The estimated total-wealth fractions dedicated to risky assets (1 − αˆ)|θˆ|
in the non-expected utility equilibrium for yearly and quarterly portfolio evalua-
tions, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic
cushions with η = 0, and additional-income levels I given by (β = 0.9, δ = 2).
The expected-utility approach with memory-less dynamic cushions η = 0
b0 = 1 b0 = 5 b0 = 10 b0 = 100 b0 = 1000
Low I |Vˆ | 229.8 45.961 22.98 2.298 0.2298
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) |λˆ| -9.0563 -0.80628 0.22497 1.1531 1.2459
Middle I |Vˆ | -229.8 -45.961 -22.98 -2.298 -0.2298
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) |λˆ| 0.17237 1.0394 1.1478 1.2454 1.2551
High I |Vˆ | -229.8 -45.961 -22.98 -2.298 -0.2298
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) |λˆ| 1.2183 1.2486 1.2524 1.2558 1.2562
Table A.15: The main variable estimates in the expected utility equi-
librium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ =
2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with
η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
Appendix: Loss aversion and wealth allocation 361
Low I |Vˆ | 460.89 92.179 46.089 4.6089 0.46089
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) |λˆ| 0.38945 1.6896 1.8521 1.9984 2.013
Middle I |Vˆ | 460.89 92.179 46.089 4.6089 0.46089
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) |λˆ| 1.7513 1.962 1.9883 2.012 2.0143
High I |Vˆ | 460.89 92.179 46.089 4.6089 0.46089
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) |λˆ| 2.0064 2.013 2.0138 2.0145 2.0146
Table A.16: The main variable estimates in the expected utility equi-
librium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ =
2.25, risk-aversion γ = 0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with
η = 0, various additional incomes I and narrow-framing degrees b0.
b0 = 1 75116
b0 = 5 15023
b0 = 10 7511.6
b0 = 100 751.16
b0 = 1000 75.116
Table A.17: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-
utility equilibrium for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0.
b0 = 1 51111
b0 = 5 10222
b0 = 10 5111.1
b0 = 100 511.11
b0 = 1000 51.111
Table A.18: The estimated global first-order risk aversion (gRA) in the expected-
utility equilibrium for quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25,
risk-aversion γ = 0.5, and memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0.
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Low I C¯/Wˆ 0.14555
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) θˆ -0.034714
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ -0.029661
Middle I C¯/Wˆ 0.020167
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) θˆ 0.11555
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.11322
High I C¯/Wˆ 0.00080024
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) θˆ 0.1338
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.13369
Table A.19: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equilibrium
for yearly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ =
0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, and various additional incomes I.
Low I C¯/Wˆ 0.22693
(β = 0.1, δ = 0.9) θˆ 0.11972
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.092553
Middle I C¯/Wˆ 0.050256
(β = 0.5, δ = 0.5) θˆ 0.25945
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.29731
High I C¯/Wˆ 0.0032122
(β = 0.9, δ = 0.1) θˆ 0.35583
(1− C¯/Wˆ )θˆ 0.35469
Table A.20: The estimated wealth allocation in the expected-utility equilibrium for
quarterly portfolio evaluations, initial loss aversion λ = 2.25, risk-aversion γ =
0.5, memory-less dynamic cushions with η = 0, and various additional incomes I.
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